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| 1 | +// Copyright (c) 2019 The Bitcoin Core developers |
| 2 | +// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying |
| 3 | +// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +#include <crypto/chacha_poly_aead.h> |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +#include <crypto/common.h> |
| 8 | +#include <crypto/poly1305.h> |
| 9 | +#include <support/cleanse.h> |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +#include <assert.h> |
| 12 | +#include <string.h> |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +#include <cstdio> |
| 15 | +#include <limits> |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | +int timingsafe_bcmp(const unsigned char* b1, const unsigned char* b2, size_t n) |
| 20 | +{ |
| 21 | + const unsigned char *p1 = b1, *p2 = b2; |
| 22 | + int ret = 0; |
| 23 | + |
| 24 | + for (; n > 0; n--) |
| 25 | + ret |= *p1++ ^ *p2++; |
| 26 | + return (ret != 0); |
| 27 | +} |
| 28 | + |
| 29 | +#endif // TIMINGSAFE_BCMP |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | +ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD::ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD(const unsigned char* K_1, size_t K_1_len, const unsigned char* K_2, size_t K_2_len) |
| 32 | +{ |
| 33 | + assert(K_1_len == CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_KEY_LEN); |
| 34 | + assert(K_2_len == CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_KEY_LEN); |
| 35 | + m_chacha_main.SetKey(K_1, CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_KEY_LEN); |
| 36 | + m_chacha_header.SetKey(K_2, CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_KEY_LEN); |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | + // set the cached sequence number to uint64 max which hints for an unset cache. |
| 39 | + // we can't hit uint64 max since the rekey rule (which resets the sequence number) is 1GB |
| 40 | + m_cached_aad_seqnr = std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(); |
| 41 | +} |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +bool ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD::Crypt(uint64_t seqnr_payload, uint64_t seqnr_aad, int aad_pos, unsigned char* dest, size_t dest_len /* length of the output buffer for sanity checks */, const unsigned char* src, size_t src_len, bool is_encrypt) |
| 44 | +{ |
| 45 | + // check buffer boundaries |
| 46 | + if ( |
| 47 | + // if we encrypt, make sure the source contains at least the expected AAD and the destination has at least space for the source + MAC |
| 48 | + (is_encrypt && (src_len < CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AAD_LEN || dest_len < src_len + POLY1305_TAGLEN)) || |
| 49 | + // if we decrypt, make sure the source contains at least the expected AAD+MAC and the destination has at least space for the source - MAC |
| 50 | + (!is_encrypt && (src_len < CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AAD_LEN + POLY1305_TAGLEN || dest_len < src_len - POLY1305_TAGLEN))) { |
| 51 | + return false; |
| 52 | + } |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | + unsigned char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]; |
| 55 | + memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key)); |
| 56 | + m_chacha_main.SetIV(seqnr_payload); |
| 57 | + |
| 58 | + // block counter 0 for the poly1305 key |
| 59 | + // use lower 32bytes for the poly1305 key |
| 60 | + // (throws away 32 unused bytes (upper 32) from this ChaCha20 round) |
| 61 | + m_chacha_main.Seek(0); |
| 62 | + m_chacha_main.Crypt(poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | + // if decrypting, verify the tag prior to decryption |
| 65 | + if (!is_encrypt) { |
| 66 | + const unsigned char* tag = src + src_len - POLY1305_TAGLEN; |
| 67 | + poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, src_len - POLY1305_TAGLEN, poly_key); |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | + // constant time compare the calculated MAC with the provided MAC |
| 70 | + if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) { |
| 71 | + memory_cleanse(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)); |
| 72 | + memory_cleanse(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); |
| 73 | + return false; |
| 74 | + } |
| 75 | + memory_cleanse(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)); |
| 76 | + // MAC has been successfully verified, make sure we don't covert it in decryption |
| 77 | + src_len -= POLY1305_TAGLEN; |
| 78 | + } |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | + // calculate and cache the next 64byte keystream block if requested sequence number is not yet the cache |
| 81 | + if (m_cached_aad_seqnr != seqnr_aad) { |
| 82 | + m_cached_aad_seqnr = seqnr_aad; |
| 83 | + m_chacha_header.SetIV(seqnr_aad); |
| 84 | + m_chacha_header.Seek(0); |
| 85 | + m_chacha_header.Keystream(m_aad_keystream_buffer, CHACHA20_ROUND_OUTPUT); |
| 86 | + } |
| 87 | + // crypt the AAD (3 bytes message length) with given position in AAD cipher instance keystream |
| 88 | + dest[0] = src[0] ^ m_aad_keystream_buffer[aad_pos]; |
| 89 | + dest[1] = src[1] ^ m_aad_keystream_buffer[aad_pos + 1]; |
| 90 | + dest[2] = src[2] ^ m_aad_keystream_buffer[aad_pos + 2]; |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | + // Set the playload ChaCha instance block counter to 1 and crypt the payload |
| 93 | + m_chacha_main.Seek(1); |
| 94 | + m_chacha_main.Crypt(src + CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AAD_LEN, dest + CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AAD_LEN, src_len - CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AAD_LEN); |
| 95 | + |
| 96 | + // If encrypting, calculate and append tag |
| 97 | + if (is_encrypt) { |
| 98 | + // the poly1305 tag expands over the AAD (3 bytes length) & encrypted payload |
| 99 | + poly1305_auth(dest + src_len, dest, src_len, poly_key); |
| 100 | + } |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | + // cleanse no longer required MAC and polykey |
| 103 | + memory_cleanse(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); |
| 104 | + return true; |
| 105 | +} |
| 106 | + |
| 107 | +bool ChaCha20Poly1305AEAD::GetLength(uint32_t* len24_out, uint64_t seqnr_aad, int aad_pos, const uint8_t* ciphertext) |
| 108 | +{ |
| 109 | + // enforce valid aad position to avoid accessing outside of the 64byte keystream cache |
| 110 | + // (there is space for 21 times 3 bytes) |
| 111 | + assert(aad_pos >= 0 && aad_pos < CHACHA20_ROUND_OUTPUT - CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AAD_LEN); |
| 112 | + if (m_cached_aad_seqnr != seqnr_aad) { |
| 113 | + // we need to calculate the 64 keystream bytes since we reached a new aad sequence number |
| 114 | + m_cached_aad_seqnr = seqnr_aad; |
| 115 | + m_chacha_header.SetIV(seqnr_aad); // use LE for the nonce |
| 116 | + m_chacha_header.Seek(0); // block counter 0 |
| 117 | + m_chacha_header.Keystream(m_aad_keystream_buffer, CHACHA20_ROUND_OUTPUT); // write keystream to the cache |
| 118 | + } |
| 119 | + |
| 120 | + // decrypt the ciphertext length by XORing the right position of the 64byte keystream cache with the ciphertext |
| 121 | + *len24_out = (ciphertext[0] ^ m_aad_keystream_buffer[aad_pos + 0]) | |
| 122 | + (ciphertext[1] ^ m_aad_keystream_buffer[aad_pos + 1]) << 8 | |
| 123 | + (ciphertext[2] ^ m_aad_keystream_buffer[aad_pos + 2]) << 16; |
| 124 | + |
| 125 | + return true; |
| 126 | +} |
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