From c30663fe69d22b28d8fb9e1ed103473a4f34e91f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 10:38:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/10] netfilter: validate user input for expected length jira VULN-37849 cve CVE-2024-35896 commit-author Eric Dumazet commit 0c83842df40f86e529db6842231154772c20edcc I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt") setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account before copying data. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238 CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8 Allocated by task 7238: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73 flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff) page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712 __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline] alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249 allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412 new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615 __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089 kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62 device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558 dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline] free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline] __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055 __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline] kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634 bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline] rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367 rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc >ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ^ ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404122051.2303764-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski (cherry picked from commit 0c83842df40f86e529db6842231154772c20edcc) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 6faf6b0042101..efacd565a4e35 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -1074,6 +1074,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) struct ebt_table_info *newinfo; struct ebt_replace tmp; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1337,6 +1339,8 @@ static int update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) { struct ebt_replace hlp; + if (len < sizeof(hlp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp))) return -EFAULT; @@ -2267,6 +2271,8 @@ static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, { struct compat_ebt_replace hlp; + if (len < sizeof(hlp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp))) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index e42c1901ad508..427b84840abe4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -955,6 +955,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct arpt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1253,6 +1255,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct arpt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 948a0af7b9c15..04cc519f147e0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1110,6 +1110,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ipt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1494,6 +1496,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ipt_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 37746545161d9..f4914f4a56c19 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1127,6 +1127,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ip6t_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -1503,6 +1505,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) void *loc_cpu_entry; struct ip6t_entry *iter; + if (len < sizeof(tmp)) + return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; From 8e4a57f132ae191c0de1cb209509aed181e743c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 10:41:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/10] net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init jira VULN-8957 cve CVE-2024-36883 commit-author Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni (cherry picked from commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index 5599863705a2c..d9f51834cccd3 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -68,12 +68,15 @@ DEFINE_COOKIE(net_cookie); static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { + unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs); + unsigned int generic_size; struct net_generic *ng; - unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]); + + generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]); ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (ng) - ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs; + ng->s.len = gen_ptrs; return ng; } @@ -1210,7 +1213,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list, if (error < 0) return error; *ops->id = error; - max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1); + /* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold + * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect + * net_alloc_generic. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1)); } error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops); if (error) { From 487b36db965fa7bc5de857833823aab0fec303fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 10:43:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/10] tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique(). jira VULN-8965 cve CVE-2024-36904 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima commit f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique() with nice analysis. Since commit ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance"), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket's sk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock. Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to reuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique() for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt. If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten and sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free somewhere else. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false. [0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0 RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0 R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84 R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0 FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80 RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0 R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 Fixes: ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/37a477a6-d39e-486b-9577-3463f655a6b7@allelesecurity.