Seo Revamp (#1059)

Author: aravind33b

docs/api/overview.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ sidebar_position: 1
 title: Overview
 ---
 
-# Uniswap APIs
+## Uniswap APIs
 
 Welcome to the Uniswap API documentation. Uniswap provides several APIs and data sources to help developers integrate with and build on top of the Uniswap protocol.
 

docs/api/subgraph/guides/v3-subgraph-example.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: v3 Protocol Query Examples
 sidebar_position: 1
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-# Subgraph Query Examples
+## Subgraph Query Examples
 
 This doc will teach you how to query Uniswap v3 analytics by writing GraphQL queries on the subgraph. You can fetch data points like :
 

docs/api/subgraph/guides/v4-subgraph-example.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: v4 Protocol Query Examples
 sidebar_position: 2
 ---
 
-# Subgraph Query Examples
+## Subgraph Query Examples
 
 This doc will teach you how to query Uniswap v4 analytics by writing GraphQL queries on the subgraph. You can fetch data points like:
 

docs/api/subgraph/overview.md

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ sidebar_position: 1
 title: Overview
 ---
 
-# The Uniswap Subgraph
+## The Uniswap Subgraph
 
 Uniswap uses multiple [subgraphs](https://thegraph.com/docs/about/introduction#what-the-graph-is) for indexing and organizing data from the Uniswap smart contracts.
 These subgraphs are hosted on The Graph hosted service and can be used to query Uniswap data.
 
-## Versions and Production Endpoints
+### Versions and Production Endpoints
 
 Each version of Uniswap has its own dedicated subgraph, and governance contracts have a dedicated subgraph as well.
 

docs/api/subgraph/subgraphs-devs/intro.md

@@ -3,15 +3,15 @@ sidebar_position: 1
 title: Introduction
 ---
 
-# Uniswap V3 SubGraph Docs 
+## Uniswap V3 SubGraph Docs 
 Welcome to exploring the data of [**Uniswap**](https://uniswap.org/), the leading EVM DEX. The docs help you understand data structure in the **SubGraphs** deployed for the dex on the [graph protocol](https://thegraph.com/).
 
 If you're completely new to the working of the V3 protocol, would recommend going through the [references](#references) below.
 
 ## Uniswap Foundation
 The docs was possible as I recieved a grant from [Uniswap Foundation](https://uniswapfoundation.mirror.xyz/). The foundation publishes [grant wishlist for RFPs](https://uniswap.notion.site/Uniswap-Foundation-Grants-Wish-List-3be614ba4e504b5caeee7b0159e64a42) regularly if you wish to get involved.
 
-### Get In Touch
+## Get In Touch
 For any updates or additions, you can raise a PR to the [docs repo](https://github.com/vintageplayer/uniswap-v3-subgraph-docs).
 
 Feel free to reach out on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/artsofbaniya) to discuss about web3 or any field, or just to keep up with what I'm building.

docs/concepts/research.md

@@ -6,39 +6,39 @@ sidebar_position: 4
 
 The [Uniswap Foundation](https://www.uniswapfoundation.org/) supports the protocol's growth and decentralization through strategic research initiatives, empowering our community with grants and resources to conduct groundbreaking research and develop practical implementations that advance the frontier DeFi. Featured research from our community:
 
-# Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3
+## Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3
 
 Authors: Austin Adams
 
 > This research paper analyzes how cheaper and faster blockchain networks impact Uniswap v3's performance compared to Ethereum mainnet, revealing that reduced transaction costs lead to better gas-adjusted execution and more efficient capital deployment by liquidity providers. Faster block times and lower costs enable increased arbitrage activity, resulting in higher fee returns for liquidity providers, though there's evidence that 2-second block times may not be optimal compared to a first-come-first-served model. Evidence suggests that many current AMM limitations stem from blockchain constraints rather than protocol design, and these issues can be significantly improved through faster, cheaper transactions.
 
 - [Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3 [Mar 2024]](https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.09494)
 
-# Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?
+## Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?
 
 Authors: Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, Florian Matthes
 
 > The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To foster competition and preserve Ethereum's decentralized ethos and censorship-resistance properties, understanding the dominant players' competitive edges is essential. This identifies features that play a significant role in builders' ability to win blocks and earn profits by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis of MEV-Boost auctions over a six-month period. 
 
 - [Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why? [Jul 2024]](https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13931)
 
-# MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets
+## MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets
 
 Authors: Jonah Burian, Davide Crapis, Fahad Saleh
 
 > Provides an economic model of Execution Tickets and uses it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction, demonstrating that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital. We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market.
 
 - [MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets [Aug 2024]](https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.11255)
 
-# What Drives Liquidity on Decentralized Exchanges? Evidence from the Uniswap Protocol
+## What Drives Liquidity on Decentralized Exchanges? Evidence from the Uniswap Protocol
 
 Authors: Alex Evans
 
 > Geometric mean market makers (G3Ms), such as Uniswap and Balancer, comprise a popular class of automated market makers (AMMs) defined by the following rule: the reserves of the AMM before and after each trade must have the same (weighted) geometric mean. This paper extends several results known for constant-weight G3Ms to the general case of G3Ms with time-varying and potentially stochastic weights. These results include the returns and no-arbitrage prices of liquidity pool (LP) shares that investors receive for supplying liquidity to G3Ms. Using these expressions, we show how to create G3Ms whose LP shares replicate the payoffs of financial derivatives. The resulting hedges are model-independent and exact for derivative contracts whose payoff functions satisfy an elasticity constraint. These strategies allow LP shares to replicate various trading strategies and financial contracts, including standard options. G3Ms are thus shown to be capable of recreating a variety of active trading strategies through passive positions in LP shares.
 
 - [What Drives Liquidity on Decentralized Exchanges? Evidence from the Uniswap Protocol [Oct 2024]](https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.19107)
 
-# The Evolution of Decentralized Exchange: Risks, Benefits, and Oversight
+## The Evolution of Decentralized Exchange: Risks, Benefits, and Oversight
 
 Authors: Campbell R. Harvey, Joel Hasbrouck, Fahad Saleh
 
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Authors: Campbell R. Harvey, Joel Hasbrouck, Fahad Saleh
 - [The Evolution of Decentralized Exchange: Risks, Benefits, and Oversight [Oct 2024]](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4861942)
 
 
-# Research Initiatives: Get Involved
+## Research Initiatives: Get Involved
 
 - [TLDR (The Latest in DeFi Research):](https://www.thelatestindefi.org/) empowers engineers, academics, and students through research fellowships with grants and expert mentorship, culminating in an annual conference to showcase groundbreaking work.
 

docs/contracts/the-compact/overview.md

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ title: Overview
 sidebar_position: 1
 ---
 
-# The Compact
-
 [The Compact 🤝](https://github.com/Uniswap/the-compact) is an ownerless ERC6909 contract that facilitates the voluntary formation and mediation of reusable **resource locks**. It enables tokens to be credibly committed to be spent in exchange for performing actions across arbitrary, asynchronous environments, and claimed once the specified conditions have been met.
 
 ## Key Components

docs/contracts/the-compact/reference/allocators.md

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ title: Allocators
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-# Allocators
-
 Allocators are crucial infrastructure components in The Compact protocol that ensure resource lock integrity and prevent double-spending.
 
 ## Role and Responsibilities

docs/contracts/the-compact/reference/arbiters.md

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ title: Arbiters
 sidebar_position: 5
 ---
 
-# Arbiters
-
 Arbiters are entities responsible for verifying and submitting claims against resource locks in The Compact protocol. When a sponsor creates a compact, they assign an arbiter per chain. That arbiter is the sole account that can trigger a claim against the compact on the respective chain and determines which accounts receive the locked balances and in what amounts.
 
 ## Role and Responsibilities

docs/contracts/the-compact/reference/compacts-eip712.md

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ title: Compacts & EIP-712
 sidebar_position: 2
 ---
 
-# Compacts & EIP-712
-
 A **compact** is an agreement created by a sponsor that allows their locked resources to be claimed under specified conditions. The Compact protocol uses EIP-712 typed structured data for creating and verifying signatures for these agreements.
 
 ## Compact Types