@@ -620,6 +620,7 @@ quite good incremental deployment properties, another advantage over BGPsec.
6206208.2 DNS
621621----------
622622
623+
623624The Domain Name System (DNS) is, like BGP, another critical component of the
624625Internet's infrastructure that has come under repeated attack in the
625626decades since it was first introduced. Also like BGP, it was developed
@@ -788,4 +789,48 @@ DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
788789
789790 .. sidebar :: DOS-preventing infrastructure
790791
791- *Cloudflare is the answer *
792+
793+ *Capacity is another aspect of network infrastructure that is
794+ vulnerable to malicious attack. Such attacks—or as they are
795+ commonly known, *Denial of Service (DoS) * attacks—threaten
796+ availability (as opposed to confidentiality or integrity). They
797+ typically involve an adversary trying to overwhelm "good" resources
798+ (link bandwidth, packet forwarding rates, server response
799+ throughput) with traffic generated by "bad" resources (botnets
800+ constructed from a distributed collection of compromised
801+ devices). Many of the defenses described in this book help protect
802+ devices from being compromised in the first place, but because they
803+ are not perfect (a human is usually the weakest link), we also need
804+ ways to mitigate the impact of a *Distributed DoS (DDoS) * attacks.
805+
806+ The DDoS challenge is addressed by two general countermeasures;
807+ there is no silver bullet. The first is to absorb potential attacks
808+ with even greater resources than the adversary is able to
809+ muster. For content, this is done using the same mechanism as is
810+ used to absorb flash crowds of legitimate traffic: a *Content
811+ Distribution Network (CDN) *. The idea is to replicate content
812+ (whether it's a movie or a critical piece of infrastructure
813+ metadata) across many, widely-distributed servers. As long as the
814+ aggregate capacity of these servers is greater than the aggregate
815+ capacity of the botnet, content remains available. This notion of
816+ *aggregate * capacity generalizes beyond servers responding to GET
817+ requests. A network is itself a distributed collection of
818+ forwarding and transmission resources, engineered to distribute
819+ those resources in a way that avoids vulnerable bottlenecks.
820+
821+ The second countermeasure is to filter malicious traffic as early
822+ (close to the source) as possible. If a DoS attack comes from a
823+ single source, then it is easy to "block" traffic from from that
824+ source at an ingress to a network you control. This is why DoS
825+ attacks are typically distributed. Dropping (or rate limiting)
826+ attack packets at the boundary router (or firewall) for an
827+ enterprise is better than allowing those packets to flood the local
828+ network and reach a victim server, but the more widely distributed
829+ the periphery of your network, the earlier you can filter malicious
830+ packets. And drawing on the first countermeasure, the more widely
831+ distributed your network resources are, the greater your aggregate
832+ filtering capacity. Global overlay networks, as provided by
833+ companies like Cloudflare and Fastly, offer a combination of
834+ content distribution and distributed packet filtering. These are
835+ commercial products, with many proprietary details, but the general
836+ principles outlined here explains the underlying strategy.*
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