Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#26149: Fix assert failure in miniscript string parsing

648f695 Correct sanity-checking script_size calculation (Pieter Wuille)

Pull request description:

  Fix a bug in the script_size sanity-check in the miniscript string parser, found by oss-fuzz in https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=51636, and introduced in e8cc2e4 (#25540).

  This bug would cause an assertion failure when feeding a miniscript with a `thresh(k,...)` fragment, with k >= 128, to an RPC.

ACKs for top commit:
  darosior:
    utACK 648f695
  achow101:
    ACK 648f695

Tree-SHA512: d86a0721758cd1e42ef02050b542f0935efdc19447a1ca76a3ade96352a6ee8261eef3d4a5cbdec77bf0ad14dfed42e9eb6bd4246b816a9f6f06d786900da9e7

Author: achow101

src/script/miniscript.h

@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ inline NodeRef<Key> Parse(Span<const char> in, const Ctx& ctx)
                 // n = 1 here because we read the first WRAPPED_EXPR before reaching THRESH
                 to_parse.emplace_back(ParseContext::THRESH, 1, k);
                 to_parse.emplace_back(ParseContext::WRAPPED_EXPR, -1, -1);
-                script_size += 2 + (k > 16);
+                script_size += 2 + (k > 16) + (k > 0x7f) + (k > 0x7fff) + (k > 0x7fffff);
             } else if (Const("andor(", in)) {
                 to_parse.emplace_back(ParseContext::ANDOR, -1, -1);
                 to_parse.emplace_back(ParseContext::CLOSE_BRACKET, -1, -1);