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Merge pull request bitcoin#1619 from real-or-random/patch-20
bip-0327: Remove obsolete paragraph
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bip-0327.mediawiki

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@@ -190,9 +190,6 @@ The aggregate public key can be ''tweaked'', which modifies the key as defined i
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In order to apply a tweak, the KeyAgg Context output by ''KeyAgg'' is provided to the ''ApplyTweak'' algorithm with the ''is_xonly_t'' argument set to false for plain tweaking and true for X-only tweaking.
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The resulting KeyAgg Context can be used to apply another tweak with ''ApplyTweak'' or obtain the aggregate public key with ''GetXonlyPubkey'' or ''GetPlainPubkey''.
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In addition to individual public keys, the ''KeyAgg'' algorithm accepts tweaks, which modify the aggregate public key as defined in the [[#tweaking-definition|Tweaking Definition]] subsection.
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For example, if ''KeyAgg'' is run with ''v = 2'', ''is_xonly_t<sub>1</sub> = false'', ''is_xonly_t<sub>2</sub> = true'', then the aggregate key is first plain tweaked with ''tweak<sub>1</sub>'' and then X-only tweaked with ''tweak<sub>2</sub>''.
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The purpose of supporting tweaking is to ensure compatibility with existing uses of tweaking, i.e., that the result of signing is a valid signature for the tweaked public key.
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The MuSig2 algorithms take arbitrary tweaks as input but accepting arbitrary tweaks may negatively affect the security of the scheme.<ref>It is an open question whether allowing arbitrary tweaks from an adversary affects the unforgeability of MuSig2.</ref>
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Instead, signers should obtain the tweaks according to other specifications.

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