✨ ADR: action pinning (#366)

* ✨ ADR: action pinning

* 📝 strengthen dependabot recommendation

Author: ctcpip

docs/adr/action-pinning.md

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+# ADR 1396308b-0814-47bd-b8fc-6b3965d31295: GitHub Actions - to pin or not to pin
+
+## Status
+
+Proposed <!-- [Proposed | Accepted | Deprecated] -->
+
+## Submitters
+
+- @ctcpip
+
+## Decision Owners
+
+- @expressjs/express-tc
+
+## Context
+
+GitHub Actions support referencing actions via:
+
+- Semantic versions (e.g., `actions/setup-node@v4`)
+- Specific commit hashes (e.g., `actions/setup-node@49933ea`)
+- Branch references (e.g., `actions/setup-node@main`)
+
+Tools like [OpenSSF Scorecard](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard) recommend pinning to commit hashes to guarantee supply chain integrity and reduce the risk of malicious updates. However, GitHub's own documentation states:
+
+> "All options are a tradeoff between guaranteed supply chain integrity and auto-patching of vulnerabilities in dependencies."
+
+Therefore, there is no perfect solution; only pros and cons depending on which choice is made.
+
+A recent discussion raised valid concerns about the real-world security value of pinning, particularly:
+
+- **Pinning disables automatic updates**, including security patches, unless maintained manually.
+- **Commit hashes are opaque**, harder to audit, and easy to misuse (e.g., referencing a malicious fork).
+- **Most CI workflows in our repos don't access secrets**, minimizing risk even in the event of compromise.
+
+Additionally, human verification of pinned commits, especially across many repos, can be error-prone or inconsistent.
+
+## Decision
+
+We will **not require pinning GitHub Actions to commit hashes** across all repositories.
+
+Instead:
+
+- Use **semantic version tags** (e.g., `@v4`) by default.
+- Do **not use `@main` or other floating branch refs**.
+- Repositories should **enable Dependabot for GitHub Actions** and set `schedule/interval` to a reasonable value, such as `monthly`.
+- For workflows that **access secrets, publish artifacts, or have privileged scopes**, repository maintainers **may** choose to pin to commit hashes **if justified**.
+- Where pinning is used:
+  - A reviewer **must manually verify** the commit hash belongs to the correct source repository.
+  - The verification step **must be noted in the PR review** to ensure accountability.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- **Improved maintainability**: Semantic versions reduce the burden of keeping commit hashes up to date.
+- **Timely security updates**: Using version tags with Dependabot allows faster adoption of upstream patches.
+- **Acknowledged risk**: While this approach reduces supply chain guarantees, the practical risk profile of most of our workflows does not justify the burden of pinning.
+- **Flexibility for maintainers**: Projects/workflows with higher sensitivity can still opt into pinning where warranted.
+
+## References
+
+[Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure](https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-building-blocks/)
+[Mitigating Attack Vectors in GitHub Workflows](https://openssf.org/blog/2024/08/12/mitigating-attack-vectors-in-github-workflows/)