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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/tax_smooth.md
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@@ -116,15 +116,15 @@ where $g_1 > 0, g_2 > 0$.
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This is called the "present value of revenue-raising costs" in {cite}`Barro1979`.
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When $\beta R \approx 1$, the quadratic term $-\frac{g_2}{2} T_t^2$ captures increasing marginal costs of taxation, implying that tax distortions rise more than proportionally with tax rates.
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The quadratic term $-\frac{g_2}{2} T_t^2$ captures increasing marginal costs of taxation, implying that tax distortions rise more than proportionally with tax rates.
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This creates an incentive for tax smoothing.
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This creates an incentive for tax smoothing.
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Indeed, we shall see that when $\beta R = 1$, criterion {eq}`cost` leads to smoother tax paths.
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By **smoother** we mean tax rates that are as close as possible to being constant over time.
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The preference for smooth tax paths that is built into the model gives it the name "tax-smoothing model", following {cite}`Barro1979`'s seminal work.
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The preference for smooth tax paths that is built into the model gives it the name "tax-smoothing model".
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Or equivalently, we can transform this into the same problem as in the {doc}`consumption-smoothing <cons_smooth>` lecture by maximizing the welfare criterion:
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