Merge branch 'main' into esql-field-validation

eric-forte-elastic · web-flow · commit db963ff86572 · 2025-09-24T17:55:26.000-04:00
diff --git a/rules/cross-platform/credential_access_trufflehog_execution.toml b/rules/cross-platform/credential_access_trufflehog_execution.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/09/18"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects the execution of TruffleHog, a tool used to search for high-entropy strings and secrets
+in code repositories, which may indicate an attempt to access credentials. This tool was abused by the Shai-Hulud
+worm to search for credentials in code repositories.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Trufflehog is a legitimate open-source tool used by security professionals and developers to search for sensitive
+    information, such as passwords, API keys, and other secrets, within code repositories. It is commonly employed
+    during security assessments and code reviews to identify potential vulnerabilities.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Credential Access via TruffleHog Execution"
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise"]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "47595dea-452b-4d37-b82d-6dd691325139"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "OS: macOS",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend"
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where event.type == "start" and process.name : ("trufflehog.exe", "trufflehog") and
+process.args == "--results=verified" and process.args == "--json" and process.args == "filesystem"
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1003"
+name = "OS Credential Dumping"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1555"
+name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
diff --git a/rules/integrations/azure/privilege_escalation_entra_id_elevate_to_user_administrator_access.toml b/rules/integrations/azure/privilege_escalation_entra_id_elevate_to_user_administrator_access.toml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2025/05/22"
 integration = ["azure"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/05/22"
+updated_date = "2025/09/15"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ note = """## Triage and Analysis
 
 ### Investigating Microsoft Entra ID Elevated Access to User Access Administrator
 
-This rule identifies when a user elevates their permissions to the "User Access Administrator" role in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD). This role allows full control over access management for Azure resources and can be abused by attackers for lateral movement, persistence, or privilege escalation. Since this is a **New Terms** rule, the alert will only trigger if the user has not performed this elevation in the past 14 days, helping reduce alert fatigue.
+This rule identifies when a user elevates their permissions to the "User Access Administrator" role in Azure RBAC. This role allows full control over access management for Azure resources and can be abused by attackers for lateral movement, persistence, or privilege escalation. Since this is a New Terms rule, the alert will only trigger if the user has not performed this elevation in the past 14 days, helping reduce alert fatigue.
 
 ### Possible investigation steps
 
@@ -61,12 +61,14 @@ This rule identifies when a user elevates their permissions to the "User Access
 references = [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin?tabs=azure-portal%2Centra-audit-logs/",
     "https://permiso.io/blog/azures-apex-permissions-elevate-access-the-logs-security-teams-overlook",
+    "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/08/27/storm-0501s-evolving-techniques-lead-to-cloud-based-ransomware/"
 ]
-risk_score = 47
+risk_score = 73
 rule_id = "8d9c4128-372a-11f0-9d8f-f661ea17fbcd"
-severity = "medium"
+severity = "high"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Domain: Identity",
     "Data Source: Azure",
     "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID",
     "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs",
@@ -79,8 +81,10 @@ type = "new_terms"
 
 query = '''
 event.dataset: azure.auditlogs
-    and azure.auditlogs.operation_name: "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources"
-    and event.outcome: "success"
+    and (
+      azure.auditlogs.operation_name: "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources" or
+      azure.auditlogs.properties.additional_details.value: "Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action"
+    ) and event.outcome: "success"
 '''
 
 
@@ -107,6 +111,6 @@ field = "new_terms_fields"
 value = ["azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName"]
 [[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
 field = "history_window_start"
-value = "now-14d"
+value = "now-7d"
 
