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Gathering-weak-npm-credentials.md

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@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ One of the accounts with publish access to `koa` had a password `password`, lite
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One of the users controlling ~2 million package downloads / month had their npm username as a password.
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The bruteforcer activity was noticed an prevented (via an IP ban) after approx 1½ days and a little less than 3 million requests to `/whoami`, but that was enough to bruteforce the top accounts — I gathered 35 accounts using this bruteforce before my IP got blocked, totaling to approx 151 000 000 package downloads per month (69% of the total bruteforce impact). I could have continued from another IP, but I notified npm at that point and coordinated with them — one of the initial questions was how fast would they notice the attack. Since then, those endpoints became better monitored and I was notified that a stricter ratelimit is now imposed. Note that a real attacker [would have started](#qa) with checking leaked credentials, and would have been able to gather most if not all of the high-impact ones in that time.
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The bruteforcer activity was noticed and prevented (via an IP ban) after approx 1½ days and a little less than 3 million requests to `/whoami`, but that was enough to bruteforce the top accounts — I gathered 35 accounts using this bruteforce before my IP got blocked, totaling to approx 151 000 000 package downloads per month (69% of the total bruteforce impact). I could have continued from another IP, but I notified npm at that point and coordinated with them — one of the initial questions was how fast would they notice the attack. Since then, those endpoints became better monitored and I was notified that a stricter ratelimit is now imposed. Note that a real attacker [would have started](#qa) with checking leaked credentials, and would have been able to gather most if not all of the high-impact ones in that time.
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#### Reused passwords leaked from other services
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