|
| 1 | +# Title |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +Start as an Experiment |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +# Problem |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +An InnerSource initiative is considered but not started because management is |
| 8 | +unsure about its outcome and, as a result, is not willing to commit to an |
| 9 | +investment. |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +# Context |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +The majority of software development projects in the company are distributed |
| 14 | +globally. The company is considering to leverage InnerSource to make the |
| 15 | +required collaboration more efficient. However, most managers are not familiar |
| 16 | +with the Open Source working model and are instead accustomed to hierarchical, |
| 17 | +top-down control style management. The idea of InnerSource is very popular with |
| 18 | +software developers in the company, not the least because many developers use |
| 19 | +or are actively developing Open Source software. |
| 20 | + |
| 21 | +# Forces |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +- Managers will want to validate the claims of improved collaboration through |
| 24 | + InnerSource before making a long term investment. This usually involves |
| 25 | + putting numbers against the expected improvements, which are hard to come |
| 26 | + by for InnerSource. |
| 27 | +- If the InnerSource initiative has a huge uptake among developers and if many |
| 28 | + projects come to rely on it, a decision to shut it down will be very |
| 29 | + unpopular and therefore hard to make. |
| 30 | +- When implementing new working models such as InnerSource which are radically |
| 31 | + different from working models previously practiced in the company, it is |
| 32 | + likely that existing, mandatory processes are no longer applicable and even |
| 33 | + that one has to operate in a regulatory, sometimes legal no-mans land. |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +# Solution |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +Declare the InnerSource initiative as a time limited experiment. Define and |
| 38 | +communicate the criteria for evaluating the experiment and ensure that |
| 39 | +sufficient data is gathered to perform the evaluation. Consider establishing |
| 40 | +a _Review Committee_ (**tbd**: pattern link) to increase the chances of |
| 41 | +management buy-in. |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +# Resulting Context |
| 44 | + |
| 45 | +Managers are able to kick start InnerSource for the following reasons: |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +- The experimental setup eases the need to management to scrutinize their |
| 48 | + numbers in the same way that they would for typical projects. |
| 49 | +- The possibility of failure of the experiment is understood and accepted. The |
| 50 | + personal risk for the supporting managers is minimized. |
| 51 | +- Even in case of a failure, the setup ensures that the company will learn from |
| 52 | + the experiment. |
| 53 | +- In case of success, the data gathered during the experiment will allow |
| 54 | + managers to make a longer lasting commitment to InnerSource. |
| 55 | + |
| 56 | +Participants in the InnerSource experiment are conscious of the fact that, as |
| 57 | +an experiment, the InnerSource initiative could be shut down or not continued |
| 58 | +after the planned lifetime in case the experiment does not yield the expected |
| 59 | +results. |
| 60 | + |
| 61 | +Finally, starting as an experiment makes it much easier to bend and adapt the |
| 62 | +existing processes and rules before you break them. |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +# Known Instances |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +- Robert Bosch GmbH |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +# Author |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | +- Georg Grütter (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +# Status |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +Draft Pattern |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +# Acknowledgements |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +- Jason Zink (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 79 | +- Diogo Fregonese (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 80 | +- Robert Hansel (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 81 | +- Hans Malte Kern (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
0 commit comments