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firewall.rst

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@@ -471,10 +471,11 @@ published in 1999, having started life as an IDS, and now owned by
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Cisco. In its original incarnation, Snort provided a lightweight,
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rule-based packet filtering and capture tool based on Berkeley Packet
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Filters. The idea is that attacks, such as worms, have a recognizable
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signature (a particular combination of header fields), and that the
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IDS can be programmed with a rule to recognize the attack traffic, and
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raise alerts when this happens. As an IPS, Snort now takes the
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additional step of blocking the attack.
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signature—for example, a particular combination of header values or a
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unique byte-string embedded in the payload—and that the IDS can be
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programmed with a rule to recognize the attack traffic, and raise
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alerts when this happens. As an IPS, Snort now takes the additional
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step of blocking the attack.
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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@@ -548,7 +549,7 @@ typically involve an adversary trying to overwhelm "good" resources
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with traffic generated by "bad" resources (botnets constructed from a
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distributed collection of compromised devices). Firewalls and other
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security appliances help protect devices from being compromised in the
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first place, but because they are not perfect (a human is usually the
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first place, but because they are not perfect (a human is often the
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weakest link), we also need ways to mitigate the impact of
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*Distributed DoS (DDoS)* attacks.
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@@ -569,26 +570,25 @@ widely-distributed servers. As long as the aggregate capacity of these
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servers is greater than the aggregate capacity of the botnet—and the
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CDN does a good job spreading requests across the available
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servers—content remains available. This notion of *aggregate* capacity
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generalizes beyond web servers responding to GET requests. A network
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is itself a distributed collection of forwarding and transmission
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resources, engineered to distribute those resources in a way that
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avoids vulnerable bottlenecks.
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generalizes beyond web servers responding to HTTP GET requests. A
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network is itself a distributed collection of forwarding and
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transmission resources, engineered to distribute those resources in a
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way that avoids vulnerable bottlenecks.
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The second countermeasure is to filter malicious traffic as early
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(close to the source) as possible. This is similar to what an IPS
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would do, except the traffic often looks legitimate. If a DoS attack
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comes from a single source, then it is easy to "block" traffic from
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that source at an ingress to a network you control. This is why DoS
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attacks are typically distributed. Dropping (or rate limiting) attack
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packets at the boundary router (or firewall) for an enterprise is
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better than allowing those packets to flood the local network and
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reach a victim server(s), but the more widely distributed the periphery
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of your network, the earlier you can filter malicious packets. And
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drawing on the first countermeasure, the more widely distributed your
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network resources are, the greater your aggregate filtering capacity.
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Global overlay networks, as provided by companies like Cloudflare and
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Fastly, offer a combination of content distribution and distributed
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packet filtering. These are commercial products, with many
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proprietary details, but the general principles outlined here explain
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their underlying strategy.
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(close to the source) as possible. If a DoS attack comes from a single
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source, then it is easy to "block" traffic from that source at an
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ingress to a network you control. This is why DoS attacks are
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typically distributed. Dropping (or rate limiting) attack packets at
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the boundary router (or firewall) for an enterprise is better than
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allowing those packets to flood the local network and reach a victim
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server(s), but the more widely distributed the periphery of your
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network, the earlier you can filter malicious packets. And drawing on
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the first countermeasure, the more widely distributed your network
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resources are, the greater your aggregate filtering capacity. Global
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overlay networks, as provided by companies like Cloudflare and Fastly,
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offer a combination of content distribution and distributed packet
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filtering. These are commercial products, with many proprietary
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details, but the general principles outlined here explain their
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underlying strategy.
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