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Merge pull request github#6975 from atorralba/atorralba/android-intent-uri-permission-manipulation
Java: CWE-266 - Query to detect Intent URI Permission Manipulation in Android applications
2 parents b230681 + 3957ebe commit 29e87b3

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‎java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/android/Android.qll

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@@ -67,6 +67,14 @@ class AndroidActivity extends ExportableAndroidComponent {
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AndroidActivity() { getASuperTypeStar(this).hasQualifiedName("android.app", "Activity") }
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}
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/** The method `setResult` of the class `android.app.Activity`. */
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class ActivitySetResultMethod extends Method {
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ActivitySetResultMethod() {
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this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("android.app", "Activity") and
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this.hasName("setResult")
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}
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}
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/** An Android service. */
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class AndroidService extends ExportableAndroidComponent {
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AndroidService() { getASuperTypeStar(this).hasQualifiedName("android.app", "Service") }

‎java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/android/Intent.qll

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@@ -148,6 +148,31 @@ predicate allowIntentExtrasImplicitRead(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::Content c
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)
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}
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/**
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* The fields to grant URI permissions of the class `android.content.Intent`:
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*
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* - `Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION`
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* - `Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION`
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* - `Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PERSISTABLE_URI_PERMISSION`
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* - `Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PREFIX_URI_PERMISSION`
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*/
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class GrantUriPermissionFlag extends Field {
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GrantUriPermissionFlag() {
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this.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeIntent and
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this.getName().matches("FLAG_GRANT_%_URI_PERMISSION")
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}
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}
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/** The field `Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION`. */
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class GrantReadUriPermissionFlag extends GrantUriPermissionFlag {
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GrantReadUriPermissionFlag() { this.hasName("FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION") }
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}
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/** The field `Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION`. */
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class GrantWriteUriPermissionFlag extends GrantUriPermissionFlag {
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GrantWriteUriPermissionFlag() { this.hasName("FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION") }
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}
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private class IntentBundleFlowSteps extends SummaryModelCsv {
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override predicate row(string row) {
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row =

‎java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/IntentUriPermissionManipulation.qll

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/**
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* Provides classes and predicates to reason about Intent URI permission manipulation
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* vulnerabilities on Android.
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*/
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import java
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private import semmle.code.java.controlflow.Guards
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private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
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private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Android
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Intent
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/**
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* A sink for Intent URI permission manipulation vulnerabilities in Android,
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* that is, method calls that return an Intent as the result of an Activity.
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*/
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abstract class IntentUriPermissionManipulationSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/**
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* A sanitizer that makes sure that an Intent is safe to be returned to another Activity.
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*
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* Usually, this is done by setting the Intent's data URI and/or its flags to safe values.
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*/
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abstract class IntentUriPermissionManipulationSanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/**
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* A guard that makes sure that an Intent is safe to be returned to another Activity.
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*
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* Usually, this is done by checking that the Intent's data URI and/or its flags contain
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* expected values.
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*/
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abstract class IntentUriPermissionManipulationGuard extends DataFlow::BarrierGuard { }
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/**
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* An additional taint step for flows related to Intent URI permission manipulation
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* vulnerabilities.
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*/
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class IntentUriPermissionManipulationAdditionalTaintStep extends Unit {
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/**
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* Holds if the step from `node1` to `node2` should be considered a taint
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* step for flows related to Intent URI permission manipulation vulnerabilities.
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*/
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abstract predicate step(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2);
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}
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private class DefaultIntentUriPermissionManipulationSink extends IntentUriPermissionManipulationSink {
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DefaultIntentUriPermissionManipulationSink() {
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exists(MethodAccess ma | ma.getMethod() instanceof ActivitySetResultMethod |
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ma.getArgument(1) = this.asExpr()
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Sanitizer that prevents access to arbitrary content providers by modifying the Intent in one of
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* the following ways:
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* * Removing the flags `FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION` and `FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION`.
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* * Setting the flags to a combination that doesn't include `FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION` or
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* `FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION`.
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* * Replacing the data URI.
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*/
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private class IntentFlagsOrDataChangedSanitizer extends IntentUriPermissionManipulationSanitizer {
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IntentFlagsOrDataChangedSanitizer() {
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exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m |
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ma.getMethod() = m and
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m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeIntent and
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this.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier()
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|
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m.hasName("removeFlags") and
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bitwiseLocalTaintStep*(DataFlow::exprNode(any(GrantReadUriPermissionFlag f).getAnAccess()),
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DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(0))) and
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bitwiseLocalTaintStep*(DataFlow::exprNode(any(GrantWriteUriPermissionFlag f).getAnAccess()),
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DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(0)))
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or
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m.hasName("setFlags") and
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not bitwiseLocalTaintStep*(DataFlow::exprNode(any(GrantUriPermissionFlag f).getAnAccess()),
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DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(0)))
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or
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m.hasName("setData")
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A guard that checks an Intent's flags or data URI to make sure they are trusted.
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* It matches the following patterns:
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*
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* ```java
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* if (intent.getData().equals("trustedValue")) {}
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*
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* if (intent.getFlags() & Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION == 0 &&
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* intent.getFlags() & Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION == 0) {}
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*
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* if (intent.getFlags() & Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION != 0 ||
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* intent.getFlags() & Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION != 0) {}
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* ```
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*/
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private class IntentFlagsOrDataCheckedGuard extends IntentUriPermissionManipulationGuard {
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Expr condition;
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IntentFlagsOrDataCheckedGuard() { intentFlagsOrDataChecked(this, _, _) }
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override predicate checks(Expr e, boolean branch) { intentFlagsOrDataChecked(this, e, branch) }
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}
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/**
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* Holds if `g` checks `intent` when the result of an `intent.getFlags` or `intent.getData` call
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* is equality-tested.
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*/
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private predicate intentFlagsOrDataChecked(Guard g, Expr intent, boolean branch) {
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exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m, Expr checkedValue |
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ma.getQualifier() = intent and
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ma.getMethod() = m and
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m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeIntent and
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m.hasName(["getFlags", "getData"]) and
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bitwiseLocalTaintStep*(DataFlow::exprNode(ma), DataFlow::exprNode(checkedValue))
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|
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bitwiseCheck(g, branch) and
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checkedValue = g.(EqualityTest).getAnOperand().(AndBitwiseExpr)
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or
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g.(MethodAccess).getMethod() instanceof EqualsMethod and
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branch = true and
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checkedValue = [g.(MethodAccess).getArgument(0), g.(MethodAccess).getQualifier()]
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)
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}
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/**
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* Holds if `g` is a bitwise check. `branch` is `true` when the expected value is `0`
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* and `false` otherwise.
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*/
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private predicate bitwiseCheck(Guard g, boolean branch) {
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exists(CompileTimeConstantExpr operand | operand = g.(EqualityTest).getAnOperand() |
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if operand.getIntValue() = 0
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then g.(EqualityTest).polarity() = branch
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else g.(EqualityTest).polarity().booleanNot() = branch
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)
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}
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/**
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* Holds if taint can flow from `source` to `sink` in one local step,
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* including bitwise operations.
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*/
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private predicate bitwiseLocalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink) {
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TaintTracking::localTaintStep(source, sink) or
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source.asExpr() = sink.asExpr().(BitwiseExpr).(BinaryExpr).getAnOperand()
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}

‎java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/IntentUriPermissionManipulationQuery.qll

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/**
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* Provides taint tracking configurations to be used in queries related to Intent URI permission
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* manipulation in Android.
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*/
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import java
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private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
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private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
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private import IntentUriPermissionManipulation
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/**
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* A taint tracking configuration for user-provided Intents being returned to third party apps.
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*/
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class IntentUriPermissionManipulationConf extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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IntentUriPermissionManipulationConf() { this = "UriPermissionManipulationConf" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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sink instanceof IntentUriPermissionManipulationSink
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node barrier) {
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barrier instanceof IntentUriPermissionManipulationSanitizer
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}
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override predicate isSanitizerGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuard guard) {
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guard instanceof IntentUriPermissionManipulationGuard
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}
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
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any(IntentUriPermissionManipulationAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
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}
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}

‎java/ql/lib/semmle/code/xml/AndroidManifest.qll

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@@ -74,6 +74,13 @@ class AndroidReceiverXmlElement extends AndroidComponentXmlElement {
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AndroidReceiverXmlElement() { this.getName() = "receiver" }
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}
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/**
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* An XML attribute with the `android:` prefix.
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*/
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class AndroidXmlAttribute extends XMLAttribute {
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AndroidXmlAttribute() { this.getNamespace().getPrefix() = "android" }
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}
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/**
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* A `<provider>` element in an Android manifest file.
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*/
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this.getAnAttribute().(AndroidPermissionXmlAttribute).isWrite() and
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this.getAnAttribute().(AndroidPermissionXmlAttribute).isRead()
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}
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predicate grantsUriPermissions() {
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exists(AndroidXmlAttribute attr |
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this.getAnAttribute() = attr and
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attr.getName() = "grantUriPermissions" and
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attr.getValue() = "true"
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)
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}
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}
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/**

‎java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-266/IntentUriPermissionManipulation.java

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public class IntentUriPermissionManipulation extends Activity {
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// BAD: the user-provided Intent is returned as-is
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public void dangerous() {
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Intent intent = getIntent();
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intent.putExtra("result", "resultData");
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setResult(intent);
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}
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// GOOD: a new Intent is created and returned
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public void safe() {
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Intent intent = new Intent();
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intent.putExtra("result", "resultData");
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setResult(intent);
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}
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// GOOD: the user-provided Intent is sanitized before being returned
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public void sanitized() {
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Intent intent = getIntent();
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intent.putExtra("result", "resultData");
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intent.removeFlags(
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Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION | Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION);
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setResult(intent);
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}
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}

‎java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-266/IntentUriPermissionManipulation.qhelp

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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
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"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
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"qhelp.dtd">
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<qhelp>
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<overview>
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<p>When an Android component expects a result from an Activity, <code>startActivityForResult</code> can be used.
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The started Activity can then use <code>setResult</code> to return the appropriate data to the calling component.</p>
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<p>If an Activity obtains the incoming, user-provided Intent and directly returns it via <code>setResult</code>
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without any checks, the application may be unintentionally giving arbitrary access to its content providers, even
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if they are not exported, as long as they are configured with the attribute <code>android:grantUriPermissions="true"</code>.
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This happens because the attacker adds the appropriate URI permission flags to the provided Intent, which take effect
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once the Intent is reflected back.</p>
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</overview>
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<recommendation>
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<p>Avoid returning user-provided or untrusted Intents via <code>setResult</code>. Use a new Intent instead.</p>
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<p>If it is required to use the received Intent, make sure that it does not contain URI permission flags, either
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by checking them with <code>Intent.getFlags</code> or removing them with <code>Intent.removeFlags</code>.</p>
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</recommendation>
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<example>
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<p>The following sample contains three examples. In the first example, a user-provided Intent is obtained and
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directly returned back with <code>setResult</code>, which is dangerous. In the second example, a new Intent
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is created to safely return the desired data. The third example shows how the obtained Intent can be sanitized
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by removing dangerous flags before using it to return data to the calling component.
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</p>
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<sample src="IntentUriPermissionManipulation.java" />
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</example>
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<references>
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<li>Google Help: <a href="https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9267555?hl=en">Remediation for Intent Redirection Vulnerability</a>.</li>
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</references>
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</qhelp>

‎java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-266/IntentUriPermissionManipulation.ql

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/**
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* @name Intent URI permission manipulation
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* @description Returning an externally provided Intent via 'setResult' may allow a malicious
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* application to access arbitrary content providers of the vulnerable application.
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 7.8
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* @precision high
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* @id java/android/intent-uri-permission-manipulation
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-266
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* external/cwe/cwe-926
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*/
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.security.IntentUriPermissionManipulationQuery
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
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where any(IntentUriPermissionManipulationConf c).hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
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"This Intent can be set with arbitrary flags from $@, " +
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"and used to give access to internal content providers.", source.getNode(), "this user input"

‎java/ql/src/change-notes/2021-10-27-android-intent-uri-permission-manipulation-query.md

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---
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category: newQuery
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---
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* A new query "Intent URI permission manipulation" (`java/android/intent-uri-permission-manipulation`) has been added.
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This query finds Android components that return unmodified, received Intents to the calling applications, which
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can provide unintended access to internal content providers of the victim application.

‎java/ql/test/library-tests/frameworks/android/content-provider/Safe.java

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import android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor;
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import android.os.RemoteException;
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// This Content Provider isn't exported, so there shouldn't be any flow
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// This content provider isn't exported, so there shouldn't be any flow
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public class Safe extends ContentProvider {
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void sink(Object o) {}

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