|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: 'Security assessment: Replace Enterprise or Domain Admin account for Entra Connect AD DS Connector account' |
| 3 | +description: 'This report lists any Entra Connect AD DS Connector account that is an Enterprise Administrator or Domain Administrator.' |
| 4 | +author: LiorShapiraa # GitHub alias |
| 5 | +ms.author: Liorshapira # Microsoft alias |
| 6 | +# ms.prod: microsoft-defender-for-identity |
| 7 | +ms.topic: article |
| 8 | +ms.date: 03/16/2025 |
| 9 | +--- |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +# Security assessment: Replace Enterprise or Domain Admin account for Entra Connect AD DS Connector account |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +This article describes Microsoft Defender for Identity's Microsoft Entra Connect AD DS Connector account default admin security posture assessment report. |
| 14 | + |
| 15 | +> [!NOTE] |
| 16 | +> This security assessment will be available only if Microsoft Defender for Identity sensor is installed on servers running Microsoft Entra Connect services. |
| 17 | +
|
| 18 | +## Why might using an Enterprise or Domain Admin account for the Microsoft Entra Connect AD DS Connector be a risk? |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +Smart attackers often target Microsoft Entra Connect in on-premises environments due to the elevated privileges associated with its AD DS Connector account (typically created in Active Directory with the MSOL_ prefix). Using an **Enterprise Admin** or **Domain Admin** account for this purpose significantly increases the attack surface, as these accounts have broad control over the directory. |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +Starting with [Entra Connect build 1.4.###.#](/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/reference-connect-accounts-permissions), Enterprise Admin and Domain Admin accounts can no longer be used as the AD DS Connector account. This best practice prevents over-privileging the connector account, reducing the risk of domain-wide compromise if the account is targeted by attackers. Organizations must now create or assign a lower-privileged account specifically for directory synchronization, ensuring better adherence to the principle of least privilege and protecting critical admin accounts. |
| 23 | + |
| 24 | +## How do I use this security assessment to improve my hybrid organizational security posture? |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +1. Review the recommended action at[ https://security.microsoft.com/securescore?viewid=actions](https://security.microsoft.com/securescore?viewid=actions) for Replace Enterprise or Domain Admin account for Entra Connect AD DS Connector account. |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +1. Review the exposed accounts and their group memberships. The list contains members of Domain/Enterprise Admins through direct and recursive membership. |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | +1. Perform one of the following actions: |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | + - Remove MSOL_ user account user from privileged groups, ensuring it retains the necessary permissions to function as the Entra Connect Connector account. |
| 33 | + |
| 34 | + - Change the Entra Connect AD DS Connector account (MSOL_) to a lower-privileged account. |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | +> [!NOTE] |
| 37 | +> While assessments are updated in near real time, scores and statuses are updated every 24 hours. While the list of impacted entities is updated within a few minutes of your implementing the recommendations, the status may still take time until it's marked as **Completed**. |
| 38 | +
|
| 39 | +## Next steps |
| 40 | + |
| 41 | +- Learn more about [Microsoft Secure score](). |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +- Learn more about [Defender for Identity Sensor for Microsoft Entra Connect](https://aka.ms/MdiSensorForMicrosoftEntraConnectInstallation) |
| 44 | + |
0 commit comments