Remove obselete checks due to the introduction of handhsake defragmen...

tation. h/t @waleed-elmelegy-arm

909e716

Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Deomid rojer Ryabkov <[email protected]>

Author: rojer

library/ssl_tls12_server.c

@@ -1061,23 +1061,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
         size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1);
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u",
                                   (unsigned) handshake_len));
-
-        /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and
-         * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */
-        if (buf[1] != 0) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0",
-                                      (unsigned) buf[1]));
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
-        }
-
-        /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
-        if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u",
-                                      (unsigned) msg_len,
-                                      (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl),
-                                      (unsigned) handshake_len));
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
-        }
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)