feat(dashboard-api): route logs through read-only service endpoint

[yasinBursali]

What

• Update extension_logs() to call /v1/service/logs instead of /v1/extension/logs, enabling log viewing for core services
• Add container_name to SERVICES dict for accurate container name resolution
• Replace bare except Exception: with specific urllib.error.HTTPError and urllib.error.URLError catches
• Add Docker Compose label spoofing prevention in _scan_compose_content()

Why

• Core services (llama-server, open-webui, dashboard-api) return 403 when viewing logs because validate_service_id() blocks them
• The dashboard Terminal button already renders for core services but the fetch fails silently
• Container name hardcoding (dream-{service_id}) fails for open-webui (container is dream-webui)
• A malicious extension could spoof Docker Compose labels to masquerade as a core service

How

• URL change: /v1/extension/logs → /v1/service/logs (the new read-only endpoint that allows all services)
• Error propagation: HTTPError handler forwards the actual status code from host agent (not always 503). URLError/OSError returns 503 with f-string fallback: "Host agent unavailable. Use 'docker logs dream-{service_id}' in terminal."
• Label security: Rejects any extension compose YAML that sets com.docker.compose.* labels (handles both dict and list label formats)
• container_name: Read from manifest, falls back to dream-{service_id}

Three Pillars Impact

• Install Reliability: No installer changes
• Broad Compatibility: Standard urllib, all Python versions
• Extension Coherence: Existing /v1/extension/logs unchanged; label spoofing prevention strengthens extension security

Modified Files

• dashboard-api/config.py — container_name field in SERVICES dict
• dashboard-api/routers/extensions.py — extension_logs() rewrite + label spoofing check

Testing

Automated

• Python compile: PASS
• Existing tests: 173 pass (1 pre-existing failure unrelated)

Manual

• View logs for core service (llama-server) via dashboard Terminal → should work (was 403 before)
• View logs for user extension → still works
• Host agent down → 503 with helpful fallback message
• Extension with com.docker.compose.service label → rejected at install time

Review

• CG: ⚠️ APPROVED WITH WARNINGS (D must merge first — operational dependency)
• Security: PASS (label spoofing covers dict+list formats)

Platform Impact

• All platforms supported. WSL2 (no host agent) gets helpful 503 fallback

Sequence

PR 5 of 7 (Phase 3). Depends on PR 4 (#806 — host agent logs endpoint)

[Lightheartdevs]

Audit: APPROVE — good security hardening

The error handling rewrite is a significant improvement — forwarding actual HTTP status codes instead of always returning 503. The Docker Compose label spoofing prevention is a valuable addition, correctly handling both dict and list label formats in YAML.

Adding container_name to SERVICES dict enables core service log viewing through the same endpoint as extensions.

Minor notes (non-blocking):

• The f-string in URLError fallback uses dream-{service_id} which may not match the actual container name (e.g., dream-webui vs the real name). Minor UX issue in error messages.

Depends on #806. Should merge after it.

[Lightheartdevs]

Revised Audit: REQUEST CHANGES — status code leakage + XSS risk

Withdrawing my earlier approval after deeper review.

Bug 1 (MEDIUM): Raw host-agent status codes forwarded to dashboard client
The HTTPError handler forwards exc.code verbatim. A 500 from the host agent (containing internal paths, Docker errors, stderr snippets) is sent directly to the client. A 401/403 (agent-to-agent auth failure) confuses the dashboard client into thinking its own auth is bad.

Fix: Clamp forwarded status codes — map 4xx from host agent to 502 (bad gateway), map 5xx to 502. Only forward sanitized error strings:

except HTTPError as exc:
    status = 502 if exc.code >= 400 else exc.code
    raise HTTPException(status_code=status, detail=f"Host agent error: {exc.code}")

Security (LOW-MEDIUM): XSS via Docker log output
Docker log content is proxied from host agent to dashboard client. If the frontend renders logs via innerHTML or dangerouslySetInnerHTML, a malicious container could inject <script> tags in its own logs. Verify the frontend uses text rendering (not HTML) for log display.

Info: container_name in SERVICES dict is dead code for this PR
The field is added to the dict but never referenced by the log fetching logic — the host agent resolves container names independently via Docker label lookup. Not a bug, but unused.

Info: Strict merge ordering required
PR #806 must merge first or /v1/service/logs won't exist and ALL log requests return 404.

What's good: Label spoofing prevention is solid (handles both dict and list formats, covers all com.docker.compose.* labels). SSRF risk is zero (URL from server config, not user input). HTML error page fallback works correctly.

[yasinBursali]

Addressing review feedback

Bug 1 (Raw status codes forwarded) — Fixed:
Changed status_code=exc.code to status_code=502 in the HTTPError handler. All host-agent errors now return 502 (Bad Gateway) to the dashboard client, preventing:

• 401/403 from host agent confusing the dashboard into thinking its own auth failed
• 500 from host agent leaking internal paths or Docker error details

Error detail string is still forwarded (sanitized via err_body.get("error", ...)) for debugging, but the status code is always 502.

Re: XSS via Docker log output — The dashboard frontend renders logs using text content (React's default JSX escaping), not innerHTML or dangerouslySetInnerHTML. No XSS vector.

Re: container_name in SERVICES dict — This field is consumed by PR #810 (resources.py) for the container-to-service reverse mapping. Required merge order: #806 → #808 → #810.

[Lightheartdevs]

Re-audit: APPROVE — fix verified

HTTPError handler now returns 502 (Bad Gateway) instead of forwarding raw host-agent status codes. Prevents internal error leakage and auth confusion. Label spoofing prevention is solid.

CI all green. Depends on #806.

[Lightheartdevs]

Note: The Rust dashboard-api rewrite (#821) merged and deleted the Python files this PR modifies.

This PR's changes were entirely to Python files (config.py, routers/extensions.py) that no longer exist. The status code clamping and label spoofing prevention need to be reimplemented in the Rust codebase at crates/dashboard-api/src/routes/extensions.rs. Note: the Rust rewrite is also missing the compose security scanning that the Python version had — this is a security regression that should be addressed.

Please rebase or rewrite against the current main branch.