|
| 1 | +[metadata] |
| 2 | +creation_date = "2024/07/12" |
| 3 | +integration = ["aws"] |
| 4 | +maturity = "production" |
| 5 | +updated_date = "2024/07/12" |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +[rule] |
| 8 | +author = ["Elastic"] |
| 9 | +description = """ |
| 10 | +Identifies when the `PutBucketReplication` operation is used to replicate S3 objects to a bucket in another AWS account. Adversaries may use bucket replication to exfiltrate sensitive data to an environment they control. |
| 11 | +""" |
| 12 | +false_positives = [ |
| 13 | + """ |
| 14 | + Bucket replication accross accounts is a legitimate practice in some AWS environments. Ensure that the sharing is authorized before taking action. |
| 15 | + """, |
| 16 | +] |
| 17 | +from = "now-6m" |
| 18 | +index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"] |
| 19 | +language = "eql" |
| 20 | +license = "Elastic License v2" |
| 21 | +name = "AWS S3 Bucket Replicated to Another Account" |
| 22 | +note = """ |
| 23 | +## Triage and Analysis |
| 24 | +
|
| 25 | +### Investigating AWS S3 Bucket Replicated to Another Account |
| 26 | +
|
| 27 | +This rule identifies when an S3 bucket is replicated to another AWS account. While sharing bucket replication is a common practice, adversaries may exploit this feature to exfiltrate data by replicating objects to external accounts under their control. |
| 28 | +
|
| 29 | +#### Possible Investigation Steps |
| 30 | +
|
| 31 | +- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions. |
| 32 | +- **Review the Sharing Event**: Identify the S3 bucket involved and review the event details. Look for `PutBucketReplication` actions where an `Account` key-value pair is included signifying replication to an external account. |
| 33 | + - **Request and Response Parameters**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` and `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` fields in the CloudTrail event to identify the role used and account ID where the bucket was replicated. |
| 34 | +- **Verify the Shared Bucket**: Check the S3 bucket that was replicated and its contents to determine the sensitivity of the data stored within it. |
| 35 | +- **Validate External Account**: Examine the AWS account to which the bucket was replicated. Determine whether this account is known and previously authorized to access such resources. |
| 36 | +- **Contextualize with Recent Changes**: Compare this sharing event against recent changes in S3 configurations. Look for any other recent permissions changes or unusual administrative actions. |
| 37 | +- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities. |
| 38 | +- **Interview Relevant Personnel**: If the share was initiated by a user, verify the intent and authorization for this action with the person or team responsible for managing DB backups and snapshots. |
| 39 | +
|
| 40 | +### False Positive Analysis |
| 41 | +
|
| 42 | +- **Legitimate Backup Actions**: Confirm if the S3 bucket replication aligns with scheduled backups or legitimate automation tasks. |
| 43 | +- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm. |
| 44 | +
|
| 45 | +### Response and Remediation |
| 46 | +
|
| 47 | +- **Immediate Review and Reversal**: If the change was unauthorized, update the S3 configurations to remove any unauthorized replication rules. |
| 48 | +- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive data or permissions. |
| 49 | +- **Policy Update**: Review and possibly update your organization’s policies on S3 bucket/object sharing to tighten control and prevent unauthorized access. |
| 50 | +- **Incident Response**: If malicious intent is confirmed, consider it a data breach incident and initiate the incident response protocol. This includes further investigation, containment, and recovery. |
| 51 | +
|
| 52 | +### Additional Information: |
| 53 | +
|
| 54 | +For further guidance on managing and securing S3 buckets in AWS environments, refer to the [AWS S3 documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/security.html/) and AWS best practices for security. |
| 55 | +""" |
| 56 | +references = [ |
| 57 | + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/replication-walkthrough-2.html/", |
| 58 | + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketReplication.html/", |
| 59 | +] |
| 60 | +risk_score = 47 |
| 61 | +rule_id = "d488f026-7907-4f56-ad51-742feb3db01c" |
| 62 | +severity = "medium" |
| 63 | +tags = [ |
| 64 | + "Domain: Cloud", |
| 65 | + "Data Source: AWS", |
| 66 | + "Data Source: Amazon Web Services", |
| 67 | + "Data Source: AWS S3", |
| 68 | + "Resources: Investigation Guide", |
| 69 | + "Use Case: Threat Detection", |
| 70 | + "Tactic: Exfiltration", |
| 71 | +] |
| 72 | +timestamp_override = "event.ingested" |
| 73 | +type = "eql" |
| 74 | + |
| 75 | +query = ''' |
| 76 | +any where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail" |
| 77 | + and event.action == "PutBucketReplication" |
| 78 | + and event.outcome == "success" |
| 79 | + and stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, "Account") |
| 80 | +''' |
| 81 | + |
| 82 | +[[rule.threat]] |
| 83 | +framework = "MITRE ATT&CK" |
| 84 | +[[rule.threat.technique]] |
| 85 | +id = "T1537" |
| 86 | +name = "Transfer Data to Cloud Account" |
| 87 | +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/" |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +[rule.threat.tactic] |
| 90 | +id = "TA0010" |
| 91 | +name = "Exfiltration" |
| 92 | +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/" |
| 93 | + |
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