Merge branch 'linus' into perf/core, to pick up perf/urgent fixes

Pick up perf/urgent fixes that are upstream already, but not
yet in the perf/core development branch.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

Author: Ingo Molnar

.mailmap

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Adam Oldham <[email protected]>
 Adam Radford <[email protected]>
 Adriana Reus <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Adrian Bunk <[email protected]>
+Ajay Kaher <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Akhil P Oommen <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alan Cox <[email protected]>
 Alan Cox <[email protected]>
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ Alexei Avshalom Lazar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alexey Makhalov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alex Hung <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alex Shi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alex Shi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -110,6 +112,7 @@ Brendan Higgins <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Brian Avery <[email protected]>
 Brian King <[email protected]>
 Brian Silverman <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Bryan Tan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Cai Huoqing <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Can Guo <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Carl Huang <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -529,6 +532,7 @@ Rocky Liao <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Ronak Doshi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Muchun Song <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Muchun Song <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ross Zwisler <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -651,6 +655,7 @@ Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Vishnu Dasa <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Vivek Aknurwar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Vivien Didelot <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Vlad Dogaru <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

CREDITS

@@ -3146,6 +3146,10 @@ S: Triftstra=DFe 55
 S: 13353 Berlin
 S: Germany
 
+N: Gustavo Pimental
+E: [email protected]
+D: PCI driver for Synopsys DesignWare
+
 N: Emanuel Pirker
 E: [email protected]
 D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
 the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
 Enhanced IBRS.
 
-Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
-unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
-unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
-For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
-retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
+eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF.
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or
+use the BHB clearing sequence.
 
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
@@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
   ===========================  =======================================================
 
+  - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - BHI: Not affected
+   - System is not affected
+ * - BHI: Retpoline
+   - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+   - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+   - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
@@ -484,7 +500,11 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
+   some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of
+   indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are
+   isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
+   between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against
+   BHI attacks.
 
    On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
    injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
@@ -638,6 +658,18 @@ kernel command line.
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+	spectre_bhi=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
+		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+		on
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
+		off
+			Disable the mitigation.
+
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3444,6 +3444,7 @@
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6063,6 +6064,15 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst
 
+	spectre_bhi=	[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+			(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the
+			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
+			clearing sequence.
+
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
 			The default operation protects the kernel from
@@ -6599,7 +6609,7 @@
 			To turn off having tracepoints sent to printk,
 			 echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/tracepoint_printk
 			Note, echoing 1 into this file without the
-			tracepoint_printk kernel cmdline option has no effect.
+			tp_printk kernel cmdline option has no effect.
 
 			The tp_printk_stop_on_boot (see below) can also be used
 			to stop the printing of events to console at

Documentation/admin-guide/mm/zswap.rst

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Setting this parameter to 100 will disable the hysteresis.
 
 Some users cannot tolerate the swapping that comes with zswap store failures
 and zswap writebacks. Swapping can be disabled entirely (without disabling
-zswap itself) on a cgroup-basis as follows:
+zswap itself) on a cgroup-basis as follows::
 
 	echo 0 > /sys/fs/cgroup/<cgroup-name>/memory.zswap.writeback
 
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ writeback (because the same pages might be rejected again and again).
 When there is a sizable amount of cold memory residing in the zswap pool, it
 can be advantageous to proactively write these cold pages to swap and reclaim
 the memory for other use cases. By default, the zswap shrinker is disabled.
-User can enable it as follows:
+User can enable it as follows::
 
   echo Y > /sys/module/zswap/parameters/shrinker_enabled
 

Documentation/dev-tools/testing-overview.rst

@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ Some of these tools are listed below:
   KASAN and can be used in production. See Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
 * lockdep is a locking correctness validator. See
   Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst
+* Runtime Verification (RV) supports checking specific behaviours for a given
+  subsystem. See Documentation/trace/rv/runtime-verification.rst
 * There are several other pieces of debug instrumentation in the kernel, many
   of which can be found in lib/Kconfig.debug
 

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/keystone-gate.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-Status: Unstable - ABI compatibility may be broken in the future
-
 Binding for Keystone gate control driver which uses PSC controller IP.
 
 This binding uses the common clock binding[1].

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/keystone-pll.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-Status: Unstable - ABI compatibility may be broken in the future
-
 Binding for keystone PLLs. The main PLL IP typically has a multiplier,
 a divider and a post divider. The additional PLL IPs like ARMPLL, DDRPLL
 and PAPLL are controlled by the memory mapped register where as the Main

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/ti/adpll.txt

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 Binding for Texas Instruments ADPLL clock.
 
-Binding status: Unstable - ABI compatibility may be broken in the future
-
 This binding uses the common clock binding[1]. It assumes a
 register-mapped ADPLL with two to three selectable input clocks
 and three to four children.

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/ti/apll.txt

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 Binding for Texas Instruments APLL clock.
 
-Binding status: Unstable - ABI compatibility may be broken in the future
-
 This binding uses the common clock binding[1].  It assumes a
 register-mapped APLL with usually two selectable input clocks
 (reference clock and bypass clock), with analog phase locked