Skip to content

Commit de44c74

Browse files
committed
Update file paths to PNG
1 parent 11f4029 commit de44c74

File tree

5 files changed

+9
-9
lines changed

5 files changed

+9
-9
lines changed

articles/confidential-computing/confidential-computing-deployment-models.md

Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -59,15 +59,15 @@ VM admins or any other app or service running inside the VM, operate beyond the
5959

6060
AMD SEV-SNP technology provides VM isolation from the hypervisor. The hardware-based memory integrity protection helps prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks. The SEV-SNP model trusts the AMD Secure Processor and the VM. The model doesn't trust any other hardware and software components. Untrusted components include the BIOS, and the hypervisor on the host system.
6161

62-
![Diagram of AMD SEV-SNP VM architecture, defining trusted and untrusted components.](media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/amd-sev-snp-vm.jpg)
62+
![Diagram of AMD SEV-SNP VM architecture, defining trusted and untrusted components.](media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/amd-sev-snp-vm.png)
6363

6464
### Secure enclaves on Intel SGX
6565

6666
**Secure enclaves on Intel SGX** protect memory spaces inside a VM with hardware-based encryption. The security boundary of application enclaves is more restricted than confidential VMs on AMD SEV-SNP. For Intel SGX, the security boundary applies to portions of memory within a VM. Users, apps, and services running inside the Intel SGX-powered VM can't access any data and code in execution inside the enclave.
6767

6868
Intel SGX helps protect data in use by application isolation. By protecting selected code and data from modification, developers can partition their application into hardened enclaves or trusted execution modules to help increase application security. Entities outside the enclave can't read or write the enclave memory, whatever their permissions levels. The hypervisor or the operating system also can't obtain this access through normal OS-level calls. To call an enclave function, you have to use a new set of instructions in the Intel SGX CPUs. This process includes several protection checks.
6969

70-
![Diagram of Intel SGX enclaves architecture, showing secure information inside app enclave.](media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/intel-sgx-enclave.jpg)
70+
![Diagram of Intel SGX enclaves architecture, showing secure information inside app enclave.](media/confidential-computing-deployment-models/intel-sgx-enclave.png)
7171

7272
## Next steps
7373

articles/confidential-computing/confidential-containers.md

Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ A hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides strong assurances.
1818

1919
Confidential containers support custom applications developed with any programming languages. You can also run Docker container apps off the shelf.
2020

21-
![Diagram of confidential container protection boundary in Kubernetes.](./media/confidential-containers/sgx-confidential-container.jpg)
21+
![Diagram of confidential container protection boundary in Kubernetes.](./media/confidential-containers/sgx-confidential-container.png)
2222

2323
## Enablers with Intel SGX on Azure Kubernetes Service(AKS)
2424

2525
To run an existing Docker container, applications on confidential computing nodes require an abstraction layer or Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) software to use the special CPU instruction set. Configure SGX to protect your sensitive application code. SGX creates a direct execution to the CPU to remove the guest operating system (OS), host OS, or hypervisor from the trust boundary. This step reduces the overall surface attack areas and vulnerabilities.
2626

2727
Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) fully supports confidential containers. You can run existing containers confidentially on AKS.
2828

29-
![Diagram of confidential container conversion, with new steps for enabling Intel SGX and AKS](./media/confidential-containers/confidential-containers-deploy-steps.jpg)
29+
![Diagram of confidential container conversion, with new steps for enabling Intel SGX and AKS](./media/confidential-containers/confidential-containers-deploy-steps.png)
3030

3131
## Partner enablers
3232

articles/confidential-computing/confidential-nodes-aks-overview.md

Lines changed: 1 addition & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.custom: ignite-fall-2021
1919

2020
Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) supports adding [DCsv2 confidential computing nodes](confidential-computing-enclaves.md) powered by Intel SGX. These nodes allow you to run sensitive workloads within a hardware-based trusted execution environment (TEE). TEE’s allow user-level code from containers to allocate private regions of memory to execute the code with CPU directly. These private memory regions that execute directly with CPU are called enclaves. Enclaves help protect the data confidentiality, data integrity and code integrity from other processes running on the same nodes. The Intel SGX execution model also removes the intermediate layers of Guest OS, Host OS and Hypervisor thus reducing the attack surface area. The *hardware based per container isolated execution* model in a node allows applications to directly execute with the CPU, while keeping the special block of memory encrypted per container. Confidential computing nodes with confidential containers are a great addition to your zero trust security planning and defense-in-depth container strategy.
2121

22-
![sgx node overview](./media/confidential-nodes-aks-overview/sgxaksnode.jpg)
22+
![sgx node overview](./media/confidential-nodes-aks-overview/sgxaksnode.png)
2323

2424
## AKS Confidential Nodes Features
2525

articles/confidential-computing/overview-azure-products.md

Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ Today customers encrypt their data at rest and in transit, but not while it is i
1717

1818
Technologies like [Intel Software Guard Extensions](https://www.intel.com.au/content/www/au/en/architecture-and-technology/software-guard-extensions-enhanced-data-protection.html) (Intel SGX), or [AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization](https://www.amd.com/en/processors/amd-secure-encrypted-virtualization) (SEV-SNP) are recent CPU improvements supporting confidential computing implementations. These technologies are designed as virtualization extensions and provide feature sets including memory encryption and integrity, CPU-state confidentiality and integrity, and attestation, for building the confidential computing threat model.
1919

20-
![Graphic of three states of data protection, with confidential computing's data in use highlighted.](media/overview-azure-products/three-states.jpg)
20+
![Graphic of three states of data protection, with confidential computing's data in use highlighted.](media/overview-azure-products/three-states.png)
2121

2222
When used with data encryption at rest and in transit, confidential computing eliminates the single largest barrier of encryption - encryption while in use - by protecting sensitive or highly regulated data sets and application workloads in a secure public cloud platform. Confidential computing extends beyond generic data protection. TEEs are also being used to protect proprietary business logic, analytics functions, machine learning algorithms, or entire applications.
2323

2424
## Navigating Azure confidential computing
2525

2626
[Microsoft's offerings](https://aka.ms/azurecc) for confidential computing extend from Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) to Platform as a Service (PaaS) and as well as developer tools to support your journey to data and code confidentiality in the cloud.
2727

28-
![Screenshot of the Azure confidential computing stack, showing tools and services.](media/overview-azure-products/acc-stack.jpg)
28+
![Screenshot of the Azure confidential computing stack, showing tools and services.](media/overview-azure-products/acc-stack.png)
2929

3030
## Reducing the attack surface
3131
The trusted computing base (TCB) refers to all of a system's hardware, firmware, and software components that provide a secure environment. The components inside the TCB are considered "critical". If one component inside the TCB is compromised, the entire system's security may be jeopardized. A lower TCB means higher security. There's less risk of exposure to various vulnerabilities, malware, attacks, and malicious people. Azure confidential computing aims to lower the TCB for your cloud workloads by offering TEEs.

articles/confidential-computing/use-cases-scenarios.md

Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.custom: ignite-fall-2021
1313
# Use cases and scenarios
1414
Confidential computing applies to various use cases for protecting data in regulated industries such as government, financial services, and healthcare institutes. For example, preventing access to sensitive data helps protect the digital identity of citizens from all parties involved, including the cloud provider that stores it. The same sensitive data may contain biometric data that is used for finding and removing known images of child exploitation, preventing human trafficking, and aiding digital forensics investigations.
1515

16-
![Confidential computing use cases](media/use-cases-scenarios/use_cases.jpg)
16+
![Confidential computing use cases](media/use-cases-scenarios/use_cases.png)
1717

1818
This article provides an overview of several common scenarios for Azure confidential computing. The recommendations in this article serve as a starting point as you develop your application using confidential computing services and frameworks.
1919

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ In this secure multi-party computation example, multiple banks share data with e
5151

5252
Through confidential computing, these financial institutions can increase fraud detection rates, address money laundering scenarios, reduce false positives, and continue learning from larger data sets.
5353

54-
![Multiparty data sharing for banks](media/use-cases-scenarios/mpc_banks.jpg)
54+
![Multiparty data sharing for banks](media/use-cases-scenarios/mpc_banks.png)
5555

5656
### Drug development in healthcare
5757

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)