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@@ -20,13 +20,15 @@ In this lecture, we'll study a famous model of optimal tax policy that Robert Ba
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In this lecture, we'll study what is often called the "tax-smoothing model" using matrix multiplication and matrix inversion, the same tools that we used in this QuantEcon lecture {doc}`present values <pv>`.
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This lecture is a sister lecture to the consumption-smoothing model of Milton Friedman {cite}`Friedman1956` and Robert Hall {cite}`Hall1978` that we studied in this QuantEcon lecture {doc}`consumption-smoothing <cons_smooth>`.
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This lecture is a sister lecture to our previous lecture on {doc}`consumption-smoothing <cons_smooth>`.
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We will see how "reinterpretating" the paramters in the consumption-smoothing model can lead to the tax-smoothing model.
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Formulas presented in {doc}`present value formulas<pv>` are again at the core of the tax-smoothing model because we shall use them to compute the present value of government expenditures.
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The government's optimization problem is to choose a tax collection path that minimizes the present value of the costs of raising revenue.
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The key idea that inspired Barro was that temporary government spending surges (like wars or natural disasters) create a stream of expenditure requirements that could be optimally financed by issuing debt and raising taxes gradually over time.
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The key idea that inspired Barro was that temporary government spending surges (like wars or natural disasters) create a stream of expenditure requirements that could be optimally financed by issuing debt and raising taxes *gradually* over time.
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This approach allows the government to minimize the distortionary costs of taxation by keeping tax rates relatively stable.
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The government expenditure stream is exogenous spending requirements that the government must finance.
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Analogous to {doc}`consumption-smoothing <cons_smooth>`, The model takes a government expenditure stream as an input, regarding it as "exogenous" in the sense of not being determined by the model.
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Analogous to {doc}`consumption-smoothing <cons_smooth>`, the model takes a government expenditure stream as an input, regarding it as "exogenous" in the sense of not being determined by the model.
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The government faces a gross interest rate of $R >1$ that is constant over time, at which it is free to borrow or lend, subject to limits that we'll describe below.
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```{math}
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:label: cost
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L = \sum_{t=0}^S \beta^t (g_1 T_t - \frac{g_2}{2} T_t^2 )
This is called the "present value of revenue-raising costs" in {cite}`Barro1979`.
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When $\beta R \approx 1$, the quadratic term $-\frac{g_2}{2} T_t^2$ captures increasing marginal costs of taxation, implying that tax distortions rise more than proportionally with tax rates. This creates an incentive for tax smoothing.
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When $\beta R \approx 1$, the quadratic term $-\frac{g_2}{2} T_t^2$ captures increasing marginal costs of taxation, implying that tax distortions rise more than proportionally with tax rates.
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Indeed, we shall see that when $\beta R = 1$ (a condition assumed in many public finance models), criterion {eq}`cost` leads to smoother tax paths.
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This creates an incentive for tax smoothing.
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Indeed, we shall see that when $\beta R = 1$, criterion {eq}`cost` leads to smoother tax paths.
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By **smoother** we mean tax rates that are as close as possible to being constant over time.
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The preference for smooth tax paths that is built into the model gives it the name "tax-smoothing model", following {cite}`Barro1979`'s seminal work.
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Or equivalently, we can transform this into the same problem as in the {doc}`consumption-smoothing <cons_smooth>` lecture by maximizing the welfare criterion:
A key object is the present value of government expenditures at time $0$:
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$$
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(Later we'll present a "variational argument" that shows that this constant path minimizes
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criterion {eq}`cost` when $\beta R =1$.)
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criterion {eq}`cost` and maximizes {eq}`welfare_tax` when $\beta R =1$.)
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In this case, we can use the intertemporal budget constraint to write
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Equation {eq}`eq:taxsmoothing` is the tax-smoothing model in a nutshell.
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## Mechanics of Tax-Smoothing Model
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## Mechanics of tax-smoothing model
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As promised, we'll provide step-by-step instructions on how to use linear algebra, readily implemented in Python, to compute all objects in play in the tax-smoothing model.
Now we assume a permanent increase in government expenditures of $L$ in year 21 of the $G$-sequence.
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Let's dive in and see what the key idea is.
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To explore what types of tax paths are welfare-improving, we shall create an **admissible tax path variation sequence** $\{v_t\}_{t=0}^S$
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To explore what types of tax paths are cost-minimizing / welfare-improving, we shall create an **admissible tax path variation sequence** $\{v_t\}_{t=0}^S$
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