Merge branch 'WI431514-app-inventory-ga-ready' of https://github.com/DeCohen/defender-docs-pr into WI431514-app-inventory-ga-ready

Author: DeCohen

.acrolinx-config.edn

@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ Select the total score link to review all feedback on clarity, consistency, tone
  "
 **More information about Acrolinx**
  
-- [Install Acrolinx locally for VSCode for Magic](https://review.docs.microsoft.com/office-authoring-guide/acrolinx-vscode?branch=main)
+- [Install Acrolinx locally for VSCode for Magic](https://review.learn.microsoft.com/office-authoring-guide/acrolinx-vscode?branch=main)
 - [False positives or issues](https://aka.ms/acrolinxbug)
 - [Request a new Acrolinx term](https://microsoft.sharepoint.com/teams/M365Dev2/SitePages/M365-terminology.aspx)
-- [Troubleshooting issues with Acrolinx](https://review.docs.microsoft.com/help/contribute/acrolinx-error-messages)
+- [Troubleshooting issues with Acrolinx](https://review.learn.microsoft.com/help/platform/acrolinx-troubleshoot?branch)
 
 "
 }

ATPDocs/deploy/remote-calls-sam.md

@@ -8,18 +8,11 @@ ms.topic: how-to
 # Configure SAM-R to enable lateral movement path detection in Microsoft Defender for Identity
 
 > [!IMPORTANT]
-> Remote collection of local administrators' group members on endpoints (using SAM-R queries) feature in Microsoft Defender for Identity will be disabled by mid-May 2025.
+> The remote collection of local administrators group members from endpoints using SAM-R queries in Microsoft Defender for Identity will be disabled by mid-May 2025. This data is currently used to build potential lateral movement path maps, which will no longer be updated after this change. The change will occur automatically by the specified date, and no administrative action is required.
 > 
 
 Microsoft Defender for Identity mapping for [potential lateral movement paths](/defender-for-identity/understand-lateral-movement-paths) relies on queries that identify local admins on specific machines. These queries are performed with the SAM-R protocol, using the Defender for Identity [Directory Service account](directory-service-accounts.md) you configured.
 
-> [!NOTE]
-> This feature can potentially be exploited by an adversary to obtain the NTLM hash of the DSA account due to a Windows limitation in the SAM-R calls that allows downgrading from Kerberos to NTLM.
-> The new Defender for Identity sensor (version 3.x) is not affected by this issue as it uses different detection methods.
-> 
-> It is recommended to use a [low privileged DSA account](directory-service-accounts.md#grant-required-dsa-permissions). You can also [contact support](../support.md) to open a case and request to completely disable the [Lateral Movement Paths](../security-assessment-riskiest-lmp.md) data collection capability.
-> Please note that this will result in reduced data available for the [attack path feature in Exposure Management](/security-exposure-management/review-attack-paths).
-
 This article describes the configuration changes required to allow the Defender for Identity Directory Services Account (DSA) to perform the SAM-R queries.
 
 > [!TIP]

ATPDocs/service-account-discovery.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Service accounts are classified into several types:
 - sMSA (Managed Service Accounts): Designed for individual services on a single server rather than groups.
 - User Account: These standard user accounts are typically used for interactive logins but can also be configured to run services.
 
-The auto discovery feature quickly identifies gMSA and sMSA accounts as well as user accounts within Active Directory that meet specific criteria and classifies them as service accounts. These accounts are then highlighted and presented, along with relevant information including insights into recent authentications and the sources and destinations of those interactions, as part of a dedicated inventory within the Defender experience. This helps you better understand the accounts' purpose so you can more easily spot anomalous activity and understand its implications.
+The auto discovery feature quickly identifies gMSA and sMSA accounts as well as user accounts within Active Directory that meet specific criteria.These criteria include having a [Service Principal Name ](/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names)(SPN) or a "password never expires" attribute assigned. The feature then classifies these accounts as service accounts. These accounts are then highlighted and presented, along with relevant information including insights into recent authentications and the sources and destinations of those interactions, as part of a dedicated inventory within the Defender experience. This helps you better understand the accounts' purpose so you can more easily spot anomalous activity and understand its implications.
 
