Add references.

Add references to bibliography and also inlcude reference
in topics such as noise and probabilistic ending.

Author: Nikoleta-v3

docs/reference/bibliography.rst

@@ -18,8 +18,10 @@ documentation.
 .. [Axelrod1984]  The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-02121-2.
 .. [Axelrod1995] Wu, J. and Axelrod, R. (1995). How to cope with noise in the Iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(1), pp. 183–189. doi: 10.1177/0022002795039001008.
 .. [Banks1980] Banks, J. S., & Sundaram, R. K. (1990). Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity. Games and Economic Behavior, 2(2), 97–117.  http://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O
+.. [Bendor1993] Bendor, Jonathan, et al. “Cooperation Under Uncertainty: What Is New, What Is True, and What Is Important.” American Sociological Review, vol. 61, no. 2, 1996, pp. 333–338., www.jstor.org/stable/2096337.
 .. [Beaufils1997] Beaufils, B. and Delahaye, J. (1997). Our Meeting With Gradual: A Good Strategy For The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.42.4041
 .. [Berg2015] Berg, P. Van Den, & Weissing, F. J. (2015). The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 282.
+.. [Flood1958] Merrill M. Flood. Some Experimental Games, 1958.
 .. [Frean1994] Frean, Marcus R. “The Prisoner's Dilemma without Synchrony.” Proceedings: Biological Sciences, vol. 257, no. 1348, 1994, pp. 75–79. www.jstor.org/stable/50253.
 .. [Hilde2013] Hilbe, C., Nowak, M.A. and Traulsen, A. (2013). Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance, PLoS ONE, 8(11), p. e77886. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.
 .. [Kraines1989] Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. Theor Decis (1989) 26: 47.  doi:10.1007/BF00134056

docs/tutorials/further_topics/noisy_tournaments.rst

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Noisy tournaments
 A common variation on iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments is to add
 stochasticity in the choice of actions, simply called noise. This noise is
 introduced by flipping plays between ‘C’ and ‘D’ with some probability that is
-applied to all plays after they are delivered by the player.
+applied to all plays after they are delivered by the player [Bendor1993]_.
 
 The presence of this persistent background noise causes some strategies to
 behave substantially differently. For example, :code:`TitForTat` can fall into

docs/tutorials/further_topics/probabilistict_end_tournaments.rst

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Probabilistic Ending Tournaments
 
 It is possible to create a tournament where the length of each Match is not
 constant for all encounters: after each turn the Match ends with a given
-probability::
+probability, [Axelrod1980b]_::
 
     >>> import axelrod as axl
     >>> players = [axl.Cooperator(), axl.Defector(),