You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/gorman_heterogeneous_households.md
+15-15Lines changed: 15 additions & 15 deletions
Display the source diff
Display the rich diff
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ kernelspec:
26
26
# Gorman Aggregation
27
27
28
28
{cite:t}`gorman1953community` described a class of preferences with the useful property that there exists a 'representative household'
29
-
in the sense that competitive equilibrium allocations can be computed by following recursive procedure:
29
+
in the sense that competitive equilibrium allocations can be computed by following a recursive procedure:
30
30
31
-
* take the heterogenous preferences of a diverse collection of households and from them synthesize the preferences of a single hypothetical 'representative household'
31
+
* take the heterogeneous preferences of a diverse collection of households and from them synthesize the preferences of a single hypothetical 'representative household'
32
32
* collect the endowments of all households and give them to the representative household
33
33
* construct a competitive equilibrium allocation and price system for the representative agent economy
34
34
* at the competitive equilibrium price system, compute the wealth -- i.e., the present value -- of each household's initial endowment
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ to the linear-quadratic class of environments assumed in their book.
56
56
57
57
The first step in implementing the above recursive algorithm will be to form a representative agent economy and then apply our DLE tools to compute its competitive equilibrium.
58
58
59
-
Thus, this lecture builds on tools and Python code described in {doc}`hs_recursive_models`, {doc}`growth_in_dles`, and {doc}`irfs_in_hall_model`
59
+
Thus, this lecture builds on tools and Python code described in {doc}`hs_recursive_models`, {doc}`growth_in_dles`, and {doc}`irfs_in_hall_model`.
60
60
61
61
62
62
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ When conditions for Gorman aggregation of preferences are satisfied, we can comp
88
88
89
89
The key is that the Gorman-aggregation conditions ensure all households have parallel Engel curves.
90
90
91
-
That feature is what lets us determine the aggregate allocations and price sytem before we compute the distribution of the aggregate allocation among individual households.
91
+
That feature is what lets us determine the aggregate allocations and price system before we compute the distribution of the aggregate allocation among individual households.
92
92
93
93
This eliminates the usual feature that the utility possibility frontier shifts with endowment changes, making it impossible to rank allocations without specifying distributional weights.
94
94
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ With the help of this powerful result, we proceed in two steps:
110
110
2. Compute household-specific policies and the Gorman sharing rule.
111
111
112
112
113
-
For the special Section 12.6 {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` case in which preference shocks are inactive, we can also
113
+
For the special case in Section 12.6 of {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013`, where preference shocks are inactive, we can also
114
114
115
115
3. Implement the Arrow-Debreu allocation using only a mutual fund (aggregate stock) and a one-period bond.
116
116
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ This representation does not involve prices directly.
563
563
564
564
#### Inverse canonical representation
565
565
566
-
Given $\rho_{0t}$ from the aggregate solution, we can solve {eq}`eq:foc_services` for $s_{jt}$, then use the {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` chapter 9 inverse canonical representation to compute $c_{jt}$ and $h_{jt}$:
566
+
Given $\rho_{0t}$ from the aggregate solution, we can solve {eq}`eq:foc_services` for $s_{jt}$, then use the inverse canonical representation from Chapter 9 of {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` to compute $c_{jt}$ and $h_{jt}$:
567
567
568
568
$$
569
569
\begin{aligned}
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ $$
624
624
\ell_{jt} = \mu_j \, g_t,
625
625
$$ (eq:labor_allocation)
626
626
627
-
where $g_t = \sum_j \ell_{jt}$ is aggregate the aggregate intermediate good.
627
+
where $g_t = \sum_j \ell_{jt}$ is the aggregate intermediate good.
628
628
629
629
#### Risk sharing
630
630
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ $$
706
706
707
707
The numerator is household $j$'s wealth -- i.e., initial capital plus present value of endowments minus the cost of the deviation consumption stream.
708
708
709
-
The denominator is the net cost of consuming one unit of aggregate consumption, i.e., the value of consumption value minus the value of the intermediate good supplied.
709
+
The denominator is the net cost of consuming one unit of aggregate consumption, i.e., the value of consumption minus the value of the intermediate good supplied.
710
710
711
711
Finally, the code constructs selection matrices $S_{ci}, S_{hi}, S_{si}$ that map the augmented state $X_t = [h_{j,t-1}^\top, x_t^\top]^\top$ into household $j$'s allocations:
712
712
@@ -913,9 +913,9 @@ def heter(
913
913
914
914
915
915
916
-
This section studies a special Section 12.6 {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` case in which the Arrow-Debreu allocation can be implemented by opening competitive markets only in a mutual fund and a one-period bond.
916
+
This section studies the special Section 12.6 {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` case in which the Arrow-Debreu allocation can be implemented by opening competitive markets only in a mutual fund and a one-period bond.
917
917
918
-
* so in our setting, we don't literally require that markets in a complete set of contingent claims be present.
918
+
* So in our setting, we don't literally require that markets in a complete set of contingent claims be present.
919
919
920
920
To match the implementation result in Chapter 12.6 of {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013`, we specialize to the one-good, constant-return case
0 commit comments