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Agent 1's posterior probabilities are depicted with orange lines and agent 2's posterior beliefs are depicted with blue lines.
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The top panel shows outcomes when nature draws from $f$.
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Evidently, when nature draws from $f$, agent 1 learns faster than agent 2, who, unlike agent 1, attaches a positive prior probability to model $h$.
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The bottom panel depicts outcomes when nature draws from $g$.
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Again, agent 1 learns faster than agent 2, who, unlike agent 1, attaches some prior probability to model $h$.
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* In both panels, agent 2's posterior probability attached to $h$ (dotted line) converges to 0.
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Notice that when nature uses model $f$, the consumption share of agent 1 is only temporarily bigger than 1, when when nature uses model $g$, agent 1's consumption share is permanently higher.
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In the top panel, Agent 1 (orange line) who initially puts weight only on $f$ (solid line) and $g$ (dashed line) eventually dominates consumption as they learn the truth faster than Agent 2 who spreads probability across all three models.
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When nature draws from $g$ (lower panel), we see a similar pattern but reversed -- Agent 1's consumption share decreases as their belief converges to the truth.
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In this exercise, the "truth" is among possible outcomes according to both agents.
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For both cases, the belief on $h$ (dotted line) eventually goes to 0.
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Agent 2's model is "more general" because it allows a possibility -- that nature is drawing from $h$ -- that agent 1's model does not include.
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The agent with the simpler (but correct) model structure learns faster and eventually dominates consumption allocation.
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Agent 1 learns more quickly because he uses a simpler model.
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In other words, the model penalizes complexity and rewards accuracy.
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It would be interesting to explore why agent 1's consumption allocation when $f$ generates the data is only temporarily higher than agent 2's, while when $g$ generates the data, it is permanently higher.
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* Hint: Somehow the KL divergence should be able to help us sort this out.
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```{solution-end}
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```
@@ -1581,23 +1595,23 @@ Consider the same setup as the previous exercise, but now:
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Choose $h$ to be close but not equal to either $f$ or $g$ as measured by KL divergence.
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For example, set $h \sim \text{Beta}(1.2, 1.1)$.
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Simulate and visualize the evolution of consumption allocations when:
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Please simulate and visualize evolutions of posterior probabilities and consumption allocations when:
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* Nature permanently draws from $f$
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* Nature permanently draws from $g$
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Observe how the presence of extreme priors affects learning and allocation dynamics.
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```
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```{solution-start} lr_ex7
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:class: dropdown
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```
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Let's implement this case with extreme priors where one agent is almost dogmatic.
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For this to converge, we need a longer sequence by increasing $T$ to 1000.
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To explore this exercise, we increase $T$ to 1000.
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Let's define the parameters for distributions and verify that $h$ and $f$ are closer than $h$ and $g$
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Let's specify $f, g$, and $h$ and verify that $h$ and $f$ are closer than $h$ and $g$
In the top panel, observe how slowly agent 1 is adjusting to the truth -- the belief is rigid but still updating.
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In the top panel, which depicts outcomes when nature draws from $f$, please observe how slowly agent 1 learns the truth.
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The posterior probability that agent 2 puts on $h$ converges to zero slowly.
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This is because we have specified that $f$ is very difficult to distinguish from $h$ as measured by $KL(f, h)$.
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The bottom panel shows outcomes when nature draws from $g$.
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The belief about $h$ slowly shifts towards 0 crossing the belief about $f$ moving up to 1 at $t = 500$.
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We have specified things so that $g$ is further away from $h$ as measured by the KL divergence.
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However, since agent 2 is rigid about $h$, and $f$ is very difficult to distinguish from $h$ as measured by $KL(f, h)$, we can see that the belief is almost stationary due to the difficulty of realizing the belief is incorrect.
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This helps agent 2 learn the truth more quickly.
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In the bottom panel, since $g$ is further away from $h$, both agents adjust toward the truth very quickly, but agent 1 acts faster given the slightly higher weight on $f$ and $g$.
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Notice that agent 1's consumption share converges to 1 both when nature permanently draws from $f$
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