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Anonymous: Add configurable device limit #10
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base: enhance-anonymous-access
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Anonymous: Add configurable device limit #10
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* Anonymous: Add device limiter * break auth if limit reached * fix typo * refactored const to make it clearer with expiration * anon device limit for config --------- Co-authored-by: Eric Leijonmarck <[email protected]>
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@claude review this PR |
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@claude review this PR |
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Claude finished @akshayutture-augment's task —— View job PR Review Complete ✓SummaryThis PR adds a configurable device limit feature for anonymous access in Grafana. The implementation allows administrators to cap the number of anonymous devices that can be tracked, preventing unlimited device registration while still allowing existing devices to update their information. Critical Issues🔴 Race Condition in Device Limit CheckLocation: The if s.deviceLimit > 0 {
count, err := s.CountDevices(ctx, time.Now().UTC().Add(-anonymousDeviceExpiration), time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Minute))
if err != nil {
return err
}
if count >= s.deviceLimit {
return s.updateDevice(ctx, device)
}
}
// Between here, another goroutine could insert a device
// Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilityImpact: Multiple concurrent requests can bypass the device limit if they all check the count before any of them insert. For example, if the limit is 100 and current count is 99, 10 concurrent requests could all see count=99 and all proceed to insert, resulting in 109 devices. Recommendation: Wrap the count check and insert in a database transaction, or use a database-level constraint/lock to enforce the limit atomically. 🟡 Inconsistent Error Handling in Authentication FlowLocation: When if err := a.anonDeviceService.TagDevice(ctx, httpReqCopy, anonymous.AnonDeviceUI); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, anonstore.ErrDeviceLimitReached) {
return nil, err // Authentication fails, but error message may be unclear
}
a.log.Warn("Failed to tag anonymous session", "error", err)
}Recommendation: Consider wrapping the error with more user-friendly context, or handling it differently to provide clearer feedback to users that the anonymous device limit has been reached. 🟡 Missing CreatedAt in updateDeviceLocation: The anonDevice := &Device{
DeviceID: "32mdo31deeqwes",
ClientIP: "10.30.30.2",
UserAgent: "test",
UpdatedAt: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
// CreatedAt is missing - will be zero value
}Impact: Tests pass with zero Recommendation: Ensure Code Quality Issues🔵 Redundant Time ArithmeticLocation: The code adds one minute to count, err := s.CountDevices(ctx, time.Now().UTC().Add(-anonymousDeviceExpiration), time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Minute))This pattern appears throughout the codebase. While the comment at 🔵 Magic Number in Time WindowLocation: device.UpdatedAt.UTC().Add(-anonymousDeviceExpiration), device.UpdatedAt.UTC().Add(time.Minute)The 🔵 Potential Performance IssueLocation: Every device creation checks the total count when the limit is enabled: if s.deviceLimit > 0 {
count, err := s.CountDevices(ctx, ...) // Full table scan on every requestImpact: This adds a Recommendation: Consider using caching with invalidation, or implementing a more efficient approach like a materialized view or periodic count updates. Security Considerations✅ SQL Injection ProtectionThe code properly uses parameterized queries throughout, protecting against SQL injection. ✅ Input ValidationDevice IDs and other inputs appear to be handled safely through the ORM layer.
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Test 1
Replicated from ai-code-review-evaluation/grafana-greptile#1