Merge bitcoin#18990: log: Properly log txs rejected from mempool

fa9f20b log: Properly log txs rejected from mempool (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

  Currently `CheckTxInputs` rejections from the mempool are the only rejections that log directly and unconditionally to debug.log instead of leaving it to the caller. This has multiple issues:

  * A rejected RPC transaction will log a redundant failure reason to debug log. All other failures are merely reported to the RPC user.
  * A rejected p2p transaction will log the failure twice. Once with the `MEMPOOLREJ` flag, and once unconditionally.
  * A rejected orphan transaction will log no failure.

  Fix all issues by simply returning the state to the caller, like it is done for all other rejections.

  The patch includes whitespace fixups to highlight relevant parts of the codebase and simplify review.

ACKs for top commit:
  naumenkogs:
    utACK fa9f20b
  rajarshimaitra:
    Concept ACK. Compiled and ran tests. `fa9f20b`
  jnewbery:
    code review ACK fa9f20b

Tree-SHA512: 86cc17b2a9239c01c4fc3f254ad48ee1d3883266966b9811030176338b9ac3deaea7ea5babfb8bbf739d7440154e30011fede8f9313175f199d4a062af6494f7

Author: MarcoFalke

src/net_processing.cpp

@@ -2582,7 +2582,10 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set)
             break;
         } else if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
             if (state.IsInvalid()) {
-                LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "   invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString());
+                LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "   invalid orphan tx %s from peer=%d. %s\n",
+                    orphanHash.ToString(),
+                    orphan_it->second.fromPeer,
+                    state.ToString());
                 // Maybe punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
                 MaybePunishNodeForTx(orphan_it->second.fromPeer, state);
             }
@@ -3742,8 +3745,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(
         // peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught,
         // regardless of false positives.
 
-        if (state.IsInvalid())
-        {
+        if (state.IsInvalid()) {
             LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(),
                 pfrom.GetId(),
                 state.ToString());

src/validation.cpp

@@ -648,8 +648,9 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
     std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry>& entry = ws.m_entry;
     CAmount& nModifiedFees = ws.m_modified_fees;
 
-    if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state))
+    if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state)) {
         return false; // state filled in by CheckTransaction
+    }
 
     assert(std::addressof(::ChainstateActive()) == std::addressof(m_active_chainstate));
     if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(), m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()))
@@ -761,7 +762,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
 
     assert(std::addressof(g_chainman.m_blockman) == std::addressof(m_active_chainstate.m_blockman));
     if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, m_active_chainstate.m_blockman.GetSpendHeight(m_view), ws.m_base_fees)) {
-        return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), state.ToString());
+        return false; // state filled in by CheckTxInputs
     }
 
     // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs