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lectures/gorman_heterogeneous_households.md

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# Gorman Aggregation
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{cite:t}`gorman1953community` described a class of preferences with the useful property that there exists a 'representative household'
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in the sense that competitive equilibrium allocations can be computed by following recursive procedure:
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in the sense that competitive equilibrium allocations can be computed by following a recursive procedure:
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* take the heterogenous preferences of a diverse collection of households and from them synthesize the preferences of a single hypothetical 'representative household'
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* take the heterogeneous preferences of a diverse collection of households and from them synthesize the preferences of a single hypothetical 'representative household'
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* collect the endowments of all households and give them to the representative household
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* construct a competitive equilibrium allocation and price system for the representative agent economy
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* at the competitive equilibrium price system, compute the wealth -- i.e., the present value -- of each household's initial endowment
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The first step in implementing the above recursive algorithm will be to form a representative agent economy and then apply our DLE tools to compute its competitive equilibrium.
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Thus, this lecture builds on tools and Python code described in {doc}`hs_recursive_models`, {doc}`growth_in_dles`, and {doc}`irfs_in_hall_model`
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Thus, this lecture builds on tools and Python code described in {doc}`hs_recursive_models`, {doc}`growth_in_dles`, and {doc}`irfs_in_hall_model`.
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The key is that the Gorman-aggregation conditions ensure all households have parallel Engel curves.
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That feature is what lets us determine the aggregate allocations and price sytem before we compute the distribution of the aggregate allocation among individual households.
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That feature is what lets us determine the aggregate allocations and price system before we compute the distribution of the aggregate allocation among individual households.
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This eliminates the usual feature that the utility possibility frontier shifts with endowment changes, making it impossible to rank allocations without specifying distributional weights.
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2. Compute household-specific policies and the Gorman sharing rule.
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For the special Section 12.6 {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` case in which preference shocks are inactive, we can also
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For the special case in Section 12.6 of {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013`, where preference shocks are inactive, we can also
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3. Implement the Arrow-Debreu allocation using only a mutual fund (aggregate stock) and a one-period bond.
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#### Inverse canonical representation
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Given $\rho_{0t}$ from the aggregate solution, we can solve {eq}`eq:foc_services` for $s_{jt}$, then use the {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` chapter 9 inverse canonical representation to compute $c_{jt}$ and $h_{jt}$:
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Given $\rho_{0t}$ from the aggregate solution, we can solve {eq}`eq:foc_services` for $s_{jt}$, then use the inverse canonical representation from Chapter 9 of {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` to compute $c_{jt}$ and $h_{jt}$:
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$$
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\begin{aligned}
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\ell_{jt} = \mu_j \, g_t,
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$$ (eq:labor_allocation)
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where $g_t = \sum_j \ell_{jt}$ is aggregate the aggregate intermediate good.
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where $g_t = \sum_j \ell_{jt}$ is the aggregate intermediate good.
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#### Risk sharing
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The numerator is household $j$'s wealth -- i.e., initial capital plus present value of endowments minus the cost of the deviation consumption stream.
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The denominator is the net cost of consuming one unit of aggregate consumption, i.e., the value of consumption value minus the value of the intermediate good supplied.
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The denominator is the net cost of consuming one unit of aggregate consumption, i.e., the value of consumption minus the value of the intermediate good supplied.
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Finally, the code constructs selection matrices $S_{ci}, S_{hi}, S_{si}$ that map the augmented state $X_t = [h_{j,t-1}^\top, x_t^\top]^\top$ into household $j$'s allocations:
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This section studies a special Section 12.6 {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` case in which the Arrow-Debreu allocation can be implemented by opening competitive markets only in a mutual fund and a one-period bond.
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This section studies the special Section 12.6 {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013` case in which the Arrow-Debreu allocation can be implemented by opening competitive markets only in a mutual fund and a one-period bond.
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* so in our setting, we don't literally require that markets in a complete set of contingent claims be present.
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* So in our setting, we don't literally require that markets in a complete set of contingent claims be present.
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To match the implementation result in Chapter 12.6 of {cite:t}`HansenSargent2013`, we specialize to the one-good, constant-return case
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b_{jt} = \bar{b} + \xi_{j,t}, \quad j = 1, \ldots, J,
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$$
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where the $\xi_{j,t}$ processes can be shut silenced by setting their innovation loadings to zero.
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where the $\xi_{j,t}$ processes can be silenced by setting their innovation loadings to zero.
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To complete the specification, we let the idiosyncratic states follow AR(1) laws of motion
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(all innovations are components of the i.i.d. vector $w_{t+1}$ in $z_{t+1} = A_{22} z_t + C_2 w_{t+1}$):
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n_endo = n_h + n_k # endogenous state dimension
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```
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With the state space representation, we can compute impulse responses to show how shocks propagate through the economy.
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With the state-space representation, we can compute impulse responses to show how shocks propagate through the economy.
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To trace the impulse response to shock $j$, we set `shock_idx=j` which selects column $j$ of the loading matrix $C$.
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This causes capital to rise as $d_{a,t}$ falls — this is permanent income logic at work.
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Next, we examine if the household consumption and endowment paths generated by the simulation obey the Gorman sharing rule
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Next, we examine whether the household consumption and endowment paths generated by the simulation obey the Gorman sharing rule
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```{code-cell} ipython3
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c_j_t0 = paths["c_j"][..., t0:]
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## Redistributing by adjusting Pareto weights
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This section analyzes Pareto-efficient tax-and-transfer schemes by simply taking competitive equilibrium allocations and then use
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This section analyzes Pareto-efficient tax-and-transfer schemes by simply taking competitive equilibrium allocations and then using
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a set of nonnegative Pareto weights that sum to one.
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```{note}
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There are various schemes that would deliver such efficient efficient redistributions, but in terms of what interests us in this example,
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There are various schemes that would deliver such efficient redistributions, but in terms of what interests us in this example,
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they are all equivalent.
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```
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