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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: content/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/cca-trustee/_index.md
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@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ who_is_this_for: This Learning Path is for software developers who want to run a
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learning_objectives:
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- Describe how you can use attestation with Arm's Confidential Computing Architecture (CCA) and Trustee services
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- Launch a CCA realm and run a sample workload on an Armv9-A AEM Base Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) with Realm Management Extension (RME) support
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- Deploy a simple workload in a CCA realm on an Armv9-A AEM Base Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) that has support for RME extensions
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- Connect the workload with Trustee services to create an end-to-end example that uses attestation to unlock the confidential processing of data
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prerequisites:
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- An AArch64 or x86_64 computer running Linux or macOS. You can use cloud instances; see this list of [Arm cloud service providers](/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/csp/)
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- An AArch64 or x86_64 computer running Linux or macOS; you can use cloud instances - see the [Arm cloud service providers](/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/csp/)
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- Completion of the [Get started with CCA attestation and Veraison](/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/cca-veraison) Learning Path
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- Completion of the [Run an end-to-end attestation flow with Arm CCA](/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/cca-essentials/) Learning Path
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---
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# User change
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title: "Overview of the software architecture"
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title: "Architecture overview for Arm CCA Attestation with Trustee"
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weight: 2# 1 is first, 2 is second, etc.
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## The role of attestation
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In this Learning Path, you will learn how attestation controls the release of confidential data into a confidential Linux realm for processing.
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The role of attestation is to assess whether the target compute environment
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offers a provable level of confidential isolation. In this Learning Path,
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the target compute environment is a Linux realm. The assessment of a provable
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level of confidential isolation must occur before the realm can be trusted
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to receive confidential data or algorithms. This use of attestation to judge
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the trustworthiness of a compute environment, before allowing it to do any
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processing, is a common practice in confidential computing.
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In this Learning Path, you will learn how attestation controls the release of confidential data into a confidential Linux realm for processing. The role of attestation is to assess whether the target compute environment offers a provable level of confidential isolation. In this Learning Path,
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the target compute environment is a Linux realm. The assessment of a provable level of confidential isolation must occur before the realm can be trusted to receive confidential data or algorithms. This use of attestation to judge the trustworthiness of a compute environment, before allowing it to do any processing, is a common practice in confidential computing.
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## Key software components
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This Learning Path is similar to
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[Run an end-to-end Attestation Flow with Arm CCA](/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/cca-essentials/).
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The main difference is that, instead of the KBS from the [Veraison](https://github.com/veraison) project, you will use components implemented in the [Confidential Containers (CoCo) Project](https://github.com/confidential-containers) to support the [IETF RATS model](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9334/) (Remote ATtestation procedureS). These components include the Attestation Service (AS), Key Broker Service (KBS), Reference Value Provider Service (RVPS), Attestation Agent (AA), and Confidential Data Hub (CDH).
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[Run an end-to-end Attestation Flow with Arm CCA](/learning-paths/servers-and-cloud-computing/cca-essentials/). The main difference is that, instead of the KBS from the [Veraison](https://github.com/veraison) project, you will use components implemented in the [Confidential Containers (CoCo) Project](https://github.com/confidential-containers) to support the [IETF RATS model](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9334/) (Remote ATtestation procedureS). These components include the Attestation Service (AS), Key Broker Service (KBS), Reference Value Provider Service (RVPS), Attestation Agent (AA), and Confidential Data Hub (CDH).
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The AS, KBS, and RVPS components are part of the [Trustee project](https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee),
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whereas the AA and CDH are part of the [Guest Components](https://github.com/confidential-containers/guest-components) project in CoCo.
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## RATS roles
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This Learning Path uses the following RATS roles:
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This Learning Path focuses on the following key concepts:
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-**Attester** – Provides evidence that is evaluated to decide trustworthiness (for example, whether it is authorized to perform an action). Evidence can include configuration data, measurements, telemetry, or inferences.
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-**Verifier** – Evaluates the evidence from the Attester and produces attestation results that are sent to the Relying party. The Verifier vouches for the validity of those results.
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-**Relying party** – Depends on the validity of information from the Attester (either directly or through the Verifier) to make an access or policy decision.
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-**Attester** – provides evidence that is evaluated to decide **Trustworthiness** (for example, whether it is authorized to perform an action).
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-**Evidence** can include configuration data, measurements, telemetry, or inferences.
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-**Verifier** – evaluates the evidence from the Attester and produces attestation results that are sent to the Relying party. The Verifier vouches for the validity of those results.
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-**Relying party** – depends on the validity of information from the Attester (either directly or through the Verifier) to make an access or policy decision.
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## Trustee components
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The AS performs this verification flow:
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1.**Verify format and origin of evidence** – For example, verify the evidence signature. This is handled by a platform-specific Verifier driver.
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2.**Evaluate claims** – For example, validate that measurements match expected values. This is handled by the Policy engine, with RVPS support.
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-**Verify format and origin of evidence** – for example, verify the evidence signature. This is handled by a platform-specific Verifier driver.
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-**Evaluate claims** – for example, validate that measurements match expected values. This is handled by the Policy engine, with RVPS support.
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Sourced Data [none]: no claim being made
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```
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This part of the output shows how the attestation service has compared the attestation token against its expectations of a trustworthy system. These comparisons are known as *trustworthiness vectors"*. It also shows the conclusions that were drawn from that comparison.
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This part of the output shows how the attestation service has compared the attestation token against its expectations of a trustworthy system. These comparisons are known as *trustworthiness vectors*. It also shows the conclusions that were drawn from that comparison.
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Note these two trustworthiness vectors in the result:
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-__Hardware [affirming]__. Evidence in the attestation token shows a good match against the expectations of CCA platform.
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