diff --git a/.typos.toml b/.typos.toml
index 8ff6f5309d..8dc7e2d55b 100644
--- a/.typos.toml
+++ b/.typos.toml
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ ser = "ser"
 Atack = "Atack"
 Meni = "Meni"
 Ono = "Ono"
+Falke = "Falke"
 
 [files]
 extend-exclude = [
diff --git a/bip-0075.mediawiki b/bip-0075.mediawiki
index 5057206466..cdee7bbae8 100644
--- a/bip-0075.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0075.mediawiki
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ This BIP introduces version 1 of this protocol. All messages sent using these ba
 When initiating communication, the version field of the first message SHOULD be set to the highest version number the sender understands. All clients MUST be able to understand all version numbers less than the highest number they support. If a client receives a message with a version number higher than they understand, they MUST send the message back to the sender with a status code of 101 ("version too high") and the version field set to the highest version number the recipient understands. The sender must then resend the original message using the same version number returned by the recipient or abort.
 
 ===EncryptedProtocolMessage===
-The '''EncryptedProtocolMessage''' message is an encapsualting wrapper for any Payment Protocol message. It allows two-way, authenticated and encrypted communication of Payment Protocol messages in order to keep their contents secret. The message also includes a status code and status message that is used for error communication such that the protocol does not rely on transport-layer error handling.
+The '''EncryptedProtocolMessage''' message is an encapsulating wrapper for any Payment Protocol message. It allows two-way, authenticated and encrypted communication of Payment Protocol messages in order to keep their contents secret. The message also includes a status code and status message that is used for error communication such that the protocol does not rely on transport-layer error handling.
 <pre>
 message EncryptedProtocolMessage {
     required uint64 version = 1 [default = 1];
diff --git a/bip-0116.mediawiki b/bip-0116.mediawiki
index 70b340f575..eef752d366 100644
--- a/bip-0116.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0116.mediawiki
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ With Merkle commitments to policy these size and runtime limitations constrain t
 The MERKLEBRANCHVERIFY opcode uses fast Merkle hash trees as specified by BIP98[1] rather than the construct used by Satoshi for committing transactions to the block header as the later has a known vulnerability relating to duplicate entries that introduces a source of malleability to downstream protocols[4].
 A source of malleability in Merkle proofs could potentially lead to spend vulnerabilities in protocols that use MERKLEBRANCHVERIFY.
 For example, a compact 2-of-N policy could be written by using MERKLEBRANCHVERIFY to prove that two keys are extracted from the same tree, one at a time, then checking the proofs for bitwise equality to make sure the same entry wasn't used twice.
-With the vulnerable Merkle tree implementation there are privledged positions in unbalanced Merkle trees that allow multiple proofs to be constructed for the same, single entry.
+With the vulnerable Merkle tree implementation there are privileged positions in unbalanced Merkle trees that allow multiple proofs to be constructed for the same, single entry.
 
 BIP141 (Segregated Witness)[3] provides support for a powerful form of script upgrades called script versioning, which is able to achieve the sort of upgrades which would previously have been hard-forks.
 If script versioning were used for deployment then MERKLEBRANCHVERIFY could be written to consume its inputs, which would provide a small 2-byte savings for many anticipated use cases.
diff --git a/bip-0360/ref-impl/rust/docs/stack_element_size_performance_tests.adoc b/bip-0360/ref-impl/rust/docs/stack_element_size_performance_tests.adoc
index 4c7f786939..de315b2279 100644
--- a/bip-0360/ref-impl/rust/docs/stack_element_size_performance_tests.adoc
+++ b/bip-0360/ref-impl/rust/docs/stack_element_size_performance_tests.adoc
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ AddressSanitizer is a fast, compiler-based tool (available in GCC/Clang) for det
 
 ==== Results
 
-No memory errors or leaks were revealed by AddressSanetizer when running the `OP_SHA256` bench test for 30 minutes.
+No memory errors or leaks were revealed by AddressSanitizer when running the `OP_SHA256` bench test for 30 minutes.
 
 ==== Procedure