debugfs: fix security_locked_down() call for SELinux

When (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) is zero, then
the SELinux implementation of the locked_down hook might report a denial
even though the operation would actually be allowed.

To fix this, make sure that security_locked_down() is called only when
the return value will be taken into account (i.e. when changing one of
the problematic attributes).

Note: this was introduced by commit 5496197 ("debugfs: Restrict
debugfs when the kernel is locked down"), but it didn't matter at that
time, as the SELinux support came in later.

Fixes: 59438b4 ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Author: WOnder93

fs/debugfs/inode.c

@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ static unsigned int debugfs_allow __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_DEBUGFS_ALLOW_BITS;
 static int debugfs_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
 {
-	int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS);
+	int ret;
 
-	if (ret && (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
-		return ret;
+	if (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) {
+		ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 	return simple_setattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, ia);
 }