Merge pull request #178530 from lauradolan/acc-images

ACC: fix image file formats

Author: denrea

articles/confidential-computing/confidential-computing-deployment-models.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ms.service: virtual-machines
 ms.subservice: confidential-computing
 ms.workload: infrastructure
 ms.topic: conceptual
-ms.date: 11/01/2021
+ms.date: 11/04/2021
 ms.author: JenCook
 ms.custom: ignite-fall-2021
 ---
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Containers also increase portability of applications, and improve resource usage
 Normally, you might deploy your solution on confidential VMs if:
 
 - You've got legacy applications that cannot be modified or containerized. However, you still need to introduce protection of data in memory, while the data is being processed.
-- You're running multiple applications requiring different operating systems (OSes) on a single piece of infrastructure.
+- You're running multiple applications requiring different operating systems (OS) on a single piece of infrastructure.
 - You want to emulate an entire computing environment, including all OS resources.
 - You're migrating your existing VMs from on-premises to Azure.
 
@@ -59,15 +59,15 @@ VM admins or any other app or service running inside the VM, operate beyond the
 
 AMD SEV-SNP technology provides VM isolation from the hypervisor. The hardware-based memory integrity protection helps prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks. The SEV-SNP model trusts the AMD Secure Processor and the VM. The model doesn't trust any other hardware and software components. Untrusted components include the BIOS, and the hypervisor on the host system.
 
-![Diagram of AMD SEV-SNP VM architecture, defining trusted and untrusted components.](media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/amd-sev-snp-vm.jpg)
+:::image type="content" source="media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/amd-sev-snp-vm.png" alt-text="Diagram of AMD SEV-SNP VM architecture, defining trusted and untrusted components.":::
 
 ### Secure enclaves on Intel SGX
 
 **Secure enclaves on Intel SGX** protect memory spaces inside a VM with hardware-based encryption. The security boundary of application enclaves is more restricted than confidential VMs on AMD SEV-SNP. For Intel SGX, the security boundary applies to portions of memory within a VM. Users, apps, and services running inside the Intel SGX-powered VM can't access any data and code in execution inside the enclave.
 
 Intel SGX helps protect data in use by application isolation. By protecting selected code and data from modification, developers can partition their application into hardened enclaves or trusted execution modules to help increase application security. Entities outside the enclave can't read or write the enclave memory, whatever their permissions levels. The hypervisor or the operating system also can't obtain this access through normal OS-level calls. To call an enclave function, you have to use a new set of instructions in the Intel SGX CPUs. This process includes several protection checks.
 
-![Diagram of Intel SGX enclaves architecture, showing secure information inside app enclave.](media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/intel-sgx-enclave.jpg)
+:::image type="content" source="media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/intel-sgx-enclave.png" alt-text="Diagram of Intel SGX enclaves architecture, showing secure information inside app enclave.":::
 
 ## Next steps
 

articles/confidential-computing/confidential-containers.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn about unmodified container support with confidential containe
 services: container-service
 author: agowdamsft
 ms.topic: article
-ms.date: 11/01/2011
+ms.date: 11/04/2021
 ms.author: amgowda
 ms.service: container-service
 ms.custom: ignite-fall-2021
@@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ A hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides strong assurances.
 
 Confidential containers support custom applications developed with any programming languages. You can also run Docker container apps off the shelf.
 
-![Diagram of confidential container protection boundary in Kubernetes.](./media/confidential-containers/sgx-confidential-container.jpg)
+:::image type="content" source="./media/confidential-containers/sgx-confidential-container.png" alt-text="Diagram of confidential container protection boundary in Kubernetes, showing no access for admins.":::
 
 ## Enablers with Intel SGX on Azure Kubernetes Service(AKS)
 
  To run an existing Docker container, applications on confidential computing nodes require an abstraction layer or Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) software to use the special CPU instruction set. Configure SGX to protect your sensitive application code. SGX creates a direct execution to the CPU to remove the guest operating system (OS), host OS, or hypervisor from the trust boundary. This step reduces the overall surface attack areas and vulnerabilities.
 
 Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) fully supports confidential containers. You can run existing containers confidentially on AKS.
 
-![Diagram of confidential container conversion, with new steps for enabling Intel SGX and AKS](./media/confidential-containers/confidential-containers-deploy-steps.jpg)
+:::image type="content" source="./media/confidential-containers/confidential-containers-deploy-steps.png" alt-text="Diagram of confidential container conversion, with new steps for enabling Intel SGX and AKS.":::
 
 ## Partner enablers
 

articles/confidential-computing/confidential-nodes-aks-overview.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: agowdamsft
 ms.service: container-service
 ms.subservice: confidential-computing
 ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 2/08/2021
+ms.date: 11/04/2021
 ms.author: amgowda
 ms.custom: ignite-fall-2021
 ---
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.custom: ignite-fall-2021
 
 Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) supports adding [DCsv2 confidential computing nodes](confidential-computing-enclaves.md) powered by Intel SGX. These nodes allow you to run sensitive workloads within a hardware-based trusted execution environment (TEE). TEE’s allow user-level code from containers to allocate private regions of memory to execute the code with CPU directly. These private memory regions that execute directly with CPU are called enclaves. Enclaves help protect the data confidentiality, data integrity and code integrity from other processes running on the same nodes. The Intel SGX execution model also removes the intermediate layers of Guest OS, Host OS and Hypervisor thus reducing the attack surface area. The *hardware based per container isolated execution* model in a node allows applications to directly execute with the CPU, while keeping the special block of memory encrypted per container. Confidential computing nodes with confidential containers are a great addition to your zero trust security planning and defense-in-depth container strategy.
 
-![sgx node overview](./media/confidential-nodes-aks-overview/sgxaksnode.jpg)
+:::image type="content" source="./media/confidential-nodes-aks-overview/sgx-aks-node.png" alt-text="Graphic of AKS Confidential Compute Node, showing confidential containers with code and data secured inside.":::
 
 ## AKS Confidential Nodes Features