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501213145.62261-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski (cherry picked from commit f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 81974a8929060..4c5b39f36c727 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -151,6 +151,12 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp) if (tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp && (!twp || (reuse && time_after32(ktime_get_seconds(), tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp)))) { + /* inet_twsk_hashdance() sets sk_refcnt after putting twsk + * and releasing the bucket lock. + */ + if (unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sktw->sk_refcnt))) + return 0; + /* In case of repair and re-using TIME-WAIT sockets we still * want to be sure that it is safe as above but honor the * sequence numbers and time stamps set as part of the repair @@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp) tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent; tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp; } - sock_hold(sktw); + return 1; } From 00e80721703e69a247c20eee5039f272284f6812 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 10:44:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/10] drm/vmwgfx: Fix invalid reads in fence signaled events jira VULN-8969 cve CVE-2024-36960 commit-author Zack Rusin commit a37ef7613c00f2d72c8fc08bd83fb6cc76926c8c Correctly set the length of the drm_event to the size of the structure that's actually used. The length of the drm_event was set to the parent structure instead of to the drm_vmw_event_fence which is supposed to be read. drm_read uses the length parameter to copy the event to the user space thus resuling in oob reads. Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Fixes: 8b7de6aa8468 ("vmwgfx: Rework fence event action") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23566 Cc: David Airlie CC: Daniel Vetter Cc: Zack Rusin Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: # v3.4+ Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240425192748.1761522-1-zack.rusin@broadcom.com (cherry picked from commit a37ef7613c00f2d72c8fc08bd83fb6cc76926c8c) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c index 66cc35dc223e7..95344735d00e6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static int vmw_event_fence_action_create(struct drm_file *file_priv, } event->event.base.type = DRM_VMW_EVENT_FENCE_SIGNALED; - event->event.base.length = sizeof(*event); + event->event.base.length = sizeof(event->event); event->event.user_data = user_data; ret = drm_event_reserve_init(dev, file_priv, &event->base, &event->event.base); From 1fea47cd8c2958ac2d2ab6f61a4a3aef3717504e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 11:02:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/10] net: sched: sch_multiq: fix possible OOB write in multiq_tune() jira VULN-8977 cve CVE-2024-36978 commit-author Hangyu Hua commit affc18fdc694190ca7575b9a86632a73b9fe043d q->bands will be assigned to qopt->bands to execute subsequent code logic after kmalloc. So the old q->bands should not be used in kmalloc. Otherwise, an out-of-bounds write will occur. Fixes: c2999f7fb05b ("net: sched: multiq: don't call qdisc_put() while holding tree lock") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Acked-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller (cherry picked from commit affc18fdc694190ca7575b9a86632a73b9fe043d) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/sched/sch_multiq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_multiq.c b/net/sched/sch_multiq.c index cd8ab90c4765d..4b7435ac0b28a 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_multiq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_multiq.c @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int multiq_tune(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, qopt->bands = qdisc_dev(sch)->real_num_tx_queues; - removed = kmalloc(sizeof(*removed) * (q->max_bands - q->bands), + removed = kmalloc(sizeof(*removed) * (q->max_bands - qopt->bands), GFP_KERNEL); if (!removed) return -ENOMEM; From f8887dbe275907e99b53f1fb77c6fa1c75524126 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2025 11:54:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/10] locks: fix KASAN: use-after-free in trace_event_raw_event_filelock_lock jira VULN-8992 pre-cve CVE-2024-41049 commit-author Will Shiu commit 74f6f5912693ce454384eaeec48705646a21c74f As following backtrace, the struct file_lock request , in posix_lock_inode is free before ftrace function using. Replace the ftrace function ahead free flow could fix the use-after-free issue. [name:report&]=============================================== BUG:KASAN: use-after-free in trace_event_raw_event_filelock_lock+0x80/0x12c [name:report&]Read at addr f6ffff8025622620 by task NativeThread/16753 [name:report_hw_tags&]Pointer tag: [f6], memory tag: [fe] [name:report&] BT: Hardware name: MT6897 (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf8/0x148 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c print_report+0x2c8/0xa08 kasan_report+0xb0/0x120 __do_kernel_fault+0xc8/0x248 do_bad_area+0x30/0xdc do_tag_check_fault+0x1c/0x30 do_mem_abort+0x58/0xbc el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c el1h_64_sync_handler+0x54/0x90 el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c trace_event_raw_event_filelock_lock+0x80/0x12c posix_lock_inode+0xd0c/0xd60 do_lock_file_wait+0xb8/0x190 fcntl_setlk+0x2d8/0x440 ... [name:report&] [name:report&]Allocated by task 16752: ... slab_post_alloc_hook+0x74/0x340 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1b0/0x2f0 posix_lock_inode+0xb0/0xd60 ... [name:report&] [name:report&]Freed by task 16752: ... kmem_cache_free+0x274/0x5b0 locks_dispose_list+0x3c/0x148 posix_lock_inode+0xc40/0xd60 do_lock_file_wait+0xb8/0x190 fcntl_setlk+0x2d8/0x440 do_fcntl+0x150/0xc18 ... Signed-off-by: Will Shiu Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton (cherry picked from commit 74f6f5912693ce454384eaeec48705646a21c74f) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- fs/locks.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c index 0fca9d6809781..69a346d475193 100644 --- a/fs/locks.c +++ b/fs/locks.c @@ -1229,6 +1229,7 @@ static int posix_lock_inode(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *request, out: spin_unlock(&ctx->flc_lock); percpu_up_read(&file_rwsem); + trace_posix_lock_inode(inode, request, error); /* * Free any unused locks. */ @@ -1237,7 +1238,6 @@ static int posix_lock_inode(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *request, if (new_fl2) locks_free_lock(new_fl2); locks_dispose_list(&dispose); - trace_posix_lock_inode(inode, request, error); return error; } From 85b609480519c24f2f883a2611d2dbfe6b231c5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 11:22:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/10] tipc: Return non-zero value from tipc_udp_addr2str() on error jira VULN-9011 cve CVE-2024-42285 commit-author Shigeru Yoshida commit fa96c6baef1b5385e2f0c0677b32b3839e716076 tipc_udp_addr2str() should return non-zero value if the UDP media address is invalid. Otherwise, a buffer overflow access can occur in tipc_media_addr_printf(). Fix this by returning 1 on an invalid UDP media address. Fixes: d0f91938bede ("tipc: add ip/udp media type") Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller (cherry picked from commit fa96c6baef1b5385e2f0c0677b32b3839e716076) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/tipc/udp_media.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/udp_media.c b/net/tipc/udp_media.c index 84347d6c457aa..f771d23fe390e 100644 --- a/net/tipc/udp_media.c +++ b/net/tipc/udp_media.c @@ -135,8 +135,11 @@ static int tipc_udp_addr2str(struct tipc_media_addr *a, char *buf, int size) snprintf(buf, size, "%pI4:%u", &ua->ipv4, ntohs(ua->port)); else if (ntohs(ua->proto) == ETH_P_IPV6) snprintf(buf, size, "%pI6:%u", &ua->ipv6, ntohs(ua->port)); - else + else { pr_err("Invalid UDP media address\n"); + return 1; + } + return 0; } From c8f742f6a4a27458aa392672819440efd02ee820 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 12:36:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/10] mptcp: pm: Fix uaf in __timer_delete_sync jira VULN-9018 commit-author Edward Adam Davis commit b4cd80b0338945a94972ac3ed54f8338d2da2076 There are two paths to access mptcp_pm_del_add_timer, result in a race condition: CPU1 CPU2 ==== ==== net_rx_action napi_poll netlink_sendmsg __napi_poll netlink_unicast process_backlog netlink_unicast_kernel __netif_receive_skb genl_rcv __netif_receive_skb_one_core netlink_rcv_skb NF_HOOK genl_rcv_msg ip_local_deliver_finish genl_family_rcv_msg ip_protocol_deliver_rcu genl_family_rcv_msg_doit tcp_v4_rcv mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit tcp_v4_do_rcv mptcp_nl_remove_addrs_list tcp_rcv_established mptcp_pm_remove_addrs_and_subflows tcp_data_queue remove_anno_list_by_saddr mptcp_incoming_options mptcp_pm_del_add_timer mptcp_pm_del_add_timer kfree(entry) In remove_anno_list_by_saddr(running on CPU2), after leaving the critical zone protected by "pm.lock", the entry will be released, which leads to the occurrence of uaf in the mptcp_pm_del_add_timer(running on CPU1). Keeping a reference to add_timer inside the lock, and calling sk_stop_timer_sync() with this reference, instead of "entry->add_timer". Move list_del(&entry->list) to mptcp_pm_del_add_timer and inside the pm lock, do not directly access any members of the entry outside the pm lock, which can avoid similar "entry->x" uaf. Fixes: 00cfd77b9063 ("mptcp: retransmit ADD_ADDR when timeout") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f3a31fb909db9b2a5c4d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f3a31fb909db9b2a5c4d Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis Acked-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_7142963A37944B4A74EF76CD66EA3C253609@qq.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski (cherry picked from commit b4cd80b0338945a94972ac3ed54f8338d2da2076) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index 059017f1d70ff..69d42cbb18b8d 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -339,15 +339,21 @@ mptcp_pm_del_add_timer(struct mptcp_sock *msk, { struct mptcp_pm_add_entry *entry; struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)msk; + struct timer_list *add_timer = NULL; spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock); entry = mptcp_lookup_anno_list_by_saddr(msk, addr); - if (entry && (!check_id || entry->addr.id == addr->id)) + if (entry && (!check_id || entry->addr.id == addr->id)) { entry->retrans_times = ADD_ADDR_RETRANS_MAX; + add_timer = &entry->add_timer; + } + if (!check_id && entry) + list_del(&entry->list); spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock); - if (entry && (!check_id || entry->addr.id == addr->id)) - sk_stop_timer_sync(sk, &entry->add_timer); + /* no lock, because sk_stop_timer_sync() is calling del_timer_sync() */ + if (add_timer) + sk_stop_timer_sync(sk, add_timer); return entry; } @@ -1392,7 +1398,6 @@ static bool remove_anno_list_by_saddr(struct mptcp_sock *msk, entry = mptcp_pm_del_add_timer(msk, addr, false); if (entry) { - list_del(&entry->list); kfree(entry); return true; } From 814952db06f287e22804f1dd6f756b6f8e20f2d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brett Mastbergen Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 09:56:36 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/10] use hackathon check_kernel_commits --- .github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml b/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml index e95c4e904f8e4..4f5559c5d550e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs: - name: Download check_kernel_commits.py run: | curl -sL \ - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree-tools/mainline/check_kernel_commits.py \ + https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree-tools/hackathon-cve-check/check_kernel_commits.py \ -o check_kernel_commits.py chmod +x check_kernel_commits.py From de388fe35f0348d05abae5167b56e9de5195ccfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brett Mastbergen Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 10:16:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 10/10] add --check-cves --- .github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml b/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml index 4f5559c5d550e..80ee591c4d8b0 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/upstream-commit-check.yml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jobs: - name: Run upstream fixes check id: checkkernel run: | - python3 check_kernel_commits.py --repo . --pr_branch "${{ github.head_ref }}" --base_branch "${{ github.base_ref }}" --markdown | tee result.txt + python3 check_kernel_commits.py --repo . --pr_branch "${{ github.head_ref }}" --base_branch "${{ github.base_ref }}" --markdown --check-cves | tee result.txt # Save non-empty results for PR comment if grep -q -v "All referenced commits exist upstream and have no Fixes: tags." result.txt; then echo "has_findings=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT