|
| 1 | +[metadata] |
| 2 | +creation_date = "2020/09/01" |
| 3 | +integration = ["azure"] |
| 4 | +maturity = "production" |
| 5 | +updated_date = "2025/03/24" |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +[rule] |
| 8 | +author = ["Elastic"] |
| 9 | +description = """ |
| 10 | +Identifies a modification to a conditional access policy (CAP) in Microsoft Entra ID. Adversaries may modify existing CAPs to loosen access controls and maintain persistence in the environment with a compromised identity or entity. |
| 11 | +""" |
| 12 | +from = "now-9m" |
| 13 | +index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-azure*"] |
| 14 | +language = "kuery" |
| 15 | +license = "Elastic License v2" |
| 16 | +name = "Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access Policy (CAP) Modified" |
| 17 | +note = """## Triage and analysis |
| 18 | +
|
| 19 | +## Investigation Guide: Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access Policy (CAP) Modified |
| 20 | +
|
| 21 | +Azure Conditional Access Policies (CAPs) are critical for enforcing secure access requirements such as multi-factor authentication (MFA), restricting specific users or groups, and managing sign-in conditions. Modifying these policies can be a technique for weakening an organization’s defenses and maintaining persistence after initial access. |
| 22 | +
|
| 23 | +This rule detects a successful update to a Conditional Access Policy in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). |
| 24 | +
|
| 25 | +### Possible Investigation Steps |
| 26 | +
|
| 27 | +- **Identify the user who modified the policy:** |
| 28 | + - Check the value of `azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName` to determine the identity that made the change. |
| 29 | + - Investigate their recent activity to determine if this change was expected or authorized. |
| 30 | +
|
| 31 | +- **Review the modified policy name:** |
| 32 | + - Look at `azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.*.display_name` to find the name of the affected policy. |
| 33 | + - Determine whether this policy is related to critical controls (e.g., requiring MFA for admins). |
| 34 | +
|
| 35 | +- **Analyze the policy change:** |
| 36 | + - Compare the `old_value` and `new_value` fields under `azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.*.modified_properties.*`. |
| 37 | + - Look for security-reducing changes, such as: |
| 38 | + - Removing users/groups from enforcement. |
| 39 | + - Disabling MFA or risk-based conditions. |
| 40 | + - Introducing exclusions that reduce the policy’s coverage. |
| 41 | +
|
| 42 | +- **Correlate with other activity:** |
| 43 | + - Pivot on `azure.auditlogs.properties.activity_datetime` to identify if any suspicious sign-ins occurred after the policy was modified. |
| 44 | + - Check for related authentication logs, particularly from the same IP address (`azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.ipAddress`). |
| 45 | +
|
| 46 | +- **Assess the user's legitimacy:** |
| 47 | + - Review the initiator’s Azure role, group memberships, and whether their account was recently elevated or compromised. |
| 48 | + - Investigate whether this user has a history of modifying policies or if this is anomalous. |
| 49 | +
|
| 50 | +### Validation & False Positive Considerations |
| 51 | +
|
| 52 | +- **Authorized administrative changes:** Some organizations routinely update CAPs as part of policy tuning or role-based access reviews. |
| 53 | +- **Security reviews or automation:** Scripts, CI/CD processes, or third-party compliance tools may programmatically update CAPs. |
| 54 | +- **Employee lifecycle events:** Policy changes during employee onboarding/offboarding may include updates to access policies. |
| 55 | +
|
| 56 | +If any of these cases apply and align with the activity's context, consider tuning the rule or adding exceptions for expected patterns. |
| 57 | +
|
| 58 | +### Response & Remediation |
| 59 | +
|
| 60 | +- Revert unauthorized or insecure changes to the Conditional Access Policy immediately. |
| 61 | +- Temporarily increase monitoring of CAP modifications and sign-in attempts. |
| 62 | +- Lock or reset the credentials of the user account that made the change if compromise is suspected. |
| 63 | +- Conduct a broader access review of conditional access policies and privileged user activity. |
| 64 | +- Implement stricter change management and alerting around CAP changes. |
| 65 | +""" |
| 66 | +references = [ |
| 67 | + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview", |
| 68 | + "https://www.rezonate.io/blog/microsoft-entra-id-the-complete-guide-to-conditional-access-policies/" |
| 69 | +] |
| 70 | +risk_score = 47 |
| 71 | +rule_id = "bc48bba7-4a23-4232-b551-eca3ca1e3f20" |
| 72 | +severity = "medium" |
| 73 | +tags = [ |
| 74 | + "Domain: Cloud", |
| 75 | + "Data Source: Azure", |
| 76 | + "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID", |
| 77 | + "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs", |
| 78 | + "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit", |
| 79 | + "Use Case: Configuration Audit", |
| 80 | + "Tactic: Persistence", |
| 81 | + "Resources: Investigation Guide" |
| 82 | +] |
| 83 | +timestamp_override = "event.ingested" |
| 84 | +type = "new_terms" |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | +query = ''' |
| 87 | +event.dataset: "azure.auditlogs" |
| 88 | + and event.action:"Update conditional access policy" |
| 89 | + and event.outcome: "success" |
| 90 | +''' |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | + |
| 93 | +[[rule.threat]] |
| 94 | +framework = "MITRE ATT&CK" |
| 95 | +[[rule.threat.technique]] |
| 96 | +id = "T1556" |
| 97 | +name = "Modify Authentication Process" |
| 98 | +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/" |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]] |
| 101 | +id = "T1556.009" |
| 102 | +name = "Conditional Access Policies" |
| 103 | +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009/" |
| 104 | + |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +[rule.threat.tactic] |
| 107 | +id = "TA0003" |
| 108 | +name = "Persistence" |
| 109 | +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/" |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | +[rule.new_terms] |
| 112 | +field = "new_terms_fields" |
| 113 | +value = ["azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName"] |
| 114 | +[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]] |
| 115 | +field = "history_window_start" |
| 116 | +value = "now-14d" |
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