diff --git a/volumes/frus1864p2.xml b/volumes/frus1864p2.xml index c916a5801..5fc48fa31 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1864p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1864p2.xml @@ -18624,7 +18624,7 @@ by which alone he believed this horrible carnage, utterly fruitless in itself, injurious, above all, to America, disgraceful to the century in which we lived, and shocking to the feelings of all - mankind, would be terminated. [Hear, hear.]The noble marquis + mankind, would be terminated. [Hear, hear.] The noble marquis concluded by moving for the papers of which he had given notice.

remarks by lord brougham.

Lord Brougham, in rising to second the @@ -33963,7 +33963,7 @@ is a byword sometimes used, I do not think it desirable that we should be of the peace-at-any-price party. I do not believe that those who are commonly de-signated by that name are. at heart - insensible to the honor and interest of the country. [Cheers.]There + insensible to the honor and interest of the country. [Cheers.] There may be differences of opinion as to the magnitude of the case, as to the validity of the reasons which may induce the country to draw the sword; but I am persuaded that there is no Englishman who would not, diff --git a/volumes/frus1865p1.xml b/volumes/frus1865p1.xml index ba77cc627..0325d83e7 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1865p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1865p1.xml @@ -22147,7 +22147,7 @@ short, is ready just now to forgive us all our faults, because, to quote the very terse words of his own translation, he looks

“To fill his coffers with the spoils of war.”

-

[Hear, hear, and laughter.]The noble earl’s speech really requires +

[Hear, hear, and laughter.] The noble earl’s speech really requires very little answer. He touched lightly upon the termination of a war which while it continued was very painfully felt in this country; and with regard to certain little wars of our own, I am glad that he @@ -63859,7 +63859,7 @@ knowingly permitted vessels of war to be equipped in our ports for the purpose of preying on American commerce; that such vessels sailed from our shores manned chiefly by English crews, and that, - [without having even wet]their keels in confederate waters, these + [without having even wet] their keels in confederate waters, these cruisers hoisted the confederate colors, assumed to be confederate vessels of war, and forthwith commenced an onslaught on the merchant shipping of the federal States. They were consequently, it is @@ -71529,20 +71529,20 @@ which has been done.[Cheers.] The House of Commons which has to meet, I have no doubt, will, like those that preceded it, be inspired by what I might almost call the sacred genius of the place - itself.[Cheers.]It will be guided by the long-established traditions - of Parliament. It will be influenced by the enlightened opinion of - the country. It will proceed in a spirit of cheerfulness and in a - spirit of justice to the discharge of its elevated duties; and well, - my Lord Mayor, do I feel assured that when, in future years, your - successors in that chair (and there will be none more worthy than - yourself ) [cheers] shall again propose to the acceptance of the - citizens of London the health of the present House of Commons, you - will then be able to accordas a tribute of gratitude what to-day you - have generously accorded as a tribute of hope; for that house will - surely, like those that preceded it, have done something to carry - forward the work of public progress and improvement, and establish - itself in the affections by promoting the welfare of the - country.[Loud cheers.]

+ itself.[Cheers.] It will be guided by the long-established + traditions of Parliament. It will be influenced by the enlightened + opinion of the country. It will proceed in a spirit of cheerfulness + and in a spirit of justice to the discharge of its elevated duties; + and well, my Lord Mayor, do I feel assured that when, in future + years, your successors in that chair (and there will be none more + worthy than yourself ) [cheers] shall again propose to the + acceptance of the citizens of London the health of the present House + of Commons, you will then be able to accordas a tribute of gratitude + what to-day you have generously accorded as a tribute of hope; for + that house will surely, like those that preceded it, have done + something to carry forward the work of public progress and + improvement, and establish itself in the affections by promoting the + welfare of the country.[Loud cheers.]

of the act, and the extent - to which it came in conflict with the opinions of the people, as - well as the extraordinary influences under which it was enacted, are - indicated by the fact that its operation was limited to the term of - two years. For a time it answered the demands of other governments. - But in 1797 the statute was amended by further restrictions upon - commerce and the people. Neither the interests of France nor public - sentiment prompted this change in the existing law. It could have - been suggested only by the power that prompted the original - enactment. The law of 1794 operated only upon citizens of the United - States within the jurisdiction of the United States. The law of 1797 + The act of 1794 was not passed in pursuance of the provisions of the + Constitrtion making it the duty of Congress to punish offences + against the laws of nations. It was entitled, “An act to punish + offences against the laws of the United States;” offences not found + in previous legislation of this or other nations, but mainly created + by the act itself. It prohibited citizens of the United States, + under heavy penalties of fine, imprisonment and confiscation of + property, from accepting Commissions in the service of nations at + war with each other, with which we were at peace; the fitting out or + increasing the force of any vessel of war with intent to enter such + service; and gave to the President full power to compel the + observance of its provisions. The character of the act, and the extent to which it came in + conflict with the opinions of the people, as well as the + extraordinary influences under which it was enacted, are indicated + by the fact that its operation was limited to the term of two years. + For a time it answered the demands of other governments. But in 1797 + the statute was amended by further restrictions upon commerce and + the people. Neither the interests of France nor public sentiment + prompted this change in the existing law. It could have been + suggested only by the power that prompted the original enactment. + The law of 1794 operated only upon citizens of the United States + within the jurisdiction of the United States. The law of 1797 operated against citizens of the United States beyond its limits and jurisdiction. The law of 1794 prohibited, under heavy penalties, the fitting out vessels of war for certain specified purposes; that of @@ -25060,7 +25060,7 @@ struggle with France, did not satisfy those who supported the authority of Spain over the colonies. To quiet these apprehensions and more completely to fulfil all possible obligations of a neutral - State, the statute of 181[[illigeble]] was enacted. The purpose of + State, the statute of 181[[illegible]] was enacted. The purpose of this act was stated in its title. It was an act to “preserve neutral relations.” This statute embraced two principles not contained in the acts of 1794 or 1797. It required the government to take bonds @@ -25070,16 +25070,16 @@ customs, upon mere suspicion of such intent, to seize and detain them until an order of release should be obtained from the President. It was not denied that an armed vessel might be lawfully - sold by an[[illigeble]] American citizen to a foreign subject, other + sold by an[[illegible]] American citizen to a foreign subject, other than a subject of Spain, but it was thought necessary to make the American citizen responsible for the action of the foreign subject where: ever he might be, and thus indirectly to prohibit the sale of - American vessels. It was an a[[illigeble]] not to punish, but to + American vessels. It was an a[[illegible]] not to punish, but to prevent crime on the part of American citizens, by depriving them - [[illigeble]]the power of its commission. It was the assertion of - the right of a belligerent not only t[[illigeble]] punish the + [[illegible]]the power of its commission. It was the assertion of + the right of a belligerent not only t[[illegible]] punish the violation of laws, but to demand the surrender of power to disregard - them. [[illigeble]]I was not legislation to punish crime against the + them. [[illegible]]I was not legislation to punish crime against the law of nations, but to prevent offences agains Spain; and that at a moment when she was drawing her supplies from the United States to carry on the war against her colonies through the port of Havana, @@ -25170,7 +25170,7 @@ feeling urged the people of the United states to take sides with the party which at its commencement was contending, apparently at least, for both. Had the policy of the United States not been essentially - pacific, a stronger [[illigeble]]ase to claim their interference + pacific, a stronger [[illegible]]ase to claim their interference could scarcely have been presented. They nevertheless dechared themselves neutral, and the principle then deliberately settled has been invariably dhered to ever since.” It was upon this principle @@ -25183,7 +25183,7 @@ to disonnect ourselves from other nations in all matters of war.

Another consideration gave force to this view of public duty. It had been the established policy of the government, in submission to the - views of the dominant political party of that [[illigeble]]bay, to + views of the dominant political party of that [[illegible]]bay, to dispense with armies, navies, and for unifications, leaving our commerce and even our territory to the protection of a just, moderate, and pacific public diff --git a/volumes/frus1867p1.xml b/volumes/frus1867p1.xml index a1b5dad6a..e076ee6b3 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1867p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1867p1.xml @@ -35661,11 +35661,11 @@ xml:id="pg_276"/> of Mr Thornton to Earl Russell, dated the 20th April, that the Brazilian minister, signer of the treaty of the 1st of May, did not arrive at Buenos Ayres until the 16th of April, and - that he did not present his letters of credence until the]8th, which - only leaves him 12 days for preparing the treaty and sending the - project to Rio de Janeiro. Mr. de Macedo will find it difficult to - convince persons who are informed as to the history of the La Plata - for the past years, that the treaty of the 1st of May was not + that he did not present his letters of credence until the 18th, + which only leaves him 12 days for preparing the treaty and sending + the project to Rio de Janeiro. Mr. de Macedo will find it difficult + to convince persons who are informed as to the history of the La + Plata for the past years, that the treaty of the 1st of May was not conceived and executed a long time before Paraguay commenced the war against the Argentine Republic, and even against Brazil.

What shall I say to the 14th allegation? I leave with Mr. de Macedo diff --git a/volumes/frus1867p2.xml b/volumes/frus1867p2.xml index 95010a14f..e4f9ac687 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1867p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1867p2.xml @@ -65589,7 +65589,7 @@

No. 1, June 21, .1867 ; the governor of Yucatan to Mr. Romero.

No. 2, June 12, 1867; the same to the governor of Campeche.

-

No. 3, June ]5, 1867 ; the governor of Campeche to the governor +

No. 3, June 15, 1867 ; the governor of Campeche to the governor of Yucatan.

No. 4, June 15, 1867; Mr. Santa Anna to General Peraza.

No. 5, June 15, 1867 ; Mr. Santa Anna to the citizens of diff --git a/volumes/frus1870.xml b/volumes/frus1870.xml index 947f522ac..523bee1b4 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1870.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1870.xml @@ -39203,7 +39203,7 @@ of your excellency.

At the same time, permit me to express my sentiments (or regrets) that it is not possible for me to reply to the request of your - excellency, with whom formerly has existed relations friend]y and + excellency, with whom formerly has existed relations friendly and satisfactory.

Approving, &c., &c., &c.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1871.xml b/volumes/frus1871.xml index a035552b0..a2d58eebf 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1871.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1871.xml @@ -34027,7 +34027,7 @@ the seal of the consulate, at Panama, day and date above written.

- [seal.]OWEN M. LONG, [seal.] OWEN M. LONG, United States Consul. @@ -58921,7 +58921,7 @@ land. In no part of the voyage are passengers subjected to any of the many unpleasant features which characterize the route now in vogue. It has no Red Sea to traverse beneath a scorching and broiling sun, none of - the seeming]y-endless tedium of the Indian Ocean, and is free of the + the seemingly-endless tedium of the Indian Ocean, and is free of the disagreeable accompaniments of all long sea-voyages. Its advantages, as compared with travel in the Eastern Hemisphere, are numerous and apparent, and are freely testified to by all the passengers who have diff --git a/volumes/frus1872p2v3.xml b/volumes/frus1872p2v3.xml index 70b599ca7..76a5a08d2 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1872p2v3.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1872p2v3.xml @@ -49201,7 +49201,7 @@ this respect:

“À en croire,” he says, “plusieurs orateurs et écrivains américains, il irait de soi que le gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne serait obligé de - dédommager au moins ]es particuliers, dont la propriété aurait été + dédommager au moins les particuliers, dont la propriété aurait été détruite par l’Alabama, (ainsi que par la Florida, ou d’autres corsaires susdits.) À mon avis, ce point est loin d’être entièrement évident, et l’on pourrait singulièrement se tromper, en se fiant trop au succès diff --git a/volumes/frus1873p1v2.xml b/volumes/frus1873p1v2.xml index 6ce91dc36..7eef4be13 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1873p1v2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1873p1v2.xml @@ -72398,7 +72398,7 @@ by the permission of the governor-general, in either Bengal or Bombay. The law in Madras was not so accurately defined, but was substantially the same.

-

An act of 1837, the draught of which was drawn by Lord Macau]ay in +

An act of 1837, the draught of which was drawn by Lord Macaulay in 1835, was passed partly to clear up doubts which had arisen under the charter act of 1833, regarding the nature of the estate which European British subjects could hold in land in India.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1881.xml b/volumes/frus1881.xml index 0441abb89..01d9277dc 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1881.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1881.xml @@ -88821,7 +88821,7 @@ clandestine publication of an anti-governmental sheet entitled Zemlia i Volia (Land and Liberty), establish in an undeniable manner the existence in Russia of a criminal association seeking to overturn the - established order. The members of this association, who ca]l themselves + established order. The members of this association, who call themselves the Russian socialistic democratic party, and which possesses, as has been stated, its printed organ has since 1874 undertaken the active propagation of their doctrines among the people, acting either diff --git a/volumes/frus1887.xml b/volumes/frus1887.xml index b0338e1d1..2b13f5036 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1887.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1887.xml @@ -86780,7 +86780,7 @@ No. 11.]

Sir: I have received your No. 9 of the 29th of November last, touching the desire of the Shah to have his country developed - by Americans, and the present diplomatic mission a]b Teheran elevated in + by Americans, and the present diplomatic mission at Teheran elevated in rank.

A copy of your dispatch has been sent to the chairmen of the Committees on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Foreign Affairs of the House of diff --git a/volumes/frus1895p2.xml b/volumes/frus1895p2.xml index 592bc1358..d5a3c07eb 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1895p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1895p2.xml @@ -31291,7 +31291,7 @@ frus:doc-dateTime-min="1896-01-13T00:00:00-05:00" n="166" subtype="historical-document" type="document" xml:id="d166"> - Mr. Mil to Mr. + Mr. Sill to Mr. Olney. [Telegram.] diff --git a/volumes/frus1900.xml b/volumes/frus1900.xml index 2c734dad2..c849674ab 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1900.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1900.xml @@ -73380,7 +73380,7 @@ refer to the report of their commission of jurists (forwarded to the Department in dispatch 410) and refuse to admit their responsibility for the killing of Pears, but nevertheless for the sake of preserving - friend]y relations with our Government are willing to pay cash indemnity + friendly relations with our Government are willing to pay cash indemnity of 5,000 pesos currency.

In accordance with your cable instructions I have declared this unacceptable, and have demanded the immediate payment of $10,000 United diff --git a/volumes/frus1902app2.xml b/volumes/frus1902app2.xml index 3a68c6b64..6a2ae6459 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1902app2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1902app2.xml @@ -57500,7 +57500,7 @@ qu’il faut surtout faire la lumière.

La plupart des autres questions peuvent sans doute édifier plus ou moins - le ]uge, mais ne fixeront point sa décision juridique. Les + le juge, mais ne fixeront point sa décision juridique. Les développements qu’on leur consacre sont en quelque sorte des préambules quand ils ne sont pas des hors d’œuvre.

IV. Une quatrième cause des erreurs où versent nos adversaires se trouve diff --git a/volumes/frus1908.xml b/volumes/frus1908.xml index 45734953b..0988d758a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1908.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1908.xml @@ -43474,7 +43474,7 @@ [undated ][Received Dec. + notBefore="1907-11-28T00:00:00-05:00">undated] [Received Dec. 21, 1907.]

The tariff law of the United States of July 24, 1897, provided in its section 3 that, on five articles out of a total of seven hundred and diff --git a/volumes/frus1909.xml b/volumes/frus1909.xml index 3202ec0a4..b4597efbd 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1909.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1909.xml @@ -23545,7 +23545,7 @@ since British and American companies had successively applied for concessions to build the road, when the time came application could be made to the British and American companies In short, when - companies of various nationalities app]y to China for railway + companies of various nationalities apply to China for railway concessions, it must always remain with China to decide the matter. It is not possible to regard an application not granted as conferring any rights or as being proof that thereafter application diff --git a/volumes/frus1914.xml b/volumes/frus1914.xml index 55322f2cb..38af1c366 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1914.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1914.xml @@ -74665,8 +74665,8 @@ Congress, in accordance with the existing Constitution; the election to be held under the Act of May 1912, which they are informed was adopted at the instance of the Maderista - [administration]and [charges]the head of the government with the - selection of electors and provides for direct vote for + [administration] and [charges] the head of the government with + the selection of electors and provides for direct vote for President.

Board to be requested to devote special attention to the agrarian question, electoral legislation, compulsory primary and @@ -75447,8 +75447,8 @@ May 3, 1914.

We have received your courteous telegraphic message of yesterday - [to-day?]in which you inform us that you deem it inadvisable for the - Constitutionalist cause to suspend hostilities against General + [to-day?] in which you inform us that you deem it inadvisable for + the Constitutionalist cause to suspend hostilities against General Huerta because such suspension would benefit the latter only and in which you state that the international conflict between Mexico and the United States, for the solution of which you accepted our good @@ -76126,7 +76126,7 @@

Sir: After returning this afternoon from the - [third plenary]conference, at which the first itemSee telegram of June 11, supra. of the plan was definitely agreed upon,And protocolized. we received a note from Mr. Rabasa with an @@ -76157,7 +76157,7 @@ My Dear Mr. Lamar: I beg to send you a memorandum in which are set forth the objections which the Mexican Delegation has to the propositions submitted by the Delegation - [over]which you preside. My colleagues and I have thought it + [over] which you preside. My colleagues and I have thought it advisable to clearly explain the bases of our objections, so that the American Delegation can consider them carefully and weigh their importance.

@@ -77129,7 +77129,7 @@ came from the Mediators would not be accepted by their party or by the Mexican people.

Their manner was courteous, expressing regret that they should decline - what was [offered]in mistaken kindness; but their statement was so + what was [offered] in mistaken kindness; but their statement was so explicit, their objection so positive, their spirit so defiant, that we asked them if we were to understand that they were expressing their own views or the views of Carranza. To this they emphatically replied that @@ -78639,7 +78639,7 @@ Constitutionalist Party of Mexico, Mr. Carranza, has sent us his replySee text inclosed with Mr. Dodge’s No. 29 of July 6, post. to our communication of - the 21st ultimo, of which we informed you in the [fourth]Plenary + the 21st ultimo, of which we informed you in the [fourth] Plenary Session, of the 24th, in which we invited him to appoint representatives to discuss and agree directly with the Delegates of General Huerta as to the organization of the Provisional Government @@ -79089,15 +79089,15 @@

Convey the following to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

The President of the United States desires me to express to the - President of [name of country]the deep appreciation of this + President of [name of country] the deep appreciation of this Government of the friendly services rendered by the Government - of [name of country]to the Government and people of the United + of [name of country] to the Government and people of the United States in offering its good offices to accommodate the differences which have unhappily arisen between the Government of the United States and the de facto authorities at Mexico City; its admiration for the ability, the patience and the gratifying success with which the distinguished representative - of the Government of [name of country]in association with the + of the Government of [name of country] in association with the other Mediators conducted the conference at Niagara Falls; and its great satisfaction that so much has already been accomplished by the mediation in the interest of the peace of @@ -80543,11 +80543,10 @@ attention today to what he terms a distinction between armistice and suspension of military operations. The latter, as in the present instance, may be a voluntary concession. On arrival of Carbajal envoys - with proper credentials and authority, military operations - [omission]suspended as announced. But an armistice is not under - consideration. It is an altogether different relation and presupposes a - pact or agreement, which in the present instance has not been - contemplated.

+ with proper credentials and authority, military operations [omission] + suspended as announced. But an armistice is not under consideration. It + is an altogether different relation and presupposes a pact or agreement, + which in the present instance has not been contemplated.

Silliman. @@ -81084,7 +81083,7 @@ calendar="gregorian" when="1914-08-03T12:00:00-06:41"> August 3, 1914, noon. -

At the preliminary meeting yesterday the [Carbajal]envoys manifested +

At the preliminary meeting yesterday the [Carbajal] envoys manifested surprise that they were expected to make an unconditional surrender.See inclosure with Mr. Silliman’s last despatch of July 31. When advised that @@ -81571,10 +81570,10 @@ with General Obregón for the delivery of the city, and peaceful occupation with guaranties for the people. At the same time I brought together General Obregon and an envoy of General Velasco - [General-in-chief of the Federal Army]to combine the complete details of - the military maneuvering for occupation and evacuation without friction, - and other points.

-

As the Governor of District [Iturbide]is now chief authority in the + [General-in-chief of the Federal Army] to combine the complete details + of the military maneuvering for occupation and evacuation without + friction, and other points.

+

As the Governor of District [Iturbide] is now chief authority in the capital, I believe the above-mentioned agreement as signed by him and Obregon can with some good will fulfill the stipulations of Niagara protocol for the recognition of the new government at the proper @@ -81646,7 +81645,7 @@

As a consequence of the departure of Licenciado Francisco S. Carbajal, who, up to last [omission], was the Provisional Depository of the Executive Power of the Republic, I have - assumed [that]Power in my capacity of Governor of the Federal + assumed [that] Power in my capacity of Governor of the Federal District and Chief of Police.

It is my principal duty to endeavor by all means to make sure that order in the city shall not be disturbed and that all of @@ -82603,7 +82602,7 @@ territory any other flag than that sacred tri-colored emblem at the foot of which we have seen many of our companions fall on the field of battle. It is very humiliating that the flag of the - Stars and Bars [sic]continues to wave over the port of Vera + Stars and Bars [sic] continues to wave over the port of Vera Cruz. I desire to suggest to you that with due respect we direct a communication to the Provisional President of the Republic requesting that he take up at once with the American Government, @@ -82784,7 +82783,7 @@ of the capital and the Niagara protocol.

More than that, he pointed out to me the necessity of the prompt evacuation of Vera Cruz. He added that there was a strong feeling among - the military chiefs to force Carranza to make a forma]request of the + the military chiefs to force Carranza to make a formal request of the United States for the evacuation and that a refusal would greatly increase the bad sentiment already aroused against Americans, with deplorable consequences.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1917Supp01v01.xml b/volumes/frus1917Supp01v01.xml index cff7ff356..20ffcd45f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1917Supp01v01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1917Supp01v01.xml @@ -11788,7 +11788,7 @@ 95 - Apr. 15 [Rec’d Apr. 16]J + Apr. 15 [Rec’d Apr. 16] From the Ambassador in Mexico (tel.) Mexico will observe strict neutrality. diff --git a/volumes/frus1917Supp02v01.xml b/volumes/frus1917Supp02v01.xml index f368e6672..3e12ab295 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1917Supp02v01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1917Supp02v01.xml @@ -59868,7 +59868,7 @@ send special financial American agent to Greece. Information here that English and French experts are very capable master the situation; so urgent that probably no delay admissible such as - would be invalued [incurred?]in getting + would be invalued [incurred?] in getting American special agent there. It would be well, however, to ask our Minister to be associated with the French and English experts in financial investigations. During an interview with diff --git a/volumes/frus1919Parisv08.xml b/volumes/frus1919Parisv08.xml index 45519ce6c..6c0ef0835 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1919Parisv08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1919Parisv08.xml @@ -26142,7 +26142,7 @@

Sir Eyre Crowe said that his experts did not consider the American proposal sufficient. They thought that the following text should be adopted. (See Appendix I.) The British experts - thought that this proposal would renew [sic]a number of difficulties. + thought that this proposal would renew [sic] a number of difficulties. There would be no blockade. There would be no capturing of ships. Vessels would be instructed to turn back. They would be informed that there was danger ahead. If they still persisted they would be made to @@ -30826,7 +30826,7 @@ Marshal Foch had declared that, unless the Supreme Council took firm and determined action, he was not in a position to obtain any results.

M. Scialoja asked whether it was proposed to - stop [stock]all the aircraft in question.

+ stop [stock] all the aircraft in question.

Captain Roper replied that the Technical Experts who had discussed the subject in the Commission on Aerial Clauses, had unanimously declared that there were no civil aircraft in @@ -31393,7 +31393,7 @@ sale, cession or exportation of all German aeronautic material has already been notified twice to the German Government (enclosed herewith copy of notes number 3765, of April [August]7, and 4111 of August 26.).August] 7, and 4111 of August 26.).See footnote 1, p. 430.

To these two notifications the German Government replied by the note @@ -37225,7 +37225,7 @@ West direction to Urpek Kaya point 1804; through villages Karasigrli, Yenije, Tepejik, Tatarkeui, Munteveli, Yenichiftlik, Papazli; southwest [southeast]over point 1804 and + rend="italic">southeast] over point 1804 and Belen Dagh; to village[s] of Kesterli, Yarishlik (3 miles east of Ahmedei)—Sart; south along ridge to Ardijak-Yaila to villages Kemer, Tabaklar, Semit, diff --git a/volumes/frus1919Parisv10.xml b/volumes/frus1919Parisv10.xml index 402fea0a7..544673554 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1919Parisv10.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1919Parisv10.xml @@ -46933,8 +46933,8 @@ [undated, - ][Received July 29, 1919.] + notBefore="1919-07-26T00:00:00+02:59">undated] + [Received July 29, 1919.]

Turks and Tartars advancing. In districts of Karabagh and [Gezus?] they now occupy approximately reopened territory of Russian Armenia. Khalil Bey, Turkish colonel now in command Azerbaidjan Tartars. @@ -46954,8 +46954,8 @@ [undated, - ][Received July 29, 1919.] + notBefore="1919-07-26T00:00:00+02:59">undated] + [Received July 29, 1919.]

Hoover, Paris.

Following from Green, Tiflis. Quote M. U. D. 40 of 26th July:— diff --git a/volumes/frus1919Parisv13.xml b/volumes/frus1919Parisv13.xml index 85bf511d0..91ca7a491 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1919Parisv13.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1919Parisv13.xml @@ -9016,7 +9016,7 @@ Agreement regulating the amounts to be allocated out of the second Dawes annuity for the Armies of Occupation in the Rhineland, the Inter-Allied - Rhine]and High Commission, and the Inter-Allied + Rhineland High Commission, and the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany, signed at Paris, September 21, 1925 11b. diff --git a/volumes/frus1919v02.xml b/volumes/frus1919v02.xml index c4fb96ed4..b5e6ac784 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1919v02.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1919v02.xml @@ -61865,7 +61865,7 @@ will be necessary. Aside from sheer support to refugees it is necessary to repatriate them, to reestablish their ability to support themselves, and - incident [al]ly to dispossess and repatriate the + incident[al]ly to dispossess and repatriate the Turkish intruders. Until this is done the entire displaced population must depend on charity. All military advises [advisers?] diff --git a/volumes/frus1920v03.xml b/volumes/frus1920v03.xml index 14314eafa..6cea86bb1 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1920v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1920v03.xml @@ -50715,7 +50715,7 @@ >Paris, December 3, 1920—5 p.m.[Received December 4—3:16 - a.m.]0 + a.m.]

1977. Contents of your 1659, November 26, 6 p.m., communicated to Foreign Office. Following is English translation of reply dated December 2nd.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1929v03.xml b/volumes/frus1929v03.xml index 5c7cbc43e..a9236c295 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1929v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1929v03.xml @@ -38108,7 +38108,7 @@ shall be duly paid by the interested persons, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Department of Agriculture and the Treasury Department of this Government informed this Department under date of - March 26 and 30 [28?]1929,28?] 1929,Not printed. respectively, that instructions had been issued to Dr. Thomas A. Bray, Inspector of the Bureau of Animal Industry, 13 Livestock Exchange Building, El Paso, diff --git a/volumes/frus1934v04.xml b/volumes/frus1934v04.xml index e6f1dadfe..8f981e4ea 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1934v04.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1934v04.xml @@ -5858,8 +5858,8 @@ Feb. 25 (23) To the Ambassador in Chile (tel.)Instructions to ascertain what action Government - contemplates taking in support of proposal.(Footnote: Same - telegram, February 25, to Peru and]Uruguay.) + contemplates taking in support of proposal. (Footnote: Same + telegram, February 25, to Peru and Uruguay.) 56 diff --git a/volumes/frus1936v01.xml b/volumes/frus1936v01.xml index 4c0df2043..97e1720be 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1936v01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1936v01.xml @@ -67907,7 +67907,7 @@ Ottawa, December 7, - 1936.[Received December 11.]| + 1936. [Received December 11.]

Sir: With reference to the Department’s diff --git a/volumes/frus1939v01.xml b/volumes/frus1939v01.xml index cc644598d..37456dd83 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1939v01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1939v01.xml @@ -33308,7 +33308,7 @@ 1, 1939—5 p.m. [Received September 1—11:55 a.m.] -

1358. My 1349, September 1, 1 [4]p.m. Draft note +

1358. My 1349, September 1, 1 [4] p.m. Draft note to Germany has received final approval of Prime Minister and of the French and is now being desptached to Berlin.See British Cmd. 6106, Misc. No. 9 (1939), doc. diff --git a/volumes/frus1940v04.xml b/volumes/frus1940v04.xml index 2e5b3144f..9e6ba97c4 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1940v04.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1940v04.xml @@ -56158,7 +56158,7 @@ >American?] Government along the lines indicated by the letter dated October 31 [24?] from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (paragraph numbered 2 my 557, November - 2, 10 [8?]a.m.).

+ 2, 10 [8?] a.m.).

I have now received a further letter dated November 7 from the @@ -64427,7 +64427,7 @@

Last press bulletins state following Ministers selected, 1. War Minister, Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, former Vice Minister of War prior Konoye Cabinet, Chief of State [Staff] Japanese Army - [of] Kwantung at time outbreak China incident: [2.]Navy Minister, Vice + [of] Kwantung at time outbreak China incident: [2.] Navy Minister, Vice Admiral Zengo Yoshida, held same position Yonai Cabinet; Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese delegate extraordinary session League of Nations 1933, president South Manchuria Railway Company 1935 to diff --git a/volumes/frus1944v06.xml b/volumes/frus1944v06.xml index 5239b7cf9..e4de549ee 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1944v06.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1944v06.xml @@ -22783,7 +22783,7 @@ Washington, May 23, 1944—[?]p.m. + calendar="gregorian" when="1944-05-23">May 23, 1944—[?] p.m.

703. Following are statements by President and Vice President on May 20, date diff --git a/volumes/frus1945v08.xml b/volumes/frus1945v08.xml index a64c0769d..b828b44a7 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1945v08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1945v08.xml @@ -68189,7 +68189,7 @@ half of last year’s figure. This basis, however, appears to be unacceptable to the United States Government. In these circumstances it would not appear possible for the two Ministers to be able to - agree [on?]a joint report. + agree [on?] a joint report. His Majesty’s Government have decided that the United Kingdom subsidy for 1945 must be limited to one of approximately one and a @@ -86750,7 +86750,7 @@ one present aim, to force France to quit our country.”

Sent Dept as 206, rptd Paris as 75 with request to rpt to London; - paraphrases to Arab cap [ital]s.

+ paraphrases to Arab cap[ital]s.

Wadsworth diff --git a/volumes/frus1948v02.xml b/volumes/frus1948v02.xml index e83a5ae6c..cbd778cce 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1948v02.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1948v02.xml @@ -120581,7 +120581,7 @@ Austria undertakes to render full assistance to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned in regard to the [voluntary] (1) - repatriation of their nationals and [may](1) [shall] (2) enter into + repatriation of their nationals and [may] (1) [shall] (2) enter into direct bilateral negotiations for this purpose. Austria further undertakes: diff --git a/volumes/frus1952-54v09p2.xml b/volumes/frus1952-54v09p2.xml index 874697b29..854f75ccf 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1952-54v09p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1952-54v09p2.xml @@ -57517,7 +57517,7 @@ Arabia. United States as intimate friend both, not forgetting its treaty - relationship dating to 1834 [1833]with + relationship dating to 1834 [1833] with Sultanate Muscat and Oman,The text of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Muscat, Sept. 21, 1833, is in J. C. Hurewitz, UN would @@ -29230,15 +29230,15 @@ corresp="#p_TTF1">Tsiang of China and informed him that if China vetoed Outer Mongolia in the Security Council, he himself would move to throw China out of the UN. - Lodge asked [name deleted]if - it would be possible for him to abstain in the voting on Outer Mongolia. - He said that, as a co-sponsor of the Canadian resolution, this would not - be possible. [Name deleted] attitude seems fairly typical of General - Assembly sentiment. It is possible that Chinese activity in various - capitals has been designed to elicit reactions; on the other hand, it - may indicate a growing and firmer intention to use the veto. It looks - more and more to us that a Chinese veto on Outer Mongolia will produce - results of untold gravity.

+ Lodge asked [name deleted] + if it would be possible for him to abstain in the voting on Outer + Mongolia. He said that, as a co-sponsor of the Canadian resolution, this + would not be possible. [Name deleted] attitude seems fairly typical of + General Assembly sentiment. It is possible that Chinese activity in + various capitals has been designed to elicit reactions; on the other + hand, it may indicate a growing and firmer intention to use the veto. It + looks more and more to us that a Chinese veto on Outer Mongolia will + produce results of untold gravity.

If they persist in their intention to veto, we should try to bring about a voting situation in which their veto will not be necessary— and do it, if possible, without having it pinned onto us.

@@ -34955,9 +34955,9 @@

. . . . . . .

I replied that while I was not personally in position to make such appraisal our people in both Washington and NY sincerely believed such - action by Japan would be misinterpreted. I suggested [name deleted]might - like to obtain first hand report and recommendations from his own UN delegation.

+ action by Japan would be misinterpreted. I suggested [name deleted] + might like to obtain first hand report and recommendations from his own + UN delegation.

[Name deleted] said the GOJ had already made decision not to act as original co-sponsor for ROK and that both resolutions have now been @@ -47752,7 +47752,7 @@ Dulles whether it was possible to provide estimates of the amounts of money allocated to basic research by the United States in comparison with the USSR. [Name - deleted]answering for Mr. Dulles, + deleted] answering for Mr. Dulles, could not give a clear response, though he could not say that the Russians had put in more resources than we have. Mr. Dulles said that at least the Soviets have concentrated more diff --git a/volumes/frus1955-57v18.xml b/volumes/frus1955-57v18.xml index 02ce19d9d..862e0cb6f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1955-57v18.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1955-57v18.xml @@ -28021,7 +28021,7 @@ subtype="historical-document" type="document" xml:id="d126"> 126. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 14, 1957Source: - Department of State, Central Files, 745K.02/2–]1457. Confidential. + Department of State, Central Files, 745K.02/2–1457. Confidential. Drafted by Hadsel. Hagerty that Dulles had checked with him before making this statement and that “he [Strauss]was all for it,” telling Strauss] was all for it,” telling Hagerty that “we wanted to show our enemies that we now deal with A-bombs as conventional weapons.” (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary @@ -15847,7 +15847,7 @@ the Director of Central Intelligence. It was Admiral Strauss’ feeling that what had occurred might well turn out to have been the test of a warhead on a ballistic missile. [1 sentence (31 words) - not declassified]Moreover, continued Admiral Strauss, if the + not declassified] Moreover, continued Admiral Strauss, if the Soviets were successful in cutting the lead time for the production of a ballistic missile as rapidly as they had succeeded in cutting the lead time for the production of their recent aircraft types, the date of @@ -27009,11 +27009,11 @@ again and would waste a lot of money. It was even proposed that a plane weighing 600,000 pounds be built, although it would in his opinion be of little use as a weapon.

-

[2 sentences (54 words) not declassified]Secretary - Humphrey wondered whether we - weren’t building nuclear weapons beyond the requirements. Admiral - Strauss said the large increase in numbers was - due to building a great many small weapons which would be widely +

[2 sentences (54 words) not declassified] + Secretary Humphrey wondered + whether we weren’t building nuclear weapons beyond the requirements. + Admiral Strauss said the large increase in numbers + was due to building a great many small weapons which would be widely dispersed. He felt that nuclear weapons were the least expensive weapons in our arsenal. Admiral Strauss added that of course at some time we would have to put on the brakes.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1955-57v22.xml b/volumes/frus1955-57v22.xml index 5e6cf4a3c..a1fe3262b 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1955-57v22.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1955-57v22.xml @@ -13262,8 +13262,8 @@ meet situation Burma, Embassy feels must point out that: GUB might not accept offer, - even without strings, where [were]possibility of US with Krajal [withdrawal] always in + even without strings, where [were] + possibility of US with Krajal [withdrawal] always in background; Acceptance of offer might not reduce amount assistance ErskineGeneral Erskine, accompanied by two military officers, - visited Burma February 26–March 8. and [name - deleted]following points were brought out:

+ visited Burma February 26–March 8. and [name deleted] + following points were brought out:

[Name deleted] said he had been directed contact Erskine to inform him regarding results of meeting held by 3 Cabinet members including Prime Minister @@ -18862,10 +18862,10 @@

Mr. Anderson began his briefing of the most important features of the proposed new statement of policy. The President interrupted him to inquire why it was that when the Indonesian - Republic had been set up, Western New Guinea had been excluded. - [Acting]Secretary Hoover and - other members of the Council explained why Netherlands New Guinea was - still the subject of negotiation between Indonesia and the Dutch.

+ Republic had been set up, Western New Guinea had been excluded. [Acting] + Secretary Hoover and other + members of the Council explained why Netherlands New Guinea was still + the subject of negotiation between Indonesia and the Dutch.

Mr. Anderson continued his briefing by reading the pertinent paragraphs describing the U.S. program for assisting the small holders to improve the raising and marketing of @@ -21954,17 +21954,17 @@ in which Sukarno and Hatta were in direct conflict to degree which was not case in Army Chief of Staff crisis.

-

At one point Sudarsono said some success if [in?]Geneva negotiations was not only important to present - government but would affect shape of successor government and strengthen - moderate influences in country who are having difficult time in face of - Communist and emotional nationalist agitation. Although I knew answer I - asked Sudarsono for the record whether successful negotiations of - economic and financial provisions of RTC - would outweigh any disadvantage from inconclusive results on Irian. He - replied that moderate elements considered economic and financial - provisions to be more important but political realities made Irian - element of predominant importance.

+

At one point Sudarsono said some success if [in?] + Geneva negotiations was not only important to present government but + would affect shape of successor government and strengthen moderate + influences in country who are having difficult time in face of Communist + and emotional nationalist agitation. Although I knew answer I asked + Sudarsono for the record whether successful negotiations of economic and + financial provisions of RTC would + outweigh any disadvantage from inconclusive results on Irian. He replied + that moderate elements considered economic and financial provisions to + be more important but political realities made Irian element of + predominant importance.

I confined myself to re-stating our position of neutrality, to questions designed to make clear message which he was conveying to me, and to saying I would of course report it to Washington.their]failure?

+ >their] failure?

Much has been said by the Secretary and by others in connection with Suez Canal problem of importance of maintaining the inviolability of international agreements. With this, as Department knows, I am in @@ -33854,11 +33854,11 @@ Department.

Numbered point one: To support the Dutch contention re New Guinea will convince many Indonesians who are now friendly to the US or UN committed [sic]that the only support they have on what they view as their - most important foreign policy problem comes from the Communist camp. I - know of few changes in our policy vis-à-vis Indonesia that would be - better calculated to drive this country closer to the Communists.

+ target="#t_UN1">UN committed [sic] + that the only support they have on what they view as their most + important foreign policy problem comes from the Communist camp. I know + of few changes in our policy vis-à-vis Indonesia that would be better + calculated to drive this country closer to the Communists.

Point two: Continued cooperation with our Dutch ally is desirable. Must this cooperation extend to the point that we associate ourselves with the desperate Dutch attempts to salvage the remnants of her colonial @@ -34305,9 +34305,9 @@ Sulawesi and Sumual apparently has confidence this is so or he would not have come to Djakarta August 28 on summons from Djuanda.

-

Opinion among responsible sources are [on]possible - success regional round table meeting divided. Hatta not over optimistic.

+

Opinion among responsible sources are [on] + possible success regional round table meeting divided. Hatta not over optimistic.

We do not anticipate complete and immediate settlement all outstanding difficulties. However, mere fact of recognition by central government that provinces have legitimate complaints should have psychological @@ -41373,9 +41373,9 @@ Regarding Sukarno. [Name deleted] said President real Javanese and will not make quick - about face regarding policies (i.e., Communism). [Name - deleted]claims answer to this will come from controlling influence - around President… . + about face regarding policies (i.e., Communism). [Name deleted] + claims answer to this will come from controlling influence around + President… . Present Cabinet will continue “have good life”, says [name deleted]. Reason for this is fact that now present?]must ask modification of the 1947 agreement. After you - have had an opportunity to read the report, if you have not already done - so, and after I have had time to reflect upon its significance, I will - have comments to make to you from Manila.In - an exclusive telegram for present?] + must ask modification of the 1947 agreement. After you have had an + opportunity to read the report, if you have not already done so, and + after I have had time to reflect upon its significance, I will have + comments to make to you from Manila.In an + exclusive telegram for Bendetsen, July 28, Gordon Gray noted that the text of the Tolentino report had not yet been received by the Departments of Defense or @@ -59471,16 +59471,16 @@ reasons set forth below have concluded that the Department of Defense should proceed to implement this program.

The six squadrons of propeller driven F–8Fs provided the Royal Thai Air - Force under the Fiscal Year 1950–1956 [1951]Mutual Defense Assistance Program to meet the force basis - determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obsolete and it will soon be - uneconomical and impractical to obtain parts for them. On the other - hand, parts for jet planes are available. For this reason, the U.S. has - assisted the Royal Thai Air Force to institute a jet training program - utilizing nine U.S. provided jet planes. In addition, 31 F–84G jet - planes have been programmed for delivery in FY 1957 to permit commencement of a program for the gradual - replacement of one of the six squadrons of propeller driven planes.

+ Force under the Fiscal Year 1950–1956 [1951] + Mutual Defense Assistance Program to meet the force basis determined by + the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obsolete and it will soon be uneconomical + and impractical to obtain parts for them. On the other hand, parts for + jet planes are available. For this reason, the U.S. has assisted the + Royal Thai Air Force to institute a jet training program utilizing nine + U.S. provided jet planes. In addition, 31 F–84G jet planes have been + programmed for delivery in FY 1957 to + permit commencement of a program for the gradual replacement of one of + the six squadrons of propeller driven planes.

Thailand has already successfully embarked upon the transition from propeller driven aircraft to jet aircraft in the expectation of receiving jets under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Furthermore, diff --git a/volumes/frus1955-57v23p1.xml b/volumes/frus1955-57v23p1.xml index 4c62fb535..f4f082e60 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1955-57v23p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1955-57v23p1.xml @@ -14706,7 +14706,7 @@ target="#t_JDA1">JDA budget to 96.4 billion yen. Kono thought JDA budget of around 10 [100?]billion yen feasible but, [for] + rend="italic">100?] billion yen feasible but, [for] political reasons, total defense budget over 140.7 billion yen would be extremely difficult. He offered get Japanese agreement to 140.7 billion yen @@ -17331,7 +17331,7 @@ June 22, 1956,Document 79. on the Ryukyuan land problem and Assistant Secretary Gray’s reply of June - [July]6,See July] 6,See footnote 4, Document 79. there has been an increase in concern about the United States administration of the Ryukyus in Japanese circles. As Ambassador less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]received another communication which indicated - that General Moore intended to take the action at 9:00 p.m., Washington - time, on November 22. The report which we received indicated that Mr. - Senaga would be declared ineligible for office as a result of having - been convicted of a felony.

+ not declassified] received another communication which + indicated that General Moore intended to take the action at 9:00 p.m., + Washington time, on November 22. The report which we received indicated + that Mr. Senaga would be declared ineligible for office as a result of + having been convicted of a felony.

With only about three hours remaining before the action was reportedly scheduled, I called Assistant Secretary of the Army Roderick. He, too, had heard nothing about the matter, and his inquiry indicated that the diff --git a/volumes/frus1955-57v27.xml b/volumes/frus1955-57v27.xml index eda8a20ed..cbb5c940a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1955-57v27.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1955-57v27.xml @@ -10409,7 +10409,7 @@ would be to our advantage as means of securing support of French and other NATO countries for our own policies and giving us additional opportunity to - influence theirs. This [garble]present trend of political + influence theirs. This [garble] present trend of political discussions in NATO but possibly emphasizing and accelerating them by specific recommendations, perhaps in next Footnote [7½ lines of - text]not declassified. We had a very useful talk which - emphasized our common agreement that the “spirit of Geneva” while it - meant, we hope, that our differences would not lead to war did not lead - to elimination of those differences or blurring over the distinction of + xml:id="d88fn4">Footnote [7½ lines of text] + not declassified. We had a very useful talk which emphasized + our common agreement that the “spirit of Geneva” while it meant, we + hope, that our differences would not lead to war did not lead to + elimination of those differences or blurring over the distinction of those who believe that the state is to serve man and not man to serve the state.

The Pope seemed himself to be in vigorous health and expressed his great @@ -27954,8 +27954,8 @@ President has invited Gronchi for a state visit beginning February 28. Despite constant U.S. encouragement [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]the Center coalition is probably weaker than a - year ago and is so divided on internal issues that a government + declassified] the Center coalition is probably weaker than + a year ago and is so divided on internal issues that a government crisis could occur at any time. Unity of the Christian Democratic Party is hampered by personal rivalries as well as policy differences. The inability to secure passage of social and economic @@ -30710,15 +30710,14 @@ Center or those ex-SocialCommunists available here are capable of overcoming their polemic habits to an extent that would permit them to put their fingers on exactly those problems most troubling the Left. - [4½ lines of source text not - declassified]Just how one could best handle the question of media - and dissemination, we have no very clear ideas at the moment, but do not - believe that these problems should prove insuperable. The - quasi-philosophic questions would have, of course, to be translated into - terms simple enough and familiar enough for the target audience to - understand. The important thing to our mind, however, is that the - approach be a serious one and eschew using sensationalism for its own - sake.

+ [4½ lines of source text not declassified] + Just how one could best handle the question of media and dissemination, + we have no very clear ideas at the moment, but do not believe that these + problems should prove insuperable. The quasi-philosophic questions would + have, of course, to be translated into terms simple enough and familiar + enough for the target audience to understand. The important thing to our + mind, however, is that the approach be a serious one and eschew using + sensationalism for its own sake.

[2 lines of source text not declassified] Possibly the encouragement of “sectarianism” and extreme leftism in the PCI might make less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]disruption of the Italian + declassified] disruption of the Italian Government. Our attention [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is rather concentrated on strengthening the Reaction to the bringing of US troops from Austria to Italy and the establishment of SETAF [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]was and still is excellent. Indeed, our + declassified] was and still is excellent. Indeed, our military relationship with Italy in Italy could hardly be better. I believe that the government today would be in favor of our stationing even more troops in Italy.

@@ -32089,10 +32088,10 @@ xml:id="d122fn8">See footnote 2, Document 74. a traditional stronghold of the Communist apparatus—was a significant milestone in the course of events. Other - policies [1 line of source text not - declassified]also have had salutary effects. For example, in early - 1955, certain privileges were withdrawn from the Communist press which - resulted in a sharp decline both in circulation and advertising.

+ policies [1 line of source text not declassified] + also have had salutary effects. For example, in early 1955, certain + privileges were withdrawn from the Communist press which resulted in a + sharp decline both in circulation and advertising.

In my opinion the greatest threat we face in Italy now rises from the new Soviet policy, one of the aims of which is reanimation of the popular front and the use of socialist-democratic party apparatus as a red @@ -33902,7 +33901,7 @@ Mattei’s Oil Agreement with Iran. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]concerning Enrico Mattel’s oil agreement + declassified] concerning Enrico Mattel’s oil agreement with the Iranian Government, the Iranian Parliament has approved the agreement and it is expected that the Shah, who negotiated it, will shortly sign it. As far as is known, this agreement @@ -36628,10 +36627,10 @@ critical of the United States, whereas the lurid publicity about the Commie spy ring which is filling every Swedish newspaper is bound to revivify anti-Communist and pro-Western feeling.

-

[5½ lines of source text not declassified]Speaking - as civilian strategists, we believe that it continues to be in our - national interest that Sweden be militarily strong even though it is not - our ally (NSC 121 of January 8, 1952 +

[5½ lines of source text not declassified] + Speaking as civilian strategists, we believe that it continues to be in + our national interest that Sweden be militarily strong even though it is + not our ally (NSC 121 of January 8, 1952 “Position of United States with Respect to Scandinavia and Finland”).For text of NSC 121, see [1 paragraph (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

It is hard at this juncture to foresee the results of our conversations. - [2 lines of source text not - declassified]Perhaps the recent attack in one of the Moscow papers - will serve to quiet public discussion of Swedish requirements without - smothering interest in making proposals to us.

+ [2 lines of source text not declassified] + Perhaps the recent attack in one of the Moscow papers will serve to + quiet public discussion of Swedish requirements without smothering + interest in making proposals to us.

Let me know whether there are any other straws that indicate how this wind is blowing in Sweden. I shall endeavor to keep you posted as to developments here and advised as to whether we feel you can @@ -37493,18 +37492,18 @@ manufacturing facilities in Norway developed under the OSP program. Ambassador Strong pointed out that [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]the Norwegians had constructed a new [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] - arms plant in accordance with our desires and that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] they were - manufacturing Bofors guns and other small arms. He said that he feared - the contracts which enabled these facilities to employ labor and keep - the plants in operation would be completed during the next few months - and that in view of the fact that these facilities were substantially - expanded because of our interest it was desirable for us to keep the - plants functioning. The Ambassador said that only a small amount of - money was involved, probably not amounting to more than $3 million.

+ the Norwegians had constructed a new [less than 1 line + of source text not declassified] arms plant in accordance with + our desires and that [less than 1 line of source text + not declassified] they were manufacturing Bofors guns and other + small arms. He said that he feared the contracts which enabled these + facilities to employ labor and keep the plants in operation would be + completed during the next few months and that in view of the fact that + these facilities were substantially expanded because of our interest it + was desirable for us to keep the plants functioning. The Ambassador said + that only a small amount of money was involved, probably not amounting + to more than $3 million.

Secretary Gray replied that the Defense Department fully understood the desirability of maintaining these facilities but that current appropriations provided only one-tenth @@ -38824,10 +38823,10 @@ faithfully administered the controls agreed upon, and the Embassy has found a high degree of cooperation from the Danish authorities in deviation cases. [2½ lines of source text not - declassified]Pressures of agricultural export groups and of - shipyards have unquestionably played an important part in determining - the Danish positions.

+ rend="italic">2½ lines of source text not declassified] + Pressures of agricultural export groups and of shipyards have + unquestionably played an important part in determining the Danish + positions.

Also Denmark’s views with respect to the U.N.’s Economic Commission of Europe (ECE) are somewhat different from those of the United States. While we see little promise in this @@ -41864,7 +41863,7 @@ The inflationary pressures are already perceptible in the Spanish economy as a consequence of the recent freezes and of the increasing use of pesetas in the construction of the joint - military bases [which?]could be effectively arrested by the + military bases [which?] could be effectively arrested by the importation of raw materials which would make possible an almost immediate increase in production.

@@ -45265,7 +45264,7 @@

Mr. Lloyd undertook to look into the matter as soon as he had returned to London.

International Labor Office - [Organization]Proposed Convention on Forced Labor

+ [Organization] Proposed Convention on Forced Labor

The Secretary said that he had one final item that he wished to discuss. There is before the ILO a proposed convention on forced labor. One of the effects of the convention would @@ -46376,13 +46375,13 @@ xml:id="d239fn2">Admiral Jerauld Wright, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Commander in Chief, Atlantic; and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Carrier Group which contains US carriers [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]and British carriers [less than 1 - line of source text not declassified] and said that the - function of the British carriers should be primarily to protect the US - carriers so that they can better utilize their superior offensive power. - Thus, the Naval forces of each country could play a useful role in - maintaining the free world’s military power.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + and British carriers [less than 1 line of source text + not declassified] and said that the function of the British + carriers should be primarily to protect the US carriers so that they can + better utilize their superior offensive power. Thus, the Naval forces of + each country could play a useful role in maintaining the free world’s + military power.

The Minister maintained that it was essential for Britain to enter into many more arrangements of the kinds referred to above in order to reach its military objectives with the limited resources it possesses. He said @@ -48592,7 +48591,7 @@ commit itself at the present time to put this IRBM capability entirely in British hands by the end of 1960. [12 lines of source text - not declassified]The Departments of State and Defense + not declassified] The Departments of State and Defense therefore recommend that if the IRBM proposal is to be put to the British Government it be reshaped so as to modify the original proposal that all four @@ -51897,9 +51896,9 @@ had just assured Congressional leaders that no secret agreements had been reached at Bermuda. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) Dulles ascertained [less than 1 line of text not - declassified]that the leak had come from a British source (Ibid.,Dulles–less than 1 line of text not declassified] + that the leak had come from a British source (Ibid.,Dulles–Herter Series), but Macmillan steadfastly denied that British sources were responsible. In a letter on March 28, he wrote: @@ -57409,11 +57408,11 @@ Howe. He said that on balance Canadian trade figures were favorable. He pointed out, however, that the Canadians had made no effort to balance trade with each country, but the - overall pictures were good. He said that uncertainties as to - [U.S.]policy caused the Canadians some concern. For example, delay in - the implementation of customs simplification would not [now?] be of - great benefit to Canadian producers since it would give them a firm - planning base for projected operations.

+ overall pictures were good. He said that uncertainties as to [U.S.] + policy caused the Canadians some concern. For example, delay in the + implementation of customs simplification would not [now?] be of great + benefit to Canadian producers since it would give them a firm planning + base for projected operations.

Mr. Howe said that he had noted with some alarm the US Tariff Commission procedure in Escape Clause actions which allowed a case, once dismissed, to be raised and reheard diff --git a/volumes/frus1958-60v03.xml b/volumes/frus1958-60v03.xml index 0ffd93ea7..249c3f8ad 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1958-60v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1958-60v03.xml @@ -10035,8 +10035,8 @@ public buildings, subways, and apartment houses. It might seem strange that a shelter program could be concealed, but Mr. Dulles believed concealment was possible. [2 lines of source text not declassified]The U.S. Embassy in Moscow - was not in a good position to discover all the facts. Mr. 2 lines of source text not declassified] The U.S. Embassy in + Moscow was not in a good position to discover all the facts. Mr. Dulles estimated that one-sixth of the Soviet urban population had shelter available, but this figure was a guess and might be too high. The Russians were publicizing warning, etc., not @@ -18192,7 +18192,7 @@ Admiral Burke admitted that Polaris was chancy at the outset. Now, however, we know that we can get a [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]warhead for the missile. We also know that we have the + declassified] warhead for the missile. We also know that we have the re-entry problem licked. Moreover, the guidance tests have been satisfactory, and the propellant is all right. Therefore, what we have now in sight and are pretty sure of obtaining is a Polaris missile with a 1200 @@ -19868,13 +19868,12 @@ >Herter, however, it was not absolutely certain.

The President suggested that we assume that a general war has occurred and we have succeeded in defeating Soviet Russia. Throughout the war China has, let - us assume, remained quiescent. In this [source text - illegible—connection?]the President added that we would certainly take - political measures to disarm and remove the threat of Communist China. We - simply could not just ignore a Communist China which remained untouched and - intact after a terrible war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To do so would be unrealistic in the - extreme.

+ us assume, remained quiescent. In this [source text illegible—connection?] + the President added that we would certainly take political measures to + disarm and remove the threat of Communist China. We simply could not just + ignore a Communist China which remained untouched and intact after a + terrible war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To do so would be unrealistic in the extreme.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget suggested that the dilemma might be solved if the phrase “by military and other measures” were changed to read “by military or other measures.” However, Secretary @@ -28594,7 +28593,7 @@ >Kistiakowsky pointed out that Atlas would carry a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warhead which would produce a [less than 1 line of source - text not declassified]blast. Mr. ] blast. Mr. McCone said miniaturization enabled us to live with a lower thrust without reducing the warhead proportionately.

Mr. Stans remarked that as the @@ -39472,7 +39471,7 @@ However, should these key shots prove unsuccessful, there is a possibility that the attainment of a Ballistic Missile warhead greater than [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Fleet Ballistic Missile warhead and an + declassified] Fleet Ballistic Missile warhead and an anti-missile missile warhead will be seriously endangered if there is a moratorium on testing. In addition several important developments scheduled for testing subsequent to Operation Hardtack would probably be @@ -40814,7 +40813,7 @@ source text not declassified]. In the case of boosted warheads, however, uncertainties in the precision of predicting actual yields of test devices in the [less than 1 - line of source text not declassified]region would + line of source text not declassified] region would complicate the problem of evasion.

Efficient warheads below 1000 pounds in weight which may be needed for applications such as AICBM and @@ -40825,10 +40824,10 @@ warheads it is probable that test of a device at a substantial fraction of the actual yield will be required, such as one-fourth. For tests of [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]designs, somewhat smaller fractions of the + declassified] designs, somewhat smaller fractions of the actual yields would be sufficient, such as one-eighth, though substantially more than [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified]would be required.

 + source text not declassified] would be required.

C. The Losses to the U.S. and to the USSR That Would Accrue From @@ -40921,7 +40920,7 @@ with substantial yield (kilotons) can be achieved by the U.S. at present with increased expenditure of fissionable material. Relatively cheap weapons of low weight and yield [1 line of source text - not declassified]cannot be developed without further + not declassified] cannot be developed without further testing.

Boosted Warheads. It is estimated that by diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v01.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v01.xml index 7bbfef322..d29bd5c4a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v01.xml @@ -14601,7 +14601,7 @@ >If the force strength is increased to 200 000, this would involve an eventual annual [an] increase in the GVN defense budget of $15.0 million [additional]piaster + xml:id="pg_113"/> budget of $15.0 million [additional] piaster equivalent [will be required].

b. Over the past few years the military assistance program for Viet-Nam has been as follows: FY 59, @@ -32226,7 +32226,7 @@ Taylor’s reaction. Taylor replied question presents difficulty from political point of view. Diem - said that [name deleted]talked with Chiang Kai-shek on recent visit to Taipei, who said it would be delicate matter to send troops to Viet-Nam but said he could send cadres, even for combat. November 27, 1961, 5:30 p.m.

Rusk: prob. of American impatience - is involved in VN. Gen. Choi - [Chau?]commented that many in VN who - revere Ho Chi Minh & hate - French and all Westerners. Diem is having great trouble staying in - power. We are trying to find out if a job can be done-Diem fears we are - trying to take over VN. Controlled VN. Gen. Choi [Chau?] + commented that many in VN who revere + Ho Chi Minh & hate French + and all Westerners. Diem is having great trouble staying in power. We + are trying to find out if a job can be done-Diem fears we are trying to + take over VN. Controlled VN press is pushing this line.

Johnson summarized where we are now. Talks began on 17 Nov. Diem worried over comment in message to DiemApparently a @@ -49965,7 +49965,7 @@ target="#t_MAAG1">MAAG could come up with a joint recommendation with ARVN field command on Ranger units which could best be spared from present - duties. If [He]could then, he felt persuade Diem to release + duties. If [He] could then, he felt persuade Diem to release them. General McGarr is working on this. I made it clear to Thuan, and he understands that diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v03.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v03.xml index a0fdd3877..91db123ed 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v03.xml @@ -13918,11 +13918,11 @@ sentence (1½ lines) not declassified] I have in mind one such area which could be reexamined and that is the trade union movement. As I understand it, the government is starting to take repressive measures - against Mr. Brui’s [Buu’s]union which is the only legitimate labor organization in the - country. I would think we might attempt to counter some of these - measures by discreet support of this labor organization, if we believe - it is soundly based.

+ against Mr. Brui’s [Buu’s] + union which is the only legitimate labor organization in the country. I + would think we might attempt to counter some of these measures by + discreet support of this labor organization, if we believe it is soundly + based.

At some point, of course, Diem will become aware of shift in our present policy of total public and private support of his person and family. We should face this likelihood @@ -15550,7 +15550,7 @@ strength of 575,000 in FY 64-65. This total includes a CIDG with a strength of 116,000 [less than 1 line not - declassified]which will be phased out as the Government + declassified] which will be phased out as the Government approaches its goal of control of 90 per cent of the population. In this connection, the plan considers the 18 months between FY 64 and end COMUSMACV. 2. Guidelines: Defoliation operations should be few in number, undertaken only in following circumstances: a) where - terrain and vegetation peculiarly [particularly?]favor use of herbicides; b) in areas remote from - population; and c) when hand cutting and burning are impracticable. A - few high priority projects can be undertaken in populated areas where - military advantage very clear and hand cutting and burning not - feasible.

+ terrain and vegetation peculiarly [particularly?] + favor use of herbicides; b) in areas remote from population; and c) when + hand cutting and burning are impracticable. A few high priority projects + can be undertaken in populated areas where military advantage very clear + and hand cutting and burning not feasible.

Crop Destruction: 1. All crop destruction operations must be approved in advance by Assistant Secretary FE and DOD. @@ -38041,9 +38040,9 @@ Congress. Several military experts were of the opinion that we could get by with the 2000 special service troops with perhaps [less - than 1 line not declassified]Thailand [] Thailand [less than 1 line not - declassified]occupy the area between the + declassified] occupy the area between the western border and the right bank of the Mekong in what is now northwestern Laos. [1 sentence (2 lines) not declassified]

@@ -44113,9 +44112,9 @@ assurances one way or the other from the U.S. Govt. He appears not to know what to do next. He is completely controlled by events and reacts rather than plans next moves. It seems Don himself feels he does not have the power of - [or?]enough influence over the Generals to overthrow the President. - However Don did not give the + >Don himself feels he does not have the power of [or?] + enough influence over the Generals to overthrow the President. However + Don did not give the impression that he wants by choice to overthrow the President. Don evidently wants to conciliate the Buddhists and said that the military should restore the pagodas and the @@ -45573,7 +45572,7 @@ only these three Generals. Conein and [less than 1 line not - declassified]conveying to General ] conveying to General Khiem and Khanh the following points. @@ -45726,18 +45725,18 @@

I told him that a dramatic gesture such as liberating the Buddhist prisoners would have a good effect on American opinion. He said he had - liberated most of them and to prove in [the]point - that Buddhists were small percentage of population gave me book which I - am pouching entitled “Buddhism in Viet-Nam”Not found. published by the Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon which - states “under the General Buddhist Association’s authority and general - direction, are grouped, on the one hand, 3 sanghas numbering well over - 3,000 monks and about 600 nuns, on the other hand, three communities of - disciples which branch out their ramification as far as to remote - hamlets. The figures of adherents to these three legally constituted lay - associations and their affiliates reach about 1,000,000, to which it - should be added an important number of non-associate disciples by as - much as threefold.”

+ liberated most of them and to prove in [the] + point that Buddhists were small percentage of population gave me book + which I am pouching entitled “Buddhism in Viet-Nam”Not found. published by the Xa Loi Pagoda in + Saigon which states “under the General Buddhist Association’s authority + and general direction, are grouped, on the one hand, 3 sanghas numbering + well over 3,000 monks and about 600 nuns, on the other hand, three + communities of disciples which branch out their ramification as far as + to remote hamlets. The figures of adherents to these three legally + constituted lay associations and their affiliates reach about 1,000,000, + to which it should be added an important number of non-associate + disciples by as much as threefold.”

The next two hours were spent by him in a remarkable discourse about his own family and extent to which Viet-Nam was an underdeveloped country. The serious lack of educated people, the difficulty which he had in @@ -46108,9 +46107,9 @@ generals about alternate leadership candidates. If meeting this afternoon develops favorably, however, soundings will be made.

Since above drafted have received CAS - report [document number not - declassified]suggesting Minh may be moving.

+ report [document number not declassified] + suggesting Minh may be + moving.

Lodge
diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v06.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v06.xml index e9de7d8fa..a23a0a255 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v06.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v06.xml @@ -6159,10 +6159,10 @@ equal to that of Western powers. Such measure will be understandable to both—the allies of the USA and the allies of the Soviet Union. It will not hurt the prestige of any power concerned. But - if you want to have your troops in West Berlin while there will be no - [sic]our troops there that will not be equal terms. You want us to be - guarantors on some other terms which are different from those of others, of - yours, but this is not realistic.

+ if you want to have your troops in West Berlin while there will be no [sic] + our troops there that will not be equal terms. You want us to be guarantors + on some other terms which are different from those of others, of yours, but + this is not realistic.

I know that in the West attempts are being made to interpret our proposal on guarantees as an expression of a desire to penetrate into West Berlin and to gain a foothold there. Believe me, Mr. President, we are not intruding into diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v08.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v08.xml index b53d12013..bdb78594f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v08.xml @@ -14266,14 +14266,14 @@ recalled. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]might occur from escalation of military + declassified] might occur from escalation of military action around Berlin, which could force U.S. to move from the local military action to the general war level.SIOP-62 execution of Alert Force [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This does not appear an appropriate response to the repulse of a [less than 1 line - of source text not declassified]attack, especially + of source text not declassified] attack, especially since SIOP-62 will almost inevitably alert the Soviets and, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] they will respond @@ -14318,14 +14318,14 @@ essential targets, the destruction of which would paralyze nuclear threat to U.S., bomber use becomes more attractive. Further, if 26 of essential targets are [less - than 1 line of source text not declassified]that do not - need to be hit in first wave, if 42 targets, close together, can - be hit by 21 bombers (each bomber striking two targets within 20 - minutes of one another), then to carry out this plan the U.S. - must only get [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]bombers into Soviet airspace and over - their initial targets within a 15 minute period. ([less than 1 line of source text not + than 1 line of source text not declassified] that do + not need to be hit in first wave, if 42 targets, close together, + can be hit by 21 bombers (each bomber striking two targets + within 20 minutes of one another), then to carry out this plan + the U.S. must only get [less than 1 line of + source text not declassified] bombers into Soviet + airspace and over their initial targets within a 15 minute + period. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DGZ’s-[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]) Allowing a 25% attrition rate @@ -14670,7 +14670,7 @@ positive identification of long range ballistic missile deployment complexes, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] excellent guidance as to Soviet deployment methods. - [2½ lines of source text not declassified]useful + [2½ lines of source text not declassified] useful evidence on the general status and organization of long range missile forces. Therefore, although significant gaps continue to exist and some of the available information is still open to alternate interpretations, the @@ -14680,12 +14680,12 @@ >ICBM deployment.]

Adequacy of Recent Intelligence Coverage

-

19. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]since mid-1960, our coverage of suspected deployment areas - in the USSR has been substantially - augmented. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] - Soviet missile test range installations, [less than 1 line - of source text not declassified] are now known to bear a close +

19. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + since mid-1960, our coverage of suspected deployment areas in the USSR has been substantially augmented. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] Soviet + missile test range installations, [less than 1 line of + source text not declassified] are now known to bear a close resemblance to deployment sites in the field. On the basis of this activity, combined with other information and analysis, we now estimate that we have good intelligence coverage of [7 lines of source text not @@ -14701,17 +14701,17 @@ declassified]. We previously had not suspected Yoshkar-Ola or Kostroma. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

-

21. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]many previously suspected areas did not contain ICBM complexes as of the summer of 1961. Four - areas [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]remain under active consideration as suspected - locations of ICBM deployment activity (see - Figure 9).Not printed. Past experience - indicates that some or all of the areas now under active consideration may - prove to be negative, and conversely, that deployment activity may now be - under way in other unsuspected areas. [2½ lines of source - text not declassified]

+

21. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + many previously suspected areas did not contain ICBM complexes as of the summer of 1961. Four areas [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + remain under active consideration as suspected locations of ICBM deployment activity (see Figure 9).Not printed. Past experience indicates that + some or all of the areas now under active consideration may prove to be + negative, and conversely, that deployment activity may now be under way in + other unsuspected areas. [2½ lines of source text not + declassified]

Probable ICBM Force LevelsThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in @@ -14742,14 +14742,14 @@ early stage of Soviet nuclear and missile technology, proved to be powerful and reliable but was probably too cumbersome to be deployed on a large scale. One or more first generation sites may have been started but - cancelled. [3 lines of source text not - declassified]The urgent development of at least one second generation - system probably began in about 1958, and an intensive firing program is now - underway concurrent with the construction of simplified deployment - complexes. We therefore believe that in about 1958 the Soviet leaders - decided to deploy only a small - force of first generation ICBMs while - pressing toward second generation systems.

+ cancelled. [3 lines of source text not declassified] + The urgent development of at least one second generation system probably + began in about 1958, and an intensive firing program is now underway + concurrent with the construction of simplified deployment complexes. We + therefore believe that in about 1958 the Soviet leaders decided to deploy + only a small force of first + generation ICBMs while pressing toward + second generation systems.

25. The net effect of this Soviet decision, together with whatever slippage is occurring in the development of second generation systems, has been to produce a low plateau of ICBM strength. @@ -14806,39 +14806,38 @@ >1½ lines of source text not declassified].

Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

-

28. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]confirms the large-scale deployment of 700 and 1,100 n.m. - ballistic missiles in western USSR. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] - approximately 50 fixed sites with a total of about 200 pads suitable for - launching these MRBMs have been firmly - identified in a wide belt stretching from the Baltic to the southern - Ukraine. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] we are virtually certain that there are about 10 - additional sites [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] Taking account of indicators pointing to still other - locations [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] we estimate with high confidence that in the western - belt alone there are now about 75 sites with a total of about 300 launch - pads, completed or under construction. (For known and estimated site - locations in this area, see Figure 9.)

+

28. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + confirms the large-scale deployment of 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles + in western USSR. [less + than 1 line of source text not declassified] approximately 50 fixed + sites with a total of about 200 pads suitable for launching these MRBMs have been firmly identified in a wide + belt stretching from the Baltic to the southern Ukraine. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we are virtually + certain that there are about 10 additional sites [less + than 1 line of source text not declassified] Taking account of + indicators pointing to still other locations [less than 1 + line of source text not declassified] we estimate with high + confidence that in the western belt alone there are now about 75 sites with + a total of about 300 launch pads, completed or under construction. (For + known and estimated site locations in this area, see Figure 9.)

29. The new information does not establish whether individual sites are fully operational, nor does it reveal which type of missile each is to employ. - [1½ lines of source text not - declassified]approximately three-quarters of the identified sites - appeared to be complete or nearly so, some were under construction, and the - evidence on others is ambiguous. Construction has probably been completed at - some sites [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] the installation of support equipment and missiles - could probably be accomplished relatively quickly thereafter, perhaps in a - period of some weeks. Three basic site configurations have been observed, - all of them bearing a strong resemblance to launch areas at the Kapustin Yar - rangehead (see Figure 8).Not printed. Any - of the three types could employ either 700 or 1,100 n.m. missiles, whose - size and truck-mounted support equipment are virtually identical. The sites - could not employ ICBMs, but one type might - be intended for the 2,000 n.m. IRBM which - has been under development at Kapustin Yar.

+ [1½ lines of source text not declassified] + approximately three-quarters of the identified sites appeared to be complete + or nearly so, some were under construction, and the evidence on others is + ambiguous. Construction has probably been completed at some sites [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the + installation of support equipment and missiles could probably be + accomplished relatively quickly thereafter, perhaps in a period of some + weeks. Three basic site configurations have been observed, all of them + bearing a strong resemblance to launch areas at the Kapustin Yar rangehead + (see Figure 8).Not printed. Any of the + three types could employ either 700 or 1,100 n.m. missiles, whose size and + truck-mounted support equipment are virtually identical. The sites could not + employ ICBMs, but one type might be + intended for the 2,000 n.m. IRBM which has + been under development at Kapustin Yar.

30. On the basis of the new evidence and a wealth of other material on development, production, training and deployment, we estimate that in the western belt alone the USSR now has about @@ -15880,15 +15879,15 @@ little in terms of extra target destruction.

Moreover, the theatre forces were not included in these calculations, through SIOP 465:3 ’62 includes about [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]alert aircraft and missiles from these forces. On the - other hand, with the exception of the defense suppression targets, no - targets [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] were included. However, we do not now expect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to - develop a significant long range nuclear delivery force in the time period - under consideration. If she does, and a change seems indicated, there will - be time for us to increase our forces appropriately.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + alert aircraft and missiles from these forces. On the other hand, with the + exception of the defense suppression targets, no targets [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were included. + However, we do not now expect [less than 1 line of source + text not declassified] to develop a significant long range nuclear + delivery force in the time period under consideration. If she does, and a + change seems indicated, there will be time for us to increase our forces + appropriately.

COMPARISON OF TARGET DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE FORCES

END FISCAL YEAR 1965

@@ -19597,7 +19596,7 @@ significant damage.Built up area may be used when tract data is not available. [Footnote in the source text.] [1½ lines of source - text not declassified]3 ] 3 DGZ’s for these forces will be selected in such a way as best to achieve Task III. (Floor space as such is introduced only to define the size of the forces to be allocated @@ -20780,12 +20779,12 @@ sophistication in weapon design.

- [2½ lines of source text not - declassified]Preliminary estimates give [2½ lines - of source text not declassified]. If the actual weight is - 10,000 pounds, a 25 MT warhead could be - delivered by the first generation Soviet ICBM to a range of about 5,500 n.m. + [2½ lines of source text not declassified] + Preliminary estimates give [2½ lines of source text + not declassified]. If the actual weight is 10,000 pounds, a 25 + MT warhead could be delivered by the + first generation Soviet ICBM to a range + of about 5,500 n.m. The 58 megaton device probably was actually a 100 MT weapon tested at reduced yield. Used as @@ -25055,10 +25054,10 @@ target="#t_CENTO1">CENTO, and ANZUS and the need for encouragement of their members to engage in wider regional relationships on non-defense matters, but speaks also of - “maintaining fully the Manila Pact [SEATO]as the foundation for the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia.” - The section on the United Nations places somewhat greater emphasis on its - utility for the achievement of U.S. objectives.

+ “maintaining fully the Manila Pact [SEATO] + as the foundation for the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia.” The section on + the United Nations places somewhat greater emphasis on its utility for the + achievement of U.S. objectives.

Under “Relations With Communist Regimes,” the draft omits in the section on Eastern Europe the former language on playing “‘liberation’ in a low key” but is otherwise substantively similar to the March 26 draft. In the @@ -25926,15 +25925,15 @@ xml:id="d87fn4">In a May 3 memorandum to Taylor, Legere wrote: “Flushed with anticipation over Norstad’s and JCS’s military requirement - for modernization [of NATO - forces]through MRBMs, the technipols - roll up their light artillery for the opening phase of the next battle - in the campaign to denuclearize Europe: down with tactical nuclear - weapons. We (Ewell-Smith-Legere) called this one cold, if I may say so.” - (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Tactical Nuclear Weapons Study) General - Lauris C. Norstad was - Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In an April 16 memorandum to NATO forces] + through MRBMs, the technipols roll up + their light artillery for the opening phase of the next battle in the + campaign to denuclearize Europe: down with tactical nuclear weapons. We + (Ewell-Smith-Legere) called this one cold, if I may say so.” (National + Defense University, Taylor + Papers, Tactical Nuclear Weapons Study) General Lauris C. Norstad was Supreme Allied + Commander, Europe. In an April 16 memorandum to Taylor, Ewell described Kaysen, Wiesner, Owen, ICBMs could begin in 1964. If new nosecones are developed, improved second generation missiles armed with higher yield warheads [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]could enter service by 1965, and the few SS-6’s in - the field could be retrofitted to carry [less than 1 - line of source text not declassified]. Thus, it is probable + declassified] could enter service by 1965, and the few SS-6’s + in the field could be retrofitted to carry [less than + 1 line of source text not declassified]. Thus, it is probable that the great bulk of the Soviet ICBM force through mid-1965 will carry warheads in the 3-6 MT range. By mid-1965, the accuracy of the @@ -40163,8 +40162,8 @@ >USSR. As regards a first-strike capability, we have a 2-1/2 to 3 advantage over the USSR. In the air defense field, the - USSR has a 3 advantage over us. - [sic]During the decade of the ‘60s, our advantage over the USSR has a 3 advantage over us. [sic] + During the decade of the ‘60s, our advantage over the USSR in the nuclear area will not fall below two times. In a nuclear exchange, there would be no winner, even though after such an exchange the U.S. would retain a superior capability than that @@ -40836,11 +40835,11 @@ FY 1965 for Minuteman is now increased by $274.8 million over the amount previously approved. Finally, the over-all force effectiveness of the recommended force of [less than - 1 line of source text not declassified]basic and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Improved - Minuteman, is greater than that achievable with the previously approved - force level of [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified] basic and [less than 1 line of + 1 line of source text not declassified] basic and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + Improved Minuteman, is greater than that achievable with the previously + approved force level of [less than 1 line of source text + not declassified] basic and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Improved Minuteman missiles. In terms of target destruction capabilities, the recommended force provides [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] @@ -41552,10 +41551,10 @@ not declassified]USSR military and government control centers in major urban areas, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]defense suppression targets located in corridors on - the way to the target cities. [Footnote in the source - text.] Recognizing that such estimates are necessarily + rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + defense suppression targets located in corridors on the way to the + target cities. [Footnote in the source + text.] Recognizing that such estimates are necessarily uncertain, the “most likely” factors imply that such an attack [2 lines of source text not declassified].The Soviet surprise attack on the U. S. to which this @@ -41624,21 +41623,21 @@

Granted there are uncertainties, in my judgment these calculations show that to the extent that the prospect [2 lines of source text - not declassified]already authorized, in combination with the other + not declassified] already authorized, in combination with the other planned forces should be clearly adequate for “Assured Destruction,” while a larger force would add very little from this point of view. From a Soviet viewpoint, the potential damage that could be inflicted by a United States retaliatory attack is so severe that they, the Soviets, should be deterred from initiating general nuclear war.

Because of the concentration of Communist China’s industry, [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Minuteman missiles can destroy about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the - industrial capacity or alternatively [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified] Minuteman missiles can destroy about - [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]. My recommended program is more than sufficient to cover - this possible requirement.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + Minuteman missiles can destroy about [less than 1 line of + source text not declassified] of the industrial capacity or + alternatively [less than 1 line of source text not + declassified] Minuteman missiles can destroy about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. My + recommended program is more than sufficient to cover this possible + requirement.

“Damage Limiting” Capabilities of Alternative U.S.Forces

In this section are discussed the “damage limiting” potential of alternative @@ -41656,20 +41655,20 @@ program including [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Minutemen by end FY 1969, and Force III is Secretary Zuckert’s proposal including [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Minutemen by end FY - 1969.[Here follows a footnote in the - source text that is a table with the costs of Minutemen forces for - FY 1964 through FY 1969. The total for Force III for FY 1964-1969 was [text not - declassified].] All Minuteman/Polaris missiles are - programmed to utilize a “missile-away” indicator (which allows the commander - to assess whether the missiles completed count-down and were launched). - Furthermore, the greater flexibility of Improved Minuteman is used to - enhance the performance of the basic Minuteman force by a combination of - retro-fitting improved missiles in Wing I through V silos and co-location of - Improved Minuteman squadrons with existing Minuteman wings.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + Minutemen by end FY 1969.[Here follows a footnote in the source text that is a + table with the costs of Minutemen forces for FY 1964 through FY 1969. The + total for Force III for FY 1964-1969 was + [text not declassified].] All + Minuteman/Polaris missiles are programmed to utilize a “missile-away” + indicator (which allows the commander to assess whether the missiles + completed count-down and were launched). Furthermore, the greater + flexibility of Improved Minuteman is used to enhance the performance of the + basic Minuteman force by a combination of retro-fitting improved missiles in + Wing I through V silos and co-location of Improved Minuteman squadrons with + existing Minuteman wings.

[Table (½ page of source text) not declassified]

[5 paragraphs (1½ pages of source text) @@ -41867,12 +41866,12 @@ arrive.

The following table compares four alternative U.S. forces. Force I is a force posture including [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Minutemen. Force II is the recommended force and + declassified] Minutemen. Force II is the recommended force and includes [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Minutemen. Force III is the proposal of Secretary Zuckert and includes [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Minutemen. Force IV includes the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Minutemen + >less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Minutemen proposed by the Chief of Staff, Air Force.

@@ -42056,7 +42055,7 @@ pessimistic estimate is the estimate least favorable to ourselves of those which are consistent with the available evidence. For example, we have so far achieved about a [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified]success rate in Minuteman ] success rate in Minuteman ICBM tests. Based on this and our experience with other missile programs, and assuming that we continue reliability testing and development, it is my judgment that a @@ -42215,7 +42214,7 @@ as their ability to make a pre-emptive strike against us. However, in view of the fact that the recommended U.S. force provides us with between a [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]numerical superiority in ] numerical superiority in ICBM’s alone [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], I do not believe that a further increment in our forces is required for this purpose.

@@ -42228,7 +42227,7 @@ they can stage it through peripheral staging bases. But this is a very vulnerable operation. If they have to take seriously the possibility that [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]they must plan a far less vulnerable operation + declassified] they must plan a far less vulnerable operation which would deliver fewer bombers to the United States. [5 lines of source text not declassified] However, it is clear that the recommended U.S. forces will provide enough diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v09.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v09.xml index 095ed7e02..b968c132b 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v09.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v09.xml @@ -13226,7 +13226,7 @@ fighting each other or the civil populace. In either situation, especially if accompanied by indications of possible Chinese Communist intervention, we might well, [2 lines of source text - not declassified]risk their being overrun while we tried to + not declassified] risk their being overrun while we tried to evaluate what might be an obscure situation.

Moreover, [2½ lines of source text not declassified] our position in Japan (given Japanese aversion to @@ -15155,8 +15155,8 @@ Friday morning when Managing Director will make summing up speech.

Over-all amount expected to be five to six billion. Individual commitments, operating procedures, and other details to be negotiated - this fall with view to legislative action early in 1962 in - [garble]countries where needed.

+ this fall with view to legislative action early in 1962 in [garble] + countries where needed.

Porter @@ -35112,11 +35112,11 @@ >Not found. (exchanged in connection 1962 US-Japan bilateral regarding application nondiscriminatory equalization fee) means only that imposition equalization fee would not make arrangement inoperative. - [1½ lines of source text not - declassified]Agreement does not mean, as has been suggested, that - GOJ agrees, or has abandoned right - to object. Japanese business interests will actively oppose fee at - Tariff Commission hearings. Moreover, confidential letter commits US to + [1½ lines of source text not declassified] + Agreement does not mean, as has been suggested, that GOJ agrees, or has abandoned right to + object. Japanese business interests will actively oppose fee at Tariff + Commission hearings. Moreover, confidential letter commits US to “consider taking appropriate action to remedy an adverse effect which might result therefrom,” and Takeuchi stressed that COCOM) is the principal means of carrying out the intent of Congress that the - United States should “formulate, reformulate, and apply such - [export]controls to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with all - nations with which the United States has defense treaty commitments.” - Any consideration of an expanded multilateral export control program of - the comprehensive nature described by Mr. Fowler must take account of the basic non-negotiability of such proposals in the absence of a very much worsened international climate. The lines of development in East-West relations growing from diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp.xml index 10420f050..d77bfddf8 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp.xml @@ -103382,8 +103382,8 @@ Commander. Col. Mallard carried the brunt of liaison with the military services and heavy responsibility with the State Department on military matters.

-

[less than 1 line not declassified]E.O.D. June - 1951Chief/Intel/PM Section/Cuban Task +

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. + June 1951Chief/Intel/PM Section/Cuban Task Force

[less than 1 line not declassified] reported to the Project from the FI Staff. His earlier assignments had @@ -103416,7 +103416,7 @@ is currently serving as Chief/Intel, Research, and Reports/WH/4.

-

[less than 1 line not declassified]E.O.D. +

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. February 1952C/FI Section/Cuban Task Force (Later DC/WH/4)

[less than 1 line not declassified] experience @@ -103552,7 +103552,7 @@ Brigade and maritime personnel Active during actual strike in War Room, Headquarters, Cuban Task Force. Currently Chief of Naval Mission, Ecuador.

-

[less than 1 line not declassified]E.O.D. +

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. September 1951C/CI Section/Cuban Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency as an instructor in the Ops Course in @@ -103594,7 +103594,7 @@ Section. Mr. Reichhardt has native fluency in Spanish. He is currently [less than 1 line not declassified].

-

[less than 1 line not declassified]E.O.D. +

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. September 1947Special Asst/WH/4/Cuban Task Force

Prior assignments included [less than 1 line not @@ -125202,7 +125202,7 @@ [less - than 1 line not declassified]October 31, 1962 + than 1 line not declassified] October 31, 1962

THE CRISIS [less - than 1 line not declassified]November 1, 1962 + than 1 line not declassified] November 1, 1962

THE CRISIS [less - than 1 line not declassified]November 2, 1962 + than 1 line not declassified] November 2, 1962

THE CRISIS[Several conversations are going on at once and only the following fragments are intelligible.]

Speaker ?: Take them out …

-

JFK: [Words unintelligible]Acheson [words unintelligible].

+

JFK: [Words unintelligible] Acheson [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: … a little bit later something [words unintelligible]. Yeah.

JFK: What’re we going to say up in Connecticut? You expected the [Bentley trial?].

diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v14.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v14.xml index c1f221a11..afa55d2d7 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v14.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v14.xml @@ -11446,19 +11446,19 @@ asked Germany not to cause difficulties with reference to these Soviet missions, because the three Western Allies had military missions stationed in East Germany which enabled them to get all sorts of [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]information which they otherwise might not be able to - obtain. Thus, the Chancellor again indicated that the legal situation - was an extremely complicated one; at the same time the national aspects - could not be kept out entirely. The Chancellor then continued to say that if an attack were made - on American soldiers who were trying to get unhampered access to Berlin, - to which they were entitled, then, under its NATO commitments, Western Germany would have to bring its - troops into play. Again, however, the Chancellor reiterated that this - whole thing was so complicated that he greatly welcomed the Secretary’s - suggestion that the legal situation be studied carefully before any - further steps were taken.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + information which they otherwise might not be able to obtain. Thus, the + Chancellor again indicated that the legal situation was an extremely + complicated one; at the same time the national aspects could not be kept + out entirely. The Chancellor then continued to say that if an attack were made on American soldiers who + were trying to get unhampered access to Berlin, to which they were + entitled, then, under its NATO + commitments, Western Germany would have to bring its troops into play. + Again, however, the Chancellor reiterated that this whole thing was so + complicated that he greatly welcomed the Secretary’s suggestion that the + legal situation be studied carefully before any further steps were + taken.

The Chancellor then turned to answer the President’s question regarding the action recommended in case of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, without the GDR harassing traffic. If he @@ -40490,9 +40490,9 @@ greater danger and was less desirable than direct talks between the Allied Powers and the GDR.

The Secretary added that would be no such complication, of course, if - there were an International Autobahn [Access]Authority. The Secretary of State then pointed out that the - morning’s discussion had not gotten around to the stationing of Access] + Authority. The Secretary of State then pointed out that the morning’s + discussion had not gotten around to the stationing of UN troops in West Berlin. To be sure, the Soviets had offered Soviet forces to be placed in West Berlin as guarantors of the freedom of the city. We opposed the stationing of diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v18.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v18.xml index 0d67085b1..1f322c239 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v18.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v18.xml @@ -20378,7 +20378,7 @@ Arab refugees under UN auspices and UN would have succeeded in consolidating refugees where all other means had failed. She said she - always [has]nightmares that Arabs might wake up some day and abandon + always [has] nightmares that Arabs might wake up some day and abandon attacks on Israel for simple expedient of pushing refugees across border into Israel. Israel soldiers would be there to insure they did not pass but what would world think of Israelis having to shoot thousands of @@ -23693,13 +23693,13 @@ sesame for the growth of Tudeh influence. Of course there might emerge, out of the chaos, a leader or group (no doubt from the military) who would impose authoritarian rule. Iran may yet go in this direction. At this time, - however, we see no contender worth considering1 (though we’re keeping eyes - peeled).

-

A possible exception is Timur - Bakhtiar, ex-SAVAK chief, who - certainly has such ambitions, but in whom we don’t see much (except as a - course of desperation). Indeed, we specifically warned him off at time of - May 1961 crisis. [Footnote in the source text.]1

+ however, we see no contender worth consideringA + possible exception is Timur + Bakhtiar, ex-SAVAK + chief, who certainly has such ambitions, but in whom we don’t see much + (except as a course of desperation). Indeed, we specifically warned him + off at time of May 1961 crisis. [Footnote in the source text.] + (though we’re keeping eyes peeled).

So the above alternative is not a real one yet. While we could slough off the old regime in Iran, we’d just be out of the frying pan into the fire. We’d have no way of assuring that we could protect our diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v21.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v21.xml index b89a61834..90ab9cfee 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v21.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v21.xml @@ -20242,12 +20242,12 @@ getting worried about his growing isolation. He clamped down hard on his opposition before last week’s local elections and [less than 1 line of source - text not declassified]also probably upset over reports that Ben - Bell a is training dissident + text not declassified] also probably upset over reports that + Ben Bell a is training dissident Moroccans. Behind Ben Bell a he sees Nasser, so is looking to us for reassurance.

We think a prompt [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]reply is in order and will have a draft shortly. + declassified] reply is in order and will have a draft shortly. While we too see some evidence Ben Bell a and Nasser would prefer to get rid of Hassan, it’s probably best not to enhance his [less than 1 @@ -24311,7 +24311,7 @@ primarily the resources of the Military Establishment. Expose by all means [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified]Communist Bloc + source text not declassified] Communist Bloc activities in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, which are inimical to the rights and aspirations of the individual. (This program should be carried on not only by the appropriate US @@ -35839,7 +35839,7 @@ were spared influence of politician-agitators. He reminded us he gets on well with Dr. Banda and expects do likewise with Kaunda. [2 lines of source text not - declassified]However, Field wants them to have right to their + declassified] However, Field wants them to have right to their party and DuPont, Minister of Law who was present, has prepared legislation for this purpose. Their plan is to deal with African Nationalists not by banning parties but by arresting and trying their @@ -36976,14 +36976,14 @@ current payments. Any payments made [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified]to ] to Roberto will be intermittent, through a secure, non-official cutout, in return for specific information and under no circumstances in a magnitude to permit the purchase of arms or otherwise materially supporting terrorism in Angola.A handwritten notation on the source text initialed by Johnson reads: - “[text not declassified]given + “[text not declassified] given gist of above 7/18/61 by phone. Text of points 1 & 2 forwarded by Keppand memo dated 7/18/61.”

diff --git a/volumes/frus1961-63v22.xml b/volumes/frus1961-63v22.xml index 184603c2e..f0822484f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1961-63v22.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1961-63v22.xml @@ -14320,11 +14320,10 @@ than 1 line of source text not declassified] July 10.Not found. [text not declassified] circulated as TDCSDB-3/647,621, July 19, - referred to [text not - declassified](TDCSDB-3/647,522) as reporting the training of - airdrop teams. (Kennedy - Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, - China)

+ referred to [text not declassified] + (TDCSDB-3/647,522) as reporting the training of airdrop teams. + (Kennedy Library, + National Security Files, Countries Series, China)

COMUSTDC has been studying @@ -18801,7 +18800,7 @@ these were taken to a special establishment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] where they were trained in guerrilla tactics. [5½ lines of source text not - declassified]The stated purpose was to prevent the + declassified] The stated purpose was to prevent the consolidation of the hold of the Chinese on Tibet, draw off Chinese resources into the insurrection there and keep in the public eye the image of Chinese aggression in the area.

@@ -19436,7 +19435,7 @@ January 29, 1962.

“We have two problems coming up re China: (1) probable ChiCom [ChiNat]approach on return to + target="#t_CHICOM1">ChiCom [ChiNat] approach on return to mainland; (2) question of food sales to ChiComs.

“These are of course two sides of same coin. We shouldn’t start down either road without at least considering the other. Attached is a think @@ -19767,7 +19766,7 @@ attempt without commitment to obtain specific details of Chiang’s latest plans for consideration by US authorities. Once specific plans were obtained, [less - than 1 line of source text not declassified]US military + than 1 line of source text not declassified] US military authorities here would study them for feasibility and pass their views to higher US authorities for consideration. Consensus was that in discussing problem with Chiang and his son a @@ -31925,9 +31924,9 @@ down.

Chiang replied that this had been discussed [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]yesterday and that [less - than 1 line of source text not declassified] such an - operation was feasible.

+ declassified] yesterday and that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such + an operation was feasible.

President Kennedy stated @@ -33850,7 +33849,7 @@ Avery Peterson, commenting on Farley’s report, observed that “there are fundamental elements of truth in Mr. Farley’s assessment but as a - general statement [it is]too seriously overdrawn and emotional + general statement [it is] too seriously overdrawn and emotional rather than rational.” Bacon sent Steeves a memorandum on March 10 briefing him on Farley’s report. (Ibid., 811.0085B/3-561 @@ -37834,7 +37833,7 @@ Foreign Minister and economic ministers; through Green’s contacts with one or two who are close to Pak; through [less than 1 line of - source text not declassified]talks with Col. + source text not declassified] talks with Col. Kim, head of Intelligence, and apparently second strongest man in junta. @@ -40615,9 +40614,9 @@

Meloy argues that present 600,000-man ROK force level is sacred; it was “developed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the - UN [US?]National Security Council.” To him, 180 billion hwan in - defense budget support is “vital” to Korea.

+ UN [US?] + National Security Council.” To him, 180 billion hwan in defense budget + support is “vital” to Korea.

This issue is giving Berger a liberal education. He has discovered that the old five-year plan for MAP gives defense such a high @@ -41229,7 +41228,7 @@ credibility to cause the Chinese to refrain from open intervention. This military sanction now exists. It is visible to the Chinese in the form of U.S. [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]forces now in the area.

+ not declassified] forces now in the area.

Option C

3. This option is essentially the present defense policy of the U.S. with regard to South Korea—that is, to be able to contain, on a @@ -42138,7 +42137,7 @@ With such an assurance, they would be justified in limiting the mission of South Korean forces to off-setting the North Korean establishment. Without that assurance [1½ lines of source text not - declassified]there is no military ground to support a + declassified] there is no military ground to support a substantial cut in Korean conventional forces.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified]

@@ -43849,10 +43848,10 @@

Carl—

President’s view that we could limit US/ROK force mission to meeting North Korean attack alone, - [1 line of source text not - declassified]provides an opening to get our ROK force cut [1½ lines of source text - not declassified].See 1 line of source text not declassified] + provides an opening to get our ROK force + cut [1½ lines of source text not + declassified].See footnote 1, Document 278.

I confess to a twinge as I heard the discussion, but on reflection it comes out this way: @@ -43868,12 +43867,12 @@ rend="italic">1 line of source text not declassified]

[5½ lines of source text not - declassified]Remember it was threat of nuclear + declassified] Remember it was threat of nuclear escalation which led to Korean armistice.

 [2½ lines of source text not - declassified]This, together with US “tripwire” also + declassified] This, together with US “tripwire” also there, is real deterrent which makes attack on Korea seem so poor a bet to Peiping. Thus the only circumstances under which the ChiComs would think of attacking would be firm conviction @@ -43949,13 +43948,13 @@ Forrestal)

Therefore, I see no need for President, in authorizing change in conventional mission, to give any more authority to count on use of [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]than before. We would continue, as in so many other - areas of the world, to be prepared against this contingency, for - ultimate decision at the time. Have we decided to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in case Iran - is overwhelmed, in case ChiComs invade SEA, etc.? How is Korea - different, especially when likelihood is so low?

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + than before. We would continue, as in so many other areas of the world, + to be prepared against this contingency, for ultimate decision at the + time. Have we decided to use [less than 1 line of + source text not declassified] in case Iran is overwhelmed, in + case ChiComs invade SEA, etc.? How is Korea different, especially when + likelihood is so low?

Bob K. @@ -45343,7 +45342,7 @@ return the government to civilian control in the summer of 1963, as he declared in the statement made on August 12, 1961. The President [Kennedy]particularly expressed his + >Kennedy] particularly expressed his satisfaction with the Korean government’s intention to restore civilian government at the earliest date.” (American Foreign Policy: Current @@ -47420,12 +47419,12 @@ probe this. If spoilage is overwhelmingly and disproportionately large in Yun strongholds, the opposition will have something critical to say.

-

5. So far opposition comment on Pak’s vote in Pusan is surprise - [garble]with snide reference to power failure when vote counting - [garble]. Pak’s vote in the Chollas is being attributed to strong - campaigning by the DRP with plenty of - money and liberal use of govt favors in an area where the govt knew Pak - might have trouble.

+

5. So far opposition comment on Pak’s vote in Pusan is surprise [garble] + with snide reference to power failure when vote counting [garble]. Pak’s + vote in the Chollas is being attributed to strong campaigning by the + DRP with plenty of money and liberal + use of govt favors in an area where the govt knew Pak might have + trouble.

6. More than anything the military vote will be debated back and forth. It was not rigged, that is sure. That it favored Yun is also sure. Inflationary pressure and consequent discontent help to explain it.

@@ -49005,17 +49004,17 @@ world interest.At a meeting held with the President and a larger group of officials later that afternoon, the Prime Minister “expressed fears that the importing countries would - gang up on the exporting countries in the multilateral - [textile]talks. The President commented that the best protection for - the exporting countries would be an effort to provide a mechanism - for the orderly expansion of their markets. Under these - circumstances, individual countries would not be hurt such as Japan - had been by its multilateral restrictions.” Ball then described U.S. efforts to - bring this about. Ikeda stated - that Japan considered these efforts favorably. (Memorandum of - conversation by Sneider; - Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/7-1861)

+ gang up on the exporting countries in the multilateral [textile] + talks. The President commented that the best protection for the + exporting countries would be an effort to provide a mechanism for + the orderly expansion of their markets. Under these circumstances, + individual countries would not be hurt such as Japan had been by its + multilateral restrictions.” Ball then described U.S. efforts to bring this + about. Ikeda stated that Japan + considered these efforts favorably. (Memorandum of conversation by + Sneider; Department of + State, Central Files, 611.94/7-1861)

The Prime Minister explained that Japan has embarked on a ten year program to double the national income. As advances are made Japan will diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v02.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v02.xml index 8857a3fe1..6c7557008 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v02.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v02.xml @@ -23314,10 +23314,10 @@ Soviet harassment of United States interests elsewhere might well be another step in this sequence of events. Ambassador Kohler pointed out on Thursday that - “…the Soviets will be intrigued with possibilities inherent [in - the]somewhat less enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast - Asia by [the] majority [of] Western European countries and may think - that by presenting them with [a] nasty flareup in central Europe and + “…the Soviets will be intrigued with possibilities inherent [in the] + somewhat less enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast Asia + by [the] majority [of] Western European countries and may think that + by presenting them with [a] nasty flareup in central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Viet-Nam, they have [a] real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction.” @@ -39012,8 +39012,8 @@ was any possibility of the GVN’s talking to Front leaders and persuading a couple of them to defect. Such defectors, who would say publicly the whole Front was a fraud and a - sham, would be worth a great deal—perhaps several mission - [million?]dollars in Switzerland.

+ sham, would be worth a great deal—perhaps several mission [million?] + dollars in Switzerland.

As to point D, it was agreed that it was not yet possible to determine how we would play our high cards in any negotiations and what we hoped to get for each card.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v03.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v03.xml index af3572571..75e298b5f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v03.xml @@ -9217,20 +9217,20 @@

(For the moment Catholics and Sudistes can be expected to scrutinize emerging government with wary eye. Catholics will be most unhappy if Thi-Ky-Lieu [Thieu]combination appears clearly to be dominant and consolidating - their position, particularly in the security services, and if efforts - are not made to appease their suspicions that anti-Catholic actions are - in works. Southerners will tend to interpret developments as - consolidation of north-center political control, unless there is - reasonable regional/religious balance in eventual Cabinet. Same - attitudes likely prevail among Cao - Dai and Hoa Hao, although these groups will remain split - in prevailing factions. In short, groupings opposition to Quat will remain potential opposition, - depending on their assessment of strength of Generals’ intentions, steps - may be taken to appease their interests, and possible momentum shown by - new government in prosecuting the war.)

+ corresp="#p_Ky1">Ky-Lieu [Thieu] + combination appears clearly to be dominant and consolidating their + position, particularly in the security services, and if efforts are not + made to appease their suspicions that anti-Catholic actions are in + works. Southerners will tend to interpret developments as consolidation + of north-center political control, unless there is reasonable + regional/religious balance in eventual Cabinet. Same attitudes likely + prevail among Cao Dai and Hoa + Hao, although these groups will remain split in prevailing factions. In + short, groupings opposition to Quat will remain potential opposition, depending on + their assessment of strength of Generals’ intentions, steps may be taken + to appease their interests, and possible momentum shown by new + government in prosecuting the war.)

As for any type of legislative body, we feel that decision on this should be deferred. If, after its establishment, govt draws heavy critical fire from “out” politicians, it might prove useful to provide them with forum @@ -12946,8 +12946,8 @@ towns under attack or of sending relief forces into areas favoring the ambushes of the enemy. While the former decision is most distasteful to a military commander, there will be cases, I am sure, when the shortage - of ARVN units will angle - [argue?]strongly for it.

+ of ARVN units will angle [argue?] + strongly for it.

While the number and intensity of Viet Cong incidents were increasing, Viet Cong harassment of communications routes continued to the point that all major routes leading into II Corps are now closed. As a result, @@ -20550,8 +20550,8 @@ conclude that if you don’t know where we are going—and what will happen—we shouldn’t pause and find this out?

McDonald: Sooner or later we’ll - force them to the conference table. We [They?]can’t win an all out war.

+ force them to the conference table. We [They?] + can’t win an all out war.

President: If we put in 100,000 won’t they put in an equal number?

McDonald: No. If we step up our bombing—

@@ -20992,8 +20992,8 @@

McNamara: We can stay away from “change of policy” but it is a change in risk and commitment. We need to explain why it is in our interest to do it.

-

Services have submitted budget request by [of?]$12 - billion. We can cut this down by half or more.

+

Services have submitted budget request by [of?] + $12 billion. We can cut this down by half or more.

Moyers: I don’t think the press thinks we are going to change basic policy, but the requirements to meet that policy.

@@ -46852,8 +46852,8 @@ nothing for a month. We can stop bombing, not say anything, and resume when we choose.

President: Would pressure mount to tell the press?

-

Bundy: Yes, it would be brutal. But Christmas and [Congress’ recess?]seem - a logical time to pause.

+

Bundy: Yes, it would be brutal. But Christmas and [Congress’ recess?] + seem a logical time to pause.

Ball: We don’t know if the Russians are really organizing a Communist Congress in the spring.

President: 1. Once we take our step, we could have serious problems to diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v08.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v08.xml index a7a0fc334..132f36dd7 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v08.xml @@ -60153,15 +60153,15 @@

That leaves us, Mr. Chairman, with another category of $740 million of items on which we are not making offers. These are in commodities which, to a very large extent, are supplied to us by countries who are not - participating in this negotiation. The largest part of that $756 - [$740?]million represents sugar ($458 million). In the case of sugar, - the United States reserves a very sizeable portion of its protected - internal market at the same premium prices to foreign suppliers as it - guarantees to domestic producers. It is well known that we—as well as - many other major consuming countries—have a rather clear sugar import - program and sugar policy, under which we allocate quotas. These quotas - are valuable and constitute considerable sources of income for many - exporting countries.

+ participating in this negotiation. The largest part of that $756 [$740?] + million represents sugar ($458 million). In the case of sugar, the + United States reserves a very sizeable portion of its protected internal + market at the same premium prices to foreign suppliers as it guarantees + to domestic producers. It is well known that we—as well as many other + major consuming countries—have a rather clear sugar import program and + sugar policy, under which we allocate quotas. These quotas are valuable + and constitute considerable sources of income for many exporting + countries.

We have, of course, made no further offer in this area, because the Sugar Act and the sugar policy that we follow is a matter of separate determination. All of the countries who supply to us are constantly in @@ -63296,7 +63296,7 @@ option is checked, and a handwritten note by the President’s personal secretary reads: “phoned Bator that Pres. checked #1 - and that memo was being given to M[arvin] W[atson]4–28–67 + and that memo was being given to M[arvin] W[atson] 4–28–67 5:40 p.m.” diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v10.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v10.xml index fd799c18d..9df8f642b 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v10.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v10.xml @@ -9575,7 +9575,7 @@

NOTES FOR BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

We now have [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]satellite photography for intelligence + declassified] satellite photography for intelligence purposes.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Search of very large areas for new installations. This coverage is @@ -13770,7 +13770,7 @@ target="#t_NSC1">NSC Special Committee report of August, 1963.

For the same reason [2 lines of source text not - declassified]the Department of State feels that it must also chair + declassified] the Department of State feels that it must also chair any audio countermeasures body in view of the Department’s primary role in this field.

Regarding Sections 7(c) and 7(d) of the DCI @@ -14810,7 +14810,7 @@ found.

Accordingly, I approve a total of [number not - declassified]complete nuclear weapons ([number + declassified] complete nuclear weapons ([number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1966. I also approve a total of [number not declassified] complete @@ -14818,7 +14818,7 @@ warhead elements) as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1965. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not - declassified]complete weapons and a planned retirement of [] complete weapons and a planned retirement of [number not declassified] complete weapons during FY 1966.

@@ -15087,7 +15087,7 @@ not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1965. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not declassified]complete weapons ([number not declassified] complete weapons ([number not declassified] warhead elements) and a planned retirement of [number not declassified] complete weapons ([number not declassified] warhead @@ -18001,7 +18001,7 @@ Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964). would now attempt to find out what the Foundation did with the money, [1½ lines of source text not declassified]and I + rend="italic">1½ lines of source text not declassified] and I thought the consequences would be very serious. Furthermore [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would become involved. I hoped this would not occur but I thought it would. @@ -19010,7 +19010,7 @@ this goal, as a deterrent or retaliatory measure in case a potential adversary develops a capability, as a supplement to nuclear weapons, or possibly as the best available substitute for them. [3 - lines of source text not declassified](Paras. 17–24) + lines of source text not declassified] (Paras. 17–24)

[Here follow the Discussion section (pages 4–8); Part II. Capabilities (pages 8–9); Part III. Intentions (pages 9–11); and Appendix (page 13).]

@@ -19079,7 +19079,7 @@ Soviet and US policies have had some effect in hindering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. [4½ lines of source - text not declassified](Para. 41) + text not declassified] (Para. 41) In terms of broad international implications, the impact of the proliferation which is already occurring—in France and Communist @@ -23528,7 +23528,7 @@ The Department of Defense is authorized to: Obtain custody of up to a total of [number not declassified]elements; + >number not declassified] elements; Disperse atomic weapons in the United States without limit providing the total number of nuclear components and @@ -27292,8 +27292,8 @@ declassified] (even with Posture B) would be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] U.S. fatalities instead of the [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]shown on the table. Even more important to the outcome - of a [less than 1 line of source text not + declassified] shown on the table. Even more important to the + outcome of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is the question of the speed and nature of Soviet response. We estimate that the Soviets have the ability to place their missiles on alert during a crisis, and, in the case of their hard missiles, @@ -34335,7 +34335,7 @@ 133.

Accordingly, I approve a total of [number not - declassified]complete nuclear weapons ([number + declassified] complete nuclear weapons ([number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968. I also approve a total of [number not declassified] complete @@ -34343,12 +34343,12 @@ warhead elements) as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1967. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not - declassified]nuclear warhead elements and a planned retirement of + declassified] nuclear warhead elements and a planned retirement of [number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements during FY 1968, resulting in a net - reduction of [number not declassified]nuclear warhead - elements during FY 1968 under the adjusted - FY 1967 stockpile.

+ reduction of [number not declassified] nuclear + warhead elements during FY 1968 under the + adjusted FY 1967 stockpile.

I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to produce and retire those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve @@ -35529,7 +35529,7 @@ replacements.

Since all 600 Minuteman IIs will be available by July 1969, I am also recommending a rate of 40 [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]Mark-17s per month, which will lead to the + not declassified] Mark-17s per month, which will lead to the complete replacement of all Mark-LLAs by end FY70. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] By buying @@ -43375,14 +43375,14 @@ 32)

Accordingly, I approve a total of [number not - declassified]nuclear warheads as the stockpile composition for the + declassified] nuclear warheads as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1969. I also approve a total of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads and a planned retirement of [number not - declassified]nuclear warheads during ] nuclear warheads during FY 1969, resulting in a net reduction of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads during FY 1969 under the adjusted number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs in FY 69 and [number not - declassified]bombs in FY 70 + declassified] bombs in FY 70 and thereafter. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing down the tactical @@ -50164,7 +50164,7 @@ U.S. Programmed Force plus [number not - declassified]MK–3s on Poseidon + declassified] MK–3s on Poseidon [*] [*] [*] @@ -50960,7 +50960,7 @@ target="#t_FY1">FY 1969.

The proposed FY 1970 operational stockpile, submitted for your consideration, consists of [number not - declassified]nuclear warheads. ] nuclear warheads. This objective is to be achieved during FY 1970 by the production of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This is a net @@ -51061,7 +51061,7 @@ Approve the revised stockpile of [number not - declassified]nuclear warheads for end ] nuclear warheads for end FY 1969 tabulated in Column 2 of Inclosure 1. @@ -52245,7 +52245,7 @@ B) may be exceeded by [number not declassified] in the event of unforeseen contingencies; however, the ceiling of [number not - declassified]weapons in ] weapons in NATO Europe may not be exceeded; (b) the grand total of weapons outside the United States (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under full U.S. control other than the U.S.) shall not @@ -53969,8 +53969,8 @@

a Costs are over and above the cost of - programmed forces with [number not declassified]Mk-3s - on programmed Poseidon and an increased bomber alert rate.

+ programmed forces with [number not declassified] + Mk-3s on programmed Poseidon and an increased bomber alert rate.

b Includes Research and Development (R&D) costs.

@@ -56224,7 +56224,7 @@ recent years has resulted in a substantial increase in the size, cost, complexity and importance of the national intelligence effort. [4 lines of source text not declassified] About [number not declassified]personnel, civilian and + rend="italic">number not declassified] personnel, civilian and military, are engaged in some aspect of intelligence activities in which many departments and agencies take part. Most of the money and manpower resources devoted to foreign intelligence activities are allocated to @@ -56531,8 +56531,8 @@ DIA’s centralized management and control have resulted in more efficient use of attache resources, better handling of [less than 1 line of source - text not declassified]requirements levied by the Department - of Defense and the Military Services, and improved [] requirements levied by the + Department of Defense and the Military Services, and improved [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. @@ -56689,7 +56689,7 @@ Communication of Signals Intelligence. In order that the National Security Agency may carry out its mission, it is imperative that it manage and control all [less than 1 - line of source text not declassified]Signals Intelligence + line of source text not declassified] Signals Intelligence material [2 lines of source text not declassified]. This requires continued administration by the National Security Agency of facilities for the communication of such diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v11.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v11.xml index 000a5064d..4ea1db993 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v11.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v11.xml @@ -14795,7 +14795,7 @@ >USSR; these are located at Kyshtym in the Urals, and near Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. [4½ lines of source text not declassified] (Para. 21)

-

4. [7½ lines of source text not declassified](Paras. +

4. [7½ lines of source text not declassified] (Paras. 25-26)

5. Future production estimates have taken into consideration Khrushchev’s statement in April 1964 that @@ -14868,9 +14868,9 @@ fissionable materials, and size, and perhaps decreased yield. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] However, possible undetected tests and [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]might have provided the Soviets with still smaller - low-yield weapons. (Paras. 41-45)

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + might have provided the Soviets with still smaller low-yield weapons. + (Paras. 41-45)

10. Thermonuclear Developments. By 1958 the Soviets had tested a variety of thermonuclear devices [2 lines of source text not declassified]. In 1961 and 1962, the Soviets @@ -14907,9 +14907,9 @@ lines of source text not declassified]. Improvements in Soviet low-yield devices which could occur during the period of this estimate are more likely to emphasize the development of small-diameter [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]warheads rather than [6½ lines of source - text not declassified].

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + warheads rather than [6½ lines of source text not + declassified].

15. Underground testing and simulation techniques would permit the acquisition of a limited amount of weapon effects data, including the effect of ground shock upon hardened underground structure, the effects of nuclear @@ -25573,8 +25573,8 @@ own security and that of their allies. In meantime, reports had appeared, Gromyko said, that de facto decisions had been taken to give access to Germans “on political plane.” If - this were so, truth would [come]out sooner or later and this would eliminate - possibility of non-proliferation agreement.

+ this were so, truth would [come] out sooner or later and this would + eliminate possibility of non-proliferation agreement.

5. I pointed out that this got down to question of definition, and asked Gromyko to clarify whether in his remarks on this subject to Supreme Soviet he had been referring to present @@ -28286,11 +28286,11 @@ With respect to ABM weapons, we think there is about an even chance that the Soviets have already [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + exoatmosphere ABM warhead yielding [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]exoatmosphere ABM - warhead yielding [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]. If they have not already done so, a Threshold - Treaty would not, in our view, make such a development impossible, as we + declassified]. If they have not already done so, a Threshold Treaty + would not, in our view, make such a development impossible, as we believe existing Soviet weapon technology would support it either without further testing, or with tests that would have a reasonable chance of not exceeding the threshold. (Paras. 10-12, 20, 21) @@ -29063,7 +29063,7 @@ The original has not been found. He said the Commission’s view was that the IDA Study was overly optimistic with regard to possible modifications under a threshold test ban [less than ½ line of source text not declassified]for + rend="italic">less than ½ line of source text not declassified] for ABM warheads. IDA Study S-235, “Special Nike-X Warhead @@ -36819,7 +36819,7 @@ the first instance should be limited to elements outlined in paragraph 5 above. We hope it will be possible on this basis to engage in the dialogue necessary before we can settle on a specific proposal. At the - same time [we]recognize the reserved and suspicious attitude taken by + same time [we] recognize the reserved and suspicious attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward discussions of the strategic balance. We hope that the positive reference to the long-term possibilities of agreements on reductions, as well to Secretary Rusk. In a January 11 memorandum to Rusk, Under Secretary Ball commented: “[It]is, in my + corresp="#p_BGW1">Ball commented: “[It] is, in my judgment, an absolutely first class job” and suggested that Dillon discuss his views with President Johnson. The @@ -21687,13 +21687,13 @@ SOURCE AND APPRAISAL [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]senior Italian [less than 1 + declassified] senior Italian [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whose opinions, we believe, reflect fairly well the opinions generally prevailing within a wide segment of the Italian [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and whose views on occasions have been [less than 1 line of source - text not declassified]given limited distribution at high + text not declassified] given limited distribution at high levels of the Italian Government [1 line of source text not declassified] Appraisal—2, that the views of the Italian [less than 1 line of @@ -21799,7 +21799,7 @@ Later on the same day [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the above views were discussed with [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]who said that he concurred in them. In + not declassified] who said that he concurred in them. In this connection this senior officer referred to an article in the 28 May 1964 issue of Il Borghese (a rightist periodical) written by Giani Preda entitled, “L’Ora Del ‘Matto’” which promotes the idea @@ -21919,19 +21919,19 @@ Republic was not taken seriously by Italy’s security and military leaders. Pacciardi had some good ideas and was honest and in earnest, but his [omission in the source - text]attract all kinds of people and to draw - everybody in his movement who had a grudge against - the present Italian Republic, from the extreme left - to the extreme right. This motley group of people - had no political or ideological cohesion; their only - common denominator was dissatisfaction with the - status quo. Particularly weak and uninfluential were - old ex-military officers who had flocked to - Pacciardi’s banner. Pacciardi’s movement will end - like Giannini’s Qualunquismo of the late 1940’s.” - Copy of above cited report is being mailed to your - office attn: PDN-CI.

+ rend="italic">omission in the source text] + attract all kinds of people and to draw everybody in + his movement who had a grudge against the present + Italian Republic, from the extreme left to the + extreme right. This motley group of people had no + political or ideological cohesion; their only common + denominator was dissatisfaction with the status quo. + Particularly weak and uninfluential were old + ex-military officers who had flocked to Pacciardi’s + banner. Pacciardi’s movement will end like + Giannini’s Qualunquismo of the late 1940’s.” Copy of + above cited report is being mailed to your office + attn: PDN-CI.

@@ -26554,7 +26554,7 @@ Currently, socialist unification has been achieved and the Christian Democratic Party (DC), [1 line of source text not - declassified]despite continuing financial problems, is + declassified] despite continuing financial problems, is at least for the time being well united behind its incumbent political secretary. Domestic funds are available if [less than 1 line of source text not diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v14.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v14.xml index 399e21d95..d4d47155f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v14.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v14.xml @@ -42175,7 +42175,7 @@

Eisenhower: Well, I’ll tell you. You know if you could just pass on [thinking that you had gotten these - people to do anything]constructive and reasonable, [it would be + people to do anything] constructive and reasonable, [it would be great].The bracketed portions in this paragraph, which are unintelligible due to distortion in the dictabelt recording, are taken from a transcript of the conversation diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v15.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v15.xml index bcb9b0fd4..590bd7e87 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v15.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v15.xml @@ -10325,7 +10325,7 @@ expressed to us before very cautiously, as probably the one most significant feature of the Texas talks. The Chancellor obviously continues to be bemused with the hope that he can “buy” a - solution to the German problem [garble]through some further + solution to the German problem [garble] through some further economic “sacrifice” by the German people. He keeps returning to it despite the domestic political and budgetary difficulties it would involve, and an agreed policy with us against the @@ -20290,12 +20290,12 @@ orally from the verbatim text of the backgrounder the statements made as to the importance of a solution of the German problem. In the light of his experience, however, the Secretary was convinced - [that]before a serious initiative could be undertaken, answers on an - agreed Four-Power basis must be found to certain questions which the - Soviets might raise. This did not mean answers to all questions at - the outset, but at least enough so as not to be caught off balance - by the Soviets. I pointed out that the US, through a series of - discussions by President Kennedy, President Johnson, and Secretary Rusk with Soviet

Mr. President:

These two [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]reports on German politics give a pretty clear picture - of what Erhard is up against.Attached but not printed are two July 12 - reports. + declassified] reports on German politics give a pretty clear + picture of what Erhard is up + against.Attached but not printed are two + July 12 reports.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v17.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v17.xml index 5e34cfd63..de4833a25 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v17.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v17.xml @@ -35603,23 +35603,24 @@ ought to ask Soviet Ambassador who was scheduled to call on him immediately after me, “but then I am afraid you would not get an answer.” He said he thought Soviets were - [garble—finally?]convinced that to intervene directly would: - (1) cause disruption of relative detente in Europe; (2) - deprive them of support of major parties in international - Communist movement all of whom vehemently opposed Soviet - intervention; (3) have a disastrous effect on upcoming - Moscow Conference of ComParties when already several - parties, including Yugoslavia, had indicated they would not - participate; (4) be a serious setback to Soviet prestige - among the non-aligned countries; and (5) set back currently - improving US-Soviet relations. Pavicevic observed that all - key foreign CP’s (i.e., all - those except Warsaw “Five”) were opposed to intervention and - that for first time in international Communist world USSR - was “isolated“; its only support came from parties (e.g. - West German, one of Greek splinters, etc.) with no power or - influence. Nevertheless, Soviets made great contribution in - finding way out of direct clash. + [garble—finally?] convinced that to intervene directly + would: (1) cause disruption of relative detente in Europe; + (2) deprive them of support of major parties in + international Communist movement all of whom vehemently + opposed Soviet intervention; (3) have a disastrous effect on + upcoming Moscow Conference of ComParties when already + several parties, including Yugoslavia, had indicated they + would not participate; (4) be a serious setback to Soviet + prestige among the non-aligned countries; and (5) set back + currently improving US-Soviet relations. Pavicevic observed + that all key foreign CP’s + (i.e., all those except Warsaw “Five”) were opposed to + intervention and that for first time in international + Communist world USSR was “isolated“; its only support came + from parties (e.g. West German, one of Greek splinters, + etc.) with no power or influence. Nevertheless, Soviets made + great contribution in finding way out of direct + clash. US policy in Czech crisis: Pavicevic said it was Yugoslav assessment that US policy had been correct one. He said it diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v18.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v18.xml index 7611d6387..1a2a3c75b 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v18.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v18.xml @@ -19555,7 +19555,7 @@ explained how they proposed to handle the tank deal through Italy. Only three people—Defense Minister Andreotti, his intelligence chief, and the deputy intelligence chief would be witting of the ultimate tank destination. - [1½ lines of source text not declassified]Since + [1½ lines of source text not declassified] Since this would be an arms export from one NATO country to another, no licenses were required. The tanks would end up in Naples and be reexported from there. [1 line of source @@ -25009,11 +25009,11 @@ a senior to a lesser official, it is problematic whether we get a letter in response to the President’s message. He noted that, meanwhile, Nasser had reactivated a long-unused [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]channel to express his desire to avoid further - deterioration in our relations.A December 28 - memorandum from Jernegan to - Rusk reported several less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + channel to express his desire to avoid further deterioration in our + relations.A December 28 memorandum from + Jernegan to Rusk reported several UAR feelers seeking improved relations. (Ibid., POL UAR-US)

@@ -31630,7 +31630,7 @@ politically possible for Eshkol to do more than the above, without long and full analysis of this problem, including deterrent - effect of keeping [garble]guessing plus IAEA technical problems.

In sum I recommend that we not attempt to force Israelis beyond what Eshkol can @@ -44172,9 +44172,9 @@ options.A May 21 memorandum from Rostow to the President laid out options for meeting a request from Feinberg to increase [text not declassified]support for Israeli - technical assistance programs in Africa. (Ibid.) My - recommendation is: I tell Feinberg that the + rend="italic">text not declassified] support for + Israeli technical assistance programs in Africa. (Ibid.) + My recommendation is: I tell Feinberg that the Israeli Government will be hearing about this matter shortly through regular [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v20.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v20.xml index 8a637637f..cfb1c825e 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v20.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v20.xml @@ -16520,12 +16520,12 @@ of source text not declassified] statement that they will oppose by force if necessary. They see any Egyptian moves without their approval as a violation of the August cease-fire agreement.

-

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]says - the UAR is working secretly to clear the - whole Canal without Israel’s approval. He suggests that the Egyptians may - provide information on the remaining obstacles in the Canal to permit Soviet - vessels in Port Said to transit the Canal and present Israel with a “fait - accompli.”

+

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + says the UAR is working secretly to clear + the whole Canal without Israel’s approval. He suggests that the Egyptians + may provide information on the remaining obstacles in the Canal to permit + Soviet vessels in Port Said to transit the Canal and present Israel with a + “fait accompli.”

He then said he believes Israel and the US have a common interest in keeping the northern part of the Canal blocked to keep the Soviet navy away from Yemen, Aden and the Persian Gulf.

@@ -45131,8 +45131,8 @@

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of latest secret Israeli-Jordan exchange:[text not - declassified](Ibid.) + xml:id="d305fn2">[text not declassified] + (Ibid.) —top level meeting postponed until Nov. 19; @@ -52257,11 +52257,11 @@ Rostow could”. not agree, however that we were on wrong course. Our policy had not changed; Secretary had stressed President’s Five Principles in his talk with Riad, making clear - there could be no withdrawal except to [on?]condition of peace established through agreement. We had - relied on Foreign Minister Eban’s - statements to us in telling UAR we saw - no need for territorial changes in Sinai, on condition that there was + there could be no withdrawal except to [on?] + condition of peace established through agreement. We had relied on + Foreign Minister Eban’s statements + to us in telling UAR we saw no need for + territorial changes in Sinai, on condition that there was demilitarization and guaranteed free navigation. Rostow said he could not see how this had damaged Israel’s negotiating position. As was case with our reply to diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v22.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v22.xml index 3728e7350..6d6a86c13 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v22.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v22.xml @@ -12967,7 +12967,8 @@ name). He inveighed against Israeli and Jewish influence in Iran, complained against lack of freedom of public expression for the religious leaders, and took an oblique swipe at the New Iran Party. [1 line of - source text not declassified]/3/

+ source text not declassified]Not + printed.

