fix: articles corrections

Author: Billybobbonnet

articles/paris-ias-ideas/beliefs-and-preferences-aside-a-simple-method-to-decompose-discriminatory-behaviors.md

@@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ We propose a complementary strategy that inverts this logic: we begin by isolati
 
 In essence, our method proceeds as follows (see Figure 1 for visual reference):
 
-1. **We obtain *G^e^* and *O^e^* which are the subjects' implicit beliefs** about an ingroup and an outgroup partner's behavior, respectively.  Geometrically, these are the intersection points between the subject's unconditional cooperation (UC) level and their conditional cooperation (CC) strategy. From a behavioral perspective, *G^e^* and *O^e^* reflect the contributions that participants implicitly anticipate from each group, absent direct information.
-2. Next, we compute the conditional cooperation that would be displayed towards an ingroup partner if that partner were expected to behave like an outgroup member. Formally, we calculate, ***CG^(O^e^)^***, which is the contribution on the subject's ingroup CC curve evaluated at *O^e^*. Geometrically, this corresponds to projecting the outgroup belief *O^e^* onto the ingroup CC function (represented by the dashed purple line in Figure 1). Behaviorally, this captures how much a participant would be willing to cooperate with an ingroup partner who they expect to act like an outgroup partner.
-3. We define statistical discrimination (SD) as the difference between the conditional cooperation with an ingroup partner expected to behave as an outgroup member ***CG^(O^e^)^***, and the unconditional cooperation actually shown towards an outgroup member. In behavioral terms, this comparison controls for expectations (both equal to *O^e^*) and isolates the impact of group identity on behavior: it is a within-subject measure of how differently individuals act toward identical behaviors depending on the partner's group membership.
+1. **We obtain *G<sup>e</sup>* and *O<sup>e</sup>* which are the subjects' implicit beliefs** about an ingroup and an outgroup partner's behavior, respectively.  Geometrically, these are the intersection points between the subject's unconditional cooperation (UC) level and their conditional cooperation (CC) strategy. From a behavioral perspective, *G<sup>e</sup>* and *O<sup>e</sup>* reflect the contributions that participants implicitly anticipate from each group, absent direct information.
+2. Next, we compute the conditional cooperation that would be displayed towards an ingroup partner if that partner were expected to behave like an outgroup member. Formally, we calculate, ***CG^(O<sup>e</sup>)^***, which is the contribution on the subject's ingroup CC curve evaluated at *O<sup>e</sup>*. Geometrically, this corresponds to projecting the outgroup belief *O<sup>e</sup>* onto the ingroup CC function (represented by the dashed purple line in Figure 1). Behaviorally, this captures how much a participant would be willing to cooperate with an ingroup partner who they expect to act like an outgroup partner.
+3. We define statistical discrimination (SD) as the difference between the conditional cooperation with an ingroup partner expected to behave as an outgroup member ***CG^(O<sup>e</sup>)^***, and the unconditional cooperation actually shown towards an outgroup member. In behavioral terms, this comparison controls for expectations (both equal to *O<sup>e</sup>*) and isolates the impact of group identity on behavior: it is a within-subject measure of how differently individuals act toward identical behaviors depending on the partner's group membership.
 4. **We compute the PbD as the difference between total discrimination (TD), and SD.**
 
 This allows us to decompose overall discrimination into a belief-driven and a preference-driven component, with PbD emerging as a direct behavioral deviation not attributable to differences in expected partner behavior.
@@ -114,13 +114,13 @@ Let ***CG*** and ***CO*** represent the conditional cooperation functions towa
 
 ### **First step:**
 
-Implicit beliefs are derived by determining the partner contribution at the intersection of the conditional and unconditional cooperation functions, specifically equations (1) and (3) for the outgroup, and equations (2) and (4) for the ingroup. At these points, which we call ***G^e^*** and ***O^e*)^**, participants are allocating to the group account some amount that might be consistent with what they expect the partner will contribute.  This decision is unconditional in nature, as they cannot make a strategy plan in advance. However, it does possess a certain degree of conditionality, as it is influenced by the participant's beliefs about their partner's behavior.  
+Implicit beliefs are derived by determining the partner contribution at the intersection of the conditional and unconditional cooperation functions, specifically equations (1) and (3) for the outgroup, and equations (2) and (4) for the ingroup. At these points, which we call ***G<sup>e</sup>*** and ***O^e*)^**, participants are allocating to the group account some amount that might be consistent with what they expect the partner will contribute.  This decision is unconditional in nature, as they cannot make a strategy plan in advance. However, it does possess a certain degree of conditionality, as it is influenced by the participant's beliefs about their partner's behavior.  
 
 Equalizing (1) and (3) we obtain:
 
 ![](/Restrepo-equation5.png)
 
-Assuming ***O_k*** = ***O^e^*,**
+Assuming ***O<sub>k</sub>*** = ***O<sup>e</sup>*,**
 
 ![](/Restrepo-equation5-.png)
 
@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ To produce the results presented in Figure 4, we applied the four-step procedure
 
 To estimate implicit beliefs, we first obtained the parameters of equations (1) and (2) by fitting a censored Tobit model to participants' conditional cooperation decisions as a function of the partner's contribution level to the public good. These models account for the lower and upper bounds of the contribution scale and capture individual responsiveness to partner behavior.
 
-Next, we inferred each participant's implicit belief about the partner's expected contribution by solving the estimated conditional cooperation equation for the value at which it equals the observed unconditional contribution. That is, we identified the partner contribution level that would rationalize the subject's unconditional behavior under the estimated conditional strategy—our measure of *G^e^* or *O^e^*, depending on the group.
+Next, we inferred each participant's implicit belief about the partner's expected contribution by solving the estimated conditional cooperation equation for the value at which it equals the observed unconditional contribution. That is, we identified the partner contribution level that would rationalize the subject's unconditional behavior under the estimated conditional strategy—our measure of *G<sup>e</sup>* or *O<sup>e</sup>*, depending on the group.
 
-To compute SD, we re-inserted the implicit belief about the outgroup's expected behavior (*O^e^*) into the conditional cooperation function estimated for the ingroup. This gave us the participant's predicted contribution toward an ingroup partner behaving like an outgroup member. We then subtracted the observed unconditional contribution toward the outgroup. The resulting difference isolates statistical discrimination: the extent to which behavior diverges when expectations are held constant but group identity differs.
+To compute SD, we re-inserted the implicit belief about the outgroup's expected behavior (*O<sup>e</sup>*) into the conditional cooperation function estimated for the ingroup. This gave us the participant's predicted contribution toward an ingroup partner behaving like an outgroup member. We then subtracted the observed unconditional contribution toward the outgroup. The resulting difference isolates statistical discrimination: the extent to which behavior diverges when expectations are held constant but group identity differs.
 
 Finally, we computed PbD as the difference between TD and SD.
 

articles/paris-ias-ideas/capitalism-in-transition.md

@@ -80,14 +80,15 @@ While several studies have examined the dynamics of compositional inequality acr
 
 Source: Ranaldi and Milanovic (2022)
 
