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Clean up references and add authors
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authors.rst

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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ introductory textbook, along with several new books focused on
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emerging topics in network and cloud systems, are available as open
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source at https://systemsapproach.org.
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Larry spent most of his career in academia, first at the Unviersity of
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Larry spent most of his career in academia, first at the University of
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Arizona and later at Princeton University, where he was the
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Robert E. Kahn Professor of Computer Science. While at Princeton he
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directed the PlanetLab Consortium, building a global testbed for

conf.py

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@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ def get_version():
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# -- Project information -----------------------------------------------------
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project = u'Network Security: A Systems Approach'
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copyright = u'2024, Systems Approach LLC (Publisher)'
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author = u'The Author List'
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copyright = u'2025, Systems Approach LLC (Publisher)'
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author = u'Larry L. Peterson and Bruce S. Davie'
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# -- General configuration ---------------------------------------------------
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# author, documentclass [howto, manual, or own class]).
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latex_documents = [
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(master_doc, 'book.tex', u'Network Security: A Systems Approach',
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u'The Author List ', 'manual', True),
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u'Larry L. Peterson and Bruce S. Davie', 'manual', True),
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]
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latex_toplevel_sectioning = 'chapter'

crypto.rst

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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ a challenge that we tackle in the next chapter.
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Once we have a set of cryptographic algorithms and a way to distribute
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keys, we are in a position to build protocols that enable secure
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communication between participants. Later chapters describes several
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such security protocols, culminating in a description of complete
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such security protocols, culminating in the description of complete
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systems that use these protocols.
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3.1 Principles of Ciphers
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Secret-key encryption and decryption.
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As we noted in the previous chapter, the principle of open design has
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been proposed for security technologies since at
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least 1975. Cryptography has a much longer history than that, however,
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been proposed for security technologies since at least 1975.
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Cryptography has a much longer history than that, however,
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going back thousands of years. One of the leading cryptographers of
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the 19th century, Auguste Kerckhoffs, stated in 1883 that
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cryptographic system designs themselves should not be secret, but
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should be parameterized by an easily changeable *key*; only the key
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should need to be secret. This also follows the principle from Chapter 2 of minimizing secrets.
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should need to be secret. This also follows the principle from Chapter
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2 of minimizing secrets.
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One reason for open design is that, if you were to depend on the
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cipher being kept secret, then you would have to retire the cipher
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processes of development, testing, analysis and standardization; all
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of this makes the algorithms expensive to replace.
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Because cryptography algorithms are expensive to replace, they are
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typically treated as plugable modules in the end-to-end security
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Because cryptography algorithms are expensive to replace, but are
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occasionally found to be vulnerable after years of use, they are
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typically treated as pluggable modules in the end-to-end security
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solutions described in the following chapters. In many cases, the
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algorithm is a selectable parameter of those solutions, which means
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the overall system does not become obsolete just because one of its
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to the hash). The two passes of the keyed-hash function are important
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to the proof of security for this HMAC construction.
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.. let's delete this incorrect pic for now
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.. _fig-macAndHmac:
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.. figure:: figures/f08-05-modified.png
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.. let's delete this incorrect pic for now; unclear if a new picture
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adds much
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.. _fig-macAndHmac:
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.. figure:: figures/f08-05-modified.png
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:width: 300px
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:align: center
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Computing a hashed message authentication code (HMAC).
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.. this appears to be out of date, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC#Design_principles
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Up to this point, we have been assuming that the message wasn’t

index.rst

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Network Security: A Systems Approach
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===========================================
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The Authors
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Peterson and Davie
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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|