On the whole, qualified observers feel that even though Khomeini continues to remonstrate against the regime and its policies, there has been a slight toning-down in his diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v23.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v23.xml index 2bf629dbe..7bc9f5e1d 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v23.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v23.xml @@ -42842,8 +42842,8 @@ 441. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–02502R, [cryptonym - not declassi-fied]/Dev. & Plans, [text - not declassified], Aug. ’64 thru Jan. 1967. Secret; []/Dev. & Plans, [text not + declassified], Aug. ’64 thru Jan. 1967. Secret; [cryptonym not declassified]. No time of receipt appears on the message. Leopoldville, 494. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–02502R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, [cryptonym - not declassified]/ Dev. & Plans, [text - not declassified], Aug. ’64 thru Jan. 1967. Secret. There is no + not declassified]/Dev. & Plans, [text not + declassified], Aug. ’64 thru Jan. 1967. Secret. There is no drafting information on the original. Washington, April 3, diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v25.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v25.xml index cb6db9dc3..2247fc4a6 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v25.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v25.xml @@ -21458,7 +21458,7 @@ other peoples of Asia. I thought that this distorted view might have contributed to the regrettable attack on the USIS Library in Dacca by a student - [garble]August 6 and the anti-US demonstrations in Chittagong on + [garble] August 6 and the anti-US demonstrations in Chittagong on August 7. I mentioned the apparent lack of alertness on the part of the Daiw police in dealing with the Dacca incident. Ayub said he greatly regretted these incidents and he was investigating the diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v28.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v28.xml index 05545c694..c42be47d6 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v28.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v28.xml @@ -14143,7 +14143,7 @@ commando or guerrilla units and were paid through FAR. This will require expansion of secret base [less than 1 line of - text not declassified]where personnel are + text not declassified] where personnel are trained. @@ -14566,7 +14566,7 @@ Laos, and arrangements made to cross-fertilize the various intelligence operations in the area. (Action: FE [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]arrange for immediate integration of + not declassified] arrange for immediate integration of Vientiane reporting and participate with OCI, DIA, etc., in this center). Secretary @@ -14910,7 +14910,7 @@ We believe use US pilots in T–28’s represents excessive risk at this time. [2 lines of source text not - declassified]In view ineffectiveness Lao pilots, + declassified] In view ineffectiveness Lao pilots, believe substantial operational advantages would be realized if Thai prepared to furnish pilots and Bangkok should approach RTG urgently with this @@ -17054,7 +17054,7 @@ authority to return fire. The purpose is to get a better feel for the situation in Laos. (2) Continue to build up T–28 strike capability and use Lao and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Thai pilots. + >less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Thai pilots. (3) Build up Thai “paru” operations in Laos. (4) Build up offensive guerrilla (Hardnose) operations. (5) Priority effort on GVN border patrols. (6) Cross-border @@ -21221,8 +21221,8 @@ Embassy suggested that lines should be drawn beyond which Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces could not pass without triggering a U.S. reaction ranging from air operations to the introduction of U.S. - troops. (Ibid.) Another element to be introduced - [garble]could be use Thai ground forces ( Another element to be introduced [garble] + could be use Thai ground forces (Deptel 2319 to Bangkok)In telegram 2319 to Bangkok, June 19, the Department reported that a Thai official had suggested the use of Thai volunteers in Laos much @@ -24758,7 +24758,7 @@ this pilot is Thai.)

Meanwhile, it is believed that the two Thais in the original T–28 have escaped into the brush and may be - in the hands of friendly Mao [Meo]tribesmen.

+ in the hands of friendly Mao [Meo] tribesmen.

The net of this somewhat messy operation is that no Americans are lost, as far as we know, although the one helicopter pilot has been severely wounded.

@@ -32360,7 +32360,7 @@ During the election campaign, rumors of coups were rife in Vientiane. [3 lines of source text not - declassified]There will always be a threat to stability, + declassified] There will always be a threat to stability, however, as long as command relationships remain in contention and distrust persists among the military leaders, particularly between Vientiane and the field commanders. However, we believe the chances @@ -33323,7 +33323,7 @@ target="#t_Deptel1">Deptel 1121). Ambassador Sullivan replied that no such Lao [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified]pilots are proficient enough to + not declassified] pilots are proficient enough to perform the task.

a. L/FE has reminded us that civilians who engage in hostilities are usually treated as @@ -34976,9 +34976,9 @@

10. I could go on and argue this case for several more paragraphs but feel I must have essentially made my point clear by now. Hence, I will stop here. However, I am stopping only to elicit a response. If, as I - hope, others in Washington have already laid this issue out - [for?]discussion, I shall rest easy. If no such discussion is underway, - I would like to open it by a further, more detailed brief. Please let me + hope, others in Washington have already laid this issue out [for?] + discussion, I shall rest easy. If no such discussion is underway, I + would like to open it by a further, more detailed brief. Please let me have reaction soonest.In telegram 686 from Vientiane, December 27, Sullivan complained that he had no reaction to his @@ -38815,13 +38815,13 @@ of source text not declassified]. It will therefore be necessary for CAS to request supplemental appropriations for this purpose in the amount of [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]in FY 1967.This recommendation was approved at the 303 - Committee meeting of September 15 as an “exemplary success story.” - U. Alexis Johnson - reiterated Bundy’s belief that the operations - aided the U.S. position in Thailand. (Minutes of the 303 Committee, + rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + in FY 1967.This recommendation was approved at the 303 Committee meeting of + September 15 as an “exemplary success story.” U. Alexis Johnson reiterated + Bundy’s belief that the operations aided + the U.S. position in Thailand. (Minutes of the 303 Committee, September 15; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 9/15/66)

@@ -45877,7 +45877,7 @@ South Laos is a particularly striking example of forward motion on these objectives. During the past year roadwatch team effort [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]has been expanded from an intermittent + declassified] has been expanded from an intermittent coverage of a few spots to an almost continuous coverage of all major trafficable routes running from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam. A trained and experienced pool of [3. Judgment here is that overcoming Thai reluctance to permit [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]teams to stage through Nakhon Phanom, + declassified] teams to stage through Nakhon Phanom, utilizing isolated, fenced facilities, is less formidable obstacle than political risk to Souvanna of use of US/Thai teams. @@ -49324,7 +49324,7 @@ SOURCE [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]This is a field appraisal of the current + declassified] This is a field appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this Agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretation of [1 line of source text not declassified] at diff --git a/volumes/frus1964-68v34.xml b/volumes/frus1964-68v34.xml index c0c6fe266..c7b8a1330 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1964-68v34.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1964-68v34.xml @@ -13642,7 +13642,7 @@ >ELDO to several of the NATO foreign ministers, including Michael Stewart [of the UK]and UK] and Fanfani [Italy].” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files @@ -29312,7 +29312,7 @@ telegram 1304 from Baghdad, when Talib asked the Ambassador for his assessment of the situation, Armstrong said: “Seemed clear SARG desired to [do]something to + target="#t_SARG1">SARG desired to [do] something to consolidate own shaky position, make Syria leader in Arab causes, deal serious blow to West (but IPC replacing lost oil from other sources), force @@ -32621,7 +32621,7 @@ merely that it seemed very late hour for calling off meeting scheduled to convene on Monday. Jordan did not know reactions of Beckett, but expected - that he would be getting [garble]in next few hours. We asked Jordan + that he would be getting [garble] in next few hours. We asked Jordan whether if meeting took place despite French proposal for postponement, French representative would attend. He was clearly not prepared for this question, and said merely that no decision in this diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v01.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v01.xml index 46b151d20..721db4ee4 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v01.xml @@ -9507,9 +9507,9 @@ invite Soviet adventurism in area; can let people talk about it but not do anything about.

What really rides on Vietnam, is whether US - people are going to play big role in world or not. That question is [in]very - serious doubt. Mass of people usually think right but intellectuals oppose - all but passive + people are going to play big role in world or not. That question is [in] + very serious doubt. Mass of people usually think right but intellectuals + oppose all but passive US role. How can we conduct policies in Asia so that we can play role we should: @@ -16061,9 +16061,9 @@ Soviets. We received a great deal of vociferous pressure from many well-meaning groups that we should immediately plunge into these negotiations. We hesitated. Indeed, we did not do it. We did not [sic]hesitate, but we did not do it because we did not - want to engage in negotiations on a subject of this magnitude until we knew - what we were talking about.

+ rend="italic">sic] hesitate, but we did not do it because we did + not want to engage in negotiations on a subject of this magnitude until we + knew what we were talking about.

The danger of going into these negotiations precipitately was that we would spend two-thirds of the time negotiating with ourselves and one-third of the time negotiating with the Soviets. If you look at the history of the nuclear @@ -16260,7 +16260,7 @@ be done in Vietnam. I asked them to read that speech because it turns out there is nothing in that speech that we have not already done and exceeded. So what the professors of 1968 considered a daring program, we have gone far - beyond. In 1968 [sic]when we came in, the number of + beyond. In 1968 [sic] when we came in, the number of troops was still increasing.

We have announced withdrawals of over 260,000. In 1968 the issue of whether one would even talk to the National Liberation Front was not settled. There @@ -19911,10 +19911,9 @@ one authority the economic and military assistance programs which are necessary to shoulder the responsibility for defense without endangering the freedom and independence of our allies and friends.

-

“The resources that are being requested are approximately at the same - [level]as the funding of these programs last year. They are small, we - believe, compared to the savings and reductions of American troops - overseas.

+

“The resources that are being requested are approximately at the same [level] + as the funding of these programs last year. They are small, we believe, + compared to the savings and reductions of American troops overseas.

“On the other hand, the International Development Assistance Act will provide us with a vital instrument to support our long-term foreign policy interests in developing countries.

@@ -22283,8 +22282,8 @@ leave the scene.”

The President declared that “We have to look closely at our whole American purpose as to whether or not it is possible for one [sic] [non-Communist]country to defend itself and leave. We know it - is possible for a Communist country to do that. I am not sure. We shall + >sic] [non-Communist] country to defend itself and leave. We know + it is possible for a Communist country to do that. I am not sure. We shall see.” Nixon ordered Kissinger to “call Dobrynin in” and relate the current U.S. diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v03.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v03.xml index f0bbfd46d..695d487d0 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v03.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v03.xml @@ -11636,8 +11636,8 @@ of the Japanese government is to … aim at a rational approach to bilateral economic issues … and in keeping with the increase in Japan’s national strength, to fulfill international obligations commensurate - with Japan’s status as the leading Asian developed country…. - [Japan’s]role should be to progressively assume international political + with Japan’s status as the leading Asian developed country…. [Japan’s] + role should be to progressively assume international political responsibilities, and to contribute actively in the field of economic development.” (Telegram 3311 from Tokyo; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, E 1 US)

-

Reporting from Bonn [text not - declassified]indicated that Chancellor Brandt thought that the fact that the G-10 reached agreement was evidence of - “cohesion in the Western Alliance” despite the “fact that in reaching an - economic agreement ‘some nations’ had ‘ganged up’ on the FRG and placed before the Germans some - already-agreed-upon decisions” (understood to be the Azores Agreement). - Brandt reportedly hoped it - would be possible to reach agreement with France on agricultural - policies, but Minister of Agriculture Josef Ertl highlighted difficult - obstacles to an agreement with the United States as U.S. proposals would - depress the prices received by German farmers. Minister of Economics and - Finance Schiller was concerned - with reaching agreement with France on the Mark-franc exchange rate and - “complained that the French were insisting on fixed parities and were - not agreeing to the general guidelines laid down by the Ten, - particularly as far as parity bands were concerned.” (Telegram [document number not declassified] from Bonn, - December 23; ibid., Nixon - Presidential Materials, NSC Files, - Country Files—Europe, Box 686, Germany, Volume X 9/71-12/71)

+

Reporting from Bonn [text not declassified] + indicated that Chancellor Brandt + thought that the fact that the G-10 + reached agreement was evidence of “cohesion in the Western Alliance” + despite the “fact that in reaching an economic agreement ‘some nations’ + had ‘ganged up’ on the FRG and placed + before the Germans some already-agreed-upon decisions” (understood to be + the Azores Agreement). Brandt + reportedly hoped it would be possible to reach agreement with France on + agricultural policies, but Minister of Agriculture Josef Ertl + highlighted difficult obstacles to an agreement with the United States + as U.S. proposals would depress the prices received by German farmers. + Minister of Economics and Finance Schiller was concerned with reaching agreement with + France on the Mark-franc exchange rate and “complained that the French + were insisting on fixed parities and were not agreeing to the general + guidelines laid down by the Ten, particularly as far as parity bands + were concerned.” (Telegram [document number not + declassified] from Bonn, December 23; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files—Europe, Box 686, + Germany, Volume X 9/71-12/71)

Background information provided to Congress in February 1972, when the administration sent forward the proposed legislation on modification of the par value of the dollar diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v05.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v05.xml index 3ba036517..e1a5dd737 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v05.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v05.xml @@ -26539,8 +26539,8 @@ as possible. To hold meetings of SC in capitals of countries which have active items before the Council, would, in our view, not contribute - to a severe [serene?]atmosphere. + to a severe [serene?] + atmosphere. Obviously in considering this new item full account must be taken of its financial implications. It is no secret that @@ -53649,12 +53649,12 @@

(Dr. Kissinger left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Irwin: This argues for universality. I agree - that with dual representation alone [i.e., without - universality]Communist China would prevail in a relatively short time. - They may prevail even with universality, but with the UN on record in favor of universality, it - would be harder to move against the GRC. - Overall, I think we would be better to go with universality.

+ that with dual representation alone [i.e., without universality] + Communist China would prevail in a relatively short time. They may + prevail even with universality, but with the UN on record in favor of universality, it would be harder + to move against the GRC. Overall, I + think we would be better to go with universality.

Mr. Wright: There is another problem related to the tie-in between dual representation and the important question. If circumstances are such that the important @@ -62231,7 +62231,7 @@ the UN. The Chinese Government earnestly hopes and requests that - the [US]Government, in conjunction with other friendly + the [US] Government, in conjunction with other friendly powers, will do everything possible to defeat the Albanian type of proposal for the expulsion of the GRC and admission of the diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v08.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v08.xml index c065720e5..8d187701c 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v08.xml @@ -16668,19 +16668,19 @@ contingency plan in terms—because it is well to give enormous discretion, because there may be a day or a time when something very sensitive may be discussed on the diplomatic front. It might be, for - example, one of the reasons you don’t give them just a blank [unclear]in - this thing is that who knows? Maybe not too good a chance, but it could - be. But who knows whether or not, perhaps, there can be some nibble in - the negotiating. If there is—I’m just using that as an example—you have - to be in a position to know whether you want to do it at that time or at - another time. That’s what we have to do; we can’t go flat-footed. On the - other hand, when we see other contingency plans, let’s see not only what - the North, but the South Vietnamese we’ve got, who have been trained, - but they’re still somewhat ignorant in terms of modern warfare is - concerned, what they have asked for, what General Abrams asked for, but also what the - CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs, and - the rest have come up with as to what we can do to that we are not + example, one of the reasons you don’t give them just a blank [unclear] + in this thing is that who knows? Maybe not too good a chance, but it + could be. But who knows whether or not, perhaps, there can be some + nibble in the negotiating. If there is—I’m just using that as an + example—you have to be in a position to know whether you want to do it + at that time or at another time. That’s what we have to do; we can’t go + flat-footed. On the other hand, when we see other contingency plans, + let’s see not only what the North, but the South Vietnamese we’ve got, + who have been trained, but they’re still somewhat ignorant in terms of + modern warfare is concerned, what they have asked for, what General + Abrams asked for, but also + what the CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs, + and the rest have come up with as to what we can do to that we are not doing. That’s why I want to see the Kitty Hawk, we want to see more B–52s, we want to see A–1s, anything that you think.

@@ -16691,9 +16691,9 @@ And, also, in terms of the targeting thing, we’ve gone over this before. I think we’ve got two or three plans I know on that issue. I think we’ve got a pretty good range of targets, including the ones you mentioned, - but we’ll take another look at the targets, too. Because - [unclear]those—if the level of enemy activity is such, and the timing is - right, and the weather is dry, we can do quite a bit.

+ but we’ll take another look at the targets, too. Because [unclear] + those—if the level of enemy activity is such, and the timing is right, + and the weather is dry, we can do quite a bit.

Moorer: Yes, sir, and the @@ -19330,17 +19330,16 @@ Background

Ambassador Porter has sent you a - message [less than 1 line not - declassified]recommending that after the Peking visitOn February 21, Nixon was scheduled to embark on a state visit to - the People’s Republic of China, the first ever by an American - President. The Vietnam war was to be a major topic of - discussion. you consider sending a private message to the - North Vietnamese to the effect that unless they permit access to - prisoners by a neutral body and agree to an exchange of sick and wounded - prisoners we will suspend the Paris Talks until further notice (Tab - B).Attached but not printed is + message [less than 1 line not declassified] + recommending that after the Peking visitOn + February 21, Nixon was + scheduled to embark on a state visit to the People’s Republic of + China, the first ever by an American President. The Vietnam war was + to be a major topic of discussion. you consider sending a + private message to the North Vietnamese to the effect that unless they + permit access to prisoners by a neutral body and agree to an exchange of + sick and wounded prisoners we will suspend the Paris Talks until further + notice (Tab B).Attached but not printed is backchannel message 570 from Paris, February 14.

Ambassador Porter notes that he @@ -20808,10 +20807,10 @@

P: The airfield?

K: Yes, I think in the Dong Hoi area about 30 miles north of the DMZ.

-

P: When we do hit it I think we should let [tell]the Chinese particularly, and the Russians—it doesn’t matter, - the Chinese immediately when it is done. They call off their dogs, - otherwise they take the consequences.

+

P: When we do hit it I think we should let [tell] + the Chinese particularly, and the Russians—it doesn’t matter, the + Chinese immediately when it is done. They call off their dogs, otherwise + they take the consequences.

K: We should do it not more than 3 days or a 2-day package and let it sit for a while.

P: It doesn’t make any difference whether 2 or 5, two is enough @@ -21717,8 +21716,8 @@ gone since then another year. I, frankly, would like an offensive to take place now, Mr. President for—

- Nixon: That’s what [Sir - Robert]Thompson wants, I know—

+ Nixon: That’s what [Sir Robert] + Thompson wants, I know—

Kissinger: Because if we had the offensive now and we didn’t lose, we would be—we would know they @@ -25173,9 +25172,9 @@

Nixon: You see, I read again last night. I went back to, deliberately, and read Churchill’s chapter about - March 21st. And as you know, [Lieutenant General Sir Hubert de la - Poer]Gough, a great one of the British military commanders, the hero of - ’16, was cashiered as a result of the damn thing. And then—and Churchill + March 21st. And as you know, [Lieutenant General Sir Hubert de la Poer] + Gough, a great one of the British military commanders, the hero of ’16, + was cashiered as a result of the damn thing. And then—and Churchill finally said it, it was a—and then he pointed out why it was a German defeat and a Brit—and an allied victory. He said for the first time in the war since Ypres, he said that the Germans lost 2 to 1 on the @@ -29503,14 +29502,14 @@ a—well, unbelievable, I mean. It’s his up and down. Now, what the—what the hell can you do? So, you cannot leave—you just can’t leave the thing. Now, under these circumstances, as I’ve often said, that it may - be that [clears throat]I’m the last person in this office for some time, - until somebody else is developing along the same lines, I mean, who’s - tough and experienced, who will be able to conduct a strong, responsible - foreign policy. So goddamnit, we’re going to do it. And that means—that - means take every risk, lose every election. That’s the way I look at it, - just as cold as that. Now people say, “Oh well, if you win you’re going - to lose your path.” I’m not sure, but the main point is, we have no - choice, you see?

+ be that [clears throat] I’m the last person in this office for some + time, until somebody else is developing along the same lines, I mean, + who’s tough and experienced, who will be able to conduct a strong, + responsible foreign policy. So goddamnit, we’re going to do it. And that + means—that means take every risk, lose every election. That’s the way I + look at it, just as cold as that. Now people say, “Oh well, if you win + you’re going to lose your path.” I’m not sure, but the main point is, we + have no choice, you see?

Kissinger: That’s my view—

@@ -29613,8 +29612,8 @@

Mr. Kissinger: [After Mr. Helms read that the North - Vietnamese statement said U.S. bombing of Haiphong should be stopped]Did - they say “should” or “must.”

+ Vietnamese statement said U.S. bombing of Haiphong should be stopped] + Did they say “should” or “must.”

Mr. Helms: It says “should” here, but I think you can read it as “must.” [Continues to read his @@ -32050,8 +32049,8 @@ Haig: And on the other hand, it’s not so bad because they still have to concentrate around these.

- Nixon: And, maybe, too - [unclear]from here. Their guys will fight and—

+ Nixon: And, maybe, too [unclear] + from here. Their guys will fight and—

Haig: It takes a good, @@ -37609,8 +37608,8 @@ commanders that would determine the outcome—either winning all or losing all. At this point President Thieu - talked to Executive - [Officer]and directed that all commanders be called to the Palace today. + talked to Executive [Officer] + and directed that all commanders be called to the Palace today. President Thieu then continued, advancing the view that if Hue and Kontum held for four days they @@ -38538,8 +38537,8 @@ postpone, you’ll also want to hit afterwards.

P: Yeah.

K: But I do not see how you can do nothing.

-

P: Oh, Christ, my view is—I think that the [omission in the - original]might be hitting and running the risk of their postponing.

+

P: Oh, Christ, my view is—I think that the [omission in the original] + might be hitting and running the risk of their postponing.

K: That’s right.

P: Which I think is a very real option.

K: That is a real option.

@@ -41723,8 +41722,8 @@ effects on the summit, and on Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam.]

- Kissinger: I think the [May - 8]speech should be low key and calm.

+ Kissinger: I think the [May 8] + speech should be low key and calm.

Nixon: Oh, I couldn’t agree more.

@@ -41875,9 +41874,8 @@ reason, you can do it.

Kissinger: This is going to be - dramatically—what I found so interesting is that Nelson - [Rockefeller]came in. I hadn’t asked to see him, and he said the same - thing—

+ dramatically—what I found so interesting is that Nelson [Rockefeller] + came in. I hadn’t asked to see him, and he said the same thing—

Nixon: He was great this morning—

@@ -42390,8 +42388,8 @@ bombing and lift the blockade.” We’d refuse.

Haldeman: That’s the one - [unclear]they should have pulled a long time ago. I can’t understand why - they haven’t.

+ [unclear] they should have pulled a long time ago. I can’t understand + why they haven’t.

Kissinger: We stop the bombing and lift the blockade—

@@ -42643,8 +42641,8 @@ us that way. Slobber over him. Make it appear that we’re not going to do anything.” We’ve got to do something, you know. It’s like, like the bluff with poker. You don’t shout it out and the rest when you’ve got - the cards. You just sit there and that’s the whole key to it. - [pause]Well, I was going to say, + the cards. You just sit there and that’s the whole key to it. [pause] + Well, I was going to say, Bob, that we don’t want to allow this business about the—this anger, and irrationality, and so forth to—

@@ -47302,8 +47300,8 @@

Mr. Rush: (to Mr. Kissinger) Is it okay to go ahead with it?

-

Mr. Kissinger: They [the - Chinese]won’t like it.

+

Mr. Kissinger: They [the Chinese] + won’t like it.

Mr. Johnson: I know, but there is nothing else we can do.

Mr. Kissinger: Their reaction so @@ -48283,8 +48281,8 @@ don’t think President could be more explicit in his instructions to hit the bridge.

“CJCS: Laird told me you said between now and Friday [May 19]we - were to restrict our activity between 5–10 NM?

+ >Laird told me you said between now and Friday [May 19] + we were to restrict our activity between 5–10 NM?

“HAK: Only because he was coming back to me, just let me make absolutely clear you can hit between now and Friday any military target on the authorized list.

@@ -51512,8 +51510,9 @@ passed to you on May 17.See footnote 2, Document 155.

-

According to [less than 1 line not declassified]in - Vientiane, Indonesian representatives in Hanoi have been reporting that: +

According to [less than 1 line not declassified] + in Vientiane, Indonesian representatives in Hanoi have been reporting + that: —There is considerable unrest in Hanoi as a result of U.S. air strikes and the mining of North Vietnamese ports. —The prices of basic commodities have doubled or tripled and a @@ -61708,12 +61707,12 @@

Kissinger: Fourthly, this is not their last word. It can’t be their last word. I mean, they—when they - start, they’re not going to nail themselves to the blackboard. - [What]they have done, in my judgment, is this: they have decided—you - see, the easy thing to do is to say that they’ll wait ’til October, and - then, if you’re way ahead, they’ll settle with you. I’ve always said - they can’t do that, because if they—supposing they had floated this plan - in October, we could just—they’d never finish it.

+ start, they’re not going to nail themselves to the blackboard. [What] + they have done, in my judgment, is this: they have decided—you see, the + easy thing to do is to say that they’ll wait ’til October, and then, if + you’re way ahead, they’ll settle with you. I’ve always said they can’t + do that, because if they—supposing they had floated this plan in + October, we could just—they’d never finish it.

Nixon: That’s right.

@@ -65597,15 +65596,15 @@

Concerning negotiations, for example, I see no immediate prospect for a ceasefire. I don’t believe the other side will agree to a ceasefire - before the election. Now I have made a record [in the private talks]that - we are prepared to make a ceasefire. Now I will move off that since I am - not sure that we have an interest in it. We believe it would be better - for us not to have one. We have offered a ceasefire, as you know, in the - May 8 proposal,See Document 136. and we have repeated this offer in - the plenary and private sessions. They always say that there must be an - overall settlement first before a ceasefire. I am prepared to make that - concession.

+ before the election. Now I have made a record [in the private talks] + that we are prepared to make a ceasefire. Now I will move off that since + I am not sure that we have an interest in it. We believe it would be + better for us not to have one. We have offered a ceasefire, as you know, + in the May 8 proposal,See Document 136. and we have repeated + this offer in the plenary and private sessions. They always say that + there must be an overall settlement first before a ceasefire. I am + prepared to make that concession.

I told this to our generals too. Let us do what is right. Let us not move because we are afraid the other side will do something. Unless the other side comes to us with the offer of a ceasefire when we resume private @@ -67604,21 +67603,20 @@ may lose some districts but we will lose no provinces. This time look at what happened in Kontum. At Tet they believed with the 320th Division they could overrun Kontum and start the whole - [unraveling]process, but we attacked them in Laos instead. But they are - very doctrinaire and when they get their orders from Hanoi they have to - carry out their plan. The local commanders have no initiative. So in - March they sent another division to Kontum trying to attract our general reserve. But they did - not succeed. In Binh Long [An Loc] they were unable to overrun the - province with three divisions and in Quang Tri they used six divisions - with tanks and everything and believed that we would only have the - Marines to resist them. They didn’t expect that we could send troops - everywhere and very fast. If they cannot take Hue with five divisions, I don’t see how they can take - anything in the next two months. And I don’t think the Russians and - Chinese can send them all the tanks to replace the ones they have - lost.

+ target="#t_Kontum1">Kontum and start the whole [unraveling] + process, but we attacked them in Laos instead. But they are very + doctrinaire and when they get their orders from Hanoi they have to carry + out their plan. The local commanders have no initiative. So in March + they sent another division to Kontum + trying to attract our general reserve. But they did not succeed. In Binh + Long [An Loc] they were unable to overrun the province with three + divisions and in Quang Tri they used six divisions with tanks and + everything and believed that we would only have the Marines to resist + them. They didn’t expect that we could send troops everywhere and very + fast. If they cannot take Hue with five + divisions, I don’t see how they can take anything in the next two + months. And I don’t think the Russians and Chinese can send them all the + tanks to replace the ones they have lost.

Ambassador Bunker: General Vogt was saying yesterday that they have lost about 650 of the 750 tanks in their inventory.

@@ -67877,8 +67875,8 @@ negotiations is as important as substance.As Le Duc Tho noted, Kissinger argued in the - article that “the way [emphasis in - original]negotiations are carried out is almost as important as the way [emphasis in original] + negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what [emphasis in original] is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first and in what manner is inseparable from the substance of the @@ -67986,10 +67984,10 @@

Mr. Duc: Or we could try “a forum between the United States and the governments of Indochina in which the NLF can participate.” And paragraph (c) - [about joint U.S.–DRV - responsibility]would be left out and in paragraph (d) [about overall, - bilateral and tripartite agreements] we would drop “tri-partite” and - substitute “multi-lateral.”

+ [about joint U.S.–DRV responsibility] + would be left out and in paragraph (d) [about overall, bilateral and + tripartite agreements] we would drop “tri-partite” and substitute + “multi-lateral.”

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should rephrase it to say “some of the parties may reach agreements with one another.” May I make this procedural proposal. We will redraft both the @@ -74769,8 +74767,8 @@

Nixon: —and he’s—he’s got to realize that. The other thing is that he’s got to realize that this, - this war has got to stop. I mean, that’s all there is to it. [unclear]We - cannot go along with this sort of dreary business of hanging on for + this war has got to stop. I mean, that’s all there is to it. [unclear] + We cannot go along with this sort of dreary business of hanging on for another four years. It’s been too long. It’s been too long. I’m convinced of this. I’m convinced of it. If I thought—believe me, if I thought, if I was reasonably sure that immediately after [unclear] going @@ -78251,7 +78249,7 @@ xml:id="pg_1076"/> our efforts on doing whatever it takes to resolve our first objective, which is to fight to force the Americans to withdraw. [Italicized words indicate Le Duan was - quoting from a document, possibly from the Politburo meeting.]The + quoting from a document, possibly from the Politburo meeting.] The achievement of our first objective will create the conditions necessary for us to subsequently attain our second objective, to fight to make the puppets collapse.’[Italicized words are the diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v09.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v09.xml index d070d1fb7..337a82930 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v09.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v09.xml @@ -14425,8 +14425,8 @@ rapidly and we may want to make a few more minor changes. [Hands over U.S. draft agreement, Tab A.] We have one more unilateral statement, which is the same one we gave you yesterday, about replacements. [Hands - over U.S. “Unilateral Statement of Replacement of Armaments”, Tab B.]And - here is another you saw. [Hands over “DRV Unilateral Statement on Prisoners”, Tab C.]

Now may I review your document point by point? May I? Should I begin, Mr. Special Advisor?

@@ -15266,10 +15266,10 @@ States ‘attaches importance to the surveillance of infiltration routes through Laos.’” Third, he added that the list of forces in South Vietnam to be exchanged when the cease-fire agreement was - signed “should reflect the absence of those [North Vietnamese]forces - which entered South Vietnam after March 25, 1972.” Fourth, since the - United States, as a gesture of good will, was prepared to stop - bombing North Vietnam a week before signing the cease-fire + signed “should reflect the absence of those [North Vietnamese] + forces which entered South Vietnam after March 25, 1972.” Fourth, + since the United States, as a gesture of good will, was prepared to + stop bombing North Vietnam a week before signing the cease-fire agreement, it would consider “as a comparable gesture of good will if the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would release a significant number of prisoners of war to United States authorities within one @@ -16750,10 +16750,10 @@ the Healing of the War Wounds and the Rehabilitation of the Economy of North Viet Nam.” This is evidence of mutual trust, so that we can rapidly reach settlement of the problem.

