Update content/developers/docs/mev/index.md (Add resource links)

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Author: abraj

public/content/developers/docs/mev/index.md

@@ -136,13 +136,13 @@ In response to sandwiching and frontrunning attacks, traders may start conductin
 
 Permissioned mempools would also accelerate the centralization risks described in the previous section. Large pools running multiple validators will likely benefit from offering transaction privacy to traders and users, increasing their MEV revenues.
 
-Combating these MEV-related problems in post-Merge Ethereum is a core area of research. To date, two solutions proposed to reduce the negative impact of MEV on Ethereum’s decentralization and security after The Merge are **Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)** and the **Builder API**.
+Combating these MEV-related problems in post-Merge Ethereum is a core area of research. To date, two solutions proposed to reduce the negative impact of MEV on Ethereum’s decentralization and security after The Merge are [**Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)**](https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/pbs/) and the [**Builder API**](https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs).
 
 ### Proposer-Builder Separation {#proposer-builder-separation}
 
 In both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, a node that builds a block proposes it for addition to the chain to other nodes participating in consensus. A new block becomes part of the canonical chain after another miner builds on top of it (in PoW) or it receives attestations from the majority of validators (in PoS).
 
-The combination of block producer and block proposer roles is what introduces most of the MEV-related problems described previously. For example, consensus nodes are incentivized to trigger chain reorganizations in time-bandit attacks to maximize MEV earnings.
+The combination of block producer and block proposer roles is what introduces most of the MEV-related problems described previously. For example, consensus nodes are incentivized to trigger chain reorganizations in [time-bandit attacks](https://www.mev.wiki/attack-examples/time-bandit-attack) to maximize MEV earnings.
 
 [Proposer-builder separation](https://ethresear.ch/t/proposer-block-builder-separation-friendly-fee-market-designs/9725) (PBS) is designed to mitigate the impact of MEV, especially at the consensus layer. PBS’ major feature is the separation of block producer and block proposer rules. Validators are still responsible for proposing and voting on blocks, but a new class of specialized entities, called **block builders**, are tasked with ordering transactions and building blocks.