 
diff --git a/rules/linux/command_and_control_curl_wget_spawn_via_nodejs_parent.toml b/rules/linux/command_and_control_curl_wget_spawn_via_nodejs_parent.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/09/18"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects when Node.js, directly or via a shell, spawns the curl or wget command. This may indicate
+command and control behavior. Adversaries may use Node.js to download additional tools or payloads onto
+the system.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Curl or Wget Spawned via Node.js"
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "d9af2479-ad13-4471-a312-f586517f1243"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Command and Control",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name == "node" and (
+  (
+    process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and
+    process.args == "-c" and process.command_line like~ ("*curl*", "*wget*")
+  ) or 
+  (
+    process.name in ("curl", "wget")
+  )
+)
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+  [rule.threat.tactic]
+  name = "Command and Control"
+  id = "TA0011"
+  reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
+
+  [[rule.threat.technique]]
+  name = "Application Layer Protocol"
+  id = "T1071"
+  reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
+
+    [[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+    name = "Web Protocols"
+    id = "T1071.001"
+    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/"
diff --git a/rules/linux/credential_access_gh_auth_via_nodejs.toml b/rules/linux/credential_access_gh_auth_via_nodejs.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/09/18"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+This rule detects when the Node.js runtime spawns a shell to execute the GitHub CLI (gh) command to retrieve
+a GitHub authentication token. The GitHub CLI is a command-line tool that allows users to interact with
+GitHub from the terminal. The "gh auth token" command is used to retrieve an authentication token for
+GitHub, which can be used to authenticate API requests and perform actions on behalf of the user. Adversaries
+may use this technique to access GitHub repositories and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information or
+perform malicious actions. This activity was observed in the wild as part of the Shai-Hulud worm.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "GitHub Authentication Token Access via Node.js"
+references = ["https://www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "e5d69377-f8cf-4e8f-8328-690822cd012a"
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+#### Prerequisite Requirements:
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
+
+#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
+"""
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Linux",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Tactic: Discovery",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+query = '''
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name == "node" and
+process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and process.args == "gh auth token"
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1552"
+name = "Unsecured Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1528"
+name = "Steal Application Access Token"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1613"
+name = "Container and Resource Discovery"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0007"
+name = "Discovery"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
diff --git a/rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml b/rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2025/08/20"
 integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/09/05"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ network where host.os.type == "windows" and dns.question.name != null and
                   "java.exe", "javaw.exe", "*.pif", "*.com", "*.scr") or
   (?process.code_signature.trusted == false or ?process.code_signature.exists == false) or
   ?process.code_signature.subject_name : ("AutoIt Consulting Ltd", "OpenJS Foundation", "Python Software Foundation") or
-  process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*.exe", "?:\\ProgramData\\*.exe")
+  ?process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*.exe", "?:\\ProgramData\\*.exe")
  ) and
 dns.question.name regex """.*\.(top|buzz|xyz|rest|ml|cf|gq|ga|onion|monster|cyou|quest|cc|bar|cfd|click|cam|surf|tk|shop|club|icu|pw|ws|online|fun|life|boats|store|hair|skin|motorcycles|christmas|lol|makeup|mom|bond|beauty|biz|live|work|zip|country|accountant|date|party|science|loan|win|men|faith|review|racing|download|host)"""
 '''
diff --git a/rules/windows/defense_evasion_regmod_remotemonologue.toml b/rules/windows/defense_evasion_regmod_remotemonologue.toml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2025/04/14"
 integration = ["endpoint", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "windows"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2025/08/08"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action != "deletion" and
       "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\ClickToRun\\VREGISTRY_*",
       "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\ClickToRun\\VREGISTRY_*"
     ) or
-    (process.executable : "C:\\windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18")
+    (process.executable : "C:\\windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and ?user.id : "S-1-5-18")
   )
 '''
 
diff --git a/rules/windows/execution_suspicious_powershell_imgload.toml b/rules/windows/execution_suspicious_powershell_imgload.toml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2020/11/17"
 integration = ["endpoint"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/09/23"
+updated_date = "2025/09/18"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -74,23 +74,42 @@ timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "new_terms"
 
 query = '''
-host.os.type:windows and event.category:library and 
-  dll.name:("System.Management.Automation.dll" or "System.Management.Automation.ni.dll") and 
+host.os.type:windows and event.category:library and
+  dll.name:("System.Management.Automation.dll" or "System.Management.Automation.ni.dll") and
   not (
-    process.code_signature.subject_name:("Microsoft Corporation" or "Microsoft Dynamic Code Publisher" or "Microsoft Windows") and process.code_signature.trusted:true and not process.name.caseless:("regsvr32.exe" or "rundll32.exe")
-  ) and 
+    process.code_signature.subject_name:(
+      "Microsoft Corporation" or
+      "Microsoft Dynamic Code Publisher" or
+      "Microsoft Windows"
+    ) and process.code_signature.trusted:true and not process.name.caseless:"regsvr32.exe"
+  ) and
   not (
-    process.executable.caseless:(C\:\\Program*Files*\(x86\)\\*.exe or C\:\\Program*Files\\*.exe) and
+    process.executable:(C\:\\Program*Files*\(x86\)\\*.exe or C\:\\Program*Files\\*.exe) and
     process.code_signature.trusted:true
-  ) and 
+  ) and
   not (
-    process.executable.caseless: C\:\\Windows\\Lenovo\\*.exe and process.code_signature.subject_name:"Lenovo" and 
+    process.executable: C\:\\Windows\\Lenovo\\*.exe and process.code_signature.subject_name:"Lenovo" and
     process.code_signature.trusted:true
-  ) and 
+  ) and
   not (
-    process.executable.caseless: "C:\\ProgramData\\chocolatey\\choco.exe" and
-    process.code_signature.subject_name:"Chocolatey Software, Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted:true
-  ) and not process.executable.caseless : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
+    process.executable: C\:\\Windows\\AdminArsenal\\PDQInventory-Scanner\\service-*\\exec\\PDQInventoryScanner.exe and
+    process.code_signature.subject_name:"PDQ.com Corporation" and
+    process.code_signature.trusted:true
+  ) and
+  not (
+    process.executable: C\:\\Windows\\Temp\\\{*\}\\_is*.exe and
+    process.code_signature.subject_name:("Dell Technologies Inc." or "Dell Inc" or "Dell Inc.") and
+    process.code_signature.trusted:true
+  ) and
+  not (
+    process.executable: C\:\\ProgramData\\chocolatey\\* and
+    process.code_signature.subject_name:("Chocolatey Software, Inc." or "Chocolatey Software, Inc") and
+    process.code_signature.trusted:true
+  ) and
+  not process.executable : (
+    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe" or
+    "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
+  )
 '''
 
 
diff --git a/rules/windows/execution_windows_powershell_susp_args.toml b/rules/windows/execution_windows_powershell_susp_args.toml