infra.rst

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@@ -102,12 +102,12 @@ more difficult to address.
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.. _reading_threat:
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Geoff Huston. `A Survey on Securing Inter-Domain Routing Part 1 –
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G. Huston. `A Survey on Securing Inter-Domain Routing Part 1 –
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BGP: Design, Threats and Security Requirements
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<https://labs.apnic.net/index.php/2021/08/03/a-survey-on-securing-inter-domain-routing-part-1-bgp-design-threats-and-security-requirements/>`__.
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APNIC Blog, August 2021.
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Peterson, L. and Davie, B. `Computer Networks: A Systems Approach. Interdomain
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L. Peterson and B. Davie. `Computer Networks: A Systems Approach. Interdomain
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Routing <https://book.systemsapproach.org/scaling/global.html#interdomain-routing-bgp>`__.
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.. _reading_BGPTLS:
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Thomas Wirtgen, Nicolas Rybowski, Cristel Pelsser, Olivier
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T. Wirtgen, N. Rybowski, C. Pelsser, O.
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Bonaventure. `The Multiple Benefits of Secure Transport for
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BGP <https://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-next/2024/files/papers/p186.pdf/>`__.
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ACM CONEXT, December 2024.
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Sharon Goldberg. `Why Is It Taking So Long to Secure Internet
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S. Goldberg. `Why Is It Taking So Long to Secure Internet
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Routing? <https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2668152.2668966/>`__
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ACM Queue, August 2014.
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Cecilia Testart and David Clark. `A Data-Driven Approach to
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C. Testart and D. Clark. `A Data-Driven Approach to
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Understanding the State of Internet Routing Security
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<https://faculty.cc.gatech.edu/~ctestart8/publications/RoutingSecTPRC.pdf>`__. TPRC
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48, February 2021.
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.. _reading_bgpsec:
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Robert Lychev, Sharon Goldberg and Michael Schapira. `BGP security
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R. Lychev, S. Goldberg and M. Schapira. `BGP security
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in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze? <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2534169.2486010>`__ ACM
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SIGCOMM, August 2013.
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.. _reading_aspa:
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Alexander Azimov et al. `BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
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A, Azimov et al. `BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
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Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/>`__. Internet
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draft, work in progress.
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.. _reading_dns:
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Peterson, L. and Davie, B. `Computer Networks: A Systems
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L. Peterson and B. Davie. `Computer Networks: A Systems
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Approach. Name Service (DNS)
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<https://book.systemsapproach.org/applications/infrastructure.html#name-service-dns>`__.
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Derek Atkins and Ron Austein. `Threat Analysis of the Domain Name
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D. Atkins and R. Austein. `Threat Analysis of the Domain Name
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System (DNS) <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3833/>`__. RFC 3833,
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August 2004.
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Geoff Huston. `Calling Time on DNSSEC?
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G. Huston. `Calling Time on DNSSEC?
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<https://labs.apnic.net/index.php/2024/05/27/calling-time-on-dnssec/>`__
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APNIC Blog, May 2024.
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.. _reading_doh:
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Hu, Z., et al. `Specification for DNS over Transport Layer
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Z. Hu, et al. `Specification for DNS over Transport Layer
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Security (TLS) <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>`__. RFC 7858, May 2016.
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Hoffman, P. and P. McManus. `DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)
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P. Hoffman and P. McManus. `DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)
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<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>`__. RFC 8484,
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October 2018.
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Schmitt, Paul and Edmundson, Anne and Mankin, Allison and Feamster,
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Nick. `Oblivious DNS: Practical Privacy for DNS Queries
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P. Schmitt, A. Edmundson, A. Mankin, and N. Feamster. `Oblivious
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DNS: Practical Privacy for DNS Queries
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<https://doi.org/10.1145/3340301.3341128>`__. Proc. 2019 Applied
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Networking Research Workshop, 2019.
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intro.rst

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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Donn Seeley. `A Tour of the
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D. Seeley. `A Tour of the
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Worm <http://www.cs.unc.edu/~jeffay/courses/nidsS05/attacks/seely-RTMworm-89.html>`__.
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What we present in this book is a systems perspective on the

principles.rst

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2.3.2 Principle of Least Privilege
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The principle of least privilege has a long history in computer
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science, having been proposed by Saltzer and Schroeder in 1975. The
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science, having been proposed by Saltzer and Schroeder in 1975 (see
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the Further Reading). The
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"Every program and every user of the system should operate using the
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illustrating that security is only one of many system requirements
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taken into consideration.
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In an OS setting, the principle of least common mechanism is related to
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the principle of least privilege since the common platform (kernel)
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runs with greater privilege. This is because minimizing the number of
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mechanisms that require elevated kernel privilege also minimizes the
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privilege required across all mechanisms that make up a system. In a
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network setting, the principle is related to the
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end-to-end-argument. That is, it is best to avoid putting functions
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such as encryption into the network when the user is likely to need
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end-to-end encryption anyway.
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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G. Popek. `A Principle of Kernel Design
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Design <https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/357401.357402>`__. ACM
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Transactions on Computer Systems. November 1984.
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In an OS setting, the principle of least common mechanism is related to
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the principle of least privilege since the common platform (kernel)
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runs with greater privilege. This is because minimizing the number of
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mechanisms that require elevated kernel privilege also minimizes the
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privilege required across all mechanisms that make up a system. In a
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network setting, the principle is related to the
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end-to-end-argument. That is, it is best to avoid putting functions
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such as encryption into the network when the user is likely to need
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end-to-end encryption anyway.
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2.3.6 Design for Iteration
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influential paper by Saltzer and Schroeder from 1975. That is the same
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Saltzer whose book (with Kaashoek) we referred to in Chapter 1. The
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fact that many of the principles from the 1975 paper reappear in the
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2009 is probably a sign that Saltzer had some confidence that these
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2009 book is probably a sign that Saltzer had some confidence that these
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principles have stood the test of time. We recommend reading the
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entire paper.
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.. admonition:: Further Reading
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Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder. `The Protection of Information
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J. Saltzer and M. Schroeder. `The Protection of Information
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in Computer Systems
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<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/index.html>`__. In
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tls.rst

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A. Langley *et al.*
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`The QUIC Transport Protocol: Design and Internet-Scale Deployment
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<https://research.google/pubs/the-quic-transport-protocol-design-and-internet-scale-deployment/>`__.
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SIGCOMM 2017.
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<https://doi.org/10.1145/3098822.3098842>`__.
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Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, August 2017.
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We also covered the impact of QUIC on congestion control in our book
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on TCP Congestion Control.
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`TCP Congestion Control: A Systems Approach <https://tcpcc.systemsapproach.org>`__.
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L. Peterson, L. Brakmo, and B. Davie, `TCP Congestion Control: A
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Systems Approach
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<https://tcpcc.systemsapproach.org/variants.html#http-performance-quic>`__.
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6.5 A Systems View of TLS

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