Update rules based on review comments

Author: shashank-elastic

pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "detection_rules"
-version = "1.0.2"
+version = "1.0.3"
 description = "Detection Rules is the home for rules used by Elastic Security. This repository is used for the development, maintenance, testing, validation, and release of rules for Elastic Security’s Detection Engine."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.12"

rules/cross-platform/credential_access_cookies_chromium_browsers_debugging.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2020/12/21"
 integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
+min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/02/21"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -25,41 +27,6 @@ language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 max_signals = 33
 name = "Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging"
-note = """## Triage and analysis
-
-> **Disclaimer**:
-> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
-
-### Investigating Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging
-
-Chromium-based browsers support debugging features that allow developers to inspect and modify web applications. Adversaries can exploit these features to access session cookies, enabling unauthorized access to web services. The detection rule identifies suspicious browser processes using debugging arguments, which may indicate cookie theft attempts, by monitoring specific process names and arguments across different operating systems.
-
-### Possible investigation steps
-
-- Review the process details to confirm the presence of suspicious debugging arguments such as "--remote-debugging-port=*", "--remote-debugging-targets=*", or "--remote-debugging-pipe=*". Check if these arguments were used in conjunction with "--user-data-dir=*" and ensure "--remote-debugging-port=0" is not present.
-- Identify the user account associated with the suspicious browser process to determine if it aligns with expected behavior or if it might be compromised.
-- Investigate the source IP address and network activity associated with the process to identify any unusual or unauthorized access patterns.
-- Check for any recent changes or anomalies in the user's account activity, such as unexpected logins or access to sensitive applications.
-- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs to identify if this activity is part of a broader attack pattern or campaign.
-- If possible, capture and analyze the network traffic associated with the process to detect any data exfiltration attempts or communication with known malicious IP addresses.
-
-### False positive analysis
-
-- Development and testing activities may trigger the rule when developers use debugging features for legitimate purposes. To manage this, create exceptions for known developer machines or user accounts frequently involved in web application development.
-- Automated testing frameworks that utilize browser debugging for testing web applications can also cause false positives. Identify and exclude processes initiated by these frameworks by specifying their unique process names or user accounts.
-- Browser extensions or tools that rely on debugging ports for functionality might be flagged. Review and whitelist these extensions or tools if they are verified as safe and necessary for business operations.
-- Remote support or troubleshooting sessions using debugging features can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Implement a policy to log and review such sessions, allowing exceptions for recognized support tools or personnel.
-- Continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines that involve browser automation may inadvertently match the rule criteria. Exclude these processes by identifying and filtering based on the CI/CD system's user accounts or process identifiers.
-
-### Response and remediation
-
-- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
-- Terminate any suspicious browser processes identified with debugging arguments to stop potential cookie theft in progress.
-- Conduct a thorough review of access logs for the affected web applications or services to identify any unauthorized access attempts using stolen cookies.
-- Invalidate all active sessions for the affected user accounts and force a re-authentication to ensure that any stolen session cookies are rendered useless.
-- Implement stricter browser security policies, such as disabling remote debugging features in production environments, to prevent similar exploitation in the future.
-- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems or data have been compromised.
-- Enhance monitoring and alerting for similar suspicious browser activities by refining detection rules and incorporating additional threat intelligence."""
 references = [
     "https://github.com/defaultnamehere/cookie_crimes",
     "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/cookie-crimes-on-mirosoft-edge/",
@@ -68,12 +35,6 @@ references = [
 ]
 risk_score = 47
 rule_id = "027ff9ea-85e7-42e3-99d2-bbb7069e02eb"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
-"""
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -105,6 +66,41 @@ process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
                    "--remote-debugging-pipe=*") and
    process.args : "--user-data-dir=*" and not process.args:"--remote-debugging-port=0"
 '''
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+> **Disclaimer**:
+> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
+
+### Investigating Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging
+
+Chromium-based browsers support debugging features that allow developers to inspect and modify web applications. Adversaries can exploit these features to access session cookies, enabling unauthorized access to web services. The detection rule identifies suspicious browser processes using debugging arguments, which may indicate cookie theft attempts, by monitoring specific process names and arguments across different operating systems.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review the process details to confirm the presence of suspicious debugging arguments such as "--remote-debugging-port=*", "--remote-debugging-targets=*", or "--remote-debugging-pipe=*". Check if these arguments were used in conjunction with "--user-data-dir=*" and ensure "--remote-debugging-port=0" is not present.
+- Identify the user account associated with the suspicious browser process to determine if it aligns with expected behavior or if it might be compromised.
+- Investigate the source IP address and network activity associated with the process to identify any unusual or unauthorized access patterns.
+- Check for any recent changes or anomalies in the user's account activity, such as unexpected logins or access to sensitive applications.
+- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs to identify if this activity is part of a broader attack pattern or campaign.
+- If possible, capture and analyze the network traffic associated with the process to detect any data exfiltration attempts or communication with known malicious IP addresses.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Development and testing activities may trigger the rule when developers use debugging features for legitimate purposes. To manage this, create exceptions for known developer machines or user accounts frequently involved in web application development.
+- Automated testing frameworks that utilize browser debugging for testing web applications can also cause false positives. Identify and exclude processes initiated by these frameworks by specifying their unique process names or user accounts.
+- Browser extensions or tools that rely on debugging ports for functionality might be flagged. Review and whitelist these extensions or tools if they are verified as safe and necessary for business operations.
+- Remote support or troubleshooting sessions using debugging features can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Implement a policy to log and review such sessions, allowing exceptions for recognized support tools or personnel.
+- Continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines that involve browser automation may inadvertently match the rule criteria. Exclude these processes by identifying and filtering based on the CI/CD system's user accounts or process identifiers.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
+- Terminate any suspicious browser processes identified with debugging arguments to stop potential cookie theft in progress.
+- Conduct a thorough review of access logs for the affected web applications or services to identify any unauthorized access attempts using stolen cookies.
+- Invalidate all active sessions for the affected user accounts and force a re-authentication to ensure that any stolen session cookies are rendered useless.
+- Implement stricter browser security policies, such as disabling remote debugging features in production environments, to prevent similar exploitation in the future.
+- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems or data have been compromised.
+- Enhance monitoring and alerting for similar suspicious browser activities by refining detection rules and incorporating additional threat intelligence."""
 
