+* The `aws:PrincipalOrgID` condition key is included in the request context only if the calling principal is a member of an organization. This is not the case with federated users; therefore, `sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML` and `sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` are not listed in the `Action` element of the policy statement `"Sid": "EnforceOrgIdentities"`. `sts:SetSourceIdentity` and `sts:TagSession` are also not included to prevent impact on `sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML` and `sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` that [set a source identity]( https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_control-access_monitor.html#id_credentials_temp_control-access_monitor-setup) or [pass session tags]( https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html#id_session-tags_operations). We recommend using the `"Sid":"EnforceTrustedOIDCProviders"` and `"Sid":"EnforceTrustedOIDCTenants` statements to help prevent requests from untrusted OpenID Connect (OIDC) tenants. To help ensure that only your trusted identity providers can be used for SAML federation, limit your principals’ ability to make configuration changes to the IAM SAML identity providers (see`"Sid":"PreventIdPTrustModifications"` in the [restrict_idp_configurations_scp](../service_control_policies/service_specific_controls/restrict_idp_configurations_scp.json)).<br /><br /> Another STS action, `sts:GetCallerIdentity`, is not included in this statement because [no permissions are required to perform this operation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html).
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