 Service account types are displayed in the Identity Info table within Advanced Hunting.
 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ You can use the sort and filter functionality on each service account tab to get
 |**Tags**    | Sensitive or Honey Token        |
 |**Auth protocols**   | Lists the available methods for verifying user identities, for example, Kerberos and NTLM (New Technology LAN Manager).         |
 |**Sources**     |  The number of potential source logins.        |
-|**Destinations**    | When a service account is trying to access a destination server, the request is directed to the target system, which can include a number of resources on that server. These resources might be a database, a file server, or other services hosted on the server.        |
+|**Destinations**    | When a service account is trying to access a destination server, the request is directed to the target system, which can include many resources on that server. These resources might be a database, a file server, or other services hosted on the server.        |
 |**Connections**   | The number of unique connections made between sources and destinations.         |
 |**Created**    |The timestamp when the service account was first created.         |
 |**Last updated**    | The timestamp of the most recent update to the service account.        |
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ You can use the sort and filter functionality on each service account tab to get
 
 For a deeper dive into what's happening in your service account click on the domain name to see the following information:
 
-When you investigate a specific Service account, you'll see the following details under the connections tab:
+When you investigate a specific Service account, you see the following details under the connections tab:
 
 :::image type="content" source="media/screenshot-of-the-connections-page.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the connections page." lightbox="media/Screenshot-of-the-connections-page.png":::
 
@@ -96,8 +96,10 @@ When you investigate a specific Service account, you'll see the following detail
 Last seen   | The date and time of the most recent sign in event over this connection.        |
 
 
-
 For more information about the following tabs, **Overview**, **Incidents and alerts**,**Observed in organization**, **Timeline**, and **Attack paths**, see: [Investigate assets](/defender-for-identity/investigate-assets#identity-details).
 
+## Related content
+- [Service principal names](/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names)
+- [How to configure SPN](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/how-to-configure-spn?tabs=add%2Caduc)
 
 If you run into any problems, we're here to help. To get assistance or support for your product issue, see how to open a support ticket at [Microsoft Defender for Identity support](support.md).

ATPDocs/understand-lateral-movement-paths.md

@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
 
 # Understand and investigate Lateral Movement Paths (LMPs) with Microsoft Defender for Identity
 
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+>  The remote collection of local administrators group members from endpoints using SAM-R queries in Microsoft Defender for Identity will be disabled by mid-May 2025. This data is currently used to build potential lateral movement path maps, which will no longer be updated after this change. The change will occur automatically by the specified date, and no administrative action is required.
+>
+
 Lateral movement is when an attacker uses non-sensitive accounts to gain access to sensitive accounts throughout your network. Lateral movement is used by attackers to identify and gain access to the sensitive accounts and machines in your network that share stored sign-in credentials in accounts, groups and machines. Once an attacker makes successful lateral moves towards your key targets, the attacker can also take advantage and gain access to your domain controllers. Lateral movement attacks are carried out using many of the methods described in [Microsoft Defender for Identity Security Alerts](alerts-overview.md).
 
-A key component of Microsoft Defender for Identity's security insights are Lateral Movement Paths or LMPs. Defender for Identity LMPs are visual guides that help you quickly understand and identify exactly how attackers can move laterally inside your network. The purpose of lateral movements within the cyber-attack kill chain are for attackers to gain and compromise your sensitive accounts using non-sensitive accounts. Compromising your sensitive accounts gets them another step closer to their ultimate goal, domain dominance. To stop these attacks from being successful, Defender for Identity LMPs give you easy to interpret, direct visual guidance on your most vulnerable, sensitive accounts. LMPs help you mitigate and prevent those risks in the future, and close attacker access before they achieve domain dominance.
+A key component of Microsoft Defender for Identity's security insights is Lateral Movement Paths or LMPs. Defender for Identity LMPs are visual guides that help you quickly understand and identify exactly how attackers can move laterally inside your network. The purpose of lateral movements within the cyber-attack kill chain are for attackers to gain and compromise your sensitive accounts using non-sensitive accounts. Compromising your sensitive accounts gets them another step closer to their ultimate goal, domain dominance. To stop these attacks from being successful, Defender for Identity LMPs give you easy to interpret, direct visual guidance on your most vulnerable, sensitive accounts. LMPs help you mitigate and prevent those risks in the future, and close attacker access before they achieve domain dominance.
 
 For example:
 

ATPDocs/whats-new.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ For updates about versions and features released six months ago or earlier, see
 ## May 2025
 
 ### Local administrators collection (using SAM-R queries) feature will be disabled
-Remote collection of local administrators' group members on endpoints (using SAM-R queries) feature in Microsoft Defender for Identity will be disabled by mid-May 2025. The details collected are used to build the potential lateral movement paths map. Alternative methods are currently being explored.
+The remote collection of local administrators group members from endpoints using SAM-R queries in Microsoft Defender for Identity will be disabled by mid-May 2025. This data is currently used to build potential lateral movement path maps, which will no longer be updated after this change. An alternative method is being explored. The change will occur automatically by the specified date, and no administrative action is required.
 
