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[New Rule] Adding Coverage for Microsoft Entra ID SharePoint Access for User Principal via Auth Broker (#4695)
* new rule 'Microsoft Entra ID SharePoint Access for User Principal via Auth Broker' * updated severity * added new terms note
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‎rules/integrations/azure/collection_entra_auth_broker_sharepoint_access_for_user_principal.toml‎

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[metadata]
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creation_date = "2025/05/01"
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integration = ["azure"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2025/05/01"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule detects non-interactive authentication activity against SharePoint Online (`Office 365 SharePoint Online`) by
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a user principal via the `Microsoft Authentication Broker` application. The session leverages a refresh token or Primary
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Refresh Token (PRT) without interactive sign-in, often used in OAuth phishing or token replay scenarios.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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Legitimate non-interactive access to SharePoint Online via the Microsoft Authentication Broker may occur in
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enterprise environments, especially with MDM solutions or automated scripts. However, this should be explicitly
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allowed and monitored.
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""",
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"""
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Some enterprise MDM or brokered flows may use refresh tokens legitimately (especially with hybrid/Azure AD joined
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devices). Automated scripts for legitimate tasks (e.g., reporting, backups) might use `python-requests`, though this
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should be explicitly allowed.
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""",
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"""
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If the user is a developer or automation engineer, validate if this behavior was for testing purposes.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-azure.signinlogs-*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Microsoft Entra ID SharePoint Access for User Principal via Auth Broker"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Microsoft Entra ID SharePoint Access for User Principal via Auth Broker
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This rule identifies non-interactive sign-ins to SharePoint Online via the Microsoft Authentication Broker application using a refresh token or Primary Refresh Token (PRT). This type of activity may indicate token replay attacks, OAuth abuse, or automated access from previously consented apps or stolen sessions.
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This is a [New Terms rule](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/new-terms-rules.html) that detects the first occurrence of a user principal name accessing SharePoint Online via the Microsoft Authentication Broker application in the last 14 days.
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### Possible Investigation Steps:
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name`: Identify the user involved. Investigate whether this user typically accesses SharePoint or if this is an anomaly.
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name`: Verify the application used (e.g., Authentication Broker). Determine if the app is expected for SharePoint access in your environment.
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name`: Review the resource being accessed. SharePoint activity should be aligned with job roles or historical usage.
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type`: Indicates the token type used. Look for `refreshToken` or `primaryRefreshToken`, which may point to token replay or silent access.
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.is_interactive`: If false, indicates the sign-in was non-interactive. Correlate with recent sign-ins to understand if a prior session may have been reused.
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- `user_agent.original`: Analyze the user agent string for automation indicators (e.g., scripts, unusual clients). Compare with what’s typical for the user or device.
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- `source.ip`: Check the originating IP address. Investigate if the IP is associated with data centers, VPNs, anonymizers, or is geographically unusual for the user.
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- `source.geo.*`: Evaluate sign-in location details. Determine if the sign-in location aligns with expected travel or usage behavior.
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.applied_conditional_access_policies`: Review whether Conditional Access policies were triggered or bypassed. Investigate if required controls (like MFA) were applied.
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- `azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_processing_details`: Review any details about the authentication, such as token type or scopes. This may indicate delegated access or automation patterns.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- Certain MDM or mobile app scenarios may use refresh tokens legitimately via brokered apps.
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- Automated processes using authorized, scripted clients could trigger this activity, especially in developer or operations environments.
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- If Conditional Access policies are configured in “report-only” mode or exempted for trusted apps, activity may appear unusual but be authorized.
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### Response and Remediation
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- If activity appears unauthorized:
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- Investigate and revoke active sessions or refresh tokens.
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- Notify the user and validate expected activity.
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- Review and audit app consent permissions and remove unused or high-risk delegated access.
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- Harden Conditional Access policies to limit non-interactive access to sensitive resources.
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- Monitor for repeated use of the same user agent, IP, or token type across other users to identify broader campaigns.
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- Consider alerting on unusual patterns in sign-in frequency, geography, and application usage for SharePoint and other key services.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2025/04/22/phishing-for-codes-russian-threat-actors-target-microsoft-365-oauth-workflows/",
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"https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools",
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"https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "a3cc60d8-2701-11f0-accf-f661ea17fbcd"
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setup = """#### Required Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs
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To use this rule, ensure that Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs are being collected and streamed into the Elastic Stack via the Azure integration.
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"""
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severity = "high"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Cloud",
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"Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
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"Tactic: Collection",
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"Data Source: Azure",
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"Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID",
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"Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in Logs",
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"Resources: Investigation Guide",
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]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "new_terms"
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query = '''
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event.dataset: "azure.signinlogs"
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and azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id: "29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e"
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and azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id: "00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000"
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and azure.signinlogs.identity: *
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and azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name: *
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and azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type: ("refreshToken" or "primaryRefreshToken")
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and azure.signinlogs.properties.is_interactive: false
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1213"
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name = "Data from Information Repositories"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1213.002"
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name = "Sharepoint"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0009"
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name = "Collection"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"
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[rule.new_terms]
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field = "new_terms_fields"
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value = ["azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name"]
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[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
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field = "history_window_start"
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value = "now-14d"
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