arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs

A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence
what the hardware speculates will happen next.

On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence.

This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by
seccomp.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

Author: James Morse

arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
 
 enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
 bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
+extern bool __nospectre_bhb;
 u8 get_spectre_bhb_loop_value(void);
 bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated(void);
 void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);

arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c

@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
 	isb();
 }
 
-static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
 static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
 {
 	__nospectre_bhb = true;

arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "bpf_jit: " fmt
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/bitfield.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/asm-extable.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/text-patching.h>
@@ -939,7 +941,48 @@ static void build_plt(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 		plt->target = (u64)&dummy_tramp;
 }
 
-static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
+/* Clobbers BPF registers 1-4, aka x0-x3 */
+static void __maybe_unused build_bhb_mitigation(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const u8 r1 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_1]; /* aka x0 */
+	u8 k = get_spectre_bhb_loop_value();
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY) ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb ||
+	    arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
+		return;
+
+	if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
+		emit(aarch64_insn_gen_hint(AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CLEARBHB), ctx);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (k) {
+		emit_a64_mov_i64(r1, k, ctx);
+		emit(A64_B(1), ctx);
+		emit(A64_SUBS_I(true, r1, r1, 1), ctx);
+		emit(A64_B_(A64_COND_NE, -2), ctx);
+		emit(aarch64_insn_gen_dsb(AARCH64_INSN_MB_ISH), ctx);
+		emit(aarch64_insn_get_isb_value(), ctx);
+	}
+
+	if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated()) {
+		emit(A64_ORR_I(false, r1, AARCH64_INSN_REG_ZR,
+			       ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3), ctx);
+		switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
+		case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
+			emit(aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value(), ctx);
+			break;
+		case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
+			emit(aarch64_insn_get_smc_value(), ctx);
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err_once("Firmware mitigation enabled with unknown conduit\n");
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool was_classic)
 {
 	const u8 r0 = bpf2a64[BPF_REG_0];
 	const u8 ptr = bpf2a64[TCCNT_PTR];
@@ -952,10 +995,13 @@ static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 
 	emit(A64_POP(A64_ZR, ptr, A64_SP), ctx);
 
+	if (was_classic)
+		build_bhb_mitigation(ctx);
+
 	/* Restore FP/LR registers */
 	emit(A64_POP(A64_FP, A64_LR, A64_SP), ctx);
 
-	/* Set return value */
+	/* Move the return value from bpf:r0 (aka x7) to x0 */
 	emit(A64_MOV(1, A64_R(0), r0), ctx);
 
 	/* Authenticate lr */
@@ -1898,7 +1944,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	}
 
 	ctx.epilogue_offset = ctx.idx;
-	build_epilogue(&ctx);
+	build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
 	build_plt(&ctx);
 
 	extable_align = __alignof__(struct exception_table_entry);
@@ -1961,7 +2007,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		goto out_free_hdr;
 	}
 
-	build_epilogue(&ctx);
+	build_epilogue(&ctx, was_classic);
 	build_plt(&ctx);
 
 	/* Extra pass to validate JITed code. */