 ### New Health Issue
 

CloudAppSecurityDocs/activity-filters-queries.md

@@ -170,8 +170,21 @@ You can export all activities from the past six months by clicking the Export bu
 
 ![Click the export icon to export records.](media/activity-filters-queries/export-button-of-activity-logs.png)
 
-When exporting data:
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Required Permissions for Exporting Capabilities:** To utilize the exporting features, users must be assigned one of the following roles:
+> - **Built-in admin roles in Defender for Cloud Apps-** These roles must be granted via [Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps Permissions and roles settings](/defender-cloud-apps/manage-admins):
+>   - Global Admin
+>   - Cloud Discovery Global Admin
+>   - Security Operator
+>   - Compliance Admin
+>   - Security Reader
+> - **Microsoft Entra ID Roles-** These roles must be assigned through [Microsoft Entra ID built-in roles](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference):
+>   - Global Administrator
+>   - Security Administrator
+>   - Cloud App Security Administrator
+>   - Global Reader
 
+When exporting data:
 - You can choose a date range of up to six months.
 - You can choose to exclude private activities.  
 - The exported file is limited to 100,000 records and is delivered in CSV format.

CloudAppSecurityDocs/app-governance-visibility-insights-compliance-posture.md

@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ For sensitivity labeling data, cards show the number apps that have accessed con
 
 For example:
 
-> [!div class="mx-imgBorder"]
-> ![number apps that have accessed content with sensitivity labels.](sensitive-data-accessed-chart1.png)
+The number of apps that have accessed content with sensitivity labels.
+> :::image type="content" source="media/sensitive-data-accessed-chart1.png" alt-text="Number of apps that have accessed content with sensitivity labels.":::
 
 ## Next steps
 

CloudAppSecurityDocs/in-browser-protection.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ To use in-browser protection, users must also have the following environmental r
 |**Operating systems**|Windows 10 or 11, macOS|
 |**Identity platform**|Microsoft Entra ID|
 |**Microsoft Edge for Business versions**|The last two stable versions. For example, if the newest Microsoft Edge is 126, in-browser protection works for v126 and v125. <br> For more information, see [Microsoft Edge releases](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-release-schedule#microsoft-edge-releases).|
-|**Supported session policies**|<ul><li>Block\Monitor of file download (all files\sensitive files)</li><li>Block\Monitor file upload (all files\sensitive files)</li><li>Block\Monitor copy\cut\paste</li><li>Block\Monitor print</li><li>Block\Monitor malware upload</li><li>Block\Monitor malware download</li></ul> <br> Users that are served by multiple policies, including at least one policy that's *not* supported by Microsoft Edge for Business, their sessions are always served by the reverse proxy. <br><br> Policies defined in the Microsoft Entra ID portal are also always served by reverse proxy.|
+|**Supported session policies**|<ul><li>Block\Monitor of file download (all files\\*sensitive files)</li><li>Block\Monitor file upload (all files\\*sensitive files)</li><li>Block\Monitor copy\cut\paste</li><li>Block\Monitor print</li><li>Block\Monitor malware upload</li><li>Block\Monitor malware download</li></ul> <br> Users that are served by multiple policies, including at least one policy that's *not* supported by Microsoft Edge for Business, their sessions are always served by the reverse proxy. <br><br> Policies defined in the Microsoft Entra ID portal are also always served by reverse proxy.<br> *Sensitive files identified by built-in DLP scanning are not supported for Edge in-browser protection|
 
 All other scenarios are served automatically with the standard reverse proxy technology, including user sessions from browsers that don't support in-browser protection, or for policies not supported by in-browser protection.
 
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ Administrators who understand the power of Microsoft Edge browser protection can
 
 4. When you're finished on the **Edge for Business protection** page, select **Save**.
 
-:::image type="content" source="media/in-browser-protection/edge-for-business-protection-settings.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Microsoft Edge for business protection settings." lightbox="media/in-browser-protection/edge-for-business-protection-settings.png":::
+   :::image type="content" source="media/in-browser-protection/edge-for-business-protection-settings.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Microsoft Edge for business protection settings." lightbox="media/in-browser-protection/edge-for-business-protection-settings.png":::
 
 ## Related content