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preface.rst

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========
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The field of network security is roughly as old as networking
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itself. Conventional wisdom is that the original Internet was built
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without security features and we have been dealing with the effects of
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those design decisions ever since. And it is not that the Internet's
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designers, implementers and architects were unaware of security
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concerns; many of them were directly involved in developing security
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technologies in early operating systems. But building a
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itself. Conventional wisdom tells us that the original Internet was
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built without security features and we have been dealing with the
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effects of those design decisions ever since. It is not that the
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Internet's designers, implementers and architects were unaware of
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security concerns; many of them were directly involved in developing
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security technologies in early operating systems. But building a
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high-performance network that could scale to global proportions and
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accommodate the heterogeneous set of technologies that existed (and
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those still to come) presented more than enough challenges. To quote
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in 1995. There is an adage in security circles that no-one should
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write their own cryptography code because it is so hard to get right,
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and something similar might be said about trying to write a security
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book. It is very easy to make mistakes, especially if you are not
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deeply immersed in the security world and the "look for every possible
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book. It is easy to make mistakes, especially if you are not deeply
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immersed in the security world and the "look for every possible
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weakness" mentality. We've had to make a few corrections over the
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years to our security section in the big textbook.
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years to our security section in the big textbook. It is our
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perspective on security as viewed in the broader networking context
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that we have endeavored to bring to the topic.
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So why did we decide to write the current book? First, we saw an
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opportunity to write about security in a way that would make sense to
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a networking person. Also, we saw an opportunity to take more of a
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systems approach to the topic. While we always try to
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take a system-level view in everything we write, it's easy with
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security to get bogged down in the details of individual components
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such as cryptographic algorithms without really tackling the systems
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issues. Cryptography is cool and interesting (in our view at least) but
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it isn't really the main thing to focus on if you are building secure
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systems. So while we do explain the basics of cryptography here, it's
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not the focus. We're aiming to explain how a system that comprises
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many moving parts, both in the network and the end-system, can be made
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secure.
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a networking person. Also, we wanted to take more of a systems
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approach to the topic. While we always try to take a system-level view
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in everything we write, it's easy with security to get bogged down in
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the details of individual components such as cryptographic algorithms
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without really tackling the systems issues. Cryptography is cool and
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interesting (in our view at least) but it isn't really the main thing
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to focus on if you are building secure systems. So while we do explain
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the basics of cryptography here, it's not the focus. We're aiming to
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explain how a system that comprises many moving parts, both in the
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network and the end-system, can be made secure.
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This question of focus caused us to examine how much we wanted to say
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about end-system security. There are entire books to be written on
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operating system security, processor architecture bugs such as spectre
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and meltdown, and preventing malware on end-systems. We made a
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conscious decision to draw a line around the network and focus there,
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recognizing that, just as TCP is an important network protocol that
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runs in end-systems, protocols like HTTPS and TLS need to be covered
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in a book on network security. In fact TLS provides an excellent case
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study in the system-level issues that come into play when you try to
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secure traffic that flows between end-systems over the Internet, and
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we devote an entire chapter to it.
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operating system security, processor architecture bugs such as Spectre
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and Meltdown, and mitigating or preventing malware such as viruses on
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end-systems. We made a conscious decision to draw a line around the
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network and focus there, recognizing that, just as TCP is an important
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network protocol that runs in end-systems, protocols like HTTPS and
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TLS need to be covered in a book on network security. In fact TLS
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provides an excellent case study in the system-level issues that come
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into play when you try to secure traffic that flows between
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end-systems over the Internet, and we devote an entire chapter to it.
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With the never-ending set of threats and vulnerabilities that need to
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be dealt with, it is all too easy to start thinking of security as
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just a collection of point solutions to the problems that have been
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identified so far. But in fact there is a well-established set of
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principles that have been identified and written down by pioneers in
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the field, such as the principle of least privilege, defense in depth,
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and so on. We have dedicated a chapter to exploring some of the most
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widely accepted principles, and then we see them applied repeatedly
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throughout the book. Perimeter firewalls, for example, can be a part of a defense
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in depth strategy, while *distributed* firewalls have been proposed
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as a way to apply least privilege to datacenter networks.
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the field. The principle of least privilege and defense in depth are
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two noteworthy examples. We have dedicated a chapter to exploring some
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of the most widely accepted principles, and then we see them applied
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repeatedly throughout the book. Perimeter firewalls, for example, can
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be a part of a defense in depth strategy, while distributed firewalls
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have been proposed as a way to apply least privilege to datacenter
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networks.
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Inevitably there are security technologies and types of attack that we
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have not covered in this book. What we have tried to do is to give the
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Acknowledgements
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----------------
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Brad Karp
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Cecilia Testart
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Motonori Shindo
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Nick Feamster
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Thanks to all the people who provided feedback on our book at various
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stages in its development, particulary the following people:
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- Brad Karp
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- Cecilia Testart
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- Motonori Shindo
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- Nick Feamster

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