Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2020-05-15

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

We've added 9 non-merge commits during the last 2 day(s) which contain
a total of 14 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix secid_to_secctx LSM hook default value, from Anders.

2) Fix bug in mmap of bpf array, from Andrii.

3) Restrict bpf_probe_read to archs where they work, from Daniel.

4) Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit progs, from Yonghong.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Author: davem330

Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst

@@ -112,6 +112,20 @@ used when printing stack backtraces. The specifier takes into
 consideration the effect of compiler optimisations which may occur
 when tail-calls are used and marked with the noreturn GCC attribute.
 
+Probed Pointers from BPF / tracing
+----------------------------------
+
+::
+
+	%pks	kernel string
+	%pus	user string
+
+The ``k`` and ``u`` specifiers are used for printing prior probed memory from
+either kernel memory (k) or user memory (u). The subsequent ``s`` specifier
+results in printing a string. For direct use in regular vsnprintf() the (k)
+and (u) annotation is ignored, however, when used out of BPF's bpf_trace_printk(),
+for example, it reads the memory it is pointing to without faulting.
+
 Kernel Pointers
 ---------------
 

arch/arm/Kconfig

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM
 	select ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
+	select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL if ARM_LPAE
 	select ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA
 	select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
+	select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
 	select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
+	select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP		if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL

include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	 char **value)
 LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata,
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata,
 	 u32 *seclen)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen)

init/Kconfig

@@ -2279,6 +2279,9 @@ config ASN1
 
 source "kernel/Kconfig.locks"
 
+config ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+	bool
+
 config ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE
 	bool
 

kernel/bpf/arraymap.c

@@ -486,7 +486,12 @@ static int array_map_mmap(struct bpf_map *map, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (!(map->map_flags & BPF_F_MMAPABLE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return remap_vmalloc_range(vma, array_map_vmalloc_addr(array), pgoff);
+	if (vma->vm_pgoff * PAGE_SIZE + (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >
+	    PAGE_ALIGN((u64)array->map.max_entries * array->elem_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return remap_vmalloc_range(vma, array_map_vmalloc_addr(array),
+				   vma->vm_pgoff + pgoff);
 }
 
 const struct bpf_map_ops array_map_ops = {

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

@@ -4340,7 +4340,9 @@ static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
 
 	if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER ||
 	    (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack &&
-	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str))
+	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str &&
+	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str &&
+	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str))
 		return;
 
 	ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
@@ -7059,6 +7061,23 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			return 0;
 		range = tnum_const(0);
 		break;
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
+		switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) {
+		case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
+		case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
+			range = tnum_const(0);
+			break;
+		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
+		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
+			return 0;
+		default:
+			return -ENOTSUPP;
+		}
+		break;
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
+		/* freplace program can return anything as its return value
+		 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program.
+		 */
 	default:
 		return 0;
 	}

kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c

@@ -323,17 +323,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void)
 
 /*
  * Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed:
- * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %s
+ * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %pks %pus %s
  */
 BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
 	   u64, arg2, u64, arg3)
 {
+	int i, mod[3] = {}, fmt_cnt = 0;
+	char buf[64], fmt_ptype;
+	void *unsafe_ptr = NULL;
 	bool str_seen = false;
-	int mod[3] = {};
-	int fmt_cnt = 0;
-	u64 unsafe_addr;
-	char buf[64];
-	int i;
 
 	/*
 	 * bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary()
@@ -359,40 +357,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
 		if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
 			mod[fmt_cnt]++;
 			i++;
-		} else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') {
+		} else if (fmt[i] == 'p') {
 			mod[fmt_cnt]++;
+			if ((fmt[i + 1] == 'k' ||
+			     fmt[i + 1] == 'u') &&
+			    fmt[i + 2] == 's') {
+				fmt_ptype = fmt[i + 1];
+				i += 2;
+				goto fmt_str;
+			}
+
 			/* disallow any further format extensions */
 			if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
 			    !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
 			    !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
 				return -EINVAL;
-			fmt_cnt++;
-			if (fmt[i] == 's') {
-				if (str_seen)
-					/* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
-					return -EINVAL;
-				str_seen = true;
-
-				switch (fmt_cnt) {
-				case 1:
-					unsafe_addr = arg1;
-					arg1 = (long) buf;
-					break;
-				case 2:
-					unsafe_addr = arg2;
-					arg2 = (long) buf;
-					break;
-				case 3:
-					unsafe_addr = arg3;
-					arg3 = (long) buf;
-					break;
-				}
-				buf[0] = 0;
-				strncpy_from_unsafe(buf,
-						    (void *) (long) unsafe_addr,
+
+			goto fmt_next;
+		} else if (fmt[i] == 's') {
+			mod[fmt_cnt]++;
+			fmt_ptype = fmt[i];
+fmt_str:
+			if (str_seen)
+				/* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
+				return -EINVAL;
+			str_seen = true;
+
+			if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
+			    !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
+			    !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			switch (fmt_cnt) {
+			case 0:
+				unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg1;
+				arg1 = (long)buf;
+				break;
+			case 1:
+				unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg2;
+				arg2 = (long)buf;
+				break;
+			case 2:
+				unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg3;
+				arg3 = (long)buf;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			buf[0] = 0;
+			switch (fmt_ptype) {
+			case 's':
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+				strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr,
 						    sizeof(buf));
+				break;
+#endif
+			case 'k':
+				strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(buf, unsafe_ptr,
+							   sizeof(buf));
+				break;
+			case 'u':
+				strncpy_from_unsafe_user(buf,
+					(__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr,
+							 sizeof(buf));
+				break;
 			}
-			continue;
+			goto fmt_next;
 		}
 
 		if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
@@ -403,6 +432,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
 		if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' &&
 		    fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x')
 			return -EINVAL;
+fmt_next:
 		fmt_cnt++;
 	}
 
@@ -825,14 +855,16 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
-	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
-		return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
+		return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
 	case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
 		return &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	case BPF_FUNC_get_current_cgroup_id:
 		return &bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto;

lib/vsprintf.c

@@ -2168,6 +2168,10 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
  *		f full name
  *		P node name, including a possible unit address
  * - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx".
+ * - '[ku]s' For a BPF/tracing related format specifier, e.g. used out of
+ *           bpf_trace_printk() where [ku] prefix specifies either kernel (k)
+ *           or user (u) memory to probe, and:
+ *              s a string, equivalent to "%s" on direct vsnprintf() use
  *
  * ** When making changes please also update:
  *	Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
@@ -2251,6 +2255,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
 		if (!IS_ERR(ptr))
 			break;
 		return err_ptr(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+	case 'u':
+	case 'k':
+		switch (fmt[1]) {
+		case 's':
+			return string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+		default:
+			return error_string(buf, end, "(einval)", spec);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */