Merge 6.9-rc5 into tty-next

We want the tty fixes in here as well, and it resolves a merge conflict
in:
	drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
as well.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Author: gregkh

.mailmap

@@ -446,7 +446,8 @@ Mythri P K <[email protected]>
 Nadav Amit <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nadav Amit <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nadia Yvette Chambers <[email protected]> William Lee Irwin III <[email protected]>
-Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Neeraj Upadhyay <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -524,6 +525,7 @@ Rémi Denis-Courmont <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Richard Genoud <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

CREDITS

@@ -3146,6 +3146,10 @@ S: Triftstra=DFe 55
 S: 13353 Berlin
 S: Germany
 
+N: Gustavo Pimental
+E: [email protected]
+D: PCI driver for Synopsys DesignWare
+
 N: Emanuel Pirker
 E: [email protected]
 D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
 the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
 Enhanced IBRS.
 
-Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
-unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
-unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
-For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
-retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
+eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF.
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or
+use the BHB clearing sequence.
 
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
@@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
   ===========================  =======================================================
 
+  - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - BHI: Not affected
+   - System is not affected
+ * - BHI: Retpoline
+   - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+   - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+   - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
@@ -484,7 +500,11 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
+   some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of
+   indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are
+   isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
+   between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against
+   BHI attacks.
 
    On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
    injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
@@ -638,6 +658,18 @@ kernel command line.
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+	spectre_bhi=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
+		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+		on
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
+		off
+			Disable the mitigation.
+
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3463,6 +3463,7 @@
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6082,6 +6083,15 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst
 
+	spectre_bhi=	[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+			(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the
+			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
+			clearing sequence.
+
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
 			The default operation protects the kernel from

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,sm8150-mdss.yaml

@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ patternProperties:
       compatible:
         const: qcom,sm8150-dpu
 
+  "^displayport-controller@[0-9a-f]+$":
+    type: object
+    additionalProperties: true
+
+    properties:
+      compatible:
+        contains:
+          const: qcom,sm8150-dp
+
   "^dsi@[0-9a-f]+$":
     type: object
     additionalProperties: true

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pwm/mediatek,pwm-disp.yaml

@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ properties:
       - const: main
       - const: mm
 
+  power-domains:
+    maxItems: 1
+
 required:
   - compatible
   - reg

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/atmel,at91-usart.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
 title: Atmel Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (USART)
 
 maintainers:
-  - Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
+  - Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@bootlin.com>
 
 properties:
   compatible:

Documentation/driver-api/virtio/writing_virtio_drivers.rst

@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ like this::
 
 	static struct virtio_driver virtio_dummy_driver = {
 		.driver.name =  KBUILD_MODNAME,
-		.driver.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 		.id_table =     id_table,
 		.probe =        virtio_dummy_probe,
 		.remove =       virtio_dummy_remove,

Documentation/filesystems/bcachefs/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================
+bcachefs Documentation
+======================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+   :numbered:
+
+   errorcodes

Documentation/filesystems/index.rst

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ Documentation for filesystem implementations.
    afs
    autofs
    autofs-mount-control
+   bcachefs/index
    befs
    bfs
    btrfs