-

Dr. Kissinger: [Reads the - paper]Now this is something I would have to take to Hanoi with me. - Because this requires Congressional action and large sums of money. And - what is your idea—to publish this protocol?

+

Dr. Kissinger: [Reads the paper] + Now this is something I would have to take to Hanoi with me. Because + this requires Congressional action and large sums of money. And what is + your idea—to publish this protocol?

Le Duc Tho: Between us.

Dr. Kissinger: This we would @@ -20341,11 +20341,11 @@ Haig, Lord reported to Kissinger: “My view is that his - [Xuan Thuy’s]reaction - was quite predictable and we came out satisfactorily.” Additionally, - “He not only said he understood what I was saying, but gave us the - agreed Laos paper, reciprocated your positive oral comments, and - remained very friendly.” (National Archives, Xuan Thuy’s] + reaction was quite predictable and we came out satisfactorily.” + Additionally, “He not only said he understood what I was saying, but + gave us the agreed Laos paper, reciprocated your positive oral + comments, and remained very friendly.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 119, @@ -20591,7 +20591,7 @@ >Vinh [ Vien] and Weyand have been - over these movements [by the enemy]that are taking place and he + over these movements [by the enemy] that are taking place and he is going to send me by in the morning his complete evaluation, which he has been doing anyway, of the Saigon situation and we will send that over to you. But he was a little I’d say @@ -30778,10 +30778,10 @@

The President replied that that was a very perceptive and soundly skeptical observation which the Prime Minister had just made. He said of all the statesmen who had sat in his office, he considered the Prime - Minister among the most receptive [perceptive]and - the most skeptical. He doubted, however, that there was anyone any more - skeptical than he was himself. He, therefore, wished to assure the Prime - Minister that we would conduct ourselves in Indochina without any + Minister among the most receptive [perceptive] + and the most skeptical. He doubted, however, that there was anyone any + more skeptical than he was himself. He, therefore, wished to assure the + Prime Minister that we would conduct ourselves in Indochina without any illusions and without emotions, but that we would act with good will.

The President then accompanied the Prime Minister to the front of the @@ -32070,7 +32070,7 @@ North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, Luu Van Loi: “We replied to this note only on 4 November, to show that we were not in a hurry, - and that we did not pin our hope on the [November 7]election in + and that we did not pin our hope on the [November 7] election in the US. The chosen timing was also significant in holding the initiative, no matter whether McGovern or Nixon: Why did he send that message this morning?See Document 131 and footnote 3 thereto. Henry came in here [unclear]to - the effect that Thieu had + >footnote 3 thereto. Henry came in here [unclear] + to the effect that Thieu had laid out, and all it meant for us to go at it alone, and he’d go it alone.See Document 133. Did he really?

@@ -42450,11 +42450,11 @@ Central Intelligence Agency, Files of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 80–R01720R, Box 8, Folder 2, GAC [George A. - Carver]Chronology) We discussed ceasefire - concepts at length, taking the position with Duc that there were - two conceptual approaches to a ceasefire. The first would be for - the SVN parties to negotiate + corresp="#p_CGA_1">George A. Carver] + Chronology) We discussed ceasefire concepts at + length, taking the position with Duc that there were two + conceptual approaches to a ceasefire. The first would be for the + SVN parties to negotiate actual areas of control; the other would be to avoid the question of control itself but rather allow it to be determined by the @@ -43242,8 +43242,8 @@

Kennedy: His message.

Nixon: You can send it over. I - don’t think it’s going to change much. It’s just really a - [chuckles]blow-by-blow, right?

+ don’t think it’s going to change much. It’s just really a [chuckles] + blow-by-blow, right?

Kennedy: Yes, sir. That’s right. But, it goes on and elaborates on what we’ve spoken about.

@@ -44452,21 +44452,21 @@ had reached the same conclusion I had. Haldeman recorded an account of the December 7 telephone conversation in his diary: “Then - immediately he [Kissinger]said, basically, I wanted you to know that I’m - in favor of going ahead, but I did want to warn about the - implications involved. Then I said, well you’re clearly making some - progress in the negotiations and it looks better, doesn’t it? And he - said, yes, we’re slowly getting there, and if we all know what we’re - getting into, it’s the right thing to do, but it’s not the - millennium. It will be a better agreement than October would have - been. We still have the option, though, of going the other way, and - he wants us to know that then we can do it by putting the heat and - the blame on the others, as he spelled out in his message. - Basically, he thinks the course the P suggests is the one he favors. - If we don’t quite make it, he’ll recess in order to consult. I asked - him how he saw the timing working out, and he said it’s a question - of whose nerves hold out the longer.” ( + immediately he [Kissinger] + said, basically, I wanted you to know that I’m in favor of going + ahead, but I did want to warn about the implications involved. Then + I said, well you’re clearly making some progress in the negotiations + and it looks better, doesn’t it? And he said, yes, we’re slowly + getting there, and if we all know what we’re getting into, it’s the + right thing to do, but it’s not the millennium. It will be a better + agreement than October would have been. We still have the option, + though, of going the other way, and he wants us to know that then we + can do it by putting the heat and the blame on the others, as he + spelled out in his message. Basically, he thinks the course the P + suggests is the one he favors. If we don’t quite make it, he’ll + recess in order to consult. I asked him how he saw the timing + working out, and he said it’s a question of whose nerves hold out + the longer.” ( Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, December 7) I have decided that we should go forward with the second option with the only condition @@ -47822,8 +47822,8 @@ Washington, December 12, 1972.

- Nixon: Well, the - [unclear]earlier. Have you got Henry’s message?

+ Nixon: Well, the [unclear] + earlier. Have you got Henry’s message?

Haig: No, his message hasn’t come in. I called about it. It’s very long, very long.Haig: I never have.

Nixon: Really? I never did. I - remember when Henry came in, remember he said, “Well we got three - [for]three over there.” + remember when Henry came in, remember he said, “Well we got three [for] + three over there.” Kissinger said this when he met with Nixon, Haig, and Kissinger: That’s right, and then—

- Nixon: Then we’ve got - [to]get—and Laird in?

+ Nixon: Then we’ve got [to] + get—and Laird in?

Kissinger: Ron [Ziegler] can handle that one.

@@ -52477,8 +52477,8 @@ Kissinger: Well, Vogt can do it. We were all—

- Nixon: I need—I need a - [unclear]out there [unclear]—

+ Nixon: I need—I need a [unclear] + out there [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, but he didn’t have the authority, Mr. President—

@@ -52737,9 +52737,9 @@ wheel together.

Kissinger: —and, believe me, it - scares them. Every time at the meeting that I say, “Now - [unclear]remember one thing, this is your last chance of negotiating in - this framework. Don’t forget this. Next time, we talk only military.” And every time he pulls back from that [unclear].

@@ -52968,9 +52968,9 @@ Nixon: Huh?

Kissinger: I wouldn’t evade it. - I’d say: “I’ve got you in, gentleman, to tell you you’re - [I’m]commander-in-chief.” Let me give them a brief—a short briefing. I - would not ask their advice—

+ I’d say: “I’ve got you in, gentleman, to tell you you’re [I’m] + commander-in-chief.” Let me give them a brief—a short briefing. I would + not ask their advice—

Nixon: Could I ask you—could I ask you—

@@ -55201,7 +55201,7 @@ doing that would be to indicate what we have to do over the next two or three weeks, and so forth. But, this is going to be—have to be watched week by week. Within a week, we’ll know whether the North Vietnamese - [unclear]probably know that they’re going to just stone us through. + [unclear] probably know that they’re going to just stone us through. We’re going to know, then, whether or not we have to submit to the Congress our own cut-off. See? We may have to submit a cut-off, and then everybody’s got to line up and fight for it. And the cut-off, however, @@ -55994,8 +55994,8 @@ with him. As you know—After the Duc meeting I—

HK: Well, here you invite him to meet you at Midway, which was after all was a great imposition for you then he doesn’t even have the courtesy to - reply—not even the courtesy to turn him [you]down.

+ reply—not even the courtesy to turn him [you] + down.

RN: That’s right. That’s why this letter—I am going to take a hard look, it may be tougher than you @@ -58451,8 +58451,8 @@ Lon Nol. Lon Nol thinks that Thieu is crazy. He doesn’t - understand why he [Thieu]doesn’t jump at it.

+ understand why he [Thieu] + doesn’t jump at it.

Nixon: He does?

@@ -58487,8 +58487,8 @@ corresp="#p_SWH_1">Sullivan told me how they stonewalled us in the technical meetings.

- Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. - [laughter]Okay.

+ Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. [laughter] + Okay.

Kissinger: Right, Mr. President—

@@ -60940,7 +60940,7 @@ “Hanoi’s Game and Current Game Plan,” December 21, is in the Central IntJob 80–R01720R, Box 1, Folder 9, GAC [George A. Carver, Jr.]Chronology, Memoranda for + >George A. Carver, Jr.] Chronology, Memoranda for Kissinger, August–December 1972. @@ -64828,8 +64828,8 @@ would still send Agnew and Haig out there to give them a face-saving way off. [unclear]

- Nixon: Yeah, but, - [laughs]suppose he doesn’t. That’s, I suppose, our problem—

+ Nixon: Yeah, but, [laughs] + suppose he doesn’t. That’s, I suppose, our problem—

Kissinger: Then we just proceed and sign the documents.

@@ -71018,8 +71018,8 @@

On the Agreement, we have the Preamble of the two-party document and the conclusion and Article 23. On the Preamble, just to save time, I accept “with the concurrence of” and I withdraw “in concert with”. It is a sign - of good will. Normally I would sell it one word at a time. - [Laughter]That is what the Special Adviser would do.

+ of good will. Normally I would sell it one word at a time. [Laughter] + That is what the Special Adviser would do.

Le Duc Tho: Article 23. But you are still going on speaking.

@@ -71038,8 +71038,8 @@ discuss it this morning. I am just going through the list of topics.

On how to fix the ceasefire, we have a suggestion of one sentence. And then, as I understand it, the Special Adviser wishes to read a statement - to me fixing the schedule, which I shall initial in blood. [Laughter]And - that I believe covers our work program for today. Am I correct, Mr. + to me fixing the schedule, which I shall initial in blood. [Laughter] + And that I believe covers our work program for today. Am I correct, Mr. Special Adviser?

Le Duc Tho: Regarding the @@ -71365,12 +71365,12 @@

Dr. Kissinger: I can never forget. Let me just sum up. On this understanding, yesterday—I appreciate that the DRV side insisted - on including my full title, for which my father thanks you. - [laughter]And that we say “in the spirit of reconciliation.” We will get - it typed and hand you a copy. [As changed and retyped, Tab A.]Tab A, “The Return of Vietnamese Civilian - Personnel Captured and Detained in South Vietnam,” is attached but - not printed. + on including my full title, for which my father thanks you. [laughter] + And that we say “in the spirit of reconciliation.” We will get it typed + and hand you a copy. [As changed and retyped, Tab A.]Tab A, “The Return of Vietnamese Civilian Personnel + Captured and Detained in South Vietnam,” is attached but not + printed.

Now I can no longer put off the evil day. Article 5.The article dealt with the withdrawal of U.S. @@ -72564,9 +72564,9 @@ don’t say about the two-party signing, but for the four-party signing I agree with you that we should have propitious atmosphere for that.

Dr. Kissinger: But we have an - understanding also of a propitious atmosphere at the other. - [laughter]Can we have a moratorium on “wars of aggression” that day - while the Secretary of State is in town?

+ understanding also of a propitious atmosphere at the other. [laughter] + Can we have a moratorium on “wars of aggression” that day while the + Secretary of State is in town?

Le Duc Tho: Then on January 28th, 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement, a meeting of the @@ -73929,11 +73929,10 @@

K: I just wanted to tell you we got a report from HaigSee Document 279. and it went just - as we expected. He [Thieu]was wailing around but not with the brutality of - before. More telling us his troubles [2 lines not - declassified] indicates that unless he has a change of mind - that he is going to come along.

+ as we expected. He [Thieu] + was wailing around but not with the brutality of before. More telling us + his troubles [2 lines not declassified] indicates + that unless he has a change of mind that he is going to come along.

P: Uh-huh.

K: He presented the issue in terms of—that only can lead to the conclusion that he’s got to take it.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v15.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v15.xml index 24eb8044b..f61edd891 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v15.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v15.xml @@ -51782,7 +51782,7 @@

Brezhnev: As you know, Jackson is linking this matter with something that bears no relation to this entire matter.A [DT]March 12 memorandum from A March 12 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger reporting on meetings with members of Senator - —(1) a break [brake?]on rising —(1) a break [brake?] on rising GRC defense spending; —(2) a GRC force capable of defending Taiwan and the Penghus taking into account

Fix of shootdown has remained consistent. Soviet track consistent with our track.

-

Mission flown nine times since November. [Reviewed typical - mission.]Soviet tracking normal. Seldom done by North Koreans.

+

Mission flown nine times since November. [Reviewed typical mission.] + Soviet tracking normal. Seldom done by North Koreans.

The President:

General Wheeler: Review of military options: @@ -28407,7 +28407,7 @@ Park asked whether the President is aware of the exchanges with the North and his impending visit. [less than 1 line not - declassified]assumed the President knew. + declassified] assumed the President knew. —Yi said he thought his Government would welcome strong U.S. Government support should his visit become known publicly, either through a communiqué or @@ -30719,11 +30719,11 @@ reference, State suggests the possibility of shifting from support of postponement to support of debate in order to realign the U.N. presence in Korea while we still have sufficient influence in the UNGA to do so in an acceptable manner.]The - State paper’s discussion of options on the procedural - question of inviting the two Koreas to participate in the - debate is still largely valid, however. Its - discussion of options on the substantive + target="#t_UNGA1">UNGA to do so in an acceptable manner.] + The State paper’s discussion of options on the + procedural question of inviting the two Koreas to participate + in the debate is still largely valid, however. + Its discussion of options on the substantive questions in the debate (UNCURK, the UNC, and troop withdrawal) also appear still largely valid as @@ -32687,8 +32687,8 @@ of as present permitting only constitutional changes to be referred to national referendum. - The Prime Minister said that the above were the major - [garble]involved. He repeated that further study was still under way + The Prime Minister said that the above were the major [garble] + involved. He repeated that further study was still under way particularly on such things as the relationship between the legislative and executive bodies. He said the primary purpose of this reformation was to reorganize the government in order to enable @@ -32981,7 +32981,7 @@ —A new National Assembly election within roughly the next half year. [The present National Assembly was elected in May 1971 for - a four-year term.]The new Assembly will have one-third of its + a four-year term.] The new Assembly will have one-third of its members nominated by the President to provide a “stable majority” in the legislature. Both the National Assembly and the President will be elected for six-year terms, with a maximum of diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v20.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v20.xml index d12407607..69c0016e6 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v20.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v20.xml @@ -11151,19 +11151,19 @@ Ambassador Unger on 22 March 1968, noting that he was aware of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] level of support - previously considered. [name not - declassified]emphasized that only [1 line of - source text not declassified], were aware of the previous U.S. - commitment. After a series of informal talks, Ambassador Unger requested authority from - Washington to proceed with this covert support. After 303 Committee - consideration on 16 August 1968, a message was sent to Ambassador - Unger from Assistant - Secretary of State Mr. William - Bundy authorizing the initiation of a covert funding - program. This message was specifically cleared by both the Secretary of - State and the Special Assistant to the President. [5 - lines of source text not declassified]

+ previously considered. [name not declassified] + emphasized that only [1 line of source text not + declassified], were aware of the previous U.S. commitment. + After a series of informal talks, Ambassador Unger requested authority from Washington to proceed + with this covert support. After 303 Committee consideration on 16 August + 1968, a message was sent to Ambassador Unger from Assistant Secretary of State Mr. William Bundy authorizing the + initiation of a covert funding program. This message was specifically + cleared by both the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant to the + President. [5 lines of source text not + declassified]

[2 paragraphs (30 lines of source text) and 1 heading not declassified]

@@ -19018,11 +19018,11 @@ provide uniforms from DoD stocks in RVN which would be moved [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]to training sites to avoid any major draw down - of DoD stocks in Thailand. We do not - believe this project could be kept covert if DoD stocks in Thailand are used. We expect [less than 1 line of source text not + declassified] to training sites to avoid any major draw + down of DoD stocks in Thailand. We + do not believe this project could be kept covert if DoD stocks in Thailand are used. We + expect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] covertly to fund for both regiments during period of training in Thailand, costs of food, housing and training, and following training to fund transportation to Cambodia. While in @@ -19244,7 +19244,7 @@ Cambodian groups had had their training (in about 3–4 months) they could be rotated in to replace the [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Thai forces. The latter can be phased in one + declassified] Thai forces. The latter can be phased in one battalion at a time, beginning practically immediately. In a separate development, Pote @@ -19444,10 +19444,9 @@ Thai Actions on Cambodia

From Ambassador Unger [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]in Bangkok we have received a number of reports - covering actions which the Thai are planning to take on Cambodia. These - are: + rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + in Bangkok we have received a number of reports covering actions which + the Thai are planning to take on Cambodia. These are: —The Thai Cabinet has agreed to send two regiments to Vietnam for augmentation of the Black Panthers, and the commitment of Black Panther units inside Cambodia in the sanctuary area. These @@ -22834,11 +22833,11 @@ with previous military experience and other high qualifications, but apparently were not very successful on the basis of the pay and allowance scale initially proposed. Recent negotiations in Bangkok [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]resulted in an agreement to raise subsistence and per - diem allowances and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] - the recruiting problem has been solved.

+ resulted in an agreement to raise subsistence and per diem allowances + and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the + recruiting problem has been solved.

Another problem has arisen with regard to training facilities. There are now three sites in Thailand being used for SGU’s and these are adequate for the first eight @@ -22917,10 +22916,10 @@ Washington. Such operations may become involved with some aspect of the counterinsurgency effort of the RTG. When this type of situation can be foreseen I have asked [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]to bring these specific operations to my attention so - that I can determine whether we should go beyond the role we have set - for ourselves in the counterinsurgency field.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + to bring these specific operations to my attention so that I can + determine whether we should go beyond the role we have set for ourselves + in the counterinsurgency field.

Finally, I wish to assure you that I have and will continue to do my utmost to see that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agencies leave the initiative in the @@ -23024,7 +23023,7 @@ after all parties have had an opportunity to assess the then existing military situation and the state of proficiency of the SGUs’. [text not declassified]reports that the text not declassified] reports that the RTA staff concurred with this statement but noted the possible problem of keeping the units beyond the agreed service of one year. [text @@ -26000,14 +25999,14 @@

The reason I am raising this matter is because [name not declassified] has again come to me with a request [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]that we engage in a similar operation, involving about - the same magnitude of funds and serving the same general purposes. In - this case, the purpose is not quite so immediately related to the - elections which are not due to take place here until 1973, but rather to - building up of the government political party, the Saha Pracha Thai - (United Thai People’s Party), having those elections, of course, - ultimately in view.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + that we engage in a similar operation, involving about the same + magnitude of funds and serving the same general purposes. In this case, + the purpose is not quite so immediately related to the elections which + are not due to take place here until 1973, but rather to building up of + the government political party, the Saha Pracha Thai (United Thai + People’s Party), having those elections, of course, ultimately in + view.

[name not declassified] reviewed many of the same considerations he had put forward before, such as that [1 line of source text not declassified] do not @@ -27868,7 +27867,7 @@ exchange. —Up to 300 RTAF sorties/month [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]would be flown if required. + declassified] would be flown if required.

The principal activities which will be financed from the additional baht @@ -27945,7 +27944,7 @@ On 5 August Chargé Newman [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]lunched with General ] lunched with General Kriangsak to follow up the discussion which the Ambassador and the DCM held with Marshal @@ -31671,18 +31670,18 @@ spotty.For a previous discussion of the performance of the Thai irregulars in Laos, see Document 147. But recent reports from [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Ambassador Godley [less than 1 line of source - text not declassified] in Vientiane indicate marked - improvement. A recent [less than 1 line of source text - not declassified] report recounts a series of incidents in the - Sam Thong–Long Tieng area during 18–30 March in which the Thai fought - with courage and determination, often in hand-to-hand combat with NVA infantry. They have withstood almost constant artillery - and mortar bombardment and have destroyed four enemy tanks, one with - grenades and small arms after it penetrated their perimeter.

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + Ambassador Godley [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + in Vientiane indicate marked improvement. A recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report + recounts a series of incidents in the Sam Thong–Long Tieng area during + 18–30 March in which the Thai fought with courage and determination, + often in hand-to-hand combat + with NVA infantry. They have withstood + almost constant artillery and mortar bombardment and have destroyed four + enemy tanks, one with grenades and small arms after it penetrated their + perimeter.

The recent, excellent Thai performance probably results from their year of combat experience and a growing confidence that they can stand up to the best NVA units. If it continues, @@ -34307,7 +34306,7 @@ Ambassador Unger approved the [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]recommendation that the matter be brought up + declassified] recommendation that the matter be brought up with the Thais by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Consul [1 line @@ -34840,10 +34839,10 @@ corresp="#p_RBK1">Kokoi Romualdez, his brother-in-law and campaign manager. Marcos said that he might have need of [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]advice of some unspecified sort in the coming months. - Helms ultimately said that he - would like to help if he could but less than 1 line of source text not declassified] + advice of some unspecified sort in the coming months. Helms ultimately said that he would + like to help if he could but Nelson was not sure whether he had made a firm undertaking to establish the requested contact. The only other thing that transpired at this meeting was that the Filipinos managed to get @@ -36804,7 +36803,7 @@ him [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We also know from a sensitive [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]source that Marcos sent + declassified] source that Marcos sent an emissary to Adevoso whom seemingly extracted a promise that Adevoso would at least lay off Marcos personally [less than 1 line of source text not @@ -40322,7 +40321,7 @@ leverage, the opposition no more than 25%. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]Manila was directed to make an independent + declassified] Manila was directed to make an independent assessment (considering the worst that could occur) in as much detail as possible and have it ready for next week’s meetings. [1 line of source text not @@ -46974,7 +46973,7 @@ the issues of military assistance and the U.S. role in maintenance of a Singapore base.” They added, “We don’t think that our policy towards these countries [the memorandum - concerned Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Indonesia]requires an + concerned Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Indonesia] requires an NSC meeting. However, a package should be forwarded to the President because of his personal interest in Indonesia.” The Department of State paper was included @@ -50692,14 +50691,14 @@ >Alamsjah in our arrangements. Since he was here with Suharto we have learned [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]that senior officers among the Indonesian military - have become sensitive over - the way that Alamsjah functioned - within the Suharto party. - (Alamsjah is only a Brigadier - General.) This smacks of Indonesian palace politics, of which we want no - part. If the matter arises, you might note that you dealt with Alamsjah merely as ] that senior officers among the Indonesian + military have become sensitive + over the way that Alamsjah + functioned within the Suharto + party. (Alamsjah is only a + Brigadier General.) This smacks of Indonesian palace politics, of which + we want no part. If the matter arises, you might note that you dealt + with Alamsjah merely as Suharto’s emissary, and as a transmission-belt for carrying the President’s views to Suharto.

@@ -52002,7 +52001,7 @@ themselves. [less than 1 line of source text not - declassified]contact has repeatedly assured [] contact has repeatedly assured [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Indonesians would not accept offer on spare parts from Soviets for Soviet military equipment. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] less than 1 line of source text not declassified]contact + >less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contact said he would advise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] results their investigation. diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v28.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v28.xml index 6ac9d7906..2884b9378 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v28.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v28.xml @@ -18002,13 +18002,12 @@ Douglas-Home: Right.

Nixon: They don’t even want to - deal with a bunch of cannibals up there. You know what I mean? - [unclear]That became the great issue. It’s always this. Now, in the case of Rhodesia, - let me say whatever you work out—whatever you work out, I’ll have you - remember this, I don’t be pushed on by that African group over there at - State because I think that—what else with the chrome thing have we - decided?

+ deal with a bunch of cannibals up there. You know what I mean? [unclear] + That became the great issue. + It’s always this. Now, in the case of Rhodesia, let me say whatever you + work out—whatever you work out, I’ll have you remember this, I don’t be + pushed on by that African group over there at State because I think + that—what else with the chrome thing have we decided?

Kissinger: We have this Byrd Amendment—

@@ -18057,8 +18056,8 @@ don’t want to cause you any trouble. We’ve got enough troubles of our own.

- Douglas-Home: [laughs] - [unclear]Horn of Africa where it could, it would be—

+ Douglas-Home: [laughs] [unclear] + Horn of Africa where it could, it would be—

Nixon: Yeah.

@@ -18116,10 +18115,10 @@ Nixon: Hmmm.

Kissinger: I think those—with - either one these circumstances the sanctions would last if - [unclear]anyway. If the British renew the sanctions and if the deal goes - through then, the Byrd Amendment - would become relevant. And then we could, we could do it.

+ either one these circumstances the sanctions would last if [unclear] + anyway. If the British renew the sanctions and if the deal goes through + then, the Byrd Amendment would + become relevant. And then we could, we could do it.

Nixon: Is there a reason or do we want to give it a reason? I mean we need these votes in the U.N.

@@ -23514,12 +23513,12 @@

Minister Mwaanga: Savimbi is not a political lightweight. He has grass roots support. He put forward a formula for bringing the - three parties together. Under the Albarge [Alvor]accord, each liberation movement or political party was to - put forward 8000 troops for a total of 24,000. The Portuguese were to - match this with another 24,000 troops. If there is an election, there is - a danger of 8,000 loyal troops and 16,000 not loyal. The President - (assumed reference to Kaunda) is + three parties together. Under the Albarge [Alvor] + accord, each liberation movement or political party was to put forward + 8000 troops for a total of 24,000. The Portuguese were to match this + with another 24,000 troops. If there is an election, there is a danger + of 8,000 loyal troops and 16,000 not loyal. The President (assumed + reference to Kaunda) is emphasizing the need for some formula to deal with this before the election.

Secretary Kissinger: If the @@ -25929,9 +25928,9 @@ situation in Angola, using maps and charts.)Not attached. [less than 1 line not declassified] Mobutu - [less than 1 line not declassified]complained - that in spite of Vance’s promises, no substantial aid had been - forthcoming.

+ [less than 1 line not declassified] + complained that in spite of Vance’s promises, no substantial aid had + been forthcoming.

Kissinger: What is our Consul General doing? Just going around wringing his hands?

@@ -26249,9 +26248,9 @@

Colby: Let’s give [dollar amount not declassified] right away and - maybe the full [dollar amount not - declassified]over a month. We can come back to the Committee before - doing anything about arms.

+ maybe the full [dollar amount not declassified] + over a month. We can come back to the Committee before doing anything + about arms.

Kissinger: I think Vance should go to Kissinger: We’ll send Vance to Mobutu [1 line not - declassified]and more if needed, and ask him to come up with a - program. It may be too late because Luanda is lost. Unless we can seize - it back, it is pretty hopeless. We’ll have a resignation from Davis, then I’ll clean out the AF bureau.

+ >Mobutu [1 line not declassified] + and more if needed, and ask him to come up with a program. It may be too + late because Luanda is lost. Unless we can seize it back, it is pretty + hopeless. We’ll have a resignation from Davis, then I’ll clean out the AF bureau.

President: But if we do nothing, we will lose Southern Africa. I think we have an understandable position.

I think we can defend it to the public. I won’t let someone in Foggy @@ -27031,11 +27030,10 @@

Vance: [1 line not declassified]

-

The Secretary: [less than 1 line not - declassified](Eagleburger enters room) The way to handle this is to - send our stuff by ship, not by air. [less than 1 line - not declassified]

+

The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified] + (Eagleburger enters room) + The way to handle this is to send our stuff by ship, not by air. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Davis: [less than 1 line not declassified]

@@ -30242,7 +30240,7 @@ as the Soviet Union is concerned, not compatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions.

Question: Sir, we are also an extra-territorial power. What - are [we]doing there?

+ are [we] doing there?

Secretary Kissinger: Our interest in Angola, which is related to the fact that the access to the sea of the surrounding countries goes @@ -31287,11 +31285,11 @@ do not think that the full impact of the Cuban influence has been felt yet. I thought maybe by the middle of December, but maybe now not until January. But once it does, the direction of the fight will go all the - other way. The [dollar amount not - declassified]will slow but not stop it; the [dollar amount not declassified] might hold it awhile; the [dollar amount not declassified] might enable us - to go ahead.

+ other way. The [dollar amount not declassified] + will slow but not stop it; the [dollar amount not + declassified] might hold it awhile; the [dollar amount not declassified] might enable us to go + ahead.

Potts: These are not mercenaries; they are regular Cuban troops. And the experienced Cubans @@ -31569,9 +31567,9 @@

Scowcroft: Give us the proposals—start with one that is bare bones to keep things together. I - note that the [dollar amount not - declassified]package contains aircraft; maybe that is not necessary - and you can cut that some. It may not be essential.

+ note that the [dollar amount not declassified] + package contains aircraft; maybe that is not necessary and you can cut + that some. It may not be essential.

Sisco: Option One—show what it means geared to the thrust of what the Soviets are putting in.

@@ -34127,20 +34125,20 @@ Soviets. Then to begin the diplomatic campaign in which the Soviets risked their overall relations with us and then we’d get a coalition government and withdraw all of the outside forces. In the illusion that - we would put in [dollar amount not - declassified]more, I kicked it off in Detroit.During a news conference in Detroit on November 25, - Kissinger expanded upon - remarks regarding Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola made - before the Economic Club of Detroit. In response to a question about - U.S. support for a coalition government, Kissinger said: “We certainly - favor the report of the Conciliation Committee of the Organization - of African Unity which called for negotiation among all three groups - and a possible coalition government, yes.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1975, p. 856) - We could then tie it in with my trip to Moscow as well and it was - working. The Soviets were blinking. The African states were with us.

+ we would put in [dollar amount not declassified] + more, I kicked it off in Detroit.During a + news conference in Detroit on November 25, Kissinger expanded upon remarks + regarding Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola made before the + Economic Club of Detroit. In response to a question about U.S. + support for a coalition government, Kissinger said: “We certainly favor the report of + the Conciliation Committee of the Organization of African Unity + which called for negotiation among all three groups and a possible + coalition government, yes.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1975, p. 856) We could then + tie it in with my trip to Moscow as well and it was working. The Soviets + were blinking. The African states were with us.

Moynihan has now screwed it up with his charges of Soviet colonial designs.] The [dollar amount not declassified] we have left will last until the end of January.

-

Secretary: If the [dollar amount not - declassified]will last until then, why were we in such a hurry to - get the [dollar amount not declassified]

+

Secretary: If the [dollar amount not declassified] + will last until then, why were we in such a hurry to get the [dollar amount not declassified]

Hyland: We weren’t. It’s the Congressmen, Clark and others, @@ -37079,8 +37077,8 @@ some training in infiltration and hand-to-hand combat.

Scowcroft: Any views on [less than 1 line not - declassified]recruitment?

+ rend="italic">less than 1 line not declassified] + recruitment?

Brown: I agree, don’t go on.

@@ -37524,10 +37522,9 @@

Sisco: One thing I want to make clear, I hope that we are not going ahead on the assumption that the - totality of the [dollar amount not - declassified]has to go to Savimbi. We may need some at the end of the line for - transition.

+ totality of the [dollar amount not declassified] + has to go to Savimbi. We may need + some at the end of the line for transition.

Nelson: We’ll go ahead on a modest scale.

@@ -38248,7 +38245,7 @@ Of the matériel already sent to Zaire for transshipment to Angola, all had been transshipped as of 18 February except 180 M–79 grenade launchers worth [dollar amount not - declassified]700 LAW + declassified] 700 LAW shoulder-fired antitank weapons worth [dollar amount not declassified] and 18 SA–7 surface-to-air missiles worth [1 @@ -38721,7 +38718,7 @@

Scowcroft: If we get into a bind, some of that [dollar amount not - declassified]could be used.

+ declassified] could be used.

Smith: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: [dollar amount not declassified]leaving an estimated + >dollar amount not declassified] leaving an estimated balance of [dollar amount not declassified] @@ -40837,8 +40834,8 @@ about American policy. We always want to know what worries you.

Kissinger: And we’ll have our - economic minister [Robinson]tomorrow. Thank you very much.

+ economic minister [Robinson] + tomorrow. Thank you very much.

[The meeting ended.]

Grennan: No, but they [the - others]should have some representation.

+ others] should have some representation.

Kissinger: But the question Jack asked is whether some should be checked with the Rhodesian Front.

@@ -54187,13 +54184,13 @@ make it look like Annex C, not like a new plan.

Schaufele: I heard on the radio - that Smith has already rejected the “four alternatives” he - [Richard]announced in his press conference.Richard held a press conference in Washington on December 22 during - which he outlined alternatives for administering the defense and - justice ministries in the interim government. (“Briton Lists - Rhodesia Alternatives,” The New York Times, - December 23, 1976, p. 3) + that Smith has already rejected the “four alternatives” he [Richard] + announced in his press conference.Richard + held a press conference in Washington on December 22 during which he + outlined alternatives for administering the defense and justice + ministries in the interim government. (“Briton Lists Rhodesia + Alternatives,” The New York Times, December + 23, 1976, p. 3)

Kissinger: He spoke too damn @@ -54225,8 +54222,8 @@ Botha: They’ll be after each other, bribing and fighting.

- Kissinger: Really? - [Laughter]Don’t they just want what is the best for their people?

+ Kissinger: Really? [Laughter] + Don’t they just want what is the best for their people?

Botha: My Prime Minister will say it’s a new Angola situation.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v30.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v30.xml index 1bc9e8b62..6b238f6ad 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v30.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v30.xml @@ -13678,13 +13678,13 @@ of 1973. the Papadopoulos regime, while adopting a policy publicly at variance with that of the US, was - nonetheless [less than 1 line not - declassified]helpful in various ways. For example, it [1 line not declassified] allowed more extensive - use of US facilities in Greece than is provided by bilateral agreements. - In the future, we could not expect this type of cooperation from the - Ioannidis regime, unless the US were prepared to be more forthcoming in - a variety of military matters.

+ nonetheless [less than 1 line not declassified] + helpful in various ways. For example, it [1 line not + declassified] allowed more extensive use of US facilities in + Greece than is provided by bilateral agreements. In the future, we could + not expect this type of cooperation from the Ioannidis regime, unless + the US were prepared to be more forthcoming in a variety of military + matters.

21. US willingness to continue to deal with the military rulers would not be popular with civilian politicians within Greece. In the unlikely event that Andreas Papandreou (or @@ -25656,7 +25656,7 @@ considerable length, on possible Turk Cypriot reactions. At end of conversation, [name not - declassified]advanced “personal view” that it “impossible” + declassified] advanced “personal view” that it “impossible” for GOGreece to simply reject Makarios’ demands. Admitted, however, that he not sanguine that rational counsel will prevail in Athens. On local @@ -26155,7 +26155,7 @@ >Makarios. Available information [1 line not - declassified]indicates GOG + declassified] indicates GOG made last effort to deter Makarios but failing had clearly completed contingency plans to remove him. ] information being received at Embassy here strongly suggests that Turks are not making effective effort to adhere to ceasefire and [less than 1 line not - declassified]suggests that on contrary they are willfully + declassified] suggests that on contrary they are willfully continuing to ignore it, and placing entire effort in jeopardy. I have, on my own initiative, passed my “impression” in this regard to MFA @@ -39420,7 +39420,7 @@ corresp="#p_IBGD1">Ioannides, who was speculating freely about his various plans, [less than 1 line not - declassified]received what he might have construed + declassified] received what he might have construed to be a weak US response.

@@ -39923,7 +39923,7 @@ into the US warnings that reached him primary concern over intercommunal violence. (According to a CIA [less than 1 line not - declassified][TDFIBDB–315/06765–74],] [TDFIBDB–315/06765–74],Not found. Brackets in the original. when asked immediately after the coup about foreign reaction, Ioannides replied, “the diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v32.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v32.xml index ee563e6e3..dcf5303c1 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v32.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v32.xml @@ -19893,8 +19893,8 @@ President would want to know and how he would prefer to read it. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson suggested that President Nixon would need to - know “risks associated with agreements and ways of reducing risks - [and]enhance unilateral verification capability.” Director of the Arms + know “risks associated with agreements and ways of reducing risks [and] + enhance unilateral verification capability.” Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith believed that the panel should “screen technical factors through top officials’ minds.” President’s Assistant for @@ -23038,11 +23038,11 @@ target="#t_K1">K: This is the problem. You remember our problems with Dobrynin. Bill [Rogers] was reluctant to raise - the issue. You had given [Gerard]Smith the instructions and now the Russians had - backed off. I thought just as a matter of discipline I ought to call - Dobrynin and remind him of - this conversation before. N: Tell him we gave in on Helsinki and why not + the issue. You had given [Gerard] + Smith the instructions and now the Russians had backed + off. I thought just as a matter of discipline I ought to call Dobrynin and remind him of this + conversation before. N: Tell him we gave in on Helsinki and why not Vienna. We don’t have to be anxious but the point is that it ought to be either Geneva or Vienna.” (Transcript of Telephone Conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The 19 radars include 7 - Perimeter Acquisition Radars [PARs]and 12 Missile Site Radars [MSRs]—including the ones authorized for deployment at - Grand Forks and Malmstrom and the MSR at Whiteman; the 633 interceptors include 465 - long-range Spartans for area defense and 168 short range Sprints for - radar defense. (An additional 246 Sprints are required for Minuteman - and defense of the National Command Authorities in the Washington, - D.C. area.) [Footnote and brackets are in the original.] + Perimeter Acquisition Radars [PARs] + and 12 Missile Site Radars [MSRs]—including the ones authorized for deployment at Grand + Forks and Malmstrom and the MSR at + Whiteman; the 633 interceptors include 465 long-range Spartans for + area defense and 168 short range Sprints for radar defense. (An + additional 246 Sprints are required for Minuteman and defense of the + National Command Authorities in the Washington, D.C. area.) + [Footnote and brackets are in the original.]

This is the critical question because the Verification Panel is in full agreement on three major issues: @@ -25551,11 +25551,11 @@ thought.

Richardson—Concerning their - capability [less than 1 line not - declassified]there is a tie between the [less - than 1 line not declassified]. Taking into account the SAM upgrade problem over the next five - years, do they have a system which is much more capable.

+ capability [less than 1 line not declassified] + there is a tie between the [less than 1 line not + declassified]. Taking into account the SAM upgrade problem over the next five years, do they have + a system which is much more capable.

Packard—They need a 3-step system. @@ -31433,11 +31433,11 @@ Kissinger highlighted this section beginning with “Under the open-ended provision.” In the margin, he wrote, “How? Does it give Soviets greater possibility - vis-à-vis NATO than as - [illegible]part?” The world at large and especially our - Allies would perceive in such a new relationship, a sort of condominium. - This is obviously one of the Europeans’ latent concerns, and a broad - based agreement, as the Soviet propose, would feed their suspicions.

+ vis-à-vis NATO than as [illegible] + part?” The world at large and especially our Allies would + perceive in such a new relationship, a sort of condominium. This is + obviously one of the Europeans’ latent concerns, and a broad based + agreement, as the Soviet propose, would feed their suspicions.

The second and probably more important aspect is the implication for the China problem. The Soviets rather gingerly walk around mention of China by using various euphemisms, but there is no doubt that the “third @@ -39110,16 +39110,17 @@ tell you about it now. It would have to be before March 15th, if anything I’ve said here that—but I would like to do it in terms of a, where, if I do it, here, where you inform [unclear] to tell [Gerard]Smith but on a, on a + corresp="#p_SGC1">[Gerard] Smith but on a, on a absolutely—I don’t believe him, I don’t have any confidence in him, basically, as a—and particularly his shop,Reference is to ACDA. naturally. And, now, understand, I think he does as well as he can, considering the people that are there.

-

But I—But I, I feel that—I feel that he looks at this thing [unclear]but, - as anybody who would be involved in long negotiations, are personally, - sometimes in miniscule terms. And also that, he just has too much of a - tendency sometimes, he doesn’t want to fight with his own people.

+

But I—But I, I feel that—I feel that he looks at this thing [unclear] + but, as anybody who would be involved in long negotiations, are + personally, sometimes in miniscule terms. And also that, he just has too + much of a tendency sometimes, he doesn’t want to fight with his own + people.

Rogers: Hmm.

@@ -41818,7 +41819,7 @@ possibility—but I think Bob is right. The more likely thing is that it would be around May 7th. This stuff probably will have to go back and forth once, and they [the Soviet - Politburo]meet every Thursday.

+ Politburo] meet every Thursday.

Nixon: Okay. Right.

@@ -44449,13 +44450,12 @@ not our major issue.

“D: I have the telegram. This is a copy from Moscow on what Semonov reports. Acting in accordance - with instructions and said nothing more. [omission in the - transcript]minister and discuss with Smith what we didn’t talk through Smith and Semonov (?). Semonov emphatically denies he talked with Smith about it.

+ with instructions and said nothing more. [omission in the transcript] + minister and discuss with Smith + what we didn’t talk through Smith + and Semonov (?). Semonov emphatically denies he talked + with Smith about it.

“K: I don’t know what to do now.

“D: I could tell you from this telegram that answer to what you proposed is still not approved. This telegram is the second from Nixon: Well, let me say this—and I know you’re not—but let me say this: This agreement, however, will give some pause - to people like [Drew]Pearson and others who are running it. [Aside to + to people like [Drew] Pearson and others who are running it. [Aside to unknown person] Can I have tea, please, instead of coffee? Thank you. [Back to Kissinger and Laird] On the ground where we have, @@ -45488,8 +45488,8 @@ Nixon: Yes. You know it serves a purpose—

- Allison: - [unclear]frustrating—

+ Allison: [unclear] + frustrating—

Nixon: —to have us think about this, and them think about it. The very fact that we had to go through this exercise, and @@ -46994,8 +46994,8 @@ will not be available until at least 1976 at the earliest. The issue is, do we want to have something in the interim? The interim system that I am talking about will cost only one-third as much with operating costs - of about [less than 1 line not - declassified]year.

+ of about [less than 1 line not declassified] + year.

President: In light of the negotiations in SALT and the need for verification, we probably need both. Suppose we got a SALT agreement by, @@ -56359,7 +56359,7 @@ “weapons,” then they’ll start counting the warheads.

Nixon: All right, fine. The number of tubes, rather - than [unclear]control the fact that—now, the third thing is that + than [unclear] control the fact that—now, the third thing is that question that you raised in here is—what do you want to say is the third thing?

@@ -58773,10 +58773,10 @@ Hearthside [Hard Site]. I didn’t focus until yesterday on Hearthside [Hard Site] and going 2 for 2.

-

S: That’s not important. Use terminal [terms?]precisely and get high level and qualitative limitations. - We won’t go into high level if it involves [omission in the - original]limitations.

+

S: That’s not important. Use terminal [terms?] + precisely and get high level and qualitative limitations. We won’t go + into high level if it involves [omission in the original] + limitations.

K: If we adopt Hearthside [Hard Site] I will get you an appt. with the @@ -63167,8 +63167,8 @@

K: On what?

S: General impression of where we stand and raised the possibility of - [omission in the original] whether Washington [omission in the - original]or [omission in the original]. Would that be agreeable?

+ [omission in the original] whether Washington [omission in the original] + or [omission in the original]. Would that be agreeable?

K: Washington what?

S: [omission in the original]

@@ -65193,11 +65193,11 @@

Nixon: The Russians were?

- Kissinger: I said give - [unclear]give us a chance to look at this thing. And there’s—I don’t - think there’s any way we can keep them from tabling it. But, we don’t - have to accept that, that particular framework, although it incorporates - what was said at that meeting.

+ Kissinger: I said give [unclear] + give us a chance to look at this thing. And there’s—I don’t think + there’s any way we can keep them from tabling it. But, we don’t have to + accept that, that particular framework, although it incorporates what + was said at that meeting.

Nixon: Sure.

@@ -65470,8 +65470,8 @@ Kissinger: He said, “If Brezhnev reads this, he’ll think that we’re playing games with him.” So, I said, “All right, why don’t you - give this to Brezhnev - [unclear]the other one has been accepted by Brezhnev [unclear] + the other one has been accepted by Smith.”

Nixon: Well, the point is, while we cannot agree @@ -69283,9 +69283,9 @@

The President: If you get a permanent agreement this becomes moot; this is the main point. The alternative is that both—and this shows why the agreement is so important—will pour billions more into submarines.

-

Dr. Kissinger: [To the - President]You had intended a big speed-up of our submarine program but - then cancelled it because of the SALT +

Dr. Kissinger: [To the President] + You had intended a big speed-up of our submarine program but then + cancelled it because of the SALT agreement.

The President: Yes. Because of the Soviet speed-up I had tentatively ordered the Navy to speed up the submarines, but I stopped it. But if @@ -73057,12 +73057,11 @@

H: That is right. On balance, however, we are very comfortable with that because of—

M: Forward(?) bases, etc.

-

H: Yes, because of our four base [forward-based]systems, our aircraft and the MIRV numerical. Now they are building - MIRV probably but you know we just - haven’t—as hard as we are looking—we haven’t gotten confirmation - yet.

+

H: Yes, because of our four base [forward-based] + systems, our aircraft and the MIRV + numerical. Now they are building MIRV + probably but you know we just haven’t—as hard as we are looking—we + haven’t gotten confirmation yet.

M: There is no question in your mind that they can do that—if we can do it they can do it.

H: [omission in the original] no question.

@@ -73100,10 +73099,10 @@

M: Yes.

H: So what we are doing is greatly improving our relative balance over the next five year period. If we did not have this freeze in the - offensive area we would have come out in the end of the five - [year]period with a greatly more serious disparity in our relative - strengths. In other words we would have been relatively much weaker and - that is really—

+ offensive area we would have come out in the end of the five [year] + period with a greatly more serious disparity in our relative strengths. + In other words we would have been relatively much weaker and that is + really—

M: That is on the basis of this 8 or 9 year basis.

H: That is right.

M: Yes.

@@ -74868,8 +74867,8 @@

Unidentified speaker: Just attitude—pick up attitude [unclear].

Nixon: Um-hmm.

-

Unidentified speaker: None of this coming out of the Committee - [unclear]procurement bill [unclear].

+

Unidentified speaker: None of this coming out of the Committee [unclear] + procurement bill [unclear].

Nixon: Well, the hearings, as I said, will bring out a lot of technical things. This is, I can assure you, this is a—I @@ -75577,7 +75576,7 @@

Stennis: … treaty, and I think, maybe, that—well, it won’t satisfy Senator Jackson, but I think he’ll [unclear]have a feeling—

+ >Jackson, but I think he’ll [unclear] have a feeling—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

@@ -77083,11 +77082,10 @@ the Rules and passed by 306–4 the Senate version of the SALT interim agreement, clearing the measure for your signature. The enrolling process will take a day so - the agreement should be at the White House Tuesday [October - 3]afternoon.” (Ibid., Box 883, SALT, SALT talks - (Helenski) [sic], ending September–October - 1972) + the agreement should be at the White House Tuesday [October 3] + afternoon.” (Ibid., Box 883, SALT, + SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], ending September–October 1972)

Warm regards.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v39.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v39.xml index 313ef5f05..1fa61581f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v39.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v39.xml @@ -21718,8 +21718,8 @@ >Mansfield Amendment there’re about three or four substitutes floating around which may be as harmful as the Mansfield Amendment. I’ve been out of - town the last few days but I read about it in the paper. - [laughter]And—

+ town the last few days but I read about it in the paper. [laughter] + And—

Nixon: We weren’t referring to you a moment ago. [laughter]

@@ -23424,16 +23424,16 @@ n="155" xml:id="pg_155"/> thing is the extreme criticism of those who believe that we in this government are not doing enough [unclear]. On MBFR, it seems to me there that this - must be, and I emphasize again, I take into account this [unclear]we + must be, and I emphasize again, I take into account this [unclear] we will have some private consultation, the process must be orderly.

Brandt: Yes.

Nixon: It must be orderly. And we must not rush in with some half-baked scheme that [unclear] the whole - texture of the alliance. That’s really what we have in mind, - [unclear]what we face here. How do you feel about MBFR? What is your procedure?

+ texture of the alliance. That’s really what we have in mind, [unclear] + what we face here. How do you feel about MBFR? What is your procedure?

Brandt: [unclear] Plainly, we need that period of bilateral explorations, and we have to make here a @@ -28866,8 +28866,8 @@ counter by saying that this is what we have all been doing.

Dr. Kissinger: The Secretary can then say that the issues are not concrete enough.

-

Mr. Farley: They [the Allies]can’t - point to a consensus in the Alliance.

+

Mr. Farley: They [the Allies] + can’t point to a consensus in the Alliance.

Mr. Hyland: Our line is that we are not yet ready on substance, especially on security considerations.

@@ -31087,7 +31087,7 @@ separate track from CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Would NATO object to the view Ken [Rush]expressed?

+ corresp="#p_RKW1">Rush] expressed?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, if it means Option 1.

@@ -36584,10 +36584,10 @@

Mr. Irwin: The indigenous forces are just as uncertain.

Mr. Kissinger: they’re more - uncertain. I’m trying to understand with [what]the uncertainty factor is. What does a 10% cut mean? If we’re - talking about division manning with a 20% uncertainty, a 10% cut doesn’t - mean a goddamned thing.

+ uncertain. I’m trying to understand with [what] + the uncertainty factor is. What does a 10% cut mean? If we’re talking + about division manning with a 20% uncertainty, a 10% cut doesn’t mean a + goddamned thing.

Mr. Eagleburger: We can’t really say—it would be lost in the noise level.

Mr. Kissinger: We would have no @@ -38390,7 +38390,7 @@ was given to Pompidou when he met with Mr. Brezhnev and today we are forwarding on a very basis [sic]through our private, through our private channels + >sic] through our private, through our private channels to Chancellor Brandt—not through the foreign office, but through some private channels we have there.” (National Archives, come in after some deliberations. K: Well, we could decide that. For example, after they come to Vienna they could do it. D: - After they come to Vienna. And then proceed [omission in - transcript]organ of conference which will handle it. K: That’s right. - D: The only difference is between … K: - The original group and the working group. D: So the only real difference between your proposal and - our proposal is that at the very beginning whether it should be invited - all who want to participate, but when they arrive, then there will be a - committee which will handle all the things. Your other proposal begins - with … K: Who will then invite other countries. D: Okay, you make it as preliminary remarks. K: Right, and - on Vienna as a site, I can tell you informally we are quite favorable, - but we don’t want to spend an enormous amount of capital with our allies - to force them to do it. D: Yeah, I - understand. K: But frankly, I mean this is between you and me, the - British have been especially difficult, and we have now told them that - they should be a little more quiet. This is strictly between you and me. - D: My feeling is this proposal you - mentioned, this is now so to speak in our confidential channel … K: - That’s right, but we haven’t told the State Department yet. D: No, I understand. But this is [omission in - transcript] because I will mention to Moscow that I talked to you … K: - We’ll support that. D: So in this case we - still have now a proposal. K: That’s correct.” Dobrynin called again at 2:25 p.m. to - clarify Kissinger’s remarks. - (Ibid., Nixon Presidential - Materials, Henry A. Kissinger - Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box - 18, Chronological File)

+ After they come to Vienna. And then proceed [omission in transcript] + organ of conference which will handle it. K: That’s right. D: The only difference is between … K: The + original group and the working group. D: + So the only real difference between your proposal and our proposal is + that at the very beginning whether it should be invited all who want to + participate, but when they arrive, then there will be a committee which + will handle all the things. Your other proposal begins with … K: Who + will then invite other countries. D: Okay, + you make it as preliminary remarks. K: Right, and on Vienna as a site, I + can tell you informally we are quite favorable, but we don’t want to + spend an enormous amount of capital with our allies to force them to do + it. D: Yeah, I understand. K: But frankly, + I mean this is between you and me, the British have been especially + difficult, and we have now told them that they should be a little more + quiet. This is strictly between you and me. D: My feeling is this proposal you mentioned, this is now + so to speak in our confidential channel … K: That’s right, but we + haven’t told the State Department yet. D: + No, I understand. But this is [omission in transcript] because I will + mention to Moscow that I talked to you … K: We’ll support that. D: So in this case we still have now a + proposal. K: That’s correct.” Dobrynin called again at 2:25 p.m. to clarify Kissinger’s remarks. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone + Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, + Chronological File)

On January 24, the North Atlantic Council announced in a press release that the Allied countries had replied to the notes from the five Warsaw Pact states inviting them to exploratory talks on D: And during this consultation - we reserve the right to raise when it will be [omission in - transcript]necessary about this neutral countries just as the right to - raise during this preliminary consultation. K: Right. D: As you I understand reserve your right to - exercise it. K: Right. D: (laughter) This - is my impression, yes? K: That is correct. D: So this is answer just for you. K: But you will give us - a formal answer?” At this point, Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviet Union would give a - formal response to the Western notes of January 24 on January 27. He - then read to Kissinger the text - of the Soviet response before its official delivery. The telephone - conversation continued: “K: Well, Anatol, you tell Gromyko that he has made a big effort - and we will make a big effort. D: - [omission in transcript] So, now, Henry, I hope by - the way on both points—on European Conference, you remember, you sent to - me your position? K: Yes, I have been in touch with Bahr. And he promised me an answer by - Monday. D: Yeah, it will be very soon. K: - And as soon as I—We are not the obstacle on that. D: I know. K: We can concert with the Europeans. And I will - get in touch with the French after Rogers is out of there because they get too confused - about our channels of communication.” Dobrynin then discussed the Soviet draft agenda - (mandates) and draft declaration for the European security conference - (see Document 124). “D: But the only clear position I would like to make—please - make sure that your Delegation in Helsinki—I am not thinking about the - final document because they don’t know about it—but I think about the - so-to-speak mandate. K: Yeah. But I have to get some agreement from the - Europeans first, Anatol. D: I know but—K: - As soon as I have heard from Bahr, - I will—D: I understand, but I think still - a certain kind is up to you what kind of a preliminary they have to - actually—on a working level they will—K: Yeah, I will—D: They shouldn’t necessarily know that we - are already involved on a high level but—K: No, no, I will calm them - down. D: Yes, because otherwise in a - little bit they will say some suggestions or objections and our people, - without knowing it, they will report to Moscow Americans making fuss. So - you see. K: No, I will calm them down.” (All of the transcripts of - telephone conversations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone - Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, - Chronological File)

+ we reserve the right to raise when it will be [omission in transcript] + necessary about this neutral countries just as the right to raise during + this preliminary consultation. K: Right. D: As you I understand reserve your right to exercise it. K: + Right. D: (laughter) This is my + impression, yes? K: That is correct. D: So + this is answer just for you. K: But you will give us a formal answer?” + At this point, Dobrynin confirmed + that the Soviet Union would give a formal response to the Western notes + of January 24 on January 27. He then read to Kissinger the text of the Soviet response before its + official delivery. The telephone conversation continued: “K: Well, + Anatol, you tell Gromyko that he + has made a big effort and we will make a big effort. D: [omission in transcript] So, now, + Henry, I hope by the way on both points—on + European Conference, you remember, you sent to me your position? K: Yes, + I have been in touch with Bahr. + And he promised me an answer by Monday. D: + Yeah, it will be very soon. K: And as soon as I—We are not the obstacle + on that. D: I know. K: We can concert with + the Europeans. And I will get in touch with the French after Rogers is out of there because they get + too confused about our channels of communication.” Dobrynin then discussed the Soviet + draft agenda (mandates) and draft declaration for the European security + conference (see Document 124). “D: But the only clear position I would like + to make—please make sure that your Delegation in Helsinki—I am not + thinking about the final document because they don’t know about it—but I + think about the so-to-speak mandate. K: Yeah. But I have to get some + agreement from the Europeans first, Anatol. D: I know but—K: As soon as I have heard from Bahr, I will—D: I understand, but I think still a certain kind is up to + you what kind of a preliminary they have to actually—on a working level + they will—K: Yeah, I will—D: They + shouldn’t necessarily know that we are already involved on a high level + but—K: No, no, I will calm them down. D: + Yes, because otherwise in a little bit they will say some suggestions or + objections and our people, without knowing it, they will report to + Moscow Americans making fuss. So you see. K: No, I will calm them down.” + (All of the transcripts of telephone conversations are in the National + Archives, Nixon Presidential + Materials, Henry A. Kissinger + Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box + 18, Chronological File)

On January 27, Bahr wrote to Kissinger in a confidential message in German: “We will decide at the end of the week about the @@ -62651,9 +62650,8 @@

Kreisky: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I think we can get something at the Conference in - Helsinki, if he [Brezhnev]understands we need to get something so it is not - just a show.

+ Helsinki, if he [Brezhnev] + understands we need to get something so it is not just a show.

President: Basket III.

Kissinger: The problem is not us @@ -63524,10 +63522,10 @@

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have no time to table a counter proposal in this session.

Ambassador Roth: The question is - what do we do with the British [Soviet?]proposal. - We do not think that we can prepare a detailed counter proposal for - delivery in this session. The NAC should - discuss various scenarios.

+ what do we do with the British [Soviet?] + proposal. We do not think that we can prepare a detailed counter + proposal for delivery in this session. The NAC should discuss various scenarios.

Mr. Hartman: NATO’s basic position is known to the Soviets. We should take the recess and then prepare separate @@ -64984,8 +64982,8 @@ Kissinger: Isn’t the Belgrade formulation acceptable?

- Gromyko: [To his colleagues:]What - is the Belgrade formulation?

+ Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] + What is the Belgrade formulation?

Kissinger: We had the impression perhaps that that formula …

@@ -65011,8 +65009,8 @@ didn’t explain it.

- Gromyko: [To his colleagues:]What - is the Belgrade formulation?

+ Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] + What is the Belgrade formulation?

Dobrynin: [To Kissinger:] No one on our side is @@ -66959,13 +66957,13 @@

Gromyko: Yes.

- Kissinger: He [the - President]turned to me and asked “What is he talking about?” and I said - I didn’t know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled—between “equal - validity” and “equal applicability.” I had two difficulties—I couldn’t - tell the difference between the two positions, and what is more - embarrassing for a Foreign Minister, I didn’t know which side had which - position. [Laughter].

+ Kissinger: He [the President] + turned to me and asked “What is he talking about?” and I said I didn’t + know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled—between “equal validity” and + “equal applicability.” I had two difficulties—I couldn’t tell the + difference between the two positions, and what is more embarrassing for + a Foreign Minister, I didn’t know which side had which position. + [Laughter].

Gromyko: Your mind must have been on more significant matters than the European Security Conference.

@@ -67020,9 +67018,8 @@ done.

The principles are done. Quadripartite rights and responsibilities. We have the problem of Basket III, of confidence-building machinery, and - while we are here we should say something about how it [the - summit]should be conducted—the length of time, speeches, if You’re - ready.

+ while we are here we should say something about how it [the summit] + should be conducted—the length of time, speeches, if You’re ready.

Gromyko: I am ready.

@@ -72281,8 +72278,8 @@

Sherer: That is hard to say. We are dealing with a man who is just unreasonable.

- Kissinger: - [Whispers]Assassination. [Laughter]

+ Kissinger: [Whispers] + Assassination. [Laughter]

What do you think, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: I think we must be @@ -72737,8 +72734,8 @@ support the Canadian proposal?

Kissinger: I think it would be - counterproductive. [To Sherer:]Don’t you?

+ counterproductive. [To Sherer:] + Don’t you?

Sherer: I agree.

Kissinger: I think many @@ -76133,12 +76130,11 @@ before.

Brezhnev: [Reads over his talking - paper and confers with Gromyko]Here are some data. In 1972—the first figures are - the number of requests for exit permits—in 1972, there were 26,800 - requests. In 1973, there were approximately 26,000. In 1974, there were - 14,000. In the first six months of 1975, there were 5,000 requests to - leave.

+ paper and confers with Gromyko] + Here are some data. In 1972—the first figures are the number of requests + for exit permits—in 1972, there were 26,800 requests. In 1973, there + were approximately 26,000. In 1974, there were 14,000. In the first six + months of 1975, there were 5,000 requests to leave.

As regards the number of people who actually left for Israel—actually some went elsewhere—in 1972, there were 29,000. In 1973, 33,000. In 1974, 19,000. And in the first six months of 1975, 6,000. Some were @@ -77921,7 +77917,7 @@ information; presents the Options 1, 2, and 3A of the negotiating proposals under interagency discussion; stresses the potential negotiating pitfalls of a simple U.S.-Soviet percentage cut; [and]emphasizes the U.S.-Soviet percentage cut; [and] emphasizes the U.S. preference toward a common ceiling approach that is phased with a first phase comprising a 15% U.S. @@ -78531,11 +78527,11 @@ Yeah. K: I could tell you what we are thinking because sooner or later you will hear it anyway. D: Yes, but—K: Let me wait. Definitely next week we will devote half an hour to that point, and I will give you a - pretty good outline of our thinking. D: Because [omission in - memorandum]K: What basically we are thinking is that in that category of - 10–15% for our forces and then reducing the Warsaw Pact forces to the level that will then - be achieved after we cut back 10–15%—D: [omission in memorandum] first + pretty good outline of our thinking. D: Because [omission in memorandum] + K: What basically we are thinking is that in that category of 10–15% for + our forces and then reducing the Warsaw Pact forces to the level that will then be + achieved after we cut back 10–15%—D: [omission in memorandum] first stage I understand. But what is second stage? K: Second stage is—D: Because our mutual [omission in memorandum] K: After we have both cut—D: Yes. [omission in memorandum] 10%? K: No. What we want to do is to get @@ -80754,15 +80750,15 @@ regard to central strategic systems. Forward based systems were dropped from any discussion with relation to the central strategic systems, and to the extent that there will be any discussion of forward based - systems, it would take place within the discussions going on - [regarding]mutual and balanced force reductions. This has been a matter - of concern to our European allies for some years, and therefore it is - particularly noteworthy that the results of the Vladivostok conference - have given them cause to rejoice on this particular issue. In addition, - I might say that the decision to establish a common ceiling with regard - to strategic delivery vehicles would be a harbinger of a decision to - accept a common ceiling with regard to forces in Central Europe.’” - Lodal commented: “Lodal commented: “Schlesinger may have been trying to reassure the Europeans that no FBS deal was made with the Soviets as per your conversation on December 6. diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76v40.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76v40.xml index 7a462d30f..629b29184 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76v40.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76v40.xml @@ -27029,7 +27029,7 @@ written statement, reiterating that it would be most embarrassing if this came to light, as the Germans most emphatically do not want to be in the position of giving the Americans advice. ([less - than 1 line not declassifed]comment: It may be noted, however, + than 1 line not declassifed] comment: It may be noted, however, that as reported in Embassy Bonn 6254, Limdis, 3 June 1970,Not printed. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) the German Foreign Office was thinking of @@ -45759,8 +45759,8 @@ banned or limited and if limited, how? (2) What did you mean by liaison office to the three powers and the senate? Is that something other than the Federal plenipotentiary? How would it operate? I am seeing Dobrynin again on Friday [February - 26]so an answer would be helpful. Warm good wishes.” + corresp="#p_DAF1">Dobrynin again on Friday [February 26] + so an answer would be helpful. Warm good wishes.”

Dobrynin tells me that Abrasimov has @@ -47130,10 +47130,10 @@ expected to be confirmed.In a memorandum to the President on March 22, Kissinger reported: “As expected the Christian Democrats (CDU) won an absolute majority in the [March - 21]Rhineland-Palatinate regional elections. The Social Democrats also - made gains at the expense of the smaller parties. Another regional - election will be held later this year [April 25] in Schleswig-Holstein.” + >CDU) won an absolute majority in the [March 21] + Rhineland-Palatinate regional elections. The Social Democrats also made + gains at the expense of the smaller parties. Another regional election + will be held later this year [April 25] in Schleswig-Holstein.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 32, President’s Daily Briefs, March 15–31, 1971) However, it @@ -47634,15 +47634,14 @@ that “tomorrow I would like to give you in a sealed envelope a new suggestion on a Berlin question.” “You can give it from my Government to the President for the Four Power [talks],” he explained. “You will be in a - position to give me a certain kind of reaction before the - [quadripartite]meeting on the 25th.” Kissinger suggested that Dobrynin send the envelope to the White House the next day; - he would then need time to consider the proposal before he could give an - informal response. The two men agreed that they would continue their - discussion during dinner at the Soviet Embassy on March 22nd. Kissinger then addressed the conduct of - negotiations on Berlin by confidential channel:

+ position to give me a certain kind of reaction before the [quadripartite] + meeting on the 25th.” Kissinger + suggested that Dobrynin send the + envelope to the White House the next day; he would then need time to + consider the proposal before he could give an informal response. The two men + agreed that they would continue their discussion during dinner at the Soviet + Embassy on March 22nd. Kissinger then + addressed the conduct of negotiations on Berlin by confidential channel:

“K: The only other question I have, you will not object if I show this to our man in Berlin—Rush?

“D: Very privately?

@@ -49836,10 +49835,10 @@

“D: I can tell you before. When I get back I will tell you.

“K: I will probably talk to you tomorrow. If not, I will put it in an envelope and leave it for General Haig. In that case I would call you Saturday [March 27]morning.” - (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Conversations, - Chronological File)

+ >Haig. In that case I would call you Saturday [March 27] + morning.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone + Conversations, Chronological File)

In a telephone conversation with Dobrynin at 3:32 p.m. on March 26, Kissinger addressed several issues @@ -57908,9 +57907,9 @@ arrangements for talks on Berlin both in the special channel and the four-power forum.

“D: I would like to check one thing which we discussed yesterday. I received - [a] call from our Ambassador [Falin]there were the gentleman [Rush] which was yesterday…

+ [a] call from our Ambassador [Falin] + there were the gentleman [Rush] which + was yesterday…

“K: I understand.

“D: Our Ambassador spoke with a third man [Bahr] who was here, not in our meeting…

@@ -62817,7 +62816,7 @@ altered. I wanted him to know, however, that if there were a deadlock we would break it in favor of the agreed position, unless overwhelming difficulties arose. I read to him the telegram from Rush [Document 291]speaking of Abrasimov’s + corresp="#p_RK1">Rush [Document 291] speaking of Abrasimov’s rough tactics towards the British Ambassador which certainly didn’t help matters. Dobrynin said that speaking confidentially the Soviet Ambassadors in Eastern Europe were not used to @@ -64642,9 +64641,8 @@ consular services for Berliners. The cost to us has been a strong suggestion of a Soviet role in the interests of West Berlin, as well as a hint that the Soviets will insist that the Three represent West Berlin in some - international bodies (such as the [UN]Security Council and perhaps the Conference on European - Security).

+ international bodies (such as the [UN] + Security Council and perhaps the Conference on European Security).

The handling of Soviet interests in West Berlin has been a loss to the West, though some, like Bahr, have argued that the Consulate General enhances rather than detracts from Three Power @@ -66673,9 +66671,9 @@ “I think we should hold tough.” R: “We are better off not to rush it. I keep telling Ken. Two days.” K: “That was not our preference.” R: “It would have been better to take another week. Not a major problem.” K: - “They are incurable bastards.” R: “They [omission in the source - text]interpreted in E. German text and not in the [W. German?] text.” K: - “And in the Russian text.” R: “Clever bastards.” (Library of Congress, + “They are incurable bastards.” R: “They [omission in the source text] + interpreted in E. German text and not in the [W. German?] text.” K: “And + in the Russian text.” R: “Clever bastards.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 369, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) If not, I do think we have a rather serious problem and you may want to @@ -73844,8 +73842,8 @@

Kissinger: Ken, how are you?

- Rush: Fine, thank you. [How did]things - go this morning? + Rush: Fine, thank you. [How did] + things go this morning? Nixon convened a meeting of the National Security Council from 9:10 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. to discuss a military response to the North Vietnamese invasion, including the mining @@ -74132,9 +74130,9 @@ Nixon: “Well, we’ll get it to them, you know. When is that? When do we have to have that done?”

- Kissinger: “I guess Tuesday [May - 16]would be a good day to have it. Monday or Tuesday. Until that they won’t - do a thing.”

+ Kissinger: “I guess Tuesday [May 16] + would be a good day to have it. Monday or Tuesday. Until that they won’t do + a thing.”

Nixon: “But if we give them that it has to be a straight quid pro quo, don’t you think?”

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve01.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve01.xml index 30bd5dc29..fa555108a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve01.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve01.xml @@ -28982,7 +28982,7 @@ continuing objective of our policy as best way to secure release of all remaining hostages. - The U.S. [U.K.](The U.S. [U.K.] (Greenhill) has already indicated belief that the U.S. contribution to a solution would be to persuade the Israelis to give up Palestinian prisoners in order to complete @@ -32818,9 +32818,9 @@ incidentally, agreed. So there’s no problem with Rogers.

- Nixon: Oh, no. - [Unclear]called upon them to stop the games. That was not going to - be our position.

+ Nixon: Oh, no. [Unclear] + called upon them to stop the games. That was not going to be our + position.

Kissinger: I don’t think we can—

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve02.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve02.xml index b29c62bde..59541df20 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve02.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve02.xml @@ -69034,7 +69034,7 @@ munitions stocks, [less than 1 line not declassified] filled [less than 1 line not declassified]. The bulk of the munitions containing - [less than 1 line not declassified]are + [less than 1 line not declassified] are 6–10 years old; those filled with [less than 1 line not declassified] have been in storage 5–9 years. No significant deterioration has been observed in either case.

@@ -78995,8 +78995,8 @@ as well as partial measures [unclear]. We are open-minded, but if you [unclear]. We accept [unclear]. We feel…we won’t object if there is not a majority of all participate…you, China [unclear]. We shall deal with - the question of [unclear]…. We think that this proposal [unclear]France. - [unclear]

+ the question of [unclear]…. We think that this proposal [unclear] + France. [unclear]

Nixon: Is this statement a proposal for a conference on limitation or disarmament?

@@ -79007,14 +79007,14 @@ Dobrynin: Yes.

Nixon: What…would the…preparatory [sic] that would be required?

- Dobrynin: Well it is [unclear]the - agenda.

+ Dobrynin: Well it is [unclear] + the agenda.

Nixon: At the ambassador level?

- Dobrynin: Agenda [unclear]foreign - ministry to organize, establish and prepare the note. [unclear.]and - Ambassadorial level. One way would be to establish a [unclear] and they - will discuss. Or the diplomatic chancelleries can discuss.

+ Dobrynin: Agenda [unclear] + foreign ministry to organize, establish and prepare the note. [unclear] + and Ambassadorial level. One way would be to establish a [unclear] and + they will discuss. Or the diplomatic chancelleries can discuss.

Nixon: It seems to me that the key is the leadership at the top. What I mean is…I’m not referring here to the tops of governments. That, too, is important. But, I really think that the…two major nuclear powers…the diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve04.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve04.xml index 7586f3007..30c3f0e8f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve04.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve04.xml @@ -64528,7 +64528,7 @@ corresp="#p_KHA1">Kissinger during the President’s visit to Iran. This proposal was turned down on the grounds of insufficient time. Subsequently, the Shah through [text not - declassified]requested that Dr. ] requested that Dr. Kissinger and yourself receive representatives from Barzani. The Shah also asked for Dr. Kissinger’s and your reaction to such a diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve05p2.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve05p2.xml index e38614650..d0642183f 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve05p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve05p2.xml @@ -20477,9 +20477,9 @@ undertaken in support of U.S. policies and interests in Libya.

[text not declassified] presented several options for consideration noting that an essential prerequisite to undertaking - any of them is a reliable [text not - declassified]picture of the policies and intentions of the Libyan - government. [text not declassified]

+ any of them is a reliable [text not declassified] + picture of the policies and intentions of the Libyan government. [text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified] unanimously favored [text not declassified] option labeled 1-A which @@ -28043,7 +28043,7 @@

1. Morocco. Although reports often conflicting, three developments have recently disturbed Moroccan scene and led to almost constant state alert among military and police forces. First, - [text not declassified]military plot against + [text not declassified] military plot against regime discovered late December or early January and some military officers, all captains or below, summarily executed. Second, according to press and intelligence reports, six or more Moroccan terrorists were @@ -33052,11 +33052,11 @@ 160 Study”] was to identify US interests as precisely as possible, evaluate their relative importance, and delineate alternative approaches that we might take to serve those interests. Attached to the NSSM 160 - options paper [small tab marked “SNIE”]are a Special NIE, - “Prospects for the Moroccan Monarchy,” as well as a detailed fact sheet - on Morocco and contingency papers on the Kenitra communications complex - and the Voice of America relay station at Tangier.

+ options paper [small tab marked “SNIE”] + are a Special NIE, “Prospects for the + Moroccan Monarchy,” as well as a detailed fact sheet on Morocco and + contingency papers on the Kenitra communications complex and the Voice + of America relay station at Tangier.

The operational situation with which we are dealing is this: Foreign Minister Benhima told Secretary

This report has been communicated to State and to Ambassador Rockwell.

-

Along these same lines, Rose Mary Woods has sent you a memorandum [Tab - B]saying that Bob Kleberg (King Ranch, Texas), has recently seen the new +

Along these same lines, Rose Mary Woods has sent you a memorandum [Tab B] + saying that Bob Kleberg (King Ranch, Texas), has recently seen the new Moroccan Prime Minister, Ahmad Osman, and that Osman would like to see the President soon after the inauguration.

@@ -34167,7 +34167,7 @@ 5, the Department reported that in their meetings with President Nixon and other American officials,“President [Bourguiba]and Bourguiba] and Bourguiba Jr. expressed concern growing Soviet naval presence Mediterranean and continued fear of Soviet-armed Algeria. Tunisia’s pro-Western stand had heightened its isolation and diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve07.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve07.xml index d3b1e333e..b4aeee10a 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve07.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve07.xml @@ -43817,8 +43817,8 @@ Kissinger: The basic principle is that [unclear].

- Keating: Yes. [unclear - exchange]The main thing is to... I’m convinced there is a change in the + Keating: Yes. [unclear exchange] + The main thing is to... I’m convinced there is a change in the subcontinent. And that India should not be equated with Pakistan. India is a strong, stable power now while Pakistan is having all this difficulty. The other one, the second one, had to do with the aid @@ -44063,7 +44063,7 @@ Chinese [unclear]. It’s, therefore, very much in our interest to see that India, we want them to succeed. Because there are 550 million people, we want them to do well. And they always hate US [unclear]internationally, we know + target="#t_US1">US [unclear] internationally, we know that.

Keating: Not always.

@@ -44325,8 +44325,9 @@ White House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.]

Singh: Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmth and greetings. - She greatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear]conveyed - in that and she asks me to convey her greetings to you [unclear].

+ She greatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear] + conveyed in that and she asks me to convey her greetings to you + [unclear].

Nixon: Sure. I appreciate that. Tell her that we were all very impressed by her great political victory @@ -44367,7 +44368,7 @@

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Singh: [unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to convey, Your Excellency, - the latest situation, as the present one has no [unclear]and we are + the latest situation, as the present one has no [unclear] and we are coming and that every second [unclear, refugees they come?]

Nixon: Every second?

@@ -44402,7 +44403,7 @@ [unclear]. And it’s the best end right now that we’ve got. Support for this approach of ours and help with [unclear]. How to meet this objective, we believe that if the building of the [unclear] can be seen - [unclear] make up their minds. [unclear]can be sure as he can be + [unclear] make up their minds. [unclear] can be sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear].

Nixon: Hmmm.

@@ -44430,14 +44431,14 @@

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Singh: [unclear] There’s a very good chance to have. Even the course of - the negotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami - [unclear]more than contained in their six-point program in the - direction. [unclear] without direction of this nature, and we have - authority to create [unclear], so it could be saved. The Council has - become most angered because they [unclear]. The confidence has been very - rudely shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan can still bring back - the country themselves, those for the present moment who find themselves - in the [unclear].

+ the negotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear] + more than contained in their six-point program in the direction. + [unclear] without direction of this nature, and we have authority to + create [unclear], so it could be saved. The Council has become most + angered because they [unclear]. The confidence has been very rudely + shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan can still bring back the + country themselves, those for the present moment who find themselves in + the [unclear].

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Singh: [unclear] Then it appears that they’re pushing them more and more @@ -44450,12 +44451,12 @@ of the conditions there you will find [unclear]; continuation of conditions where the military rule is pitted against almost united will of [unclear] people. [unclear] We’ll do that to maintain control of the - situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. - [unclear]from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and - maybe even from your point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to - resort to that. That your country and ours, we can work together, work - in a [unclear] manner. To that extent [unclear] stability, so much in - common. We should not.

+ situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. [unclear] + from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and maybe even + from your point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to resort to + that. That your country and ours, we can work together, work in a + [unclear] manner. To that extent [unclear] stability, so much in common. + We should not.

Nixon: You don’t, you don’t have a feeling that the situation would be to your interest to have a, to @@ -48447,8 +48448,8 @@ escalated their demand into total independence immediately. Well, that Yahya will never agree to. There has to be a face-saving formula and a transition period.

-

Douglas-Home: That’s right, and I think it will. I think two - [unclear]with regard to everything. You’ve got to have it.

+

Douglas-Home: That’s right, and I think it will. I think two [unclear] + with regard to everything. You’ve got to have it.

Kissinger: We told the Indians that if they could separate the political process and if they could give @@ -49935,9 +49936,9 @@

Khan: [unclear] And I’m grateful you anticipated our desire and have [unclear—been in contact with the - Russians?] on this. Because, if you can [unclear—bring the - Russians?]with you on the need for maintaining peace on the - subcontinent, it just might turn the tide.

+ Russians?] on this. Because, if you can [unclear—bring the Russians?] + with you on the need for maintaining peace on the subcontinent, it just + might turn the tide.

Nixon: I hope so. Well, the Russians should have some influence. What reaction did we get from @@ -51303,9 +51304,9 @@ the Indians [who] see the Pakistanis in a uniquely weak position, with the world opinion turned against them. And basically there’s an opportunity they’ll never get again for at least [unclear]. So if any - mistake was made it was being too hard on Pakistan. [unclear]Secondly, I - think, we have a very aggressive record. Of one we haven’t backed down, - first for the refugees, secondly for relief in East Pakistan, and + mistake was made it was being too hard on Pakistan. [unclear] Secondly, + I think, we have a very aggressive record. Of one we haven’t backed + down, first for the refugees, secondly for relief in East Pakistan, and thirdly in moving things concretely towards the political evolution. We’re the only ones that pass that test.

@@ -52479,7 +52480,7 @@ Kissinger: Well, we said this threatens the whole climate of confidence we’ve tried so hard to - establish. I told him yesterday that [unclear]it’s exactly the opposite + establish. I told him yesterday that [unclear] it’s exactly the opposite of what they should want. They’re driving us into aligning ourselves with countries that we have no particular parallel interest in on the sub-continent. And I said, “How can you talk to us about Security @@ -53061,29 +53062,29 @@ the press is like the Kennedys were because the Kennedys were obsessed with the idea of the Indian mystery and all of the God-like qualities and so forth of the Indians. He said those of us who work with the - Indians up here know that they are the [unclear—most?]devious, trickiest - sons-of-bitches there are. And he went on to say, I went on to tell him, - I said how come we got so many votes. He said, “yeah, we got all the - votes except India’s, the Russian satellites.” And we even got Rumania. - He said, “well first of all, you know a lot of Mid-Eastern votes were - with us.” [unclear] They were sort of reflecting the Israeli thing. I - can see that, you know, on withdrawal, they can’t be against withdrawal. - But then he said there are countries like Namibia and a lot jackass - places like that [unclear]. He said they also—this idea, you see this is - where The New York Times and the rest are wrong, where they said that if - aggression is engaged in by a democracy it’s all right. But where it’s - engaged in by a dictatorship, it’s wrong. They forget that most of the - countries in the world are dictatorships, including all these little - countries. Second point, the point that I made to him which I [unclear], - now look there’s a totally moral attitude of our critics here. First - they say, they make the point that because there’s 600 million Indians - and only 60 million in West Pakistan, we’re on the wrong side. We should - be with the 600 million Indians. I said since when do we determine the - morality of our policy on the basis of how many people a country has? I - said the second reason that they’re wrong, then they say but India is a - democratic country, and Pakistan is a totalitarian country, a - dictatorship, and therefore India—we shouldn’t be on the side of a - dictatorship but on the side of the democratic country. I said if + Indians up here know that they are the [unclear—most?] devious, + trickiest sons-of-bitches there are. And he went on to say, I went on to + tell him, I said how come we got so many votes. He said, “yeah, we got + all the votes except India’s, the Russian satellites.” And we even got + Rumania. He said, “well first of all, you know a lot of Mid-Eastern + votes were with us.” [unclear] They were sort of reflecting the Israeli + thing. I can see that, you know, on withdrawal, they can’t be against + withdrawal. But then he said there are countries like Namibia and a lot + jackass places like that [unclear]. He said they also—this idea, you see + this is where The New York Times and the rest are wrong, where they said + that if aggression is engaged in by a democracy it’s all right. But + where it’s engaged in by a dictatorship, it’s wrong. They forget that + most of the countries in the world are dictatorships, including all + these little countries. Second point, the point that I made to him which + I [unclear], now look there’s a totally moral attitude of our critics + here. First they say, they make the point that because there’s 600 + million Indians and only 60 million in West Pakistan, we’re on the wrong + side. We should be with the 600 million Indians. I said since when do we + determine the morality of our policy on the basis of how many people a + country has? I said the second reason that they’re wrong, then they say + but India is a democratic country, and Pakistan is a totalitarian + country, a dictatorship, and therefore India—we shouldn’t be on the side + of a dictatorship but on the side of the democratic country. I said if aggression is engaged in by any country, it’s wrong. And in a sense it’s even more wrong for a democratic country to engage in it because democratic countries are held in a higher degree of morality. And I said @@ -55354,10 +55355,10 @@ complete collapse of the world’s psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle a not so insignificant country without - anybody doing anything. Now the purpose of the [unclear—course?]that I’m - suggesting is whether we can put enough chips into the pot to get the - Russians for their own reasons, for the other considerations, to call a - halt to it. It may not work, after which—

+ anybody doing anything. Now the purpose of the [unclear—course?] that + I’m suggesting is whether we can put enough chips into the pot to get + the Russians for their own reasons, for the other considerations, to + call a halt to it. It may not work, after which—

Nixon: What are we going @@ -55490,7 +55491,7 @@ Nixon: It may well be that we just have to say that [unclear—we’ve done?] the best we can. We will lose public opinion [unclear] Chou En-Lai, but that’s all right. We - lose public opinion. [unclear]Understand we’re not risking—

+ lose public opinion. [unclear] Understand we’re not risking—

Kissinger: Yeah, but we @@ -55659,7 +55660,7 @@ Nixon: Why have they [unclear]? I don’t, I don’t believe—I don’t want them to be able to know. We need a news conference for it. They went out having a luncheon - meeting there and I don’t know who that [unclear]probably put out that + meeting there and I don’t know who that [unclear] probably put out that story to that effect. Who else there could have put out the story to the effect that I directly ordered it, or any of us were involved? Huh?

@@ -56285,7 +56286,7 @@ that way in that spirit.

Matskevich: I am grateful for your very candid approach. Unfortunately, I was with Mr. Brezhnev [unclear]so that’s why I didn’t talk to it. We + >Brezhnev [unclear] so that’s why I didn’t talk to it. We talked now with Brezhnev about four problems: the Middle East, Europe, SALT talks, and we talk trade. And I have [unclear] three @@ -59121,7 +59122,7 @@ Nixon: I think we to [need] make more use of our own PR people - to get across our side. [unclear]I think we have to realize [unclear]. + to get across our side. [unclear] I think we have to realize [unclear]. Get across our point of view. [unclear]

@@ -61274,7 +61275,7 @@ Nixon: The EC–121. The biggest, and the biggest error frankly that has—it was a hell of an error on Korea for us to [unclear] wouldn’t go across the Yalu. - Macarthur was right. Right as hell. And now [unclear]to this point. I + Macarthur was right. Right as hell. And now [unclear] to this point. I don’t know whether [unclear]. We’ve got to say we’re not doing it.

@@ -64022,9 +64023,9 @@

Nixon: Well, I know, but we tell them, you know what you tell them. You tell the Peking guys, the - President he didn’t care what the [UN]Security Council did. He wanted to have it directly from the - Russians. He’s fortunate.

+ President he didn’t care what the [UN] + Security Council did. He wanted to have it directly from the Russians. + He’s fortunate.

Kissinger: Well, what if the Russians vote with us at the Security Council? We are fine.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve08.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve08.xml index 8c121a258..550a0d7ff 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve08.xml @@ -19219,7 +19219,7 @@

Eliot: We’ll send you - [Atherton]a summary by the end of this week. How’s our joint + [Atherton] a summary by the end of this week. How’s our joint statement?

@@ -37815,13 +37815,13 @@ That’s baloney. That is not true. I have never been and never will be, because I want good relations. So, and the impression that whoever is president of the United States is basically against the biggest - democracy in the world is not a healthy one to have. It’s just - [unclear]It’s not healthy for the other—for the superpowers to think - that, it isn’t healthy for your neighbors to think that, it isn’t - healthy, certainly, for people in this country to think that. And - finally, apart from its not being healthy, it’s just not true. So, these - are some of the things that I hope you take with you, and I hope you - take some pleasant memories, too.

+ democracy in the world is not a healthy one to have. It’s just [unclear] + It’s not healthy for the other—for the superpowers to think that, it + isn’t healthy for your neighbors to think that, it isn’t healthy, + certainly, for people in this country to think that. And finally, apart + from its not being healthy, it’s just not true. So, these are some of + the things that I hope you take with you, and I hope you take some + pleasant memories, too.

Jha: I can take very happy memories, sir, and I must say throughout a very difficult period one of @@ -37848,9 +37848,9 @@ Jha: …for there to be a feeling that India and this country [unclear].

- Nixon: That’s right. [Unclear]And - we can find—Let me say you can tell her I will do my part. I’ll go more - than half way and I have great respect for her not because she is a + Nixon: That’s right. [Unclear] + And we can find—Let me say you can tell her I will do my part. I’ll go + more than half way and I have great respect for her not because she is a woman, but because she’s a great leader. I have great respect for her because she’s a skillful politician.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve13.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve13.xml index 6ff899749..27263b8e1 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve13.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve13.xml @@ -18326,8 +18326,8 @@ corresp="#p_KHA1">Kissinger and the Chinese.

Mr. Kissinger stated that Ambassador Farland would receive a copy of - everything given to Yahya. [text not declassified]Mr. - Kissinger asked Ambassador + everything given to Yahya. [text not declassified] + Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Farland if he thought Hilaly would permit our messages to be ready by the foreign office. Ambassador Jenkins when he discusses with his colleagues in - the Foreign Ministry. [Chou - laughs]That would be Mr. Holdridge. - In the end we come back together.

+ the Foreign Ministry. [Chou laughs] + That would be Mr. Holdridge. In the + end we come back together.

PM Chou: Mr. Holdridge with Mr. @@ -29171,7 +29171,7 @@

PM Chou: The lady yesterday [Miss - Pineau]had a runny nose. Now that it’s getting later it is getting very + Pineau] had a runny nose. Now that it’s getting later it is getting very cool.

Dr. Kissinger: At the Ming tombs it was very warm.

@@ -29673,8 +29673,8 @@ “the two states in Korea,” because that would be equal to saying that Korea will be permanently divided into two, regardless whether the Korean people should wish for unification and should be able to do so peacefully.

-

Dr. Kissinger: [reaching for a - folder]I am even using a red folder in Peking.

+

Dr. Kissinger: [reaching for a folder] + I am even using a red folder in Peking.

PM Chou: But mine isn’t red.

@@ -40696,10 +40696,10 @@ Washington, undatedSource: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box - 1037, Files for the President-China Material, China-AH January - [1972]visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A typed - notation indicated that the message was to be “delivered in sealed - envelope directly to Gen. Gen. Haig.” Kissinger wrote next to the reference number: “and your immediately following message with identifier 008.” @@ -59685,11 +59685,11 @@ winter. As for a U.S. symphony orchestra, it would be better for them to come later, for it is more complicated than the scientific delegation. As for the journalist visit, the timing is not important; but some of our - [American]journalists friends suggested they could come during your election - period to learn more about political life. But I doubt whether this is the - best time for them to go because our American friends will be kept busy. And - others might speculate about the reason for them to go then. So I doubt - this.

+ [American] journalists friends suggested they could come during your + election period to learn more about political life. But I doubt whether this + is the best time for them to go because our American friends will be kept + busy. And others might speculate about the reason for them to go then. So I + doubt this.

Mr. Jenkins: Well, that’s very considerate of you to bear that in mind. I think there are mixed considerations involved there, and I think we can have further communication on it.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p1.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p1.xml index e5759a963..b9a34aad7 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p1.xml @@ -30586,9 +30586,9 @@ capabilities in their respective sectors of the city in order to meet their obligations to assure the security and public order of the Western sectors. Such activities consist essentially of [text - not declassified]In the American sector, these responsibilities - are carried out by the Army’s Special Operations Field Office (SOFO).

+ not declassified] In the American sector, these + responsibilities are carried out by the Army’s Special Operations Field + Office (SOFO).

The Department of the Army has now determined that such activities are no longer an appropriate function for Army personnel. Army and Defense officials have informed us that if another agency cannot be induced to @@ -30839,8 +30839,8 @@

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

The Army’s Special Operations Field Office (SOFO) in Berlin has been conducting [text - not declassified]operations in the U.S. Sector since about 1947 - to insure security and public order in the city. The Departments of + not declassified] operations in the U.S. Sector since about + 1947 to insure security and public order in the city. The Departments of Defense and Army now believe that these activities are inappropriate to the traditional missions of the Army, and hence Army should no longer operate SOFO. The Department of State diff --git a/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p2.xml b/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p2.xml index 6a047a84c..03aae704e 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1969-76ve15p2.xml @@ -57749,8 +57749,8 @@ UK negotiations with the IMF.

Source: Ford Library, National Security - Adviser, ]Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box - 25, UK (23). Eyes Only. A + Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 25, + UK (23). Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “President has seen.” Ford and UK negotiations with the IMF.

Source: Ford Library, National Security - Adviser, ]Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box - 25, UK (23). Eyes Only. A + Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 25, + UK (23). Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “President has seen.” Ford and - Zbigniew - Brzezinski]good-neighbour relations cannot in general be - regarded by us otherwise but as affecting the interests of our - security.

+ Zbigniew Brzezinski] + good-neighbour relations cannot in general be regarded by us otherwise + but as affecting the interests of our security.

We believe that the situation emerging around Iran requires clear and explicit statements to be made on our as well as on your part on nonadmissibility of outside interference in the internal affairs of diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v08.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v08.xml index f5d43d7eb..2f6f4143d 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v08.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v08.xml @@ -84858,12 +84858,12 @@ said there was still the problem of getting real negotiations going. Kamil said that he did not see this problem. If Israel refuses, they will accept their responsibilities, and we go to the - Secretary of the Security Council [sic]or Geneva. But - this would be the beginning of a change in Israel’s move toward moderation. - Israel should be put in a position where they see they are challenging - everybody in the world. A confrontation with the facts should take place. If - the only way to get peace is through withdrawal, then this is what the - Sadat initiative will have + Secretary of the Security Council [sic] or Geneva. + But this would be the beginning of a change in Israel’s move toward + moderation. Israel should be put in a position where they see they are + challenging everybody in the world. A confrontation with the facts should + take place. If the only way to get peace is through withdrawal, then this is + what the Sadat initiative will have produced. Begin should not be able to feel that he can impose his terms by being militarily strong.

diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml index 34542be9c..031508af9 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v09Ed2.xml @@ -53004,7 +53004,7 @@ xml:id="d195fn7">In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: “complete [unit?] on ME. Cy; - Vance-[unclear]–Vance-[unclear]-JC reports concerns on.”

(9) Israel-Egypt peace blow to USSR diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v13.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v13.xml index 185cc4c76..1006c4ee2 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v13.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v13.xml @@ -64463,7 +64463,7 @@ Brown visit has assumed even greater significance in the new situation. It should be scheduled soon, but enough lead time should be allowed to play [plan?]carefully for it. We recommend setting a November date, + >plan?] carefully for it. We recommend setting a November date, but not announcing the trip until October. This will also give us time to monitor developments on the Sino-Vietnamese border. We also need to consider whether we should inform the Chinese that the trip will have to diff --git a/volumes/frus1977-80v17p1.xml b/volumes/frus1977-80v17p1.xml index 738c45feb..561ce301c 100644 --- a/volumes/frus1977-80v17p1.xml +++ b/volumes/frus1977-80v17p1.xml @@ -16412,7 +16412,7 @@ Frank Carlucci (Acting DCI) - [name not declassified](Chief, Africa + {"code":"deadline_exceeded","msg":"operation timed out"}