bip8: remove recommendation to force activation after a year

Signed-off-by: Antoine Poinsot <[email protected]>

Author: darosior

bip-0008.mediawiki

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "S
 
 ==Motivation==
 
-BIP9 introduced a mechanism for doing parallel soft forking deployments based on repurposing the block nVersion field. Activation is dependent on near unanimous hashrate signalling which may be impractical and result in veto by a small minority of non-signalling hashrate. Super majority hashrate based activation triggers allow for accelerated activation where the majority hash power enforces the new rules in lieu of full nodes upgrading. Since all consensus rules are ultimately enforced by full nodes, eventually any new soft fork will be enforced by the economy. This proposal combines these two aspects to provide eventual flag day activation after a reasonable time (recommended a year), as well as for accelerated activation by majority of hash rate before the flag date.
+BIP9 introduced a mechanism for doing parallel soft forking deployments based on repurposing the block nVersion field. Activation is dependent on near unanimous hashrate signalling which may be impractical and result in veto by a small minority of non-signalling hashrate. Super majority hashrate based activation triggers allow for accelerated activation where the majority hash power enforces the new rules in lieu of full nodes upgrading. Since all consensus rules are ultimately enforced by full nodes, eventually any new soft fork will be enforced by the economy. This proposal combines these two aspects to provide eventual flag day activation after a reasonable time, as well as for accelerated activation by majority of hash rate before the flag date.
 
 Due to using timestamps rather than block heights, it was found to be a risk that a sudden loss of significant hashrate could interfere with a late activation.