bpf: Make per_cpu_ptr return rdonly PTR_TO_MEM.

jira VULN-136
cve CVE-2022-0500
commit-author Hao Luo <[email protected]>
commit 34d3a78

Tag the return type of {per, this}_cpu_ptr with RDONLY_MEM. The
returned value of this pair of helpers is kernel object, which
can not be updated by bpf programs. Previously these two helpers
return PTR_OT_MEM for kernel objects of scalar type, which allows
one to directly modify the memory. Now with RDONLY_MEM tagging,
the verifier will reject programs that write into RDONLY_MEM.

Fixes: 63d9b80 ("bpf: Introducte bpf_this_cpu_ptr()")
Fixes: eaa6bcb ("bpf: Introduce bpf_per_cpu_ptr()")
Fixes: 4976b71 ("bpf: Introduce pseudo_btf_id")
	Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
	Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 34d3a78)
	Signed-off-by: Brett Mastbergen <[email protected]>

Author: bmastbergen

kernel/bpf/helpers.c

@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_per_cpu_ptr, const void *, ptr, u32, cpu)
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_per_cpu_ptr_proto = {
 	.func		= bpf_per_cpu_ptr,
 	.gpl_only	= false,
-	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL,
+	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RDONLY,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ BPF_CALL_1(bpf_this_cpu_ptr, const void *, percpu_ptr)
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_this_cpu_ptr_proto = {
 	.func		= bpf_this_cpu_ptr,
 	.gpl_only	= false,
-	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID,
+	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID | MEM_RDONLY,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID,
 };
 

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

@@ -4078,15 +4078,30 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
 			}
 		}
-	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM) {
+	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
+		bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
+
+		if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
+				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+
+		if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
+				regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+
 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
+
 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
 					      reg->mem_size, false);
-		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
+		if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem))
 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
 		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
@@ -6098,6 +6113,13 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
 		} else {
+			/* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
+			 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
+			 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
+			 * check_mem_access().
+			 */
+			ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
+
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
@@ -8883,7 +8905,7 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 
 		dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type;
-		switch (dst_reg->type) {
+		switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) {
 		case PTR_TO_MEM:
 			dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size;
 			break;
@@ -10981,7 +11003,7 @@ static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			err = -EINVAL;
 			goto err_put;
 		}
-		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM;
+		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
 		aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize;
 	} else {
 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;