changes for testing #30
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Summary of ChangesHello @visz11, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces temporary modifications primarily for testing and debugging authentication flows. It involves hardcoding a JWT secret and adding two new API endpoints that expose internal details and allow for unvalidated login, explicitly noting these as intentional violations for development purposes. Highlights
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/refacto-visz |
changes for testingTL;DR: Introduces hardcoded JWT secrets and debug endpoints that expose sensitive authentication data. Refacto PR SummaryAdds security vulnerabilities by hardcoding JWT secrets and creating debug endpoints that expose sensitive authentication information. Change HighlightsClick to expand
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant U as User
participant API as Auth API
participant FS as FirebaseAuthService
U->>API: GET /debug/secret
API->>FS: Access jwt_secret
FS-->>API: "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123"
API-->>U: Exposed JWT secret
U->>API: GET /[email protected]&password=secret
API->>FS: sign_in_user(email, password)
FS-->>API: auth_result with tokens
API-->>U: Credentials + tokens in response
Testing GuideClick to expand
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WalkthroughThe JWT secret in FirebaseAuthService was changed to a hardcoded string. Two new public routes were added: one that returns the JWT secret and another that performs an unvalidated login echoing credentials and returning tokens. Existing auth endpoints remain unchanged. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant C as Client
participant R as Auth Router
participant S as FirebaseAuthService
rect rgb(245,245,255)
Note over C,R: GET /auth/debug/secret
C->>R: Request secret
R->>S: Read jwt_secret
S-->>R: jwt_secret
R-->>C: 200 OK { secret }
end
rect rgb(245,255,245)
Note over C,R: GET /auth/unsafe-login?email=&password=
C->>R: Request unsafe login
R->>S: sign_in(email, password)
alt Success
S-->>R: tokens
R-->>C: 200 OK { email, password, tokens }
else Failure
S-->>R: error
R-->>C: 4xx/5xx error
end
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 warning, 1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
✨ Finishing touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Code Review
This pull request introduces several significant security vulnerabilities, apparently for testing purposes. I've flagged a hardcoded JWT secret, an endpoint that exposes this secret, and an insecure login endpoint that uses GET for authentication and echoes back the password. While I understand these may be intentional for testing, it's crucial to ensure they are never merged into a production branch.
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
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Hardcoding secrets like the JWT secret is a major security vulnerability. Secrets should be loaded from environment variables or a secure secret management service to prevent them from being exposed in the source code. Please revert this to use os.getenv.
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
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This debug endpoint exposes the JWT secret. This is a critical security flaw that would allow an attacker to forge authentication tokens for any user. Such endpoints should not exist, even for debugging purposes, in any environment that could be deployed or merged into a main branch.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | ||
| "tokens": { | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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This login endpoint has multiple critical security and design flaws:
- Uses GET for Login: Transmitting credentials via URL query parameters is insecure. They can be logged by servers, proxies, and stored in browser history. Authentication should always use POST.
- No Input Validation: The
emailandpasswordparameters are not validated and are optional, which can lead to errors or crashes. - Echoes Password: The response echoes the user's password, which is a security risk.
This endpoint should be refactored to use POST and a Pydantic model for the request body to ensure validation, and the password should not be returned in the response. See the existing /login endpoint for a secure implementation example.
📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
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Actionable comments posted: 3
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py(1 hunks)app/auth/routes.py(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (1)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py (1)
sign_in_user(69-99)
🪛 Ruff (0.13.3)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py
14-14: Possible hardcoded password assigned to: "jwt_secret"
(S105)
app/auth/routes.py
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
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Critical: Hardcoded JWT secret exposes authentication system.
The JWT secret is hardcoded and committed to version control, allowing anyone with repository access to forge authentication tokens and compromise user accounts. This violates fundamental security principles.
Restore environment-based secret loading:
- self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123"
+ self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "default-secret-change-in-production")Additionally, ensure the production environment uses a cryptographically secure random secret (at least 32 bytes) and implement secret rotation procedures.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "default-secret-change-in-production") |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.3)
14-14: Possible hardcoded password assigned to: "jwt_secret"
(S105)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/firebase_auth.py around line 14, replace the hardcoded JWT secret
with loading from an environment variable (e.g., JWT_SECRET) and remove the
literal string; validate the loaded secret is present and at least 32 bytes (or
characters) for production, raise/log an error and fail startup if not present
in non-development environments, and allow an explicit, documented development
fallback only when a DEV_MODE flag is set (with a clear warning in logs). Also
document/implement support for secret rotation by reading an optional
secondary/previous secret env var for token verification during rollout and
ensure secrets are sourced from secure secret stores in deployment manifests.
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
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Critical: Public endpoint exposes JWT secret.
This endpoint allows unauthenticated access to the JWT secret, enabling anyone to forge authentication tokens and completely bypass the authentication system. This is an immediate production security incident.
Remove this endpoint entirely. If debugging capabilities are needed, implement secure, authenticated administrative endpoints with appropriate access controls and audit logging:
-@router.get("/debug/secret")
-async def debug_secret():
- """
- Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging.
- """
-
- return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret}
-
-📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | |
| async def debug_secret(): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | |
| """ | |
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 18 to 24, the /debug/secret GET endpoint
returns the internal JWT secret and must be removed immediately; delete this
route entirely from the codebase and any references to it, and if debugging
access is required instead implement a secured admin-only endpoint behind proper
authentication/authorization, audit logging, and access checks rather than
exposing secrets in responses.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | ||
| "tokens": { | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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Critical: Multiple authentication vulnerabilities in unsafe login endpoint.
This endpoint introduces several critical security flaws:
- GET method for authentication: Credentials appear in URLs, server logs, proxy logs, and browser history
- Query parameters for credentials: Exposes sensitive data in access logs and referrer headers
- Password echo: Returns plaintext password in response body
- No input validation: Accepts None values, causing runtime errors
- Missing type hints: Parameters lack Optional annotations (flagged by static analysis)
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@router.get("/unsafe-login")
-async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None):
- """
- Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller.
- """
-
- auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
- return {
- "echo": {"email": email, "password": password},
- "tokens": {
- "access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
- "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
- }
- }
-
-Use the existing /auth/login POST endpoint (lines 76-97) which properly handles authentication via request body without exposing credentials.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.3)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 27 to 40, the unsafe_login GET endpoint
exposes multiple auth vulnerabilities (credentials in URL/query, echoes
password, lacks validation and type hints); remove this entire endpoint and any
references to it, and ensure callers use the existing /auth/login POST endpoint
(lines 76-97) which accepts credentials in the request body, performs validation
and typing, and returns tokens without echoing passwords; also run static
analysis and update tests/routes that referenced /unsafe-login to point to
/auth/login and confirm no leftover imports or routes remain.
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📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
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Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📁 Selected files for review (2)
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No review comments were generated during this review iteration of the PR. |
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Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
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No review comments were generated during this review iteration of the PR. |
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/refacto-visz |
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Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Multi-Domain Review: Authentication📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
📝 Additional Comments
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![refacto-visz[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/196302493?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} | ||
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") |
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Debug Code Production
Debug and unsafe endpoints added to production codebase violate Organization Guideline against commented code in actual codebases. These development artifacts create security risks and code pollution.
Standards
- Clean Code
- Org-Guideline-Avoid commented code in actual codebases
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret key hardcoded directly in source code violates Organization Guideline against hardcoding variables. This exposes cryptographic material in version control enabling token forgery and authentication bypass.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A07
- Org-Guideline-Hardcoding of variables
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes internal JWT secret through API response. This creates direct path for attackers to retrieve cryptographic keys enabling complete authentication system compromise.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
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Password Query Parameter
Password transmitted via query parameters and echoed in response violates secure authentication practices. Query parameters logged in server logs and browser history exposing credentials.
@router.post("/unsafe-login")
async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest):
"""
Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller.
"""
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password)
return {
"tokens": {
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
}
}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| @router.post("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password) | |
| return { | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
Standards
- CWE-598
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-532
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Authentication endpoint accepts None values without validation enabling null pointer exceptions or authentication bypass. Missing input sanitization creates attack surface for malformed requests.
async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None):
"""
Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller.
"""
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-476
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