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Merge pull request #13580 from R-Y-M-R/fix-docs-phrasing
Fix: improve docs typos & phrasing
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docs/examples/blind-auction.rst

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@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ During the **bidding period**, a bidder does not actually send their bid, but
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only a hashed version of it. Since it is currently considered practically
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impossible to find two (sufficiently long) values whose hash values are equal,
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the bidder commits to the bid by that. After the end of the bidding period,
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the bidders have to reveal their bids: They send their values unencrypted and
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the bidders have to reveal their bids: They send their values unencrypted, and
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the contract checks that the hash value is the same as the one provided during
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the bidding period.
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The following contract solves this problem by accepting any value that is
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larger than the highest bid. Since this can of course only be checked during
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the reveal phase, some bids might be **invalid**, and this is on purpose (it
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even provides an explicit flag to place invalid bids with high value
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even provides an explicit flag to place invalid bids with high-value
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transfers): Bidders can confuse competition by placing several high or low
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invalid bids.
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docs/examples/micropayment.rst

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Micropayment Channel
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********************
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In this section we will learn how to build an example implementation
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In this section, we will learn how to build an example implementation
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of a payment channel. It uses cryptographic signatures to make
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repeated transfers of Ether between the same parties secure, instantaneous, and
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without transaction fees. For the example, we need to understand how to
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Alice only needs to send cryptographically signed messages off-chain
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(e.g. via email) to Bob and it is similar to writing checks.
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Alice and Bob use signatures to authorise transactions, which is possible with smart contracts on Ethereum.
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Alice and Bob use signatures to authorize transactions, which is possible with smart contracts on Ethereum.
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Alice will build a simple smart contract that lets her transmit Ether, but instead of calling a function herself
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to initiate a payment, she will let Bob do that, and therefore pay the transaction fee.
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The contract will work as follows:
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1. Alice deploys the ``ReceiverPays`` contract, attaching enough Ether to cover the payments that will be made.
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2. Alice authorises a payment by signing a message with her private key.
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2. Alice authorizes a payment by signing a message with her private key.
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3. Alice sends the cryptographically signed message to Bob. The message does not need to be kept secret
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(explained later), and the mechanism for sending it does not matter.
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4. Bob claims his payment by presenting the signed message to the smart contract, it verifies the
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Each message includes the following information:
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* The smart contract's address, used to prevent cross-contract replay attacks.
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* The total amount of Ether that is owed the recipient so far.
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* The total amount of Ether that is owed to the recipient so far.
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A payment channel is closed just once, at the end of a series of transfers.
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Because of this, only one of the messages sent is redeemed. This is why

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