-The first graph plots the level of income inequality against compositional inequality for more than forty countries, covering almost 80% of global GDP and two-thirds of the world population (see Figure 2). Three main results emerge from this graph. First, the higher the compositional inequality, the higher the income inequality. In other words, classical capitalism displays higher interpersonal income inequality than new capitalism. Second, three world clusters emerge from this analysis. The first cluster includes Latin American countries, which are, on average, characterized by high levels of both compositional and income inequality. These countries can, therefore, be considered classical capitalist economies with extremely high interpersonal inequality. The second cluster is composed of western countries, including the US, Canada, and the UK. This cluster is characterized by mild levels of both inequality dimensions. Finally, the third cluster is the Nordic countries, which surprisingly combine high levels of compositional inequality with low levels of income inequality. The third result emerging from this graph -- and in my view, the most compelling of the three -- is actually a non-result: we do not find evidence of any countries with both low compositional inequality and extremely high income inequality. In other words, we do not find evidence of new capitalism characterized by very high interpersonal inequality. As we will see in the next sections of the book, this result will shed light on the normative aspect of compositional inequality.
-
+The first graph plots the level of income inequality against compositional inequality for more than forty countries, covering almost 80% of global GDP and two-thirds of the world population (see Figure 2). Three main results emerge from this graph. First, the higher the compositional inequality, the higher the income inequality. In other words, classical capitalism displays higher interpersonal income inequality than new capitalism. Second, three world clusters emerge from this analysis. The first cluster includes Latin American countries, which are, on average, characterized by high levels of both compositional and income inequality. These countries can, therefore, be considered classical capitalist economies with extremely high interpersonal inequality. The second cluster is composed of western countries, including the US, Canada, and the UK. This cluster is characterized by mild levels of both inequality dimensions. Finally, the third cluster is the Nordic countries, which surprisingly combine high levels of compositional inequality with low levels of income inequality. The third result emerging from this graph -- and in my view, the most compelling of the three -- is actually a non-result: we do not find evidence of any countries with both low compositional inequality and extremely high income inequality. In other words, we do not find evidence of new capitalism characterized by very high interpersonal inequality. 
 **Figure 2**
 
 ![](/Ranaldi-figure-2.png)
 
 Source: Ranaldi (2025)
 
+As we will see in the next sections of the book, this result will shed light on the normative aspect of compositional inequality.
+
 The second graph plots the growth incidence curves for capital and labor income, separately, for the period 2000-2016. The main message from this graph is that global compositional inequality has decreased in the 21st century, and at a non-negligible pace: the world overall has transitioned from compositional inequality levels like those seen in Latin America to levels seen in western countries. This reduction can be explained by two major factors. First, the world has experienced an important individual-level capitalization process: the percentage of individuals in the world with positive capital income has risen from 20% to 32%. Second, the global middle class has benefited the most from this capitalization process, and particularly so in China.
 
 Taken together, these two graphs reveal two important insights about the nature of today's capitalism. *First*, they show that economies are far from the stylized vision of a system defined by a stark opposition between capital income earners and labor income earners. We observe significant variation in the extent to which individuals earn income from multiple sources — a pattern likely shaped by different stages of development, institutional arrangements, fiscal regimes, and other contextual factors. *Second*, from a dynamic perspective, the world appears to be moving towards lower levels of compositional inequality — especially when considering recent transformations in major economic actors such as China, which has progressively integrated market-oriented reforms. While such openness has, in fact, contributed to rising wealth inequality among individuals, it has also made financial systems more accessible to the broader population and enabled wider ownership of private property, including housing and small businesses.

articles/paris-ias-ideas/on-travelling-concepts.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ authors:
     positions_and_institutions:
       - institution: Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University
         positions: []
-      - institution: LLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam
+      - institution: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam
         positions: []
     social_channels:
       google_scholar: ''
@@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ This paper deals with a rather wide range of topics, each one of which probably
 
 Now that may be a good reason not to try to do so, but rather to stick with one issue, one view. However, sometimes it can be useful to take a broad perspective, treat a variety of questions and observationsas making up a single subject matter, one that can be approached from various angles. Sure, that does result in a lack of detail, but one may hope that one makes good for that by showing connections that otherwisewould go unnoticed. This paper is written in that spirit.[](http://stokhof.org/)
 
-This paper is the result of spending a month as writer-in-residence at the Institut d'études avancées in Paris. I would like to thank directors Saadi Lahlou and Paulius Yamin and the wonderful staff of the institute for their hospitality and support. Together with the stimulating environment created by the fellows of the institute, they made my stay not only productive but also extremely interesting and pleasant. I owe a special thanks to Saadi Lahlou for his support at a critical juncture.
-
-I thank Michiel van Lambalgen for discussions on 'philosophie pauvre' and Tamara Dobler for introducing me to conceptual engineering and sharing her ideas with me. And thanks to Johan van Benthem, Tamara Dobler, Michiel van Lambalgen, Fenrong Liu, and Robert van Rooij for their helpfulcomments on an earlier version.
-
 So, many details will be skipped, many interesting arguments will go unexamined and even go unmentioned. For a proper academic paper this is questionable. But we see no other way to present our takeon the issues within the limitations that are set. So, we invite the reader to read this rather as an essay: a set of fairly general observations, questions and, yes, also arguments, that trace broad aspects of this problem complex that we hope are of some interest. The paper is structured accordingly. The main text is devoted to a general and, we hope, accessible development of the main lines of thought, while referencesto and discussions of the literature are relegated to footnotes. [^1]
 
 That being said, what is the paper about? Concepts and their role in philosophy take centre stage. We start with an overview of key features of classical conceptual analysis, the dominant methodology inanalytic philosophy (section 1). We continue with a discussion of the challenge that is proposed by conceptual engineering (section 2). Finding both lacking in certain respects, we sketch an alternative view on philosophical concerns, called 'philosophy pauvre', which comes with a different take on the nature of concepts, that of 'travelling concepts' (section 3). In order to illustrate the idea of a travelling concept, we discuss understanding as such a concept (section 4) and apply the results to some key issues in discussions of understanding in the context of generative artificial intelligence (section 5). We conclude with anoutline of some general consequences of the views developed in the paper (section 6).
@@ -376,7 +372,7 @@ Much of the discussion in the literature about these issues is characterised by
 If this conclusion is in the right direction, it also indicates more productive ways of dealing with the many problems that the rapid developments in this area present. Technical developments are difficult to predict, and even more difficult to control. But our way of thinking and speaking about what genAI is and, perhaps even more important, what it should be, are under our control. It is indeed our words, our concepts, that we use in thinking and arguing about these issues. And in the end, it is up to us to decide how we are going to use them. That will not change what genAI is and what genAI systems can do, of course. But it will be a decisive element in determining what they can do for us, what they are for us.
 
 
-[^1]:So, ideally, the non-philosopher can read just the main text and the philosopher just the footnotes.
+[^1]:So, ideally, the non-philosopher can read just the main text and the philosopher just the footnotes.This paper is the result of spending a month as writer-in-residence at the Institut d'études avancées in Paris. I would like to thank directors Saadi Lahlou and Paulius Yamin and the wonderful staff of the institute for their hospitality and support. Together with the stimulating environment created by the fellows of the institute, they made my stay not only productive but also extremely interesting and pleasant. I owe a special thanks to Saadi Lahlou for his support at a critical juncture.I thank Michiel van Lambalgen for discussions on 'philosophie pauvre' and Tamara Dobler for introducing me to conceptual engineering and sharing her ideas with me. And thanks to Johan van Benthem, Tamara Dobler, Michiel van Lambalgen, Fenrong Liu, and Robert van Rooij for their helpfulcomments on an earlier version.
 
 [^2]:Well, everybody in, broadly speaking, contemporary analytical philosophy anyway. Although it would be illuminating to look at the current centrality of concepts in analytic philosophy from the perspective of other philosophical approaches, this is not the place to do it. We will focus on analytic philosophy, and for the sake of brevity drop the adjective 'analytic' throughout, without any prejudice that what is said applies beyond the confines of the analytic perspective.
 

media/b/bioet-2019-1-cognition-la-bioethique-aux-frontieres-de-la-vie-.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ article_slug: BIOET_2019_1_Cognition
 caption: 'La bioéthique : aux frontières de la vie ?'
 date: 2019-10-17T16:00:36.000Z
 highlight: false
-index: 15
+index: 18
 issue: content/issues/Agir en temps de crise.md
 language: French
 picture: ''

media/s/syne1-2015-12-sharing-to-communicate-bioethique-et-laicite.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ article_slug: SynE1_2015_12_sharing-to-communicate
 caption: Bioéthique et laïcité
 date: 2015-04-29T10:00:00.000Z
 highlight: false
-index: 175
+index: 176
 issue: content/issues/brains-that-pull-the-triggers.md
 language: English
 type: youtube