 
 [[rule.threat]]

rules/cross-platform/defense_evasion_timestomp_touch.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2020/11/03"
 integration = ["endpoint"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was n
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
 `event.ingested` to @timestamp.
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
 """
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [

rules/cross-platform/guided_onboarding_sample_rule.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2022/09/22"
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -63,12 +63,6 @@ This alert will show once every 24 hours for each host. It is safe to disable th
 references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-rules.html"]
 risk_score = 21
 rule_id = "a198fbbd-9413-45ec-a269-47ae4ccf59ce"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
-"""
 severity = "low"
 tags = ["Use Case: Guided Onboarding", "Resources: Investigation Guide"]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"

rules/cross-platform/privilege_escalation_setuid_setgid_bit_set_via_chmod.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2020/04/23"
 integration = ["endpoint"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -22,12 +22,6 @@ name = "SUID/SGID Bit Set"
 references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
 risk_score = 21
 rule_id = "8a1b0278-0f9a-487d-96bd-d4833298e87a"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
-"""
 severity = "low"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Endpoint",

rules/linux/credential_access_potential_linux_ssh_bruteforce_external.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2022/09/14"
 integration = ["system"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -75,10 +75,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
 - The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html).
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
 """
 severity = "low"
 tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Resources: Investigation Guide"]

rules/linux/credential_access_potential_linux_ssh_bruteforce_internal.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2023/02/21"
 integration = ["system"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/01/15"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -71,10 +71,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
 - The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html).
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
 """
 severity = "medium"
 tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Resources: Investigation Guide"]

rules/linux/defense_evasion_chattr_immutable_file.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2022/07/22"
 integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -93,10 +93,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 
 #### Custom Ingest Pipeline
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html).
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
 """
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [

rules/linux/defense_evasion_hidden_file_dir_tmp.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2020/04/29"
 integration = ["endpoint"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/02/04"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -64,10 +64,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 
 #### Custom Ingest Pipeline
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html).
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
 """
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [

rules/linux/defense_evasion_hidden_shared_object.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2022/07/20"
 integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/03/24"
+updated_date = "2025/03/20"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -92,10 +92,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 
 #### Custom Ingest Pipeline
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html).
-
-### Additional notes
-
-For information about troubleshooting maximum alerts warning please refer to this [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/alerts-ui-monitor.html#troubleshoot-max-alerts).
 """
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [