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| 1 | +# reviewdog/action-setup@v1 GitHub Action Compromise |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +In March 2025, security researchers discovered that the reviewdog/action-setup@v1 |
| 4 | +GitHub Action had been compromised. The attacker altered the v1 tag to point to a |
| 5 | +malicious commit between March 11 and later reverted it to conceal the compromise. |
| 6 | +Encoded payloads were embedded into the install.sh script and any running |
| 7 | +workflows using this Action would execute the malicious code. The code, when |
| 8 | +executed in CI pipelines, could dump workflow environment variables into logs, |
| 9 | +exposing them this way to anyone viewing the CI run. |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +## Impact |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +By redirecting the trusted @v1 tag to a malicious commit, the attacker caused |
| 14 | +workflows using this Action to execute injected code that printed environment |
| 15 | +variables and secrets into build logs. This could lead to the unintentional |
| 16 | +disclosure of access tokens, API keys, and credentials, particularly in public |
| 17 | +repositories where logs are accessible, undermining the confidentiality of |
| 18 | +automated build environments. |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +## Type of Compromise |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +This is a _Publishing Infrastructure_ type of compromise, as the attacker |
| 23 | +manipulated the Action's distributed version reference (Git tag) rather than its |
| 24 | +codebase or maintainer, abusing weaknesses in how automation components are |
| 25 | +published and trusted within GitHub's workflow ecosystem. |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | +## References |
| 28 | + |
| 29 | +- [New GitHub Action supply chain attack: reviewdog/action-setup](https://www.wiz.io/blog/new-github-action-supply-chain-attack-reviewdog-action